The paper proposes a novel understanding of how Aristotle’s theoretical works complement each other in such a way as to form a genuine system, and this with the immediate (and ostensibly central) aim of addressing a longstanding question regarding Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’—namely, is Aristotle’s first philosophy a contribution to theology, or to the science of being in general? Aristotle himself seems to suggest that it is in some ways both, but how this can be is a very difficult question. My (...) answer is in some respects a version of one that goes back at least to the middle ages—i.e., that first philosophy is concerned with the gods (and to that extent offers a theology) because the gods are causes and principles of beings precisely insofar as they are beings. The more original aspect of my position lies in my claim that the sort of tension found in the Metaphysics is likewise to be found in many of Aristotle’s physical works. Thus, for example, the De caelo is (I argue) concerned generally with natural beings (= beings susceptible of change), but its discussions are focused largely on the heavenly bodies and the Aristotelian elements insofar as they admit of change with respect to place. Here I claim that the particular objects of discussion are dealt with precisely because they are causes and principles of natural beings as such. Something similar goes, I claim, for the De generatione et corruptione, the general concern of which is a particular species of natural being—i.e., natural beings susceptible of generation and corruption. In this way, I argue, Aristotle successively deals in his theoretical works with those causes and principles of (say) a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a being, those causes and principles of a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a natural being, those causes and principles of a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a perishable natural being, and so on for the lower genera under which the species horse is subsumed. (shrink)

According to Margaret Wilson, Leibniz is inconsistent when it comes to the question of whether one can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities, and this because he sometimes conceives of sensible qualities as sensations and sometimes conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities. When he conceives of them as sensations, he denies that we can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities; when he conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities, he asserts that we can. In this paper I (...) argue that Wilson is wrong to think that Leibnizian ideas admit of various degrees of confusion or distinctness. I also argue that although Wilson's problem admits of being reformulated in a manner consistent with a correct understanding of Leibnizian perceptions and ideas, this reformulated version of the problem admits to a satisfactory interpretive solution. (shrink)

This paper presents a new reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s famous (and controversial) rule-following arguments. Two are the novel features offered by our reconstruction. In the first place, we propose a shift of the central focus of the discussion, from the general semantics and the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of mathematics and the rejection of the notion of a function. The second new feature is positive: we argue that Wittgenstein offers us a new alternative notion of a rule (to replace (...) the rejected functions), a notion reminiscent of Category Theory’s notion of a morphism. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to offer a clear explanation of what monadic domination, understood as a relation obtaining exclusively among monads, amounts to in the philosophy of Leibniz (and this insofar as monadic domination is conceived by Leibniz not to account for the substantial unity of composite substances). Central to my account is the Aristotelian notion of a hierarchy of activities, as well as a particular understanding of the relations that obtain among the perceptions of monads that stand in (...) relations of monadic domination and subordination. (shrink)

It's well known that Leibniz characterizes bodies in two apparently incompatible ways. On the one hand, he asserts that a body is a real or well-founded phenomenon; on the other, he claims that a body is an aggregate of substances that possesses the reality of these same substances. In this essay I aim to defend an explanation of the relation that exists, according to Leibniz, between these two conceptions of body, an explanation that shows them to be compatible and, indeed, (...) complementary. In the first part of this paper I aim above all to show that Robert Adams and Donald Rutherford are wrong to think that these two conceptions are to be reconciled by recognizing that for Leibniz they apply to one and the same thing. (shrink)

In the second part of this essay, I aim to show that Leibniz, in asserting that bodies are aggregates of substances, wants to affirm something about bodies insofar as they exist a parte rei or in reality: in reality a body is not a being, but a multitude of beings or substances. And this, on my view, is precisely what leads Leibniz to assert that bodies are phenomena: since a body is not in reality a being, but many beings, it (...) follows that a body, conceived as a being, is something that exists only objectively in the soul. That is, a body, conceived as a single thing, is not something real, but an imaginary being, a creature of the mind, a phenomenon. (shrink)

Nuestro interés en el contenido mental no-conceptual es, principalmente, la articulación de una versión sustantiva (no-trivial) de esta clase de contenido en la experiencia perceptual. El debate acerca del contenido no-conceptual ha girado, en su mayor parte, alrededor de su existencia; y los argumentos que se han ofrecido en su favor abogan por una versión no sustantiva según la cual el contenido no-conceptual es aquel que no satisface ciertos requisitos conceptuales. Así, para desarrollar una versión sustantiva del contenido mental no-conceptual (...) hemos apelado a la versión de la experiencia perceptual de propiedades espaciales ofrecida por Evans (1982 cap. 6). A partir de esto desarrollamos un nuevo argumento a favor del contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia perceptual que lo vincula a la actividad característica de la experiencia perceptual. Por último, exponemos uno de los ataques de McDowell (1996) a la noción de contenido no-conceptual y presentamos nuestras réplicas a este ataque, mostrando su insuficiencia. Al mostrar que la crítica de McDowell no es exitosa, consideramos que podríamos tener una versión del contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia que es inmune a esta línea de argumentación. (shrink)

A number of recent studies have called into question the traditional interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist beginning, at the latest, with the composition of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686). In particular, in a recent book Daniel Garber affirms that between the late 1670s and late 1690s Leibniz maintains a realist doctrine according to which the created world is populated with extended corporeal substances. In trying to prove his thesis, Garber appeals to a document written in 1690 where Leibniz, addressing (...) an objection by Michelangelo Fardella, denies that bodies are composed of souls, declares that souls are substantial forms, and affirms that bodies are composed instead of substances. According to Garber, this shows that Leibniz then believed that bodies were composed, not of simple substances, but of extended substances possessing souls. Here I try to show that, to the contrary, the mentioned document (along with two others closely associated with it) support the traditional interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist in 1690. (shrink)

Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking -- thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to (...) be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other 'critical thinkers' to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs. (shrink)

