Over the past decade, many politicians and celebrities in North America have found themselves embroiled in scandals that involved them having worn black make-up and in at least one incident white make-up. In most of these cases, the used make-up was part of a costume for Halloween, Purim, Carnival, or a themed party. This article challenges the view that wearing cross-racial make-up on such occasions as part of personal costumes—as opposed to costumes that are integral to specific cultural traditions, such (...) as the New Orleans Zulu parade—is always wrong. To do so, it assesses the five most promising objections to this practice. Although some of these objections count against certain uses of cross-racial make-up, I show that in several high-profile cases where such make-up was worn, none of them had force, whether because the objections themselves were implausible and/or because they did not apply. (shrink)

To uncover the main dimensions of sport personality traits, a lexical study was conducted. In the first two phases, 321 adjectives denoting the way somebody practices sports were selected. In the third phase, 555 respondents self-rated the adjectives. Congruence analyses provided evidence of six factors, five of which are sport personality trait factors plus one physical individual difference factor. Marker scales from the sport personality trait factors show convergent correlations with the generic HEXACO personality obtained years earlier. Furthermore, meaningful relations (...) with the six most frequently practiced sport and leisure activities were observed. Contextualized sport personality trait factors can be useful in research on sport preferences, sport behaviors, and sport outcomes. (shrink)

Providing equitable food security for a growing population while minimizing environmental impacts and enhancing resilience to climate shocks is an ongoing challenge. Here, we quantify the resource intensity, environmental impacts and nutritional output of a small (0.075 ha) low-input subsistence Mediterranean agroecological farm in a developed nation that is based on intercropping and annual crop rotation. The farm provides one individual, the proprietor, with nutritional self-sufficiency (adequate intake of an array of macro- and micro-nutrients) with limited labor, no synthetic fertilizers (...) or herbicides, and zero waste, effectively closing a full farm-table-farm cycle. We find that the agroecological farm outperforms conventional farming as practiced in the same country in terms of both lower environmental burdens, across all examined environmental metrics (63% lower on average) per kg produce, and higher nutritional score (66% higher on average). Per equal farmland, the environmental lopsidedness was even higher (79% lower than conventional farming on average), with nearly the same nutritional score (3% lower on average). Moreover, when considering total land area, which includes farmland and supporting non-agricultural lands, as well as postgate impacts and food losses, the advantage of the agroecological system over conventional farming is even more pronounced. Situated within a Mediterranean region that is undergoing rapid climate change, this food system is a unique case study of nutrition- and environment-oriented food production system. While its deployment potential is limited by lack of supportive policies, it nonetheless represents one of the most starkly bold alternatives to current food systems. (shrink)

Although 43 countries have a monarch as their head of state, the question of whether monarchies can be morally justified has been neglected by contemporary philosophers. In this article, I argue that it is doubtful whether any existing monarchies can be morally justified. As I show, they all suffer from one or more of the following defects: they flout democratic principles; they are non-meritocratic; and/or they fail to provide at least some royals with an adequate range of lifestyle options. However, (...) I go on to identify a novel type of elective monarchy that escapes these problems, and which, I submit, can be vindicated as long as it serves legitimate public objectives (e.g. by promoting social cohesion among citizens and/or by fostering international trade). (shrink)

Wat betreft economische groei en ontwikkeling van de werkloosheid heeft de Nederlandse economie het sinds 1973 slechter gedaan dan andere OECD-landen. Op de vraag naar de oorzaken van die slechte prestatie zijn in het verleden uiteenlopende antwoorden gegeven door o.m. Bomhoff en Clavaux. Ook zijn er diverse wegen aangegeven om op te rukken naar een betere positie. In dit artikel presenteren de auteurs de resultaten van een internationale doorsnee-analyse om de verschillen in economisch succes tussen landen met behulp van een (...) eenvoudig neo-klassiek macro-economisch model te verklaren. Dit biedt de mogelijkheid om te traceren wat de rol van de exportgroei, de groei van de bevolking, de wisselkoers, de verhouding tussen de binnenlandse en de buitenlandse prijsontwikkeling en de investeringsquote voor verschillen in economische ontwikkeling is geweest. Vooral de uitvoer gecorrigeerd voor de omvang van de bevolking, de investeringsquote en de nominale wisselkoers komen als belangrijke verklarende variabelen naar voren. Op grond van hun analyse komen de auteurs tot de conclusie dat een beleid gericht op het verbeteren van de Nederlandse economische prestatie op lange termijn zich vooral zou moeten concentreren op het benutten van exportkansen en op een hoog investeringsniveau ter bevordering van technologische vernieuwing en daarmee verbetering van de concurrentiepositie. Daarbij moet worden voorkomen dat revaluatie van de gulden het exporteffect teniet doet. (shrink)

François Lamy, a Benedictine monk and Cartesian philosopher whose extensive relations with Arnauld, Bossuet, Fénélon, and Malebranche put him into contact with the intellectual elite of late-seventeenth-century France, authored the very first detailed and explicit refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics in French, Le nouvel athéisme renversé. Regrettably overlooked in the secondary literature on Spinoza, Lamy is an interesting figure in his own right, and his anti-Spinozist work sheds important light on Cartesian assumptions that inform the earliest phase of Spinoza’s critical reception (...) in the seventeenth-century. I begin by presenting Lamy’s life and the contentious state of Spinoza’s French reception in the 1680 and 1690s. I then discuss a central argument in Lamy’s refutation, namely the Cartesian objection that Spinoza’s account of the conceptual independence of attributes is incompatible with the theory of substance monism. Contrasting Lamy’s objection with questions put to Spinoza by de Vries and Tschirnhaus, I maintain that by exhibiting the direction Spinoza’s views on substance and attribute took in maturing we may accurately assess the strength of Spinoza’s position vis-à-vis his Cartesian objector, and I argue that, in fact, Spinoza’s mature account of God as an expressive ens realissimum is not vulnerable to Lamy’s criticism. In conclusion, I turn to Lamy’s objection that Spinoza’s philosophy is question-begging in view of Spinoza’s account of God, and I exhibit what this point of criticism tells us about the intentions of the first French Cartesian rebuttal of the Ethics. (shrink)

