We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...) type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties. (shrink)

The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The (...) nonconceptual content of the mental states induced when one uses a perceptual demonstrative constitutes the mode of presentation of the perceptual demonstrative that individuates but does not identify the object of perceptual awareness and allows reference to it. On that account, perceptual demonstratives put us in a de re relationship with objects in the world through the non-conceptual information retrieved directly from the objects in the environment. (shrink)

In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experiential concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the referents of such demonstratives. To avoid ‘encodingism’, that is, relating representations to representations, we postulate that the process of reference fixing must be bottom-up and nonconceptual, so that it can break the circle of conceptual content and touch the world. For that purpose, an appropriate causal relation between representations and the world (...) is needed. We claim that this relation is provided by spatial and object-centered attention that leads to the formation of object files through the function of deictic acts. This entire causal process takes place at a pre-conceptual level, meeting the requirement for a solution to the grounding problem. Finally we claim that our account captures fundamental insights in Putnam’s and Kripke’s work on “new” reference. (shrink)

Raftopoulos’s most recent book argues, among other things, for the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Before we can assess any such claims, we need to know what’s meant by “early vision” and by “cognitive penetration”. In this contribution to this book symposium, I explore several different things that one might mean – indeed, that Raftopoulos might mean – by these terms. I argue that whatever criterion we choose for delineating early vision, we need a single criterion, not a (...) mishmash of distinct criteria. And I argue against defining cognitive penetration in partly epistemological terms, although it is fine to offer epistemological considerations in defending some definitions as capturing something of independent interest. Finally, I raise some questions about how we are to understand the “directness” of certain putative cognitive influences on perception and about whether there’s a decent rationale for restricting directness in the way that Raftopoulos apparently does. (shrink)

Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.

Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be direct (...) and exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism. (shrink)

When I act on something, three kinds of idea (or representation) come into play. First, I have a non-visual representation of my goals. Second, I have a visual description of the kind of thing that I must act upon in order to satisfy my goals. Finally, I have an egocentric position locator that enables my body to interact with the object. It is argued here that these ideas are distinct. It is also argued that the egocentric position locator functions in (...) the same way as a demonstrative, and that the involvement of such demonstratives in visual content negates naive realism. (This is a nearly final draft of a paper that is to be published in Raftopoulos and Machamer (eds), Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference (forthcoming from Cambridge UP. It is a shorter revised version of "Visual Reference", posted earlier.). (shrink)

O debate acerca de qual é a natureza do conteúdo da experiência perceptiva ganhou novos contornos nas últimas décadas ao se introduzir a questão de se este conteúdo é conceitual ou não conceitual. Essa questão metafísica acerca da natureza da percepção é geralmente pressionada por uma outra de índole epistêmica: como a experiência perceptiva pode justificar crenças acerca do nosso entorno? John McDowell sustenta que, se a experiência já não tem um conteúdo conceitual de modo a apresentar o mundo como (...) sendo de uma determinada maneira, acarretando assim um elo comum entre percepção e pensamento, então é difícil ver como a experiência poderia justificar uma crença, especialmente se entendemos a justificação em termos internalistas, como faz McDowell. Contrapondo-se a essa posição, Athanassios Raftopoulos alega que se a experiência perceptiva envolve conceitos intrinsecamente e, portanto, é penetrada cognitivamente, então a experiência não é independente das nossas crenças de fundo e, desse modo, não pode funcionar como um tribunal neutro de justificação, pois o apoio evidencial fornecido pela experiência é circular e epistemologicamente viciado. Neste texto, eu defendo uma explicação de como a experiência perceptiva mantém uma relação racional com o pensamento empírico. Na primeira parte, vou elaborar duas teses que são centrais para explicar o papel de justificação da experiência perceptiva segundo uma perspectiva minimamente internalista, a saber, a tese do conteúdo comum entre a percepção e a crença e a tese da independência da percepção em relação à crença. Indicarei as dificuldades que estão envolvidas na tentativa de conciliar essas teses. A primeira parece requerer o conceitualismo de conteúdo, enquanto a segunda parece implicar sua rejeição. Apesar de declarações em contrário, eu argumento que McDowell falha em fazer justiça à segunda tese em Mind and World. Na segunda parte, apoiado na teoria enativa da percepção, de Alva Noë, defendo uma leitura menos intelectualista da primeira tese, descomprometida com o conceitualismo de conteúdo, e mostro como ela pode ser conciliada com a segunda. Finalmente, explico como atos perceptivos que nos dão acesso direto a objetos podem coagir racionalmente o pensamento empírico acerca do mundo circundante. Essa explicação pretende fazer justiça a um internalismo que qualifico como mínimo. (shrink)

Should we do speculative cognitive science? - In present day philosophy, I see a fashion that uses empirical facts (data) to support positions that are not philosophical but empirical in nature. The argumentative structure is classical philosophy, saying that ‘this has to be that way because …’ where the ‘this’ refers to some empirical state of affairs. This kind of philosophy speculates about empirical facts in areas where we do not yet know the facts – the arguments are a priori, (...) supported by a posteriori data. This is precisely what the speculative philosophy of German Idealism was doing, e.g. in the works of Schelling or Hegel. (shrink)