O artigo em tela tem como objetivo refletir sobre as contradições, antagonismos e problemáticas que envolvem a educação, seus modos e processos; bem como a escola, a pedagogia, o Estado e o sistema capitalista. Para tanto, começamos ressaltando ainda a infeliz ineficiência da função e papel que a estrutura educacional e escolar desempenha. Ineficiência objetiva e controlada por um empresariado e políticos brasileiros que se colocam a disposição de em primeiro lugar defender os interesses do capital internacional, do capital nacional (...) e em segundo os deles próprios. Que na verdade é o primeiro! Com isso, partindo de tais reflexões, aos modos que a pedagogia, a educação e a filosofia foram tratadas ao longo do tempo e da história, aos modos e formas que a educação e a escola se comportam no atual Brasil, encerramos com importantes reflexões. (shrink)

Resumo: Um dos grandes problemas das ciências em geral, é a constante busca por universalizações, generalizações e sistematizações dos seus objetos, dados, conteúdos e resultados. Talvez sejam ainda vestígios ou resquícios do positivismo ou a identificação com um possível cientificismo. Porém, ao se fazer isso, nega-se o próprio caráter, o papel, o sentido e a função da ciência, que é ser provisória, e não permanente ou eterna. Mesmo havendo em certos casos, a possibilidade de universalizações, generalizações e sistematizações, no qual (...) também ainda permanecerão abertas e não fechadas em si. Logo, neste trabalho se procura debruçar e refletir sobre o que é história, o sentido da história e a historiografia por abordagens, aspectos e instrumentos da filosofia, da sociologia, da antropologia, da filosofia da história, da historiografia, da teoria da história, da escrita da história e dentre outros. Isso para que deste modo talvez possamos nos desvencilhar de certos mitos, conteúdos e produções de certa história e historiografia universalista. Uma vez que, em tal narrativa e escrita da história, produziram-se muitas interpretações equivocadas, míticas e generalizantes da história do mundo e dos povos em geral, onde, de modo arbitrário, o eurocentrismo, o europeísmo e o ocidentalismo assumiram a apresentação e representação da produção histórica e cultural do mundo, quase uma aculturação e homogeneização dos povos, culturas e etnias, descaracterizando-os nas suas próprias narrativas e processos históricos, isso dentro de um “pacote e produto histórico ocidental”. No qual a história foi colocada e reduzida a determinismos de diversos tipos e modos. Logo, um dos objetivos cruciais aqui, é justamente desconstruir tais narrativas, percepções e procedimentos de sorrateira aculturação e etnocentrismo da história mundial. Portanto, é necessário superar toda e qualquer narrativa, escrita e produção histórica que coloca grupos, etnias e culturas entre superiores e inferiores na produção histórica e na história, no qual os grupos superiores fazem a história e são os protagonistas dela, enquanto os grupos inferiores são os meros coadjuvantes no mundo, bem como na produção histórica. Isso ocorre porque a história e a produção da mesma são campos de disputas, conflitos e embates de ideais, mesmo pela produção científica. (shrink)

O presente trabalho1se dá diante da conjuntura política, econômica e social no Brasil, envolvendo a pandemia do COVID-19; além do aumento do sucateamento e precarização da estrutura e sistema educacional público. Para tanto, realizamos um processo de pesquisa empírico-qualitativa do cotidiano de uma equipe escolar e da comunidade que a cerca. Isto no que diz respeito ao enfrentamento dos obstáculos postos à educação pública, à pandemia, às reduções e cortes orçamentários da educação, além da própria desestruturação -em vários âmbitos e (...) aspectos -dos profissionais da educação. Inclusive, observamos e constatamos que esta equipe de profissionais estava sujeita a inúmeros riscos, solitária, quase invisível, resistindo e lutando por sonhos com uma comunidade. Isso de um fazer professoral, pedagógico e social que se encontravam esses profissionais, alguns adoecidos e em batalha para cumprir o exercício de sua profissão. Mesmo lhes custando a saúde e a vida, estes pareciam optar mais pela vida e pelos sonhos de uma comunidade melhor do que os deles. (shrink)

St. Thomas Aquinas has always considered intelligence a potency higher than the will, absolutely speaking. That being said, and in my view, the existential primacy of the will in the act of freedom (particularly in choosing the existential end) is also indisputably Thomistic, as Cornelio Fabro has shown. This paper endeavors to explain Aquinas' doctrine on the absolute primacy of the intellect and thus show that these two primacies can be affirmed coherently, that is, the intellect’s absolute primacy and the (...) will’s existential primacy. Firstly, I will explain the reasoning St. Thomas Aquinas uses in the Summa to justify the absolute primacy of the intellect over the will. Secondly, I will explore some parallel texts, in order to shed light on my interpretation of the Summa and expand our view regarding this and related doctrinal points. Thirdly, I will offer a brief study of Fabro’s position, one in which his concerns regarding the intellect’s absolute primacy are taken into account and carefully considered. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem como objetivo verificar como educandos da Rede Pública de ensino do Município de Niterói/RJ percebem o fenômeno da violência nas suas comunidades e como esta percepção se evidencia em seus discursos. Para isso foi aplicado um questionário semiestruturado com questões objetivas e uma discursiva, no qual foi respondido por 120 estudantes com idades entre 13 e 17 anos da Rede Estadual de Ensino de escolas da Zona Norte de Niterói, estado do Rio de Janeiro. As respostas às (...) questões objetivas foram analisadas quantitativamente e à questão discursiva por meio de técnica categorial, onde as categorias eram os itens escolhidos nas respostas dos estudantes. As questões discursivas foram analisadas qualitativamente, gerando uma análise quanti-qualitativa. Verificamos também resultados de pesquisas análogas, e a discussão foi construída à luz dos teóricos Albert Bandura, Michel Foucault e Lev Vygotsky, no qual se mostrou que nossos dados são suportados pela literatura. (shrink)