REPRODUÇÃO EM NOVILHAS LEITEIRAS -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- O principal objetivo da criação de substitutos em gado leiteiro é produzir uma novilha que tenha seu parto aos dois anos de idade (23 a 25 meses) e com um peso de 550 a 580 kg. O manejo reprodutivo das novilhas começa quando estas atingem 14 ou 15 meses de idade e um peso de 350 a 370 kg. A produção de novilhas deve ser suficiente para substituir as vacas descartadas anualmente (25 a (...) 35%), e para contribuir com o crescimento do rebanho. Espera-se que em um gado leiteiro deva haver uma população de animais de reposição, desde um dia de vida até à fase de novilha ao parto, correspondendo pelo menos a 70 % do total das vacas (figura 1). -/- Figura 1: A meta do programa de produção de substitutos ou fêmeas de reposição consiste em uma novilha que chegue ao seu primeiro parto aos 24 ou 25 meses de idade, entre um peso de 550 a 580 kg. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- A produção de novilhas depende basicamente de três fatores: da fertilidade das vacas, ou seja, do número de bezerras nascidas anualmente; da mortalidade durante a criação e desenvolvimento; e da eficiência reprodutiva das novilhas. O manejo reprodutivo moderno das novilhas é orientado para a utilização da inseminação artificial, seja em um estro natural ou sincronizado. As novilhas representam a população animal geneticamente mais avançada no rebanho, portanto, o mérito genético de suas crias obtidas por inseminação é maior do que o das crias das vacas adultas. Além disso, as crias das novilhas obtidas mediante a inseminação aceleram o avanço genético, uma vez que contribuem com uma proporção maior de substituições do rebanho em comparação com as crias das vacas de outras faixas etárias. Além disso, as novilhas são as fêmeas mais férteis do rebanho (porcentagem de concepção: 60 a 70% vs 30 a 40% em vacas), pelo que o custo do sêmen por gestação é menor em comparação com as vacas adultas, o que permite investir em melhores touros e em sêmen sexado. -/- 1. PUBERDADE -/- A puberdade é definida como a fase de desenvolvimento em que a fêmea apresenta o seu primeiro estro fértil. Regularmente as novilhas leiteiras, sob condições ótimas de manejo, chegam à puberdade entre 11 e 12 meses de idade, ou seja, antes de alavancar o peso recomendado para receber o primeiro serviço. Vale salientar que as novilhas podem ficar gestantes após a puberdade; no entanto, isto não é conveniente porque ainda não completou-se o seu desenvolvimento. Se ficarem gestantes nos primeiros ciclos estrais, as novilhas poderiam chegar ao parto com pouco desenvolvimento físico, o que provocaria distocias e baixa produção de leite (figura 2). A ativação do sistema neuroendócrino para que a bezerra atinja a puberdade é regulada principalmente pelo estado nutricional (condição corporal). A transição do anestro pré-puberal à ciclicidade puberal coincide com um aumento da condição corporal e das concentrações de insulina, IGF-I e leptina. Estes hormônios agem como sinais metabólicos no hipotálamo e hipófise que modificam a frequência de secreção das gonadotropinas, resultando na maturação folicular e ovulação. O atraso em relação à puberdade está diretamente relacionado com deficiências na alimentação; esta condição verifica-se em criações pouco tecnificadas, principalmente de pequenos e médios produtores. As novilhas que já atingiram o peso para receber o primeiro serviço e não apresentaram estro, devem ser examinadas por via retal para excluir possíveis anormalidades do desenvolvimento, tais como freemartinismo ou hipoplasia genital. -/- Figura 2: O fator mais importante que determina a puberdade é a nutrição. Bezerras bem alimentadas apresentam ciclos estrais aos 11 meses de idade e devem ser inseminadas aos 14 ou 15 meses de idade, com um peso de 350 a 370 kg. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- 2. DETECÇÃO DE ESTRO E INSEMINAÇÃO ARTIFICIAL -/- A baixa eficiência na detecção de estros é o problema que mais afeta a eficiência reprodutiva das novilhas. De acordo com a duração do estro (8 a 18 horas), a observação das novilhas em períodos de 30 minutos durante a manhã e à tarde, permite detectar em estro até 70% das fêmeas, enquanto a observação contínua (24 horas) aumenta a eficiência na detecção até 95% (figuras 3 e 4). No manejo tradicional dos rebanhos leiteiros, as novilhas recebem pouca atenção por parte dos trabalhadores, o que resulta em baixa eficiência na detecção de estros (50 a 60%). Em diferença das vacas adultas em lactação, as novilhas estão menos expostas a fatores que diminuem a expressão do estro, portanto, com uma rotina de observação, de pelo menos duas horas na manhã (6h a 8h da manhã) e duas horas pela tarde até a noite (17h da tarde a 19h da noite), pode-se detectar até 90% das fêmeas no estro (figura 5). -/- Figura 3: O fator que mais influencia a idade ao primeiro parto é a baixa eficiência na detecção de estros, pelo que é recomendável a observação de estros com pessoal qualificado, em períodos de pelo menos duas horas pela manhã e duas à tarde. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 4: Com a observação contínua é possível alcançar de 90 a 95% de eficiência na detecção de estros. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 5: A inseminação deve ser realizada durante o período de receptividade sexual. Com boa eficiência na detecção de estros, a inseminação pode ser praticada no programa AM-PM e PM-AM, ou em apenas um turno de inseminação pela manhã (10:00), com bons resultados. -/- 3. TAXA DE PRENHEZ -/- O melhor indicador de eficiência reprodutiva é a taxa de prenhez. Este indicador refere-se à proporção de animais gestantes do total elegível para inseminação, num período equivalente a um ciclo estral. Como já se descreveu no trabalho Fisiologia do Estro e do Serviço na Reprodução Bovina, este indicador considera a eficiência na detecção de estros e a porcentagem de concepção, e reflete com maior objetividade a eficácia do manejo reprodutivo. Este parâmetro pode ser melhorado através de um aumento da proporção de novilhas detectadas em estro, o que se obtém aumentando o tempo de observação e aplicando técnicas de sincronização do estro (figura 6). -/- 4. INSEMINAÇÃO DE NOVILHAS COM SÊMEN SEXADO -/- A utilização de sêmen sexado é uma boa opção para a produção de novilhas de reposição. Com a nova tecnologia disponível para a separação de espermatozoides com o cromossomo x, é possível alcançar até 90% de crias fêmeas; no entanto, o processo de separação de espermatozoides tem baixa eficiência, o que limita o número de espermatozoides por palheta. As palhetas de inseminação com sêmen sexado contém de dois a três milhões de espermatozoides (doses de sêmen não sexado têm de 20 a 30 milhões). De acordo com os dados de fertilidade de gados comerciais, as novilhas inseminadas com sêmen sexado mostram de 10 a 20% menor concepção que novilhas inseminadas com sêmen não sexado, o que desencoraja o seu uso. Causas de baixa fertilidade não são conhecidas, no entanto, estão associadas com a menor concentração espermática e com alguns danos nos espermatozoides provocados pelo processo de separação. No entanto, o uso de sêmen sexado é uma opção viável para aumentar a produção de novilhas no rebanho, e com o melhoramento dos processos de separação espermática em pouco tempo se converterá em uma prática de rotina nos estábulos (figura 7). -/- Figura 6: Uma técnica que aumenta a eficiência na detecção dos estros consiste em pintar a região da grupa. Quando esta pintura desaparece ou se nota que as novilhas estão "talhadas", devem ser apalpadas via retal para determinar se existem sinais genitais de estro. Acervo pessoal do autor. -/- Figura 7: As novilhas são as fêmeas mais férteis do rebanho, por isso o custo do sêmen por gestação é menor em comparação com as vacas adultas, o que permite investir em melhores touros e em sêmen sexado. Acervo pessoal do autor. 5. MONTA DIRIGIDA -/- A monta dirigida ou direta é uma opção prática e eficaz para emprenhar as novilhas. Neste sistema se introduz um touro com um grupo de novilhas, para que ele se encarregue de encontrar as fêmeas em estro e proceder a monta. Em rebanhos comerciais, o ideal é a utilização de um touro para 25 fêmeas. No entanto, com este manejo perde-se a oportunidade de utilizar a inseminação artificial e, com isso, a possibilidade de melhoria genética. -/- 6. PROGRAMAS DE SINCRONIZAÇÃO DE ESTROS -/- Os tratamentos para sincronizar o estro das novilhas possuem os mesmos fundamentos que os utilizados nas vacas. -/- 6.1 Prostaglandina F2a -/- A PGF2α é utilizada para a sincronização de estros em grupos de novilhas, e também é utilizada para a indução do estro individualmente, nas fêmeas que são examinadas por via retal e têm um corpo lúteo. A resposta dos animais tratados é variável; em novilhas pode-se alcançar até 95% de animais em estro. O tempo de manifestação do estro após a injeção é de 48 a 120 horas. -/- 6.1.1 Dupla injeção de PGF2a -/- Além da sincronização dos animais selecionados pela presença de um corpo lúteo diagnosticado por palpação retal, existem dois programas que não incluem a palpação retal. Por exemplo, na segunda-feira, ou no dia preferido, injeta-se PGF2α em todas as novilhas que se deseja inseminar. Cerca de 50% das novilhas manifestarão estro nas próximas 48 a 120 horas. As fêmeas que não mostrarem estro receberão uma segunda injeção na segunda-feira seguinte (intervalo de sete dias). As que apresentaram estro com a primeira injeção teriam um corpo lúteo nesse momento, enquanto as que não o manifestaram estavam em estro ou em metaestro; assim, ao repetir o tratamento sete dias depois, estas últimas novilhas teriam um corpo lúteo e responderiam à PGF2α (figura 8). No outro programa, é administrada duas doses de PGF2α com 11 dias de separação/intervalo. As novilhas podem ser inseminadas no estro observado, após qualquer uma das duas injeções. Este programa oferece uma boa sincroniza- ção após a segunda injeção e é o programa de escolha na sincronização das novilhas receptoras de embriões (figura 9). -/- Figura 8: Sincronização do estro com dupla injeção de PGF2a com 7 dias de diferença/intervalo. