This article starts by identifying the phenomena that Hume thought to explain the need, hence utility, of a rudimentary system of property. Then, and prominently, it considers Hume’s arguments for believing that only a system of private property is justifiable. Hume argues that only in a society with adequate but not absolute abundance and altruism does property have a point or purpose. Property’s basic job, then, is that of addressing conflict and disagreement among persons of limited altruism and means, and (...) so property’s primary purpose is regulative and adjudicative. This point is not disturbed by fluctuations in altruism or the extent of abundance that might result from differing social arrangements. Thus Hume’s explanation of property is logically separable from the question of what kind of system of ownership is justifiable. This raises the central topic of the paper: Does Hume provide arguments showing not only that a system of private property is justifiable but that only such a system will suffice to avoid a condition of chaos and savagery? As argued here, while Hume’s arguments to this conclusion repay careful consideration, they fail and to show that only a system of ownership dominated by private property is justifiable. (shrink)

To what extent do early intuitions about ownership depend on cultural and socio-economic circumstances? We investigated the question by testing reasoning about third party ownership conflicts in various groups of three- and five-year-old children (N = 176), growing up in seven highly contrasted social, economic, and cultural circumstances (urban rich, poor, very poor, rural poor, and traditional) spanning three continents. Each child was presented with a series of scripts involving two identical dolls fighting over an object of possession. (...) The child had to decide who of the two dolls should own the object. Each script enacted various potential reasons for attributing ownership: creation, familiarity, first contact, equity, plus a control/neutral condition with no suggested reasons. Results show that across cultures, children are significantly more consistent and decisive in attributing ownership when one of the protagonists created the object. Development between three and five years is more or less pronounced depending on culture. The propensity to split the object in equal halves whenever possible was generally higher at certain locations (i.e., China) and quasi-inexistent in others (i.e., Vanuatu and street children of Recife). Overall, creation reasons appear to be more primordial and stable across cultures than familiarity, relative wealth or first contact. This trend does not correlate with the passing of false belief theory of mind. (shrink)

