- Doxastic Justification and Testimonial Beliefs.Emmanuel Smith - 2023 - Episteme (N/A):1-14.details
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Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe.Wade Munroe - forthcoming - Episteme:1-27.details
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What the tortoise should do: A knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation.Lisa Miracchi Titus & J. Adam Carter - 2024 - Noûs.details
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Carroll’s Regress Times Three.Gilbert Plumer - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):551-571.details
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The Euthyphro Challenge in Metasemantics.Bar Luzon - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):217-237.details
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(1 other version)The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief.Patrick Bondy - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1761-1781.details
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Sobre a natureza da inferência em Boghossian.Doraci Engel - 2019 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 64 (3):e34644.details
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Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.details
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Inferential Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
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Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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The guise of good reason.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):204-224.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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The Hereby-Commit Account of Inference.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):86-101.details
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Reasoning, Rules and Representation.Paul Robinson & Richard Samuels - 2018 - In Sorin Bangu (ed.), Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge: Approaches From Psychology and Cognitive Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 30-51.details
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Lewis Carroll’s regress and the presuppositional structure of arguments.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (1):1-38.details
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How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College Londondetails
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Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407.details
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Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1757-1768.details
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Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement.Kirk Ludwig & Wade Munroe - 2019 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Hoo Wai Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge. pp. 15-39.details
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Literal Perceptual Inference.Alex Kiefer - 2017 - In Metzinger Thomas & Wiese Wanja (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. MIND Group.details
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Content and Meaning Constitutive Inferences.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):29–47.details
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Inferential Integrity and Attention.Carlos Montemayor - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional.Mª Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2018 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 12 (2):70-82.details
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On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.details
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The Mind's "I". [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):255-265.details
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Limiting logical pluralism.Suki Finn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4905-4923.details
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Delimiting the Boundaries of Inference.Paul Boghossian - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):55-69.details
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Varieties of Inference?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.details
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We cannot infer by accepting testimony.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2589-2598.details
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Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.details
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Inference and the taking condition.Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):294-302.details
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Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief.Uwe Peters - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1086-1102.details
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Inferring as a way of knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.details
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What reasoning might be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference.Ulf Hlobil - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.details
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Judgment's Aimless Heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Functionalism About Inference.Jared Warren - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning.Wade Munroe - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):841-866.details
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Argument, Inference, and Persuasion.Matthew William McKeon - 2020 - Argumentation 35 (2):339-356.details
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Have Mercier and Sperber untied the knot of human reasoning?Ladislav Koreň - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):849-862.details
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On fundamental responsibility.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
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Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated.Andreas Müller - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (1):2-15.details
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Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.details
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Reasoning without regress.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2263-2278.details
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Inference Without Reckoning.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.details
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Is logical knowledge dispositional?Julien Murzi & Florian Steinberger - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):165-183.details
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