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- Figura 9: Sincronização do estro com dupla injeção de PGF2a com 11 dias de diferença/intervalo. Elaborado pelo autor. -/- 6.2 Progestágenos -/- Existe um tratamento que consiste na inserção, na parte externa da orelha, de um implante que contém norgestomet, que permanece na região auricular por nove dias. Além disso, o tratamento é complementado com a injeção intramuscular de valerato de estradiol e norgestomet, no momento da colocação do implante. O tempo de apresentação do estro a partir da remoção do implante é de 48 a 72 horas e a proporção de animais em estro muitas vezes se torna maior do que 80%. Outro tratamento é baseado na inserção intravaginal de dispositivos de liberação de progesterona. O dispositivo pode ser utilizado durante 12 dias ou o período de exposição pode ser encurtado, desde que seja acompanhado da injeção de uma dose luteolítica de PGF2α, um dia antes ou no momento da remoção do dispositivo. A fertilidade global conseguida após o serviço no estro sincronizado é similar à obtida no estro natural; porém, algumas novilhas são menos férteis, o que está associado com alterações no desenvolvimento folicular e alterações na relação temporal entre o estro e a ovulação. Observou-se que o tratamento com implantes de norgestomet combinados com a injeção de valerato de estradiol pode induzir comportamento estral em animais que não estão ciclando normalmente. Isso ocorre porque os níveis de estradiol, administrados no primeiro dia, persistem até o momento da remoção do implante. Assim, ao remover a fonte do progestágeno e ao haver concentrações altas de estradiol se desencadeia o estro, o qual em novilhas anéstricas não é acompanhado de ovulação, enquanto que em novilhas ciclando se altera a relação temporal entre o estro, pico pré-ovulatório de LH e ovulação. Bons resultados são alcançados quando o valerato de estradiol não é administrado e é substituído por uma injeção de PGF2α no momento da remoção do implante. Outro fator que tem sido associado com baixa fertilidade é o dia do ciclo em que o tratamento começa. Observou-se que quando coincide com a presença de um corpo lúteo (diestro), a porcentagem de concepção é maior do que quando não há um corpo lúteo (proestro). Isto ocorre porque a concentração sérica do progestágeno, por si só, não é capaz de suprimir a secreção pulsátil de LH, o que faz com que o folículo dominante presente no momento de iniciar o tratamento não sofra atresia e persista até o dia da retirada do progestágeno, convertendo-se no folículo ovulatório. Com isso, o folículo já envelheceu e o ovócito já sofreu alterações que reduzem o seu potencial para desenvolver um embrião viável. Quando o tratamento coincide com a presença de um corpo lúteo, a secreção de LH é efetivamente suprimida devido ao efeito aditivo da progesterona secretada pelo corpo lúteo e do progestágeno exógeno, inserido na vaca, o que provoca a reposição folicular. Em condições de campo, a seleção das vacas pela presença de um corpo lúteo antes de iniciar o tratamento com progestágenos é impraticável, uma vez que não é possível visualizá-lo, além disso essa prática/seleção não faria sentido, já que seria mais fácil tratar estes animais com dose ou doses de PGF2α. Atualmente existem tratamentos para eliminar folículos dominantes e promover uma nova onda folicular. -/- 6.3 Progestágenos orais -/- O acetato de melengestrol (MGA) é um progestágeno administrado por via oral. Em fêmeas bovinas é utilizado para melhorar a eficiência alimentar nos currais de engorda, o que se consegue através da inibição da apresentação do estro. Como todos os progestágenos, o MGA inibe a secreção de LH, eliminando assim a maturação do folículo e a ovulação. Após a remoção do MGA, o folículo dominante termina o seu desenvolvimento e as fêmeas apresentam estro em forma sincronizada. A dose de MGA por novilha é de 0,5 a 1 mg por dia, em tratamentos que variam de 9 a 14 dias. A apresentação comercial de MGA contém 0,22 mg do hormônio por 1 g do produto. O MGA pode ser facilmente misturado com qualquer concentrado ou grão moído. Após o último dia de tratamento, o estro se apresenta de dois a seis dias. O intervalo de remoção do MGA ao estro é mais longo quando comparado com outros progestágenos. Isto deve-se ao tempo de remoção do MGA, uma vez que enquanto um implante ou dispositivo intravaginal é removido abruptamente, o MGA pode continuar a ser absorvido enquanto é removido do trato gastrointestinal. Com tratamentos de 14 dias podem-se obter porcentagens de concepção menores em comparação com o estro natural, o que se deve em grande parte à ovulação de folículos persistentes. Um tratamento eficaz, que também melhora a fertilidade, consiste na administração de MGA durante 14 dias, seguido de uma injeção de PGF2α 15 ou 17 dias após a remoção do progestágeno. Com este programa, uma alta proporção de fêmeas teriam um corpo lúteo no momento da injeção da PGF2α e apresentariam estro com boa sincronização. Outro tratamento eficaz consiste na administração do MGA durante nove dias, mais uma dose de PGF2α ao nono dia; com este programa também se obtêm bons resultados em sincronização do estro e fertilidade. Este tratamento foi avaliado com novilhas holandesas e a porcentagem de fêmeas sincronizadas é elevada (95%). A porcentagem de concepção é semelhante à obtida no estro natural. Estes resultados são comparáveis aos obtidos com outros programas, como implantes de norgestomet ou dispositivos intravaginais de liberação de progesterona, mas com um custo significativamente menor (figura 10). -/- 6.4 Sincronização da ovulação e inseminação em tempo fixo -/- Em contraste com o observado em vacas em lactação, a resposta das novilhas aos programas de sincronização da ovulação e inseminação a tempo fixo é deficiente, o que se reflete em porcentagens de concepção de 20 a 35% menores que as novilhas inseminadas no estro natural. A causa desta resposta está relacionada com diferenças no desenvolvimento folicular; assim, nas novilhas o tempo de desenvolvimento do folículo dominante é mais rápido e o tempo de domínio é mais curto do que nas vacas em lactação. Desta forma, o folículo da onda folicular sincronizada com a injeção de GnRH sofre atresia antes da injeção de PGF2α, de tal forma que quando se induz a ovulação com a segunda injeção de GnRH, as novilhas têm folículos em diferentes estádios de desenvolvimento, o que provoca assincronia entre a ovulação e a inseminação artificial. -/- Figura 10: Programa de sincronização do estro com Acetato de Melengestrol (MGA). Elaborado pelo autor. -/- 7. MANEJO DO ANESTRO -/- Uma vez que as novilhas atingem a puberdade, apresentam ciclos estrais em intervalos de 21 dias que só são interrompidos pela gestação ou por alguma patologia. O anestro patológico é raro em novilhas; no entanto, surgem casos de piometra e cistos luteinizados, que são tratados com uma dose de PGF2α. Também se observam anormalidades de desenvolvimen- to, tais como freemartinismo e hipoplasia genital, patologias que não têm tratamento; somente 8% das novilhas freemartin são férteis. O anestro funcional (as novilhas manifestam estro, mas não são detectadas) é frequen- te e está diretamente relacionado com a eficiência na detecção de estros. As novilhas com idade e peso para se integrarem no programa reprodutivo e não apresentarem sinais de estro devem ser examinadas retalmente para diagnosticar a causa do anestro. Se, durante a palpação retal, as novilhas tiverem um corpo lúteo são tratadas nesse momento com PGF2α, os animais sem corpo lúteo podem receber uma injeção de PGF2α, sete dias depois. Este programa sincroniza o estro e aumenta a probabilidade de o detectar (figura 11). -/- Figura 11: As novilhas com idade e peso para se integrarem no programa reprodutivo e não mostrarem sinais de estro devem ser verificadas via retal para diagnosticar a causa do anestro. Arquivo pessoal do autor. -/- 8. MANEJO DA NOVILHA INFÉRTIL -/- A fertilidade das vacas leiteiras diminuiu nos últimos 30 anos, enquanto a fertilidade das novilhas não se alterou; após a primeira inseminação, entre 60 e 70% das novilhas emprenham. O objetivo do programa reprodutivo é conseguir que 90% das novilhas gestem nos primeiros três serviços. Desta forma, esta proporção de animais daria à luz antes dos 25 meses de idade. É comum que 10% das novilhas se transformem em animais repetidores, ou seja, novilhas com mais de três serviços inférteis. A causa da falha na concepção de novilhas deve-se principalmente à morte embrionária precoce. Uma causa importante da falha na concepção das novilhas repetidoras são as patologias adquiridas no aparelho reprodutivo; é comum encontrar aderências ovarianas e salpingite. Provavelmente, esses problemas são consequência de alguma infecção adquirida durante a criação. Diversos tratamentos hormonais têm sido testados para resolver o problema de infertilidade em novilhas repetidoras e os resultados obtidos ainda são deficientes. Como estes tratamentos não apresentam resultados consistentes, a melhor forma de mitigar o problema de infertilidade nas novilhas é melhorando as práticas de inseminação, ou seja, o momento da inseminação, o manejo do sêmen e a técnica de inseminação empregada. Além disso, a melhor técnica para aumentar a proporção de novilhas prenhes no rebanho é aumentar a eficiência da detecção de estros. -/- 9. RESUMO -/- As novilhas devem parir aos dois anos de idade (23 a 25 meses). O peso ao parto deve ser de 550 a 580 kg. O manejo reprodutivo começa aos 14 ou 15 meses de idade, com um peso de 350 a 370 kg. As palhetas de sêmen sexado contêm de 2 a 3 milhões de espermatozoides. As doses de sêmen não sexado contêm de 20 a 30 milhões de espermatozoides. A porcentagem de concepção das novilhas inseminadas com sêmen sexado é 10 a 20% menor do que com sêmen não sexado. Com sêmen sexado se obtém entre 90 e 95% de fêmeas. A porcentagem de concepção com programas de IATF é de 20 a 35% menor que nas novilhas inseminadas no estro natural. Cerca de 90% das novilhas devem ficar prenhes nos primeiros três serviços. Devem ser produzidas novilhas para substituir as vacas que são descartadas anualmen- te (25 a 35%). Espera-se que um gado leiteiro tenha ao dispor uma população de animais de reposição, desde um dia de vida até a etapa de novilha ao parto, correspondente a, pelo menos, 70 % do total das vacas. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- AUAD, Alexander Machado et al. Manual de bovinocultura de leite. Brasília: LK Editora, 2010. BRICKELL, J. S.; MCGOWAN, M. M.; WATHES, D. C. Effect of management factors and blood metabolites during the rearing period on growth in dairy heifers on UK farms. Domestic animal endocrinology, v. 36, n. 2, p. 67-81, 2009. DE VRIES, A. et al. Exploring the impact of sexed semen on the structure of the dairy industry. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 91, n. 2, p. 847-856, 2008. Fertilidade em Vacas Leiteiras: Fisiologia e Manejo. Fisiologia do Estro e do Serviço na Reprodução Bovina. FERREIRA, A. M. Manejo reprodutivo de bovinos leiteiros: práticas corretas e incorretas, casos reais, perguntas e respostas. Edição do autor, Juiz de Fora, 2012. FERREIRA, A. de M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns (causas e tratamentos). Juiz de Fora: Minas Gerais–Brasil, p. 422, 2010. GALINA, Carlos; VALENCIA, Javier. Reproducción de los animales domésticos. 2006. GONÇALVES, J. N. Manual do produtor de leite. Viçosa, MG: Aprenda Fácil, 2012. HEINRICHS, A. J. Raising dairy replacements to meet the needs of the 21st century. Journal of dairy science, v. 76, n. 10, p. 3179-3187, 1993. HOFFMAN, P. C. Optimum body size of Holstein replacement heifers. Journal of Animal Science, v. 75, n. 3, p. 836-845, 1997. NEIVA, R. S. Criação eficiente de bezerros e novilhas. Lavras: Autor, 2013. NEIVA, Rogério Santoro. Produção de bovinos leiteiros. Lavras: UFLA, 1998. PEREIRA, E. S. et al. Novilhas leiteiras. Graphiti Gráfica e Editora LTDA, Fortaleza, Ceará, 2010. CARVALHO, B. C. Manejo reprodutivo de novilhas leiteiras. In. SENAR. Curso de reprodução e genética em bovinocultura de leite. Coronel Pacheco: Senar, 2021. YOUNGQUIST, Robert S.; THRELFALL, W. R. Large animal theriogenology. 2007. (shrink)

