- Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.details
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Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.details
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Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Synthese 134 (3):477-504.details
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Immune Belief Systems.Peter Klein - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.details
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Immune Belief Systems.Peter Klein - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.details
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Moore's Paradox, Assertion and Knowledge.O. R. Jones - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):183 - 186.details
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Explaining our own beliefs: Non-epistemic believing and doxastic instability.Ward E. Jones - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (3):217 - 249.details
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Moore’s Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief.John N. Williams - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):221-248.details
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Knowledge and the norms of assertion.John Koethe - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):625-638.details
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Wittgenstein on self-knowledge and self-expression.Rockney Jacobsen - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):12-30.details
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Self-quotation and self-knowledge.Rockney Jacobsen - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):419-445.details
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Self-knowledge and consciousness.Keith Hossack - 2002 - Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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Where’s the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic.Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):137-167.details
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XII*—Insincerity and Commands.Jane Heal - 1977 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):183-202.details
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Moore's paradox: A Wittgensteinian approach.Jane Heal - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):5-24.details
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Insincerity and Commands.Jane Heal - 1977 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77:183 - 201.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Crimmins, Gonzales and Moore.Hajek Alan & Stoljar Daniel - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):208-213.details
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Crimmins, Gonzales and Moore.Daniel Stoljar & Alan Hájek - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):208-213.details
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Inescapable Surprises and Acquirable Intentions.Laurence Goldstein - 1993 - Analysis 53 (2):93 - 99.details
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Believing P but Not P.James Garvey - 1997 - Cogito 11 (1):14-16.details
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Self‐Knowledge, Rationality and Moore's Paradox.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):533-556.details
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Privileged Access Naturalized.Jordi FernÁndez - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372.details
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Privileged access revisited.Jordi FernÁndez - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):102-105.details
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Privileged Access Revisited.Jordi Fernández - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):102 - 105.details
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Privileged access naturalized.Jordi Fernandez - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.details
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Probability and Assertion.V. H. Dudman - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):204 - 211.details
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Conscious experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, Moore, and Bayes.Igor Douven - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):361-375.details
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Moore’s Paradox, Asserting and Skepticism.Katheryn Doran - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):41-48.details
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Bonney on Saying and Disbelieving.Max Deutscher - 1967 - Analysis 27 (6):184 - 186.details
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Bonney on saying and disbelieving.Max Deutscher - 1967 - Analysis 27 (6):184-186.details
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A Note on Saying and Disbelieving.Max Deutscher - 1965 - Analysis 25 (3):53 - 57.details
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G.E. Moore: Selected Writings.Thomas Baldwin (ed.) - 1993 - Routledge.details
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Letters to Russell, Keynes, and Moore.Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Maynard Keynes, G. E. Moore & Bertrand Russell - 1974 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Edited by Bertrand Russell, John Maynard Keynes, G. E. Moore & G. H. von Wright.details
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Self-expression.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.details
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Assertion: New Philosophical Essays.Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.details
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