Damaged Cultural Mentality: Causes and Solutions -/- A damaged cultural mentality refers to the deeply ingrained patterns of thinking, beliefs, and behaviors within a society that limit personal and collective progress. These mentalities are shaped by historical events, societal norms, and traditional practices, and they often perpetuate harmful ideologies that can stifle innovation, critical thinking, and the well-being of individuals. Reforming such mentalities is a complex process because it requires addressing not only external behaviors but also the internalized beliefs and (...) values that define a community or nation. In this essay, we will explore the causes of damaged cultural mentality and discuss potential solutions for reform. -/- Causes of Damaged Cultural Mentality -/- 1. Historical Legacy and Trauma A significant factor in the development of a damaged cultural mentality is historical trauma. Societies that have experienced colonization, war, or oppression often carry the psychological scars of these events for generations. These experiences can instill a sense of inferiority, fear, or distrust in individuals, leading to self-destructive behaviors and societal divisions. For example, cultures that have been colonized may adopt the values of their colonizers, while simultaneously developing a resistance to anything perceived as foreign or different. This dichotomy can create confusion and hinder progress, as individuals navigate conflicting cultural ideals. -/- 2. Cultural Inertia and Tradition Traditions and cultural norms are powerful forces that shape the way people think and behave. In many societies, traditional ways of thinking are upheld as sacred and immutable, which can prevent growth and adaptation. This cultural inertia is often rooted in the belief that the past holds all the answers to present-day problems. Over time, this mentality becomes so ingrained that questioning or deviating from tradition is seen as unacceptable or disrespectful. As a result, harmful practices such as gender inequality, caste systems, or rigid social hierarchies can persist, even when they no longer serve the well-being of the population. -/- 3. Social Conditioning and Peer Pressure From an early age, individuals are socialized into the values and norms of their society. This social conditioning shapes how people perceive themselves and others, often reinforcing stereotypes, biases, and prejudices. Peer pressure, in the form of societal expectations and the desire for acceptance, further perpetuates these mentalities. In some cases, individuals may even internalize harmful cultural beliefs, causing them to perpetuate practices that harm both themselves and others. For instance, the glorification of materialism or the devaluation of education can become entrenched in a culture, limiting opportunities for progress. -/- 4. Lack of Critical Thinking and Education A significant barrier to reforming a damaged cultural mentality is the lack of critical thinking and education. In societies where education is either inaccessible or insufficiently emphasized, individuals may not be equipped to question or analyze the cultural norms and beliefs that govern their lives. Without the tools to critically evaluate their beliefs, people are more likely to accept societal constructs without challenge, thus maintaining the status quo. Additionally, when education is overly focused on rote memorization or conformity, rather than on fostering creativity and critical thinking, it becomes difficult to challenge harmful cultural ideologies. -/- Solutions to Reform a Damaged Cultural Mentality -/- 1. Holistic Education and Critical Thinking One of the most effective ways to combat a damaged cultural mentality is through education. Education should not only focus on academic knowledge but also on the development of critical thinking skills. By encouraging students to question and analyze the beliefs and practices around them, they can develop a deeper understanding of how cultural mentalities shape their lives. Furthermore, education should emphasize the value of empathy, diversity, and open-mindedness, enabling individuals to appreciate different perspectives and challenge harmful stereotypes. A holistic education system that encourages inquiry and reflection can be a powerful tool in breaking the cycle of damaged cultural mentalities. -/- 2. Promotion of Dialogue and Inclusivity Reforming cultural mentalities requires creating spaces for open dialogue and exchange of ideas. In many societies, people are reluctant to challenge traditional beliefs because of fear of ostracization or punishment. To address this, it is essential to foster a culture of inclusivity, where individuals feel safe expressing their views and engaging in meaningful conversations. Platforms for discussion, such as community forums or workshops, can allow individuals to voice their concerns and hear different viewpoints. This exchange of ideas helps broaden perspectives and encourages people to re-evaluate harmful mentalities. -/- 3. Leveraging Media and Technology In today’s interconnected world, media and technology have the potential to reach a wide audience and influence societal change. By using media platforms to promote positive cultural values and challenge damaging ideologies, societies can shift public attitudes. Documentaries, social media campaigns, and online education can highlight the negative consequences of certain cultural practices and showcase examples of reform and progress. For instance, campaigns advocating for gender equality or environmental conservation can gradually reshape societal values and encourage individuals to adopt more balanced and sustainable mindsets. -/- 4. Cultural Adaptation and Integration While it is important to preserve cultural traditions that promote well-being and unity, it is also necessary to adapt and evolve in response to changing circumstances. A key solution for reforming a damaged cultural mentality is integrating progressive values with traditional ones. This approach allows for the preservation of cultural identity while also embracing values such as equality, respect for human rights, and social justice. Leaders and influencers within a society must take on the role of cultural reformers, guiding their communities toward practices that are both progressive and culturally relevant. -/- 5. Community Empowerment and Leadership For cultural reform to take root, it must be driven from within the community. Local leaders, educators, and activists play a crucial role in challenging harmful mentalities and advocating for change. Empowering individuals at the grassroots level to lead reform efforts ensures that the process is authentic and sustainable. Community-based initiatives, such as workshops on mental health, gender equality, or environmental awareness, can empower individuals to take ownership of their cultural transformation. -/- Conclusion -/- Reforming a damaged cultural mentality is a complex but essential task for societal progress. The causes of these mentalities are multifaceted, including historical trauma, social conditioning, cultural inertia, and a lack of critical thinking. However, with a strategic approach that includes education, open dialogue, media advocacy, cultural adaptation, and community empowerment, societies can begin to dismantle harmful beliefs and practices. By fostering a culture of critical reflection and inclusivity, we can build more equitable, progressive societies that embrace both tradition and innovation for the well-being of all. -/- . (shrink)

Deadgirl (2008) is based around a group of male teens discovering and claiming ownership of a bound female zombie, using her as a sex slave. This narrative premise raises numerous tensions that are particularly amplified by using a zombie as the film's central victim. The Deadgirl is sexually passive yet monstrous, reifying the horrors associated with the female body in patriarchal discourses. She is objectified on the basis of her gender, and this has led many reviewers to dismiss the (...) film as misogynistic torture porn. However, the conditions under which masculinity is formed here—where adolescent males become “men” by enacting sexual violence—are as problematic as the specter of the female zombie. Deadgirl is clearly horrific and provocative: in this article I seek to probe implications arising from the film's gender conflicts. (shrink)

Amazon Book Review Series of “Better Economics for the Earth: A Lesson from Quantum and Information Theories”.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