An essay, which I wrote for the catalog to the exhibition “ARCHESCAPE: the Piranesi Flights,” organized by the Dutch Piranesi scholar Gijs Wallis de Vries. The text, which is necessarily kept short, uses notions of the magnificent and the tragic that I discovered in Hartshorne’s Aesthetic Diagram as discussed in “The Ages of Beauty.”.

This paper analyses the phenomenology and epistemology of chatbots such as ChatGPT and Bard. The computational architecture underpinning these chatbots are large language models (LLMs), which are generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems trained on a massive dataset of text extracted from the Web. We conceptualise these LLMs as multifunctional computational cognitive artifacts, used for various cognitive tasks such as translating, summarizing, answering questions, information-seeking, and much more. Phenomenologically, LLMs can be experienced as a “quasi-other”; when that happens, users anthropomorphise them. (...) For most users, current LLMs are black boxes, i.e., for the most part, they lack data transparency and algorithmic transparency. They can, however, be phenomenologically and informationally transparent, in which case there is an interactional flow. Anthropomorphising and interactional flow can, in some users, create an attitude of (unwarranted) trust towards the output LLMs generate. We conclude this paper by drawing on the epistemology of trust and testimony to examine the epistemic implications of these dimensions. Whilst LLMs generally generate accurate responses, we observe two epistemic pitfalls. Ideally, users should be able to match the level of trust that they place in LLMs to the degree that LLMs are trustworthy. However, both their data and algorithmic opacity and their phenomenological and informational transparency can make it difficult for users to calibrate their trust correctly. The effects of these limitations are twofold: users may adopt unwarranted attitudes of trust towards the outputs of LLMs (which is particularly problematic when LLMs hallucinate), and the trustworthiness of LLMs may be undermined. (shrink)

During emerging public health crises, both policymakers and members of the public are looking to scientific experts to provide guidance. Even in cases where there are significant uncertainties, there is pressure for experts to “speak with one voice” to avoid confusion, allow officials to make evidence-based decisions rapidly, and encourage public support for such decisions. This can lead experts to engage in masking of information about the state of the science or regarding assumptions involved in policy recommendations. Although experts might (...) have good reasons for masking disagreements, uncertainties, or assumptions when offering policy advice, we argue that this strategy can result in epistemic harms. Using the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show that public health authorities masked two types of information necessary for laypersons to evaluate public health recommendations: (1) experts’ disagreements about the scientific evidence and (2) the role of values in making inferences from the science to policy positions. We contend that this resulted in epistemic harms against laypeople that provide a pro tanto case against masking information. We further argue that when the science is in flux and policies need to be implemented despite significant uncertainties, there is an all-things-considered case against masking the types of information discussed. (shrink)

Katie Steele and H. Orri Stefánsson argue that, to reflect an agent’s limited awareness, the algebra of propositions on which that agent’s credences are defined should be relativised to their awareness state. I argue that this produces insurmountable difficulties. But the project of relativising the agent’s algebra to reflect their partial perspective need not be abandoned: the algebra can be relativised, not to the agent’s awareness state, but to what we might call their subjective modality.