Conto: Sabiá, Percevejo, Bacalhau, Ratão e Esculápia: Histórias, Memórias, Filosofias e Psicanálises.....\.....|.|... || Alberto Raimundo Francisco de Souza e outros...\|......|| || ‘As portas da escuridão vão serem abertas.’ || A vida, a Existência e o Viver são repletos de mistérios. Pessoas se encontram e se desencontram durante a jornada da vida, e em seus caminhos e trajetórias. Sorrimos e choramos. Mas tudo faz parte do movimento e do fluir da Vida. Sabiá, Percevejo, Bacalhau e Ratão estavam a busca de algo (...) perdido, talvez já encontrado e ainda não compreendido. Ambos com seus dilemas, conflitos, complexos e crises, isso diante, com e nas relações sociais tão problemáticas e suas contradições. Entretanto, durante o encontro desses quatro sujeitos com uma estranha criatura, a Esculápia ou Asclépia, tanto faz, esse é o nome dela, os quatro desconhecidos que estão a travar uma longa discussão, sobre muitos assuntos polêmicos da vida, bem como de si mesmos, irão fazer movimentos catárticos e de descobertas, e que os impactará para sempre. || ‘Certamente, em algum dia, alguma vez e em algum momento, você também já se perguntou: o que eu tenho que fazer aqui? Qual é o meu propósito aqui? O que eu vim fazer nesse mundo? E as vezes não existe nenhuma resposta que queiras realmente ouvir, pois há de ser que, talvez, nenhuma seja a certa ou conclusiva.’ || ‘Se ver através e por meio do outro, ou dos outros, são uma das qualidades mais raras que existem na espécie humana, porém, talvez poucos ainda a descobriram, e talvez menos ainda, a exerçam no seu cotidiano.’ || ‘A vida e o viver, contém e estão repletos, talvez cheios de seus mistérios, mistérios revelados e outros ocultos, esperando apenas a serem descobertos, e tão logo, revelados a você.’. (shrink)

A cidade nas práticas artísticas [The city in artistic practices] is the result of the work developed, of the presentations and the debates held within the cycle of seminars “The experience of the city between art and philosophy”, held between 3 March 2020 and 16 June 2021 (calendar dramatically compromised by the challenges of the COVID 19 pandemic), one of the main activities of the OBRA project — Fragmentation and Reconfiguration: experiencing the city between art and philosophy, based at IFILNOVA (...) — Philosophy Institute of NOVA, in Lisbon. The book is divided into five parts, relating to each of the artistic disciplines to which the seminars were dedicated – cinema, photography, sound arts, literature and architecture —, which are edited by the organizers responsible for each of them — respectively, Susana Viegas, Humberto Brito, Nuno Fonseca João Oliveira Duarte and Susana Ventura — and composed of the respective narrated accounts of each seminar and of short essays, some merely textual, others graphical or even photographic, which are either in-depth versions of the reflections and positions that were presented and debated by the participants and guests, or works that motivated and inspired the work of the seminars. The seminar cycle and the book now presented here intend to reflect on the role of artistic practices in the representation and reconfiguration of urban experience, trying to understand their different attempts to apprehend and express the fragmentation of aesthetic experience in modern and contemporary cities, as well as to evaluate their contribution to an eventual symbolic and imaginative reconfiguration of that experience. Each section tries, in its own way, to answer questions such as: How do these arts think and reinvent the city? What do they make us feel? And what is their social and political role? For reasons that are easy to understand, Lisbon was the starting point, but other cities were also part of the journey. (shrink)

This paper deals with the mutations in Wittgenstein’s treatment of the notions of “generality” and of “singularity”, from his first philosophy, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, to his later mature philosophy represented by the Philosophical Investigations. As we shall see, Wittgenstein’s philosophical handling of the notion of “visual perception” plays a key role in those conceptual transformations.

I argue that the prime matter that Leibniz posits in every created monad is understood by him to be a mere defect or negation, and not something real and positive. Further, I argue that Leibniz’s talk of prime matter in every created monad is inspired by the thirteenth-century doctrine of spiritual matter, but that such talk is simply one way in which Leibniz frames a point that he frequently makes elsewhere—namely, that each creaturely essence incorporates a limitation that is the (...) ultimate source of an original imperfection that affects the creature from the first moment of its existence. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

Abstract: The work at hand is an effort to expose and contextualize, the possible expressions of the first forms, modes and types of mystical, ritualistic, magical, sacrificial, belief and mythical manifestations in the social, cultural, economic, political and historical processes of societies. Thus verifying the first foundations, processes and biopsychosocial constructions, as well as their mystical and belief productions and reproductions. This is verified through and by peoples considered primitive, ancient and archaic. In this way, we will attempt a chronological (...) reconstruction of the formation and manifestation of the first mystical, magical, ritualistic and sacrificial practices throughout history, culminating in the formation of 'religions. Since it is precisely through the relationships between peoples, societies, cultures, civilizations and their cultural, mystical, mythical, ritualistic and belief anthropophagisms that other manifestations and possible 'religions' are produced. Thus, it is in the relationships and social interactions between them, integrating certain elements, contents, beliefs, etc. from each other, that the manifestations considered religious have emerged and spread to countless places. Therefore, these processes and manifestations have not remained static, but have changed and transformed throughout history up to the present day. And so Magic, Rituals, Myths, sacrifices and relationships with death have also been transformed and given new meanings. In the process, differentiations and transformations have produced certain dissonances, but also certain consonances or similarities. However, after the creation of religions and their relationship with the state, especially with the capitalist system, these dissonances are much more evident. We can also say that this work is perhaps a summary exposition of the unfolding of the 'evolutionary' processes of development, progress and multiproducts of the countless mystical, religious and cultural manifestations and their 'gods.' 'Evolutionary, progress and development' here refers only to the meanings and aspects of the creations, productions, re-elaborations and creative organizations of peoples, societies and/or civilizations, their cultures, mysticisms and beliefs. Above all, their deities, magic, rituals and gods. However, none are superior or lower. ||| Keywords: Mysticisms; Primitive; Rituals; Sacrifices; Historiography; Beliefs; Religions; Modernity; Capitalism; Death; Philosophy of History; Philosophy of Religion; Cultural Philosophy; Anthropology of Religions. (shrink)

