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  1. (1 other version)Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications - Reading in Mind and Language.Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.) - 1995 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Many philosophers and psychologists argue that out everyday ability to predict and explain the actions and mental states of others is grounded in out possession of a primitive 'folk' psychological theory. Recently however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human beings are able to predict and explain each other's actions by using the resources of their own minds to simulate the psychological aetiology of the actions of the others. This book and (...)
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  • A Priority and Existence.Stephen Yablo - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 197--228.
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  • Aptness and Truth in Verbal Metaphor.David Hills - 1997 - Philosophical Topics 25 (1):117-153.
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  • Statements partly about observation.David Lewis - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (1):1-31.
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  • Metaphor and Thought.Andrew Ortony (ed.) - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    The book will serve as an excellent graduate-level textbook in cognitive psychology, linguistics, and artificial intelligence.
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  • Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
    Science Without Numbers caused a stir in 1980, with its bold nominalist approach to the philosophy of mathematics and science. It has been unavailable for twenty years and is now reissued in a revised edition with a substantial new preface presenting the author's current views and responses to the issues raised in subsequent debate.
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  • From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Several of these essays have been printed whole in journals; others are in varying degrees new. Two main themes run through them. One is the problem of meaning, particularly as involved in the notion of an analytic statement. The other is the notion of ontological, commitment, particularly as involved in the problem of universals.
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  • (1 other version)How in the world?Stephen Yablo - 1996 - In Christopher Hill (ed.), Metaphysics. University of Arkansas Press. pp. 255--86.
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  • Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument (...)
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  • Naturalism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Naturalism in Mathematics investigates how the most fundamental assumptions of mathematics can be justified. One prevalent philosophical approach to the problem--realism--is examined and rejected in favor of another approach--naturalism. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be successfully applied in set theory. Her clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.
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  • (2 other versions)Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20-40.
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  • Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
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  • Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Stephen Yablo - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):229 - 283.
    [Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces of (...)
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  • Modal fictionalism.Gideon Rosen - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):327-354.
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  • Ontological commitments.William P. Alston - 1958 - Philosophical Studies 9 (1-2):8 - 17.
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  • Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):1-16.
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  • On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.
    This paper explores the sense in which belief "aims at the truth". In this course of this exploration, it discusses the difference between belief and make-believe, the nature of psychoanalytic explanation, the supposed "normativity of meaning", and related topics.
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  • Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
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  • (1 other version)Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. WALTON - 1990 - Philosophy 66 (258):527-529.
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  • Mimesis as Make-Believe.Kendall Walton - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):413-434.
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  • Science without Numbers.Michael D. Resnik - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):514-519.
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  • The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
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  • A Subject with no Object.Zoltan Gendler Szabo, John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):106.
    This is the first systematic survey of modern nominalistic reconstructions of mathematics, and for this reason alone it should be read by everyone interested in the philosophy of mathematics and, more generally, in questions concerning abstract entities. In the bulk of the book, the authors sketch a common formal framework for nominalistic reconstructions, outline three major strategies such reconstructions can follow, and locate proposals in the literature with respect to these strategies. The discussion is presented with admirable precision and clarity, (...)
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  • (2 other versions)What Metaphors Mean.Donald Davidson - 1978 - Critical Inquiry 5 (1):31-47.
    The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for conveying ideas, even if unusual ones, seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a special meaning. I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Paraphrase, whether possible or not, inappropriate to what is said: we try, in paraphrase, to say it (...)
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  • (1 other version)The myth of the seven.Stephen Yablo - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 88--115.
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  • The method of truth in metaphysics.Donald Davidson - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):244-254.
    Repr. as Essay 14 in Davidson, Donald, _Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation_, 2nd ed. Oxford, UK (Clarendon, 2001). 215-226.
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  • (1 other version)Symposium: On What there is.P. T. Geach, A. J. Ayer & W. V. Quine - 1948 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 25 (1):125-160.
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  • (1 other version)Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make‐Believe.Kendall L. Walton - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):39-57.
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  • V*—Idiom and Metaphor.Martin Davies - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):67-86.
    Martin Davies; V*—Idiom and Metaphor, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 67–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.
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  • (2 other versions)What metaphors mean.Donald Davidson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 31.
    The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for conveying ideas, even if unusual ones, seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a special meaning. I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Paraphrase, whether possible or not, inappropriate to what is said: we try, in paraphrase, to say it (...)