Our aim in this paper is to extend the semantics for the kind of logic of ground developed in (deRosset and Fine, 2023). In that paper, we very briefly suggested a way of treating universal and existential quantification over a fixed domain of objects. Here we explore some options for extending the treatment to allow for a variable domain of objects.

In this paper, we draw on Alfred Schutz’s theoretical framework to better understand how oppression is enacted through discriminatory acts. By closely examining the role of typifications and relevances in our experience of others, and by supplementing this analysis with contemporary social scientific resources, we argue that a Schutzian perspective on oppression yields important phenomenological insights. We do this in three key steps. Firstly, we contextualise Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World within Schutz’s broader body of work, (...) elucidating his central conditions of discrimination. Secondly, we highlight the limitations of Schutz’s account, in how it fails to capture more peripheral, subtle, and implicit oppressive practices. Finally, we introduce two underexplored insights derived from Schutz’s framework: the role of relevances in understanding the motivational underpinnings of implicit biases, and the connection between self-typification and stereotype threat. With this multidimensional approach, we hope to enhance our understanding of oppression whilst bridging gaps in Schutz’s original conceptualization. (shrink)

Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman’s approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of these formalisations to the alethic modal case. This logical exploration will allow us (...) to study (i) cases of metaphysical incompatibility between modal facts and (ii) cases of modal dialetheias. In turn, this will enrich our understanding of the role of impossibility in the fragmentalist framework. (shrink)

An operational approach to quantum mechanics has been developed in the past decades in our group in Brussels. A similar approach is taken in this work, making use of the extra operational depth offered by this approach, to show that the construction of spacetime is specific to each observer. What is usually referred to as the block universe then emerges by noting that parts of the past and future are also contained in the present, but without the limitations that a (...) four-dimensional block universe usually implies, of a reality in which change would be impossible. In our operational approach, reality remains dynamic, with free choice playing a central role in its conceptualization. We also show that, when operationally analyzed, the theory implies that objects move not only in space, but also and especially in time, and more generally in spacetime, with their rest mass being a measure of their kinetic time energy. We therefore claim that Einstein’s relativity revolution has not been fully realized, since most physicists are not ready to accept these consequences of the theory although the formula’s showing them, when operationally analyzed, are in every relativity textbook. In particular, when relativistic motion is revisited as a genuine four-dimensional motion, it becomes possible to reinterpret the parameter c associated with the coordinate speed of light, which becomes the magnitude of the four-velocity of all material entities. We observe that this four-dimensional motion in Minkowski space can also be better understood if placed in the broader perspective of quantum mechanics, provided that non-locality is interpreted as non-spatiality, thus indicating the existence of an underlying non-spatial reality, the nature of which could be conceptual, consistent with the conceptuality interpretation of quantum mechanics. This hypothesis is reinforced by noting that when observers, or experiencers, as they will be referred to in this article, are described by acknowledging their cognitive nature of entities moving in a semantic space, Minkowski metric emerges in a natural way. (shrink)

This chapter contains an introduction by the editors of the volume P.F. Strawson and his Philosophical Legacy. First, the chapter describes Strawson’s life and gives a summary of his most important works, ranging from his early ‘On Referring’ to his latest book Analysis and Metaphysics. Secondly, it gives an overview of the contributions that appear in P.F. Strawson and his Philosophical Legacy. Lastly, a bibliography of primary and secondary sources is given. The aim of the chapter is to introduce the (...) reader to Strawson’s work and to facilitate the learning process of becoming acquainted with Strawson’s philosophical project. (shrink)

The relationship between topological explanation and mechanistic explanation is unclear. Most philosophers agree that at least some topological explanations are mechanistic explanations. The crucial question is how to make sense of this claim. Zednik (Philos Psychol 32(1):23–51, 2019) argues that topological explanations are mechanistic if they (i) describe mechanism sketches that (ii) pick out organizational properties of mechanisms. While we agree with Zednik’s conclusion, we critically discuss Zednik’s account and show that it fails as a general account of how and (...) when topological explanations are mechanistic. First, if topological explanations were just mechanism sketches, this implies that they could be enriched by replacing topological terms with mechanistic detail. This, however, conflicts how topological explanations are used in scientific practice. Second, Zednik’s account fails to show how topological properties can be organizational properties of mechanisms that have a place in mechanistic explanation. The core issue is that Zednik’s account ignores that topological properties often are _global_ properties while mechanistic explanantia refer to _local_ properties. We demonstrate how these problems can be solved by a recent account of mechanistic completeness (Craver and Kaplan in Br J Philos Sci 71(1):287–319, 2020; Kohár and Krickel in Calzavarini and Viola (eds) Neural mechanisms—new challenges in the philosophy of neuroscience, Springer, New York, 2021) and use a multilayer network model of Alzheimer’s Disease to illustrate this. (shrink)

Tyler Burge is famous for defending primitivist naturalism about mental representations, according to which mental representations are primitive natural states. Primitivist naturalism contrasts with semantic reductionism, according to which mental representations are reducible to more fundamental natural states. Burge developed the most compelling and influential attack on semantic reductionism from a primitivist naturalist point of view. My goal in this paper is to defend semantic reduc- tionism from Burge’s attack. I assess and refute his objection to the motivations for semantic (...) reductionism and his objection to the semantic reductionist theory that he takes to be the most promising one, namely, teleosemantics. I argue that in spite of the ingenuity of Burge’s objections, they fail to show that there is no motivation for taking representational states as reducible to more fundamental natural states or that the core thesis of teleosemantics is flawed. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a (...) Guarding Condition as addendums to historicism that are necessary to accommodate our cases of group responsibility. (shrink)

This study investigates how e-business capabilities and digital marketing strategies jointly influence business performance in the e-commerce industry, which has experienced unprecedented growth driven by technological advancements and changing consumer behavior. E-business capabilities encompass the use of technology and digital infrastructure, while digital marketing strategies are employed to attract and retain online customers. The study examines the effect of e-business capabilities through digital marketing strategies on the customer satisfaction and loyalty of UAE e-commerce industry. The research is descriptive and explanatory, (...) and uses a structured 5-scale Likert questionnaire to collect data from the HR managers of 135 e-commerce companies based in UAE. The statistical analysis is performed using structural equation modeling. The findings highlight the significant relationship of the study variables. Consequently, the results of this study provide valuable insights for e-commerce businesses, elucidating the need to invest in robust e-business capabilities to support effective digital marketing efforts. Additionally, the research underscores the significance of tailoring digital marketing strategies to align with specific business objectives and customer segments. The study also contributes to the literature on digital transformation, by demonstrating how e-business capabilities and digital marketing strategies can enable e-commerce firms to adapt and thrive in the dynamic and competitive digital environment. (shrink)