Por outras Historiografias, Filosofias, Sociologias, Antropologias, Teorias da História e Filosofias da História.......... Ensaios sobre ‘Antiguidade:’ Reflexões sobre ‘o declínio e queda de Roma, o que não nos contaram......... O que não nos contaram sobre o declínio e queda do império romano do ocidente no séc. V d.C.?.............. -/- Resumo:......... -/- Infelizmente em certas eras, períodos, contextos e momentos da produção da historiografia, ocorreram e ainda ocorrem vários anacronismos, permeados de romantismos, paixões, dramatizações, apologias a grupos, culturas e povos específicos, (...) bem como certas práticas de preconceitos, etnocentrismos, xenofobias e aculturamento do e para com o outro. Desse modo, muitos conteúdos não apenas anacrônicos, de preconceitos, etnocêntricos e xenófobos foram sendo produzidos e reproduzidos ao longo da história, sobretudo sentimentos e complexos em transferências sobre outros povos e culturas. Como que projeções de um ‘eu’ sobre o outro. Com isso, o trabalho em tela fará o esforço de demonstrar que há muitos equívocos, problemas conceituais, metodológicos, linguísticos e talvez interpretativos quanto ao suposto declínio e queda do império romano do ocidente em 476 d.C. Fatos que talvez possam estar carregados de ideologias, dramatizações, apologias, alienações, distorções, contradições e hipérboles em vários sentidos, âmbitos e aspectos. Para demonstrar tais evidências, faremos um trabalho empenhado na revisão da literatura, com abordagens e auxílio também da análise dos discursos, da sociologia, antropologia, da filosofia da história e da lógica, ambas corroborando com a historiografia, isso para dar conta de trazer luzes e novas informações sobre o declínio e queda do império romano do ocidente no séc. V. d.C....... -/- Palavras-chaves: Império Romano; Queda; Declínio; Bárbaros; Ocidente; Europa; Historiografia; Paradoxos; Hipérboles; Filosofia da História; Modernidade......... -/- Filosofia, sociologia e antropologia da história da Roma antiga, seu declínio e queda, novas abordagens, métodos, reflexões, análises, perspectivas, possibilidades e conteúdos. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term “explanation” in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors’ claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also (...) provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label “understandable AI” to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following De Regt (2017) and Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent’s success in using the system. (shrink)

The following is a paper presented for the Course Rahner and Lonergan at the University of Toronto (Winter, 2014), revised and edited Winter, 2018. Our purpose is to defend the possibility of “perceptualism,” that is to say, the position maintaining that the intelligible content of consciousness is given in perception and not posited by the activity of the subject. Assisted by the insights of Cornelio Fabro, this defense contrasts perceptualism with Bernard Lonergan’s “critical realism”. This paper focuses on the notion (...) of experience, seemingly the basis of the opposition between perceptualism and critical realism. (shrink)

Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We (...) argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word ‘school’, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation. (shrink)

Muito se ouve falar em cidadão, ser cidadão, direitos e deveres do cidadão, bem como atuar ativamente enquanto cidadão. Porém, inúmeras pessoas ignoram esse tão complexo, profundo e importante termo. Saber sua origem, etimologia, sentido e significados são de suma importância para os sujeitos que fazem parte de uma estrutura, sistema e conjuntura social que abarca os indivíduos como seus cidadãos. Desse modo, o presente trabalho busca uma compreensão mais aprofundada do que é cidadão, ser cidadão, sua origem, ativação e (...) a efetividade prática de tal conceito na realidade social, política, econômica e histórica, uma vez que, o conceito ou termo deriva de origens longínquas e como construto e produção humana no social, não veio do acaso, mas através e por meio da racionalidade, experiências, processos, vivencias e percepções diante das relações sociais, políticas, econômicas e históricas. Logo, nos foi necessário realizar procedimentos e movimentos historiográficos e de filosofia da linguagem, indo a Grécia e Roma Antigas, no qual foram configurando o termo em suas origens e legando para as posteridades, inclusive para nós brasileiros. Sendo assim, fizemos o esforço de buscar as origens do termo, conceito e aplicabilidade no social partindo brevemente da Grécia e Roma Antiga, e relacionando-o com a realidade e aspectos da linguagem, inclusive sua relação com o processo contemporâneo, no qual nos movem a indagar quais problemas envolvem o termo, prática, direitos do cidadão e ou ser cidadão, onde surgem questões também como se há algum problema de semântica, de conceito, falta de entendimento do termo ou uma economia da concretude e aplicabilidade. Bem como, se há cidadãos de primeira, segunda e terceira categoria. Anacronismos ou resgates dos significados e sentidos? E o que dizer da exclusão das mulheres, negros, indígenas, crianças e outros da investidura como cidadãos? Logo, o trabalho em tela é de ordem Bibliográfica, de Revisão da Literatura e abarcando áreas, elementos, instrumentos e aspectos da historiografia, filosofia da linguagem, análises do discurso, sociologia e da antropologia social e cultural. (shrink)

Why I thought it useful to offer an explanation of Hegel’s doctrine on the Incarnation was so that the reader may be empowered to identify Hegel’s influence in modern accounts of this mystery. Even if, in my view, Hegel’s interpretation of revealed religion differs greatly from Catholic Doctrine, it is not surprising to find the presence of some of his concepts in modern theology. In truth, what matters is not the theologian’s self-identification as Hegelian or as non-Hegelian, but whether or (...) not the theologian adopts Hegel’s concepts. This paper offers an explanation of the internal dynamism of Hegelian concepts and their relation to Christian doctrine in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This research may help to show in what way it is possible to explain Christian religious doctrine with a philosophy other than the Thomistic one and how, at least in Hegel’s case, religious doctrine is changed and reduced to an erroneous philosophical content. Also, an attempt is made to show the internal “coherence” of this Hegelian re-reading of Christianity so that theologians may become more cautious about accepting an explanation of Christian doctrine simply because the Christian language is preserved in that explanation. (shrink)

Abstract In The Descent of Man (1879), Charles Darwin proposed a speculative evolutionary explanation of extended benevolence—a human sympathetic capacity that extends to all nations, races, and even to all sentient beings. This essay draws on twenty-first century social science to show that Darwin’s explanation is correct in its broad outlines. Extended benevolence is manifested in institutions such as legal human rights and democracy, in behaviors such as social movements for human rights and the protection of nonhuman animals, and in (...) normative attitudes such as emancipative values and a commitment to promote the rights or welfare of animals. These phenomena can be substantially explained by cultural evolutionary forces that trace back to three components of what Darwin called the human “moral sense”: (1) sympathy, (2) our disposition to follow community rules or norms, and (3) our capacity to make normative judgments. Extended benevolence likely emerged with “workarounds,” including political ideologies, that established an inclusive sympathetic concern for sentient life. It likely became as widespread as it is now due to recently arisen socio-economic conditions that have created more opportunities for people to have contact with and take the perspective of a broader cross-section of humanity, as well as other species. (shrink)