In this study, the starting point is the well-known physical laws applied to human social life. On the basis of natural laws human actions are considered and through the prism of physical laws such concepts as use and possession are defined. A parallel is drawn between such a representation of these concepts and those conflicting views that are available in the literature regarding the concept of property. To complete the definitions of use and possession nature is introduced as a fictitious (...) owner. And on this basis, the positive possibility of a theoretical solution to the problem of initial assignment is shown. Again, on the basis of physical laws, the fundamental concept of [human] needs is introduced. It is shown that the collision of people's needs on the same thing allows uniform classifying property defined in literature as the relationship between a person and a thing or as the relationship between people because of a thing. Considering the relationship between two human beings through needs and costs, as a natural necessity, people inevitably renounce their claims to possess and use certain things in favor of other people. It is shown that this refusal forms the right of those people in whose favor this refusal is carried out to possess and use things. The right of one is the refusal of all others to own and use the thing. It is shown that the right was ensured and will always be ensured by force. The use or threat of the use of force is something that can reliably ward off a person from the unbridled realization of his needs. In the process of the formation of mankind, nature itself forces people to organize into communities that can oppose their individual members and their associations with significantly greater power. The whole, as a rule, is stronger than its part. And it is society that can reliably ensure the exercise of rights for its members. Natural laws also make it possible to resolve, on the basis of the concept of law, as a renunciation of possession and use, the issue of belonging to what nature gives us. These are natural resources and the human body. It is shown that the human body should belong to the person himself, and the resources to all members of society equally. The affiliation of all other things produced by man can be unambiguously determined within the framework of contractual relations between members of society, their associations and society as a whole. Since the right of everyone is ensured by the society, and, therefore, by each member of the society individually, a necessary condition for membership is understanding and recognition of the rights of certain things to other members of the society. And this may be the main criterion for joining full members of society, as opposed to the commonly used age criterion, which works on the bulk of people, but gives failures in many special cases. A typical example of such cases is the deprivation or infringement of the rights of persons of full legal age, but committed acts that are called unlawful in society. As part of the research on ownership issues, ownership is considered. It is shown that the necessary tool for using the objects of co-ownership is the voting of co-owners. A special case of co-ownership, when all co-owners have equal shares in co-ownership, is indistinguishable from what is called democracy. It is shown that voting in general and democracy in particular, as procedures for aggregating preferences, can have a positive decision, in refutation of the universality of the conclusion of Arrow's theorem. (shrink)

Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story Collection offers a delightful and whimsical mix of Vietnamese fables that are both clever and entertaining. The stories remind me of Aesop's Fables, where each tale imparts valuable lessons through the adventures of the Kingfisher in a quirky bird village. Laced with humor, wit, and a touch of sarcasm, these stories are a joy to read. One standout is Sincere Concern, where the Kingfisher embraces the art of winning friends and influencing others—his key strategy (...) being to smile, greet others, and remember their names. Meanwhile, his assistant, tasked with keeping the Kingfisher from making mistakes, must also take on small jobs to ensure the Kingfisher feels valued and respected. The irony is that, despite all of this, the Kingfisher can never seem to remember his assistant's name! (shrink)

A careful, theoretical clarification of gender roles has only recently begun in social and political philosophy. It is the aim of the following piece to reveal that an analysis of women’s traditional position - her distinctive activities, labor and surrounding sense of ‘mine’ - can not only make valuable contributions towards clarifying traditional property disputes, but may even provide elements for a new conception of ownership. By way of illustration, the article focusses on the influential work of John Rawls (...) and argues that - when Rawls’s own analysis and principles of justice are supplemented by an account of what is here called ‘reproductive labor’ - his theory in fact tends to a form of democratic socialism. Stated somewhat differently, my aim is to shift the terms of the property debate as posed by Rawls fromwithinhis own position. I hope to show that the real ownership question which now emerges is no longerwhether‘justice as fairness’ countenances a private property or socialist form of democracy, but what preciseformsuch a socialism should take. (shrink)

This dissertation is an attempt to find a single framework for understanding two seemingly conflicting aspects of Nabokov's Russian novels---the metaphysical and the existential. The metaphysical aspect is analyzed according to Leibniz's "Monadology," with its key concepts of the monad, pre-established harmony, the optimization of the universe, and sufficient reason. The existential aspect is examined according to Sartre's theory of the gaze from "Being and Nothingness"; its main notions are being-for-another, radical individuation and intersubjective struggle. Concern with the level of (...) being is assumed to be the most basic and unifying element of the Nabokovian worldview. It is shown that Nabokov conceives individual being as value, and that he understands self-authorship as self-ownership. The value of individual being is threatened by intersubjective contact: the other, via the gaze, can undermine its property status, and eventually alienate it. All particular plots are derived from these underlying premises. The key Nabokovian themes of blindness, non-transparency, loss, memory and art are demonstrated to refer back to the root concepts of the gaze and self-protection. ;The dissertation develops two original conceptual tools: a theory of unreliable focalization and a theory of paranoid experience ;Close readings of Nabokov's texts have resulted in several philological findings. Structural and textual parallels have been discovered between "Mashen'ka" and Shakespeare's "Hamlet," as well as between "Priglashenie na kazn'" and Descartes' "Meditations." It has also been shown that the protagonist's story in "Zashchita Luzhina" is repeated four times and not two. (shrink)

This paper considers the relation between the sources of normativity, reasons, and normative conflicts. It argues that common views about how normative reasons relate to their sources have important consequences for how we can understand putative normative conflicts.