This essay aims to expose the metaphysical underpinnings of enactivism. While enactivism relies heavily on rejecting the traditional mind-body problem by excluding the familiar thought experiments that favor phenomenal dualism, the crucial point that is overlooked is instead the brain-body problem, specifically the crucial interaction between the brain and the bodily limbs in their embodied activities of perception and cognition. If enactivism is correct, differences in sensory experience necessarily entail differences in embodied activity—this is the metaphysical core of enactivism, which (...) we think is entirely wrong. We will argue that a physical or biological body ("Körper") is configured or shaped into a perceptually living body ("Leib") by brain patterns and not by embodied activity or by the so-called sensorimotor contingencies. Undoubtedly, embodied actions influence sensory perception. However, since variations in embodied actions do not necessarily lead to variations in sensory experience, they are not metaphysically constitutive of these experiences (supervenience claim). (shrink)

In his Lectures on Fine Art (1835), Hegel emphasizes the grotesque character of Indian art. Grotesqueness results, in his view, from a contradiction between meaning and shape due to the incongruous combination of spiritual and material elements. Since Hegel's history of art is teeming with examples of inadequacy between meaning and shape, this paper aims to distinguish the grotesque from other types of artistic dissonance and to problematize Hegel's ascriptions of grotesqueness to ancient Indian art. In the first part of (...) the paper, I characterize the grotesque by the unnatural distortion of natural shapes with the purpose of achieving a direct sensuous manifestation of an indeterminate and impersonal divinity, Brahman. Such an attempt is, in Hegel's view, self-contradictory and self-defeating, leading to an exaggeration of the conflict between nature and spirit instead of the intended reconciliation between the two parts. In the second part of the paper, I compare Hegel's account of Indian art to the ‘monstrous myths’ of early modern Europe. Unlike his predecessors, Hegel legitimizes the grotesque representations of Hindu gods as endowed with profound meaning and the result of a universal human need, yet he describes them as ultimately irrational and repulsive based on a prejudiced view of the Indian people(s). In this sense, Hegel's assessment of Indian art functions as a reflection of modern European culture, its fascination and horror in the face of what Enlightenment could not entirely purge, rather than as a truthful and objective account of Indian art and culture. By questioning Hegel's characterization of Hindu iconography and mythology, this paper contributes to underexplored areas of Hegelian aesthetics, namely Hegel's account of symbolic art, especially Indian art, as well as his views on negative aesthetic experiences and values. (shrink)

Kant was never satisfied with the version of his “Refu- tation” published in 1787 (KrV, B 275-279). His dissatisfaction is already evident in the footnote added to the preface of the second edition of the Critique in 1787. As a matter of fact, Kant continued to rework his argument for at least six years after 1787. The main exegetical problem is to figure out who is the target of the “Refutation”: a non-skeptic idealist, a global skeptic of Cartesian provenance or (...) both. In this last case, the related problem is to know whether either of them is the Cartesian skeptic of the first Meditation, the idealist skeptic of the second Meditation and first part of the third Meditation, or some other non-skeptic idealist. I present and defend a new reconstruction of Kant’s “Refu- tation” as a successful argument against Mendelssohnian idealism of Cartesian provenance. This defense is based on a simple logical sketch of the proof provided by Dicker but essentially modified in light of Dyck’s insight about Kant’s opponent. How shall I support my reading? First, by appealing to overwhelming textual evidence according to which the proof is of the existence of mind-independent things, showing that Kant’s main opponent is Mendelssohn’s idealism of Cartesian provenance. Finally, I support my reading by showing that Kant’s “Refutation” is doomed to fail against all forms of global skepticism but is quite successful against Mendelssohn’s idealism. (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of intransitive self-consciousness and second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content (1986). First, I aim to show that the idea of intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of perception. In an (...) adverbial theory of perception, we do not see a blue sense-data, but we see something blue-ly, whereas in intransitive self-consciousness, we are not conscious of ourselves when we undergo a conscious experience—instead, we experience something self-consciously. But what does this mean precisely? First, I take intransitive self-consciousness to be the first-person operator that prefixes the content of any experience that the subject undergoes, regardless of whether or not the subject is self-referred. Further, I argue that this first-person adverbial way of entertaining the content of any experience in Perry’s revised framework fixes the subject as part of the circumstance of the evaluation of the content of her own experience. We can only evaluate whether the content is veridical or falsidical relative to the subject undergoing the experience. This is referred to here as “self-concernment without self-reference.” When I am absorbed in reading a book, I do not self-represent my own experience of reading a book, let alone see myself as a constituent of the content of this experience. Even so, I experience that reading self-consciously in the precise sense that I do belong to the circumstance of the evaluation of the selfless content of my experience of reading the book. The content of the experience of reading a book is simply a propositional function, true or false of myself. (shrink)

I argue that my non-dual epistemic-phenomenalist view is the one that best harmonises my interpretation of the Fourth Paralogism with the widely shared reading of the Refutation of Idealism that I sketched and defended above. The bottom line of my view is a clear distinction between the metaphysical and epistemological sides of Kantian idealism. Again, according to my non-dual-epistemic-phenomenalism, the mundus sensibilis and mundus intelligibilis are epistemologically distinct ways of considering the metaphysically identical outside world. Appearances are nothing but the (...) way the things in themselves appear or exist inside our sensible minds as mere representations. In this sense, I reject both the two-world view, the two-aspect view, and Allais’s deflationary anti- phenomenalist reading. (shrink)

How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, (...) as well as any other metaphysical views about the ultimate nature of qualia. The reworking of the displaced perception model I am proposing is supposed to be compatible with any available metaphysical view on qualia. The second step consists of rejecting the epistemological misgivings of the original model, namely the view that knowing qualia requires “connecting beliefs” along with “meta-representations.” Yet, Dretske’s crucial mistake has been to force knowledge of qualia into the “belief-box.” As a matter of fact, there is only one belief involved in introspecting qualia, namely the qualia-belief itself. The third final step is this. Assuming the key Wittgensteinian insight, I argue that introspection of qualia is a process that is both epis- temically reliable and automatic. It is reliable because it dispenses with justification of any beliefs whatsoever. Moreover, it is automatic because it also dispenses with reflexive connecting beliefs. For example, it takes nonconceptual awareness of the color blue as an input and automatically yields the belief that phenomenal blue is the conscious character of my experience of the sky as an output just by employing the concept BLUE. (shrink)

From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is a connection (...) between TD and global skepticism, the intriguing question is: Who is this skeptic? According to Strawson, “the skeptic” is a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience. In contrast, the fact that TD turns on the key notion of self-consciousness has induced several other scholars to assume that the skeptic is no none but a Cartesian external-world skeptic. None of those readings find textual support or are compatible with the very structure of the first Critique. The question is: Does this mean that TD aims only to undermine empiricism, as Guyer suggests? I do not believe so. I am pretty convinced that TD addresses a peculiar form of global skepticism, namely “Hume’s challenge to reason.” Assuming that we cognize (erkennen) and experience (erfahren) appearances as objects as a requirement of Newtonian physics, TD aims to provide a justification of the principle that nature is uniform that is superior to Hume’s justification. (shrink)

This brief paper is devoted to criticizing the widespread reading of Kant’s first Critique, according to which reference to subject-independent objects is “constituted” by higher-order cognitive abilities (concepts). Let us call this the “constitutional view.” In this paper, I argue that the constitutional reading confuses the un-Kantian problem of how we come to represent objects (which I call the intentionality thesis), with the quite different problem of how we cognize (erkennen) (which I call the “cognition thesis”) that we do represent (...) objects, that is, things that exist independently of the subject. (shrink)