Globalization has made it easier for people to migrate, thus increasing diversity within organizations. One problem with this migration is that 1st and 2nd generation immigrants may prefer different leadership styles than those of the mainstream culture. The purpose of this survey-based quantitative comparative study was to investigate the effects of acculturation on the work-related cultural values and leadership style preferences of Mexican immigrants living in the United States. The research question that guided this study focused on the differences in (...) work-related cultural values and preferred leadership styles between 2 generations of Mexican immigrants, Mexicans, and U.S.-born Caucasians. Two hundred and forty-five participants completed the survey. The researcher used a Likert-type self-assessing questionnaire adapted from existing instruments to measure the work-related cultural values and preferred leadership styles of two generations of Mexican immigrants, native Mexicans, and U.S.-born Caucasians. Statistical tools, such as correlations, Cronbach’s alpha, t-test, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used to test measurement reliability and to test for differences in the mean scores of the criterion variables among the 4 groups. The researcher found that, in the aggregate, Mexican immigrants did not acculturate to the mainstream values of the United States, 2nd generation Mexican immigrants’ scores were similar to those of U.S.-born Caucasians in work-related values, and all groups prefer the servant leadership style. Implications for social change may include raising the awareness of human resource managers of the differences and similarities in values and preferences of their staff, which may help improve the relationships between managers and the employees. (shrink)

Philosophy can be regarded as a type of conceptual research subjected to the usual standards of rationality. However, there seems to be no objective and accepted criteria for evaluating and comparing philosophical theories. From a heuristic- and erotetic-based approach, philosophy is here considered a set of second-order reflections that are presupposed by more specific theories; and evaluated by their informativeness, adequateness, cogency, generality, novelty, and presuppositional nature. As a practice, one can proceed upwards (from problems to presuppositions) or downwards (from (...) presuppositions as meaning conditions for assertions under question). But as a product, a philosophical theory is to be assessed as how it helps foster knowledge and assists in learning, posing, and solving new queries. (shrink)

These thirteen paragraphs portray epistemology as the study, not directly of knowing as a human action (which could be considered the object also of anthropology) but as the study of the mode of being of the object in the subject and, in this sense, of intentional being. Moreover, intentional being is not understood as the being of the cognitional species or representation, which is real and subjective, but as the being of the known, as the presence of the known to (...) the knower (obviously, through the species but a being not reduced to the subjective being of the species): this kind of being is the proper object of epistemology. Other considerations regarding the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology take place as well. As regards the method, this essay attempts to apply Aquinas’ four steps of scientific reasoning to epistemology, in the following fashion and order: 1- Solution of the problem of the universals by recourse to the theory of the agent intellect (resolutio secundum rem); 2- Definition of knowledge as intentional possession of being (res. sec. rationem); 3- Judgment of value regarding the different instances of human knowledge or critique of knowledge (compositio secundum rem) and 4- Reinterpretation (in the light of the previous path) of common notions of epistemology, such as truth, certainty, evidence, and error (comp. sec. rationem). (shrink)

Diante dos embates e dilemas que vive o Brasil após o ano de 2016, fundamentalmente no que diz respeito a educação pública brasileira, o presente trabalho procurou se debruçar, refletir e verificar a posição e situação do educando brasileiro no cenário social nacional, e sobretudo escolar. Levamos em conta como base de configuração do indivíduo-sujeito e estudante sua identidade enquanto ser biopsicossocial, isso na perspectiva Aristotélica e Marxista de homem, tanto como ser dotado de razão, emoção, vontade, social, político, teleológico (...) (Aristóteles) e essencialmente ser de trabalho e histórico (Marx). (shrink)

There is a growing awareness that there are many subtle forms of exclusion and partiality that affect the correct workings of a judicial system. The concept of epistemic injustice, introduced by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, is a useful conceptual tool to understand forms of judicial partiality that often go undetected. In this paper, we present Fricker’s original theory and some of the applications of the concept of epistemic injustice in legal processes. In particular, we want to show that the seed (...) planted by Fricker has flourished into a rich field of study in which the concept is used to analyze many different phenomena in law, not always following the original characterization provided by her. This has led to a distinction between what we will call the narrow version of the concept, which is closer to Fricker’s original account, and the wider version of epistemic injustice, which is a more controversial notion because it is always on the verge of morphing into other well-known concepts like sexism, racial discrimination, oppression, silencing, and gaslighting. We will show that the value of the narrow version is mostly theoretical, and that in order to use the concept of epistemic injustice one must adopt a more liberal understanding of it. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to try to elucidate Wittgenstein’s ex-travagant thesis that each and every mathematical advancement involves some “semantical mutation”, i.e., some alteration of the very meanings of the terms involved. To do that we will argue in favor of the idea of a “modal incompati-bility” between the concepts involved, as they were prior to the advancement, and what they become after the new result was obtained. We will also argue that the adoption of this thesis profoundly (...) alters the traditional way of con-struing the idea of “progress” in mathematics. (shrink)

The present study aims at understanding how Ethica Nicomachea V.6 relates to its preceding chapters, V.1-5. On the one hand, the interpreter wonders for what purpose Aristotle introduces a topic named ‘the civic just’ (to politikon dikaion) in V.6, since V.1-5 treats extensively of matters of justice in the city. On the other hand, the same text posits that there is a certain ‘just without qualification’ (to haplōs dikaion), which may or may not be the civic just itself; compared to (...) the just without qualification, other forms of just are so by similitude (kath’homoiteta). In attempting to clear the confusion around those two points, the present study proposes the following: (1) the civic just is the just without qualification insofar as it is the primordial form of the just, in which only humans who are cumulatively free, equals and self-sufficient have a share; (2) the description of the civic just recapitulates several aspects of the discussions of justice in V.1-5 – the laws, the kinds of equality, rule, the legal suit - because the civic just encompasses all the forms of just (dikaion) related to the virtues of universal justice (V.1) and partial justice (V.2-5); (3) the expression to politikon dikaion is introduced in V.6 in order to contrast everything treated in V.1-5 with the domestic just, to oikonomikon dikaion, mentioned for the first time in V.6; (4) the forms of the domestic just are just only by similitude with the civic just because justice loses density outside the civic sphere, a situation which can be explained by the shortcomings Aristotle ascribes to women, children and slaves in EN V.6 (lack either of freedom or equality or yet self-sufficiency) as well as in Politica I (varying degrees of defective deliberation and virtue). (shrink)