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  • (1 other version)Metaphor and prop oriented make-believe.Kendall L. Walton - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press UK.
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  • Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):516-518.
    This book does three main things. First, it defends mathematical platonism against the main objections to that view (most notably, the epistemological objection and the multiple-reductions objection). Second, it defends anti-platonism (in particular, fictionalism) against the main objections to that view (most notably, the Quine-Putnam indispensability objection and the objection from objectivity). Third, it argues that there is no fact of the matter whether abstract mathematical objects exist and, hence, no fact of the matter whether platonism or anti-platonism is true.
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  • (1 other version)How in the World?Stephen Yablo - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):255-286.
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  • Reflexive fictionalisms.Daniel Nolan & J. O'Leary-Hawthorne - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):23-32.
    There is a class of fictionalist strategies (the reflexive fictionalisms) which appear to suffer from a common problem: the problem that the entities which are supposedly fictional turn out, by the lights of the fictionalist theory itself, to exist. The appropriate solution is to reject so-called strong fictionalism in each case: that is, to reject the variety of fictionalism which takes appeal to the domain of fictional entities to provide an explanation or analysis of the operators or predicates with which (...)
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  • (2 other versions)What Metaphors Mean.Donald Davidson - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 453-465.
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  • Crispin Wright, Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. [REVIEW]Boguslaw Wolniewicz - 1986 - Studia Logica 45 (3):330-330.
    The book is an attempt at explaining to the nation the ideas of Frege's Grundlagen. It is wordy and trite, a paradigm case of a redundant piece of writing. The reader is advised to steer clear of it.
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  • Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Noel Carroll - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):93-99.
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  • (2 other versions)Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 249-264.
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  • From a Logical Point of View.Richard M. Martin - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (4):574-575.
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  • Ontological Commitments.William P. Alston - 1958 - Bobbs-Merrill.
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  • Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
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  • A fictionalist account of the indispensable applications of mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (3):291 - 314.
    The main task of this paper is to defend anti-platonism by providing an anti-platonist (in particular, a fictionalist) account of the indispensable applications of mathematics to empirical science.
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  • Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. [REVIEW]Matthew McGrath - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):239-242.
    Mark Balaguer has written a provocative and original book. The book is as ambitious as a work of philosophy of mathematics could be. It defends both of the dominant views concerning the ontology of mathematics, Platonism and Anti-Platonism, and then closes with an argument that there is no fact of the matter which is right.
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  • An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. [REVIEW]Louis P. Pojman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):496-498.
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  • A Postscript on Metaphor.W. V. Quine - 1978 - Critical Inquiry 5 (1):161-162.
    Besides serving us at the growing edge of science and beyond, metaphor figures even in our first learning of language; or, if not quite metaphor, something akin to it. We hear a word or phrase on some occasion, or by chance we babble a fair approximate ourselves on what happens to be a pat occasion and are applauded for it. On a later occasion, then, one that resembles the first occasion by our lights, we repeat the expression. Resemblance of occasions (...)
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  • A Problem for Fictionalism about Possible Worlds.Gideon Rosen - 1993 - Analysis 53 (2):71 - 81.
    Fictionalism about possible worlds is the view that talk about worlds in the analysis of modality is to be construed as ontologically innocent discourse about the content of a fiction. Versions of the view have been defended by D M Armstrong (in "A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility") and by myself (in "Modal Fictionalism', "Mind" 99, July 1990). The present note argues that fictionalist accounts of modality (both Armstrong's version and my own) fail to serve the fictionalists ontological purposes because they (...)
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  • On Metaphor.Sheldon Sacks - 1981 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 40 (1):99-101.
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  • The availability of what we say.Jerry A. Fodor & Jerrold J. Katz - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (1):57-71.
    Fodor and katz criticize cavell's position on the relation between ordinary language philosophy and empirical investigations of ordinary language, In "must we mean what we say?," _inquiry, Volume 1, Pages 172-212, And "the availability of wittgenstein's later philosophy," "philosophical review", Volume 71, Pages 67-93. Cavell holds that disagreements between ordinary language philosophers over grammar and semantics are in no sense empirical. Fodor and katz show that ordinary language philosophers are engaged in empirical investigation. (staff).
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  • (1 other version)Abstract Objects: A Case Study.Stephen Yablo - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):220-240.
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  • (2 other versions)Review of Crispin Wright: Frege's conception of numbers as objects[REVIEW]Gregory Currie - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):475-479.
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