The claim that ―concepts serve as rules for the synthesis of representations‖ is understood by the mainstream of Kant‘s scholarship as if categories and concepts, in general, are conditions for the constitution of objects out of the manifold of sensations devoid of reference. That is the claim that I wish to question here. The claim comes in different flavors and formulations. Still, none of them are relevant here. I aim to provide an alternative account for the claim that ―the representation (...) makes the object possible.‖ I argue that the traditional view represents a solution to what I call the pseudo-problem of intentionality, namely to account for how a representation of something emerges out of a manifold of sensations devoid of reference. Yet, the intentionality problem is a misunderstanding of what I call the recognition thesis: the role of concepts is to provide the rules for the (mind-dependent) recognition (Erkenntnis) of the mind-independent existence of transcendental objects (noumena). ―The representation makes the object possible in the relevant sense that only by means of concepts can we recognize that what is sense-dependently represented actually exists mind-independently as transcendental objects or noumena in the negative sense. My view is embedded in the framework of what today is called ―Kantian Nonceptualism‖. Still, my view is neither a simple re-statement of Kantian Nonconceptualism nor depends on it. It is independently grounded on what Kant calls ―Erkenntnis‖. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of type-B materialism against Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982) inspired by the Kantian main opposition between concepts and sensible intuitions. Like all materialists of type B, I argue that on her release from her black-and-white room, Mary makes cognitive progress. However, contrary to the so-called phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS), I do not think that such progress can be accounted for in terms of the acquisition of new concepts. I also reject Tye’s recent account of (...) Mary’s cognitive progress as the acquisition of a “thing-knowledge.” What is crucial is not the Russellian opposition between knowing things and knowing truths but rather the Kantian opposition between conceptual and nonconceptual representations of the same thing (property). Mary’s phenomenal knowledge is here accounted for as the result of the cooperation of her newly acquired nonconceptual representation of the same phenomenal redness (the same thing) she had a conceptual representation before. As that new nonconceptual representation carries information about the same physical property she already represented but is now coded in analog rather than in digital form (Dretske, 1981), that nonconceptual representation can be accounted for in physical terms as Chalmers’s Master argument requires. Nevertheless, that representation can account for Mary’s cognitive progress since it carries information coded in analog form, something that the imprisoned she could never possess. (shrink)

My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske’s celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30pm CST on November 23 in 1963 (...) in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. (shrink)

The aim of this paper has been to present a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism. I have considered several different targets of the Refutation, five of them mentioned by Kant himself. I believe that I have shown that the Refutation of Idealism is best considered only as a sound argument against Mendelssohnian subjectivist idealism, against Mendelssohnian immaterialism, and against Mendelssohnian realist idealism. First, Kant’s Refutation is a sound argument in favor of the claim that the outer things represented (...) in our minds are real rather than ideal; that is, they exist mind-independently as noumena. And second, Kant’s refutation is a sound argument for a fundamental ontology of noumena: the ultimate nature of reality and of our minds is neither material nor mental but made up of things in themselves. (shrink)

I argue for a new reading of Pyrrhonian beliefs inspired by representationalism (the content view) in recent philosophy of mind. I shall argue that there are two senses of acceptance or “acquiescence in something” (eudokein tini pragmati) rather than two senses of belief (doxa). For this reason, we can maintain along with Sextus that the Pyrrhonian skeptic behaves intentionally and can live his life in society adoxastôs without any proper beliefs whatsoever. However, the skeptical sense of acceptance is not the (...) mere avowal of a feeling or a mere report or register of the way things appear to me. I want to suggest the following reading. Acceptance without belief is an anti-predicative passive and involuntary acceptance of content by means of an indicator function (pathos or phainomenon) in virtue of the past regular connection between the representational content and the indicator function. The pathos (as a present state of mind) or the phainomenon “means” (that is, indicates) passively and involuntarily a content in virtue of its regular connection with this content through time. For example, the Pyrrhonian’s acceptance of the content of the sentence “there is fire” is based on the fact that he here and now perceives smoke and that pathos passively and involuntarily means (represents) the content that there is fire. There is no judgment involved at all: even when the skeptic suspends his judgment (epochê) about whether there is fire, his pathos makes him involuntarily accept that there is fire. That is what Sextus, following the Stoic tradition, calls “commemorative signs” (hupomnêstikon) in opposition to the so-called “indicative signs” (endeiktikon), namely the “internal assertion” of the content as a belief (as a propositional attitude). As I do not believe that any reasonable reading of the skeptical acceptance may be defended only by means of philological analysis and by the research of the huge doxography, my arguments deliberately mix historical evidence with reasons of a systematic nature. In this way, the defense of my alternative reading is abductive, namely as the inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

We set forth what one may call a “constitutional reading” in opposition to the traditional widespread “constructivist reading” of the object of cognition. In the light of the so-called one-object view reading of Transcendental idealism, the object of cognition is nothing but the object that exists in itself insofar as it appears to our cognitive apparatus. The object exists mind-independently, while our cognition of the same object must be mind-independent. The constructivist reading mistakes the epistemological problem of how we come (...) to cognize mind-dependently that what we represent (“the constitutional view”) are mind-independent objects with the Berkelian ontological problem of how we construct objects out of an undifferentiated, unstructured manifold (the constructivist view) My diagnosis is as follows. The first reason is the traditional “two-worlds view” reading of Kant’s idealism. If we take what exists in itself and the object of cognition as distinct things, then we must conclude that the object of cognition is a mind-dependent construction. Constructivist readers mistake the mind-dependent nature of our human cognition of objects for the putative mind-dependent nature of the known object. The second reason is overintellectualization. Constructivist readers mistake the objectifying syntheses of the imagination, below the threshold of self-consciousness, for cognitive conceptual operations by means of which we cognize (erkennen) the objects of cognition, or so I shall argue. (shrink)

This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...) relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations.” The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations.” In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

This paper is a new non-descriptivist defense of non- conceptualism, based on a new interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of concepts. We advance the following claim: What distinguishes non-conceptual from conceptual singular representations is the way partial representations of the object’s features are integrated into the whole representation of the object: while at the non-conceptual level this integration takes the form of images of the object’s features that are stored and projected, at the conceptual level this integration takes the form of (...) the recognition that those features are properties of a same object, what Kant calls “synthetic unity of Aperception”. (shrink)

Content nonconceptualism and State conceptualism are motivated by different readings of what I want to call here Bermúdez’s conditions on content-attribution (2007). In one read- ing, what is required is a neo-Fregean content to solve problems of cognitive significance at the nonconceptual level (Toribio, 2008; Duhau, 2011). In the other reading, what is required is a neo-Russellian or possible-world content to account for how conspecifics join attention and cooperate, contemplating the same things from different perspectives in the same perceptual field. (...) The solution to this apparent contradiction is the rejection of the real content view and the adherence to what I call here Content-pragmatism: there is no such thing as the content of experience. According to content pragmatism, “proposition” is not as real as a mental state, but rather, it is a term of art that semanticists use, as a matter of theoretical convenience, to classify mental states. What follows from Content-pragmatism is Content- pluralism: there are so many contents that are required to meet Bermúdez’s condition on content attribution. Because both criticism and the defense of State conceptualism overlook the real scope of Bermúdez’s condition on content attribution, they are ineffective. In this paper, I will argue that the opposition between State and Content nonconceptualism is a real one, but only a relative one, that is, relative to the opposite constraints to be met. If we want to solve the problems of cognitive significance, the best we can do is to let the content of experience be modeled as neo-Fregean content, namely, a compound of nonconceptual modes of presentation of objects and properties. In this case, Content-nonconceptualism prevails. In contrast, if we want to account for how conspecifics join attention to the same entities in the same perceptual field from different perspectives, the best we can do is let the content of experience be modeled either as a structured Russellian proposition or as a function from possible worlds to truth-values. In this case, State-nonconceptualism prevails. (shrink)