Some Molinists claim that a perfectly good God would actualize a world that is salvifically optimal, that is, a world in which the balance between the saved and damned is optimal and cannot be improved upon without undesirable consequences. I argue that given some plausible principles of rationality, alongside the assumptions Molinists already accept, God’s perfect rationality necessarily would lead him to actualize a salvifically optimal world; I call this position “Optimistic Molinism.” I then consider objections and offer replies, concluding (...) that Optimistic Molinism is undefeated and merits further exploration. (shrink)

O presente trabalho em tela busca se debruçar nas relações e interconexões entre etnocentrismo, xenofobia e medo. Entretanto, o medo é medo de alguma coisa ou de alguém. Talvez do nada. Porém, quando nos deparamos com o medo, pensamentos e práticas etnocêntricas e xenofóbicas, a literatura demonstra que há processos ligados a mecanismos de pulsão, repressão e recalque, pois o medo está como pano de fundo, causando um desencadeamento de emoções e sentimentos de um sujeito frente ao outro. Então, quando (...) dois indivíduos se encontram, há um conflito interno por questões culturais e de objetificação entre ambos. Desse modo, o conflito não é apenas pessoal ou individual, mas fundado em estruturas e formação cultural. Portanto, quando dois indivíduos distintos se encontram, também são duas culturas se defrontando. Com isso, podem ocorrer pensamentos e práticas etnocêntricas e xenofóbicas oriundas do medo, de se estar diante do outro, do diferente, do desconhecido e que não sou eu. Assim, com o medo colocado, aparece o conflito, a angústia, o repúdio e a negação do outro. E daí já se evidencia o etnocentrismo e a xenofobia. Porém, o impulso é o recalque que se reprime por medo do outro, do diferente e do desconhecido. Logo, Etnocentrismo, Xenofobia e Medo: Pulsão, Repressão e Recalque como Medo oculto do outro, do desconhecido, do diferente e do diverso, talvez tal fato só apaziguemos com um olhar com análises relativizadoras, tanto das culturas como dos outros, pois talvez assim se possa encontrar a saída de tais neuroses. A pesquisa adentra pelas teorias da Antropologia e com suportes de campos da Psicologia, História, Psicanálises e Sociologia. Desse modo, a pesquisa não abarca apenas o caráter bibliográfico e de revisão da literatura, mas também adentra sutilmente pelos caminhos da “observação e descrição” do fato e fenômeno histórico-social, fazendo assim certo esforço de “explorá-lo e explicá-lo” pelas teorias de base, que suportam o construto. (shrink)

Many theists conceive of God as a perfect being, i.e., as that than which none greater is metaphysically possible. On this grand view of God, it seems plausible to think that such a supreme and maximally great being would not be subject to luck of any sort. Given the divine perfections, God is completely insulated from luck. However, I argue that the opposite is true: precisely because God is perfect, he is subject to a kind of luck called constitutive luck. (...) In this paper, first I provide an analysis of luck and then explain the concept of constitutive luck. I proceed to defend constitutive luck from charges of incoherence and examine a different approach to make sense of this luck. Furthermore, I distinguish between two kinds of constitutive luck and argue that even if God isn’t subject to one kind, evading the second kind is unsuccessful. I offer two ways that God is constitutively lucky and reach a surprising conclusion: a perfect being is the luckiest of all possible beings. (shrink)

A história humana possui seus processos e especificidades no e do tempo e espaço, com certas rupturas e continuidades de certos processos e elementos. Podemos citar como exemplo: Os tipos e modos de desigualdades, sistemas escravistas e sistemas coloniais etc. Mas, não sendo igual ou da mesma forma. Há especificidades e características ligadas ao tempo e ao espaço contextual. Porém, sem dúvidas, há acontecimentos e fatos históricos que ocorrem com certas semelhanças e características entre passado e presente, ainda que dentro (...) dos seus respectivos contextos. Logo, a cada época e contexto social, político, econômico, cultural, religioso e histórico, podemos observar certas semelhanças, entre ‘o ontem e o hoje. ’ A exemplo, o Sistema Feudal que ocorreu em muitos continentes e países, e em tempos específicos e com suas especificidades contextuais. Desse modo, como já mencionado, parecem que certos elementos ou resquícios de fatos históricos anteriores ou passados se evidenciam em outras épocas e contextos. Não que sejam os mesmos sistemas, nem tampouco a continuidade deles, mas apenas semelhanças e características que parecem ‘ir e vir. ’ Diante de tais fatos, seus problemas e consequências; debruçamo-nos em fontes sobre o Sistema Feudal Europeu dos séc. X ao XIV d. C. para compreendermos elementos, eventos e episódios que vêm ocorrendo na contemporaneidade brasileira, com algumas semelhanças com o Sistema Feudal. Fundamentalmente, no que diz respeito às terras, grandes latifundiários, religião, política, economia e rituais. Assim, identificamos que: a) Religião, Política e ‘poder’, tanto no feudalismo quanto nas relações políticas atuais no Brasil, continuam na perspectiva de defender a propriedade privada de grandes extensões de terras nas mãos de poucos; b) manter e reproduzir as ideias conservadoras e ‘moralistas’ dos grupos que detém o ‘poder político e econômico’; e c) naturalizar a pobreza e a miséria da população como destino ou normal-natural, bem como atribuir às conquistas econômicas e materiais dos grandes latifundiários a algo divino ou determinado. (shrink)

