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Logical Non‐Cognitivism

Philosophical Issues 28 (1):425-450 (2018)

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  1. Williamsonian Scepticism about the A Priori.Giacomo Melis & Crispin Wright - forthcoming - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori. Oxford University Press.
    We focus on Timothy Williamson’s recent attack on the epistemological significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction, and offer an explanation of why, fundamentally, it does not succeed. We begin by setting out Williamson’s core argument, and some of the background to it and move to consider two lines of conciliatory response to it—conciliatory in that neither questions the central analogy on which Williamson's argument depends. We claim, setting aside a methodological challenge to which Williamson owes an answer, that no (...)
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  • How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):1-40.
    Epistemic relativism has the contemporary academy in its grip. Not merely in the United States, but seemingly everywhere, most scholars working in the humanities and the social sciences seem to subscribe to some form of it. Even where the label is repudiated, the view is embraced. Sometimes the relativism in question concerns truth, sometimes justification. The core impulse appears to be a relativism about knowledge. The suspicion is widespread that what counts as knowledge in one cultural, or broadly ideological, setting (...)
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  • Blind reasoning.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.
    The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of 'blind but blameless' reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
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  • The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
    Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditional rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, that intuition is a kind of direct, immediate apprehension akin to perception. This paper suggests that although the perceptual analogy has often been dismissed as encouraging a theoretically useless metaphor, a quasi-perceptualist view of intuition may enable rationalists to begin to meet the challenge of supplying a (...)
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  • (5 other versions)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20-43.
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  • Inventing Logical Necessity.Crispin Wright - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
    In some previous work, I tried to give a concept-based account of the nature of our entitlement to certain very basic inferences (see the papers in Part III of Boghossian 2008b). In this previous work, I took it for granted, along with many other philosophers, that we understood well enough what it is for a person to infer. In this paper, I turn to thinking about the nature of inference itself. This topic is of great interest in its own right (...)
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  • Minimal Intuition.Ernest Sosa - 1998 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 257-269.
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  • Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  • (5 other versions)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
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  • Knowledge of Validity.Sinan Dogramaci - 2010 - Noûs 44 (3):403-432.
    What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of (...)
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  • On Basic Logical Knowledge: Reflections on Paul Boghossian’s “How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?‘.Crispin Wright - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):41 - 85.
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  • Rational intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic status.Ernest Sosa - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.
    A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.
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  • Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
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  • (1 other version)What the tortoise said to Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):278-280.
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  • The incoherence of empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
    Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual (...)
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  • (1 other version)Logical Necessity and Other Essays.Edward Craig, I. G. McFetridge, John Haldane & Roger Scruton - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (164):352.
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  • Knowledge of Logic.Paul Boghossian - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Paul Boghossian defends a meaning‐based approach to the apriority of the propositions of logic. His model is based on the idea that the logical constants are implicitly defined by some of the axioms and inference rules in which they are involved, thereby offering an alternative to those theories that deny that grasp of meaning can contribute to the explanation of a thinker's entitlement to a particular type of transition or belief.
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  • Implicit definition and the a priori.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 286--319.
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  • New Essays on the A Priori.Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
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  • Intuition, entitlement and the epistemology of logical laws.Crispin Wright - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):155–175.
    The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of principles of basic logic. When certain important distinctions (...)
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  • Comment on Paul Boghossian, "What is inference".Crispin Wright - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):27-37.
    This is a response to Paul Boghossian’s paper: What is inference?. The paper and the abstract originate from a symposium at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA in San Diego in April 2011. John Broome was a co-commentator.
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  • Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Language.John Heil - 1992 - Philosophical Books 31 (4):229-231.
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  • On some arguments for the necessity of necessity.Bob Hale - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):23-52.
    Must we believe in logical necessity? I examine an argument for an affirmative answer given by Ian McFetridge in his posthumously published paper 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues', and explain why it fails, as it stands, to establish his conclusion. I contend, however, that McFetridge's argument can be effectively buttressed by drawing upon another argument aimed at establishing that we ought to believe that some propositions are logically necessary, given by Crispin Wright in his paper 'Inventing Logical necessity'. My contention is (...)
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  • Comments on Boghossian.John Broome - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):19-25.
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  • (2 other versions)Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Language.Jane Heal - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):642-647.
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  • (1 other version)In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):302-311.
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  • Fact and meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on philosophy of language.Jane Heal - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
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