I aim to develop an alternative theoretical model for the direct cognition of the elementary states of others called the theory of interaction (henceforth TI), also known as the “second person” approach. The model I propose emerges from a critical reformulation of the displaced perception model proposed by FRED DRETSKE (1995) for the introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Moreover, against Dretske, I argue that no meta-representation (second-order representation of a first-order representation as a representation) is involved in the (...) process, but only concepts, rudimentary enough, of others’ emotions: contentment and discontentment. Strictly speaking, all the empirical data and findings in developmental psychology only support the hypothesis that children in the pre-linguistic phase understand perceptual facial expressions of contentment and discontentment. My proposal consists of the following thesis: The direct perception of others' elementary mental states is not a perception in the usual sense of the word according to which we just perceive things, but rather a “perception of facts.” But how to understand that? It is nothing more than an epistemological process that is automatic and reliable at the same time. It is reliable in the epistemological-externalist sense of not involving any inference, reflection, theorizing or epistemic justification: a baby’s perception of her mom’s facial expression of discontentment (in the usual sense of “per- ception”) does not constitute a reason supporting the belief that mommy is discontent. The very word “belief” should not be understood in the usual sense but rather in the sense of a natural inclination for truth. But at the same time, it is automatic because the belief is a result or output of a process entirely subliminal and computational in nature. Thus, for instance, a child perceives that her mom is discontent (fact-awareness) by perceiving consciously (“perception” in the usual sense) a facial expression of discontentment (sensorial input) but recognizes that her mother is discontent as a result (output) of an entirely subliminal process. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS) and in favor of what Chalmers has called type-A materialism ([2006], [2010] p. 111). On her release, Mary makes no cognitive discovery at all, not even a thin, non-possibility-eliminating discovery, as Tye has recently claimed [2012]. When she is imprisoned, Mary already knows everything that is to be known about the phenomenal character of her experiences. What Mary acquires is a new non-cognitive and nonconceptual representation.

In this research, an agent-based model was developed to study the propagation of physical climate shocks through supply chain networks. By combining supply chain and financial models, the study examines the effects of climate shocks on firms’ production capacities and their subsequent impacts on firm default risk. A comprehensive mathematical framework is presented for the simulation of physical risks, their subsequent up- and downstream impacts along the supply chain, and the translation of physical impacts into an increased level of default (...) risk. The results highlight the importance of supply chains as a transmission channel for physical climate risks and emphasize the effectiveness of implementing adaptation measures. Practical examples demonstrate the model’s behavior under different hypothetical climate scenarios and identify the sectors most vulnerable to increases in the frequency and intensity of climate events. Overall, this study provides insights into the transmission dynamics of climate shocks and emphasizes the need for resilience against climate events in supply chain networks. (shrink)

This study delves into the feasibility of introducing a market in Barangay Tanagan, Calatagan, Batangas, with a primary focus on assessing its viability and potential impact on local economic development. Utilizing survey questionnaires and employing statistical analysis techniques, the research gathered data from a carefully selected sample of 366 residents out of the total population of 4,224. The study evaluates both the potential benefits and challenges associated with establishing the proposed market. Findings, subjected to thorough analysis through methods such as (...) frequency counts and weighted mean calculations, provide valuable insights into discernible patterns, emerging trends, and relevant correlations. This analytical approach contributes to a pragmatic perspective that informs and guides future studies in the field. The study reveals an interest among respondents in the establishment of public markets in their vicinity, recognizing its potential to bolster the barangay and attract diverse opportunities. The anticipated positive impact extends to fostering economic growth and enhancing local commerce in Barangay Tanagan. Consequently, based on these compelling findings, the researchers advocate for a proposal outlining the establishment of a public market in Barangay Tanagan as a means of addressing the identified needs and aspirations of the community. (shrink)

This volume offers a collective study of the work of P. F. Strawson (1919-2006) and an exploration of its relevance for current philosophical debates. It is the first book since Strawson's death to cover the full range of his philosophy, with chapters by world-leading experts about his lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, and philosophical methodology. It aims to achieve a balance between exegesis of Strawson, critical engagement, and consideration of the reception and continuing value (...) of his work. It explores the intellectual relations between Strawson and some of his predecessors and contemporaries and it will be an indispensable source for scholars and students of twentieth-century philosophy and its influence in the twenty-first. With contributions by Anne Bezuidenhout, Ian Rumfitt, Paul Snowdon, Quassim Cassam, Michelle Montague, Hans-Johann Glock, Anil Gomes, Lilian Alweiss, Giuseppina D'Oro, A.P. Martinich, Paul Russell, Lucy Allais, and Victoria McGeer. (shrink)

This paper addresses Fichte’s puzzle of self-consciousness. I propose a new reading of “Fichte’s original insight,” inspired by Pareyson’s general reading, which I call here the “Fichtean metaphysical turn in transcendental philosophy.” Against the mainstream view in Fichte’s scholarship, I argue that Fichte’s and Kant’s views do not concur regard- ing the primary reference of the “I”, namely spontaneous agency in thinking, which Fichte calls “Tathandlung”. Yet, their views do, in fact, concur when Fichte claims that this spontaneous agency in (...) thinking is the “essence” or the underlying nature of the self, which Kant denies. Regarding this, I take the side of Fichte. But how is Fichte’s original insight supposed to solve the puzzle of self-consciousness? At that transcendental level, the puzzle does not arise because there is no need for self-identification in the first place. Transcendental self-knowledge results from the sui generis intellectual Selbstanschauung that everyone has of oneself as sheer spontaneous agency in thinking. But at the empirical level, the puzzle does not arise either and for the same reason. Reference to the embodied self dispenses with any self-identification because it is based on the fundamental metaphysical relation everybody has to their own body, namely identity. (shrink)

This paper examines how professionals (N = 32) working on artificial intelligence (AI) view structural AI ethics challenges like injustices and inequalities beyond individual agents' direct intention and control. This paper answers the research question: What are professionals’ perceptions of the structural challenges of AI (in the agri-food sector)? This empirical paper shows that it is essential to broaden the scope of ethics of AI beyond micro- and meso-levels. While ethics guidelines and AI ethics often focus on the responsibility of (...) designers and the competencies and skills of designers to take this responsibility, our results show that many structural challenges are beyond their reach. This result means that while ethics guidelines and AI ethics frameworks are helpful, there is a risk that they overlook more complicated, nuanced, and intersected structural challenges. In addition, it highlights the need to include diverse stakeholders, such as quadruple helix (QH) participants, in discussions around AI ethics rather than solely focusing on the obligations of AI developers and companies. Overall, this paper demonstrates that addressing structural challenges in AI is challenging and requires an approach that considers four requirements: (1) multi-level, (2) multi-faceted, (3) interdisciplinary, and (4) polycentric governance. (shrink)

The right to a dignified death is largely overlooked by Brazilian law. This neglect of the end-of-life process and its ramifications is the focus of this study, which aims at an exploratory survey to identify pertinent aspects requiring development to ensure a dignified end-of-life experience. In total, 50 publications were examined with online and physical surveys of works published up to March 2023. They express concerns regarding ethical dilemmas in caring for individuals nearing the end of life, yet they do (...) not delve into existing mechanisms for safeguarding end-of-life dignity or identify areas that still lack standardization to ensure effective care. This study should contribute to the enhancement of critical perspectives on the issue of end-of-life experiences, considering current safeguards, the legal boundaries set by the State, and potential future strides toward advancing studies aimed at the practical update of the Brazilian legal system. (shrink)