: To address the question “on what there is” raised by Quine, and to accomplish the task of comprehending exhaustively the many ontological units that populate the great province of Being, we propose as an alternative to Puntel’s ontology a new ontology designated as “Structural Ontology” (SO). Such ontology is based on systematic-structural theoretical foundations, but leads to a diverse view in which structured factual units, structural configurations (dynamics), as well as apparent ontological units (objects), all encompassed by the temporal (...) sub-dimension that interconnects them, understood as an internal sub-dimension of the macro-dimension of Being, co-subsist. In this sense, we begin by situating the ontological theme in current philosophical discussion from a Quinean perspective. We then present a concept of truth derived from our reading of puntelian philosophy, which will be the point of connection between language and the world. Subsequently, we show how from the concept of truth, after a brief foray into philosophical semantics, we arrive at the ontological field from the ontological categories of structure and ontological state. Finally, we outline, in its general features, our structural ontology, which includes its own ontological notions that give new directions to philosophical understanding of this great theme. (shrink)

El objetivo de este pequeño trabajo es ayudar a comprender la necesidad de la composición real en el ser participado. Lo hacemos sirviéndonos de una parte de la magnífica obra del p. Fabro, La noción metafísica de participación. En la primera parte de nuestro trabajo nos serviremos de algunos de los textos de Santo Tomás que reportaba el p. Fabro, los que más nos ayuden a comprender la demostración. En la segunda, y al mismo efecto, estudiaremos el silogismo del p. (...) Fabro, con el cual dicho autor trataba de condensar la demostración de la composición real en todo ser participado. (shrink)

Problematizando o SER, o EU, o consciente e o inconscinte humano, do nascituro ao pós nascimento..-|||-Problematizing the BEING, the I, the conscious and the unconscious human, from the unborn child in the mother's womb to after birth.--|||--Problematizar el SER, el YO, el humano consciente e inconsciente, desde el feto en el vientre materno hasta después del nacimiento.----||||----TÍTULO: ---PELA CIENTIFICIDADE FRENTE AS PSEUDOCIÊNCIAS ROMÂNTICAS, MÍTICAS E DE CRENÇAS NA CONCEPÇÃO DO EU, DO CONSCIENTE E INCONSCIENTE DOS NASCITUROS E RECÉM-NASCIDOS.---||||----TITLE: ----FOR SCIENTIFITY (...) IN THE FACE OF ROMANTIC AND MYTHICAL PSEUDOSCIENCE AND BELIEFS IN THE CONCEPTION OF THE "I", OF THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS OF THE UNBORN AND NEWBORN. -----||||---TÍTULO: ---POR LA CIENTIFICIDAD FRENTE A LAS PSEUDOCIENCIAS Y CREENCIAS ROMÁNTICAS Y MÍTICAS EN LA CONCEPCIÓN DEL YO, DEL CONSCIENTE Y DEL INCONSCIENTE DEL NO NACIDO Y DEL RECIÉN NACIDO--|||---RESUMO: Quando surge o EU do SER, no nascituro ou no recém-nascido? Há diferenças entre o EU desse SER nos dois momentos, vivencias, experiencias e movimentos distintos? No útero materno e ou após o nascimento? E o que dizer sobre a questão da consciência e inconsciência desse SER e EU simultaneamente? Há consciência e inconsciência? Apenas uma delas?! Nenhuma!? E se houver uma apenas ou as duas, elas estão ativas? São iguais no útero e após o nascimento? Podem mudar ou se modificarem? Poderíamos dizer sobre um EU, consciência e inconsciente antes de nascer e depois de nascer? Só existe um EU depois de sair do útero materno? Há apenas consciência e inconsciência após o nascimento do SER e EU? Estas são as questões que tentaremos trabalhar no ensaio em tela e suas problemáticas da atualidade. Importante informar que a noção e concepção consciente e inconsciente discutidas aqui não irão estar restritas aos aspectos moral, jurídico, religioso, formal, cultural e social, elas estarão na dimensão e pauta das áreas das neurociências, biofisiológicas, biopsíquicas e filosófica. Desse modo, realizaremos um trabalho de busca e resgate histórico do Eu, do Consciente e Inconsciente da espécie humana, no qual produções como as de Freud serão nossa base inicial e de discussões críticas quanto ao que vem sendo confeccionado sobre a história e atuação dessas esferas psíquicas da humanidade. Sendo assim, realizaremos um movimento de historiografia desses componentes da psiquê, situando-os no tempo e espaço histórico, geográfico, cultural, corporal e mental. Palavras-chave: Ciência; Pseudociências; nascituros.----||||||-----ABSTRACT: When does the I of BEING arise, in the unborn or the newborn? Are there differences between the I of this BEING in the two distinct moments, experiences, and movements? In the womb or after birth? And what about the question of consciousness and unconsciousness of this BEING and I simultaneously? Is there consciousness and unconsciousness? Only one of them? None? And if there is only one or both, are they active? Are they the same in the womb and after birth? Can they change or modify each other? Could we say about an I, consciousness and unconscious before birth and after birth? Is there only an I after leaving the mother's womb? Is there only consciousness and unconsciousness after the BEING and I are born? These are the questions that we will try to work on in this essay and its current problems. It is important to inform that the notion and conception of conscious and unconscious discussed here will not be restricted to moral, juridical, religious, formal, cultural and social aspects, they will be in the dimension and agenda of the neuroscience, biophysiological, biopsychic and philosophical areas. In this way, we will carry out a historical search and rescue work of the "I", the Conscious and the Unconscious of the human species, in which productions such as those of Freud initial base and of critical discussions about what has been done about the history and performance of these psychic spheres of humanity. Thus, we will carry out a historiographical movement of these components of the psyches, situating them in historical, geographic, cultural, biological, body and mental time and space.------|||||-----RESUMEN: ¿Cuándo surge el YO del SER, en el feto o en el recién nacido? ¿Existen diferencias entre el YO de este SER en los dos momentos, diferentes vivencias, vivencias y movimientos? ¿En el útero de la madre y/o después del nacimiento? ¿Y qué podemos decir del tema de la consciencia e inconsciencia de este SER y YO simultáneamente? ¿Existe conciencia e inconsciencia? ¡¿Solo uno de ellos?! ¿¡Ninguno!? Y si solo hay uno o ambos, ¿están activos? ¿Son iguales en el útero y después del nacimiento? ¿Pueden cambiar o modificarse? ¿Podríamos decir sobre un YO, la conciencia y la inconsciencia antes del nacimiento y después del nacimiento? ¿Existe un solo YO después de salir del útero materno? ¿Existe sólo consciencia e inconsciencia después del nacimiento del SER y del YO? Estas son las cuestiones que intentaremos trabajar en el ensayo que nos ocupa y sus problemáticas actuales. Es importante informar que la noción y concepción consciente e inconsciente aquí discutida no se restringirá a los aspectos morales, legales, religiosos, formales, culturales y sociales, estarán en la dimensión y agenda de las áreas de las neurociencias, biofisiológicas, biopsíquico y filosófico. De esta manera, realizaremos un trabajo de búsqueda y rescate histórico del Yo, el Consciente y el Inconsciente de la especie humana, en el que producciones como las de Freud serán nuestra base inicial y discusiones críticas respecto de lo creado sobre la historia y el desempeño de estas esferas psíquicas de la humanidad. Por ello, realizaremos un movimiento de historiografía de estos componentes de la psique, ubicándolos en el tiempo y el espacio histórico, geográfico, cultural, corporal y mental. Palabras clave: Ciencia; Pseudociencias; Yo-I; consciente; niños inconscientes y no nacidos. (shrink)

What is the distinction between understanding and forming a concept? In my view, for Aquinas, intelligere (the act of understanding) and dicere (the forming of a verbum or mental word) are not two different acts, but simply two different aspects of the same act of understanding. In the following, I will explore more in depth what this distinction means for Aquinas. Firstly, I will give a mostly doctrinal or systematic overview of the issue and, secondly, I will support my claims (...) with relevant textual evidence, taken exclusively from Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. This study, as an appendix, is part of “The Influence of Kant in Transcendental Thomism: Rahner, Lonergan and Von Balthasar” (forthcoming). In my view, Lonergan’s way of distinguishing intelligere and dicere is different from St. Thomas’ way. In the body of my book, I focus on Lonergan’s reasons to distinguish these notions in his own particular way, whereas this study focuses on St. Thomas’ doctrine. It is my hope that the following lines will foster an understanding of St. Thomas’ epistemology and of its application to Trinitarian theology. (shrink)

In the natural and social sciences, it is common to use toy models—extremely simple and highly idealized representations—to understand complex phenomena. Some of the simple surrogate models used to understand opaque machine learning (ML) models, such as rule lists and sparse decision trees, bear some resemblance to scientific toy models. They allow non-experts to understand how an opaque ML model works globally via a much simpler model that highlights the most relevant features of the input space and their effect on (...) the output. The obvious difference is that the common target of a toy and a full-scale model in the sciences is some phenomenon in the world, while the target of a surrogate model is another model. This essential difference makes toy surrogate models (TSMs) a new object of study for theories of understanding, one that is not easily accommodated under current analyses. This paper provides an account of what it means to understand an opaque ML model globally with the aid of such simple models. (shrink)

El artículo expone el papel del otro y de lo otro en la hermenéutica de Gadamer a la luz de la idea de diálogo. Para comprender se requiere reconocer lo otro en su carácter de tú, asumir que no se tiene distancia frente a él y estar abierto a acoger lo dicho por él como una posible verdad. La compresión posee una estructura dialéctica que implica la cancelación de las propias expectativas y el acceso a un saber más abarcante. Aunque (...) la comprensión es histórica, en ella se muestra cada vez un aspecto de la cosa misma, que resulta de la interacción del yo y el tú en el curso de la conversación hermenéutica y que constituye una verdad común con caracteres análogos a los del saber de tipo práctico. [The paper exposes the role of the other in Gadamer’s hermeneutics in the light of the idea of dialogue. Understanding requires the recognition of the other as a thou, the acceptance of the lack of distance from him and the openness to embrace what is said by him as a possible truth. Understanding has a dialectical structure which implies the cancellation of one’s own expectations and the access to a more comprehensive knowledge. Even though every understanding is historical, it discloses an aspect of the thing itself, which results from the interaction of the I and the thou during the process of hermeneutical conversation and constitutes a common truth with analogous characteristics to practical reason.] . (shrink)

Durante los últimos años, el problema de cómo justificar aquellas creencias que se originan en testimonios ha ocupado un lugar central en la epistemología. Sin embargo, muy pocas de esas reflexiones son conocidas en el derecho probatorio. En el presente ensayo analizo la prueba testimonial a la luz de estas reflexiones con el fin de poner de manifiesto los supuestos epistemológicos de algunos principios procesales. En concreto, analizo la legislación colombiana y la estadounidense en el marco de la disputa entre (...) el reduccionismo y el antirreduccionismo en la filosofía del testimonio. Al final sugiero una nueva aproximación epistemológica que replantea los términos de la disputa y que tiene implicaciones importantes para la valoración de la prueba testimonial en los procesos judiciales. (shrink)

Los sesgos cognitivos afectan negativamente la toma de decisiones en todas las esferas de la vida, incluyendo las decisiones de los jueces. La imposibilidad de eliminarlos por completo de la práctica del derecho, o incluso de controlar sus efectos, contrasta con el anhelo de que las decisiones judiciales sean el resultado exclusivo de un razonamiento lógico-jurídico correcto. Frente el efecto sistemático, recalcitrante y porfiado de los sesgos cognitivos, una posible estrategia para disminuir su efecto es enfocarse, no en modificar el (...) comportamiento de los agentes judiciales, sino en moldear su entorno para que los sesgos tengan menos oportunidades de aparecer. En particular, es más provechoso concentrar los esfuerzos en identificar aquellas reglas procesales que faciliten o limiten el efecto de los sesgos. En este ensayo propongo un diálogo fructífero entre el derecho y la psicología que puede llevar a mejorar la calidad de los sistemas judiciales. La propuesta está basada en la creación de guías de práctica judicial que puedan servir de base para la creación de protocolos procesales que limiten en la medida de lo razonable sus efectos negativos y conduzcan a mejores decisiones judiciales. (shrink)

Moore’s Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikka’s interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way (...) our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moore’s Paradox. (shrink)