ABSTRACTThe contemporary debate over responsibility for belief is divided over the issue of whether such responsibility requires doxastic control, and whether this control must be voluntary in nature. It has recently become popular to hold that responsibility for belief does not require voluntary doxastic control, or perhaps even any form of doxastic ‘control’ at all. However, Miriam McCormick has recently argued that doxastic responsibility does in fact require quasi-voluntary doxastic control: “guidance control,” a complex, compatibilist form of control. In this (...) paper, I pursue a negative and a positive task. First, I argue that grounding doxastic responsibility in guidance control requires too much for agents to be the proper targets for attributions of doxastic responsibility. I will focus my criticisms on three cases in which McCormick's account gives the intuitively wrong verdict. Second, I develop a modified conception of McCormick's notion of “ownership of belief,” which I call Weak Doxastic Ownership. I employ this conception to argue that responsibility for belief is possible even in the absence of guidance control. In doing so, I argue that the notion of doxastic ownership can do important normative work in grounding responsibility for belief without being subsumed under or analyzed in terms of the notion of doxastic control. (shrink)

Suppose that two competing norms, N1 and N2, can be identified such that a given person’s response can be interpreted as correct according to N1 but incorrect according to N2. Which of these two norms, if any, should one use to interpret such a response? In this paper we seek to address this fundamental problem by studying individual variation in the interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual profiles of the participants based on their case judgments and reflective attitudes. To investigate (...) the participants’ reflective attitudes we introduce a new experimental paradigm called the Scorekeeping Task. As a case study, we identify the participants who follow the Suppositional Theory of conditionals (N1) versus Inferentialism (N2) and investigate to what extent internally consistent competence models can be reconstructed for the participants on this basis. After extensive empirical investigations, an apparent reasoning error with and-to-if inferences was found in one of these two groups. The implications of this case study for debates on the proper role of normative considerations in psychology are discussed. (shrink)

The contemporary agonist thinker, Chantal Mouffe argues that conflicts are constitutive of politics. However, this position raises the question that concerns the survival of order and the proper types of conflicts in democracies. Although Mouffe is not consensus-oriented, consensus plays a role in her theory when the democratic order is at stake. This suggests that there is a theoretical terrain between the opposing poles of conflict and consensus. This can be discussed with the help of concepts and theories that seem (...) to be standing between the two, namely compromise, debate and the borders of democracy. I will argue that we can reveal this position with the theoretical analysis of compromise in the works of F. R. Ankersmit on the historical origin of representative democracy, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson on the role of compromise in divided communities. J. S. Mill’s view of colliding opinions offers a moderate agonistic understanding of politics, while the concept of debate plays a similar role for Márton Szabó, a contemporary Hungarian political theorist. Finally, Mouffe’s position stands at the conflictual end of this spectrum, although conflicts are delimited on the normative ground of democracy. (shrink)

This paper surveys the relationship between Clergy Vocational Conflict, cognitive conflict and psychological well-being in a sample of 178 Muslim clergy in Turkey. It was found that Clergy Vocational Conflict is accompanied by religious conflict and Quest. Those who experienced Clergy Vocational Conflict and religious conflict suffered from poor psychological well-being. Quest, which does not affect psychological well-being, and religious conflict, which adversely affects it, are more common among the younger stratum of the sample. However, well-being prevails among the older (...) layer and among the more educated clergy. Finally, psychological well-being, self-esteem, Quest and religious conflict were found as predictors for Clergy Vocational Conflict. (shrink)

Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., “by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control”) are common expressions of epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, previous published findings (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo & Phillips, 2018) on the opposition between Contextualism and Relativism for epistemic modals are re-examined. It is found that these findings contain a substantial degree of individual variation. To investigate whether participants differ in their interpretation of epistemic modals, an experiment with multiple phases and sessions (...) is used to classify participants according to the three semantic theories of Relativism, Contextualism, and Objectivism. Through this study, some of the first empirical evidence for the kind of truth-value shifts postulated by semantic Relativism is presented. It is furthermore found that participants’ disagreement judgments match their truth evaluations and that participants are capable of distinguishing between truth and justification. In a second experimental session, it is investigated whether participants thus classified follow the norm of retraction which Relativism uses to account for argumentation with epistemic modals. Here the results are less favorable for Relativism. In a second experiment, these results are replicated and the normative beliefs of participants concerning the norm of retraction are investigated following work on measuring norms by Bicchieri (2017). Again, it is found that on average participants show no strong preferences concerning the norm of retraction for epistemic modals. Yet, it was found that participants who had committed to Objectivism and had training in logics applied the norm of retraction to might-statements. These results present a substantial challenge to the account of argumentation with epistemic modals presented in MacFarlane (2014), as discussed. Keywords: Epistemic Modals, Relativism, Norm Conflicts, Retraction, Semantics, Truth Conditions, Argumentation. (shrink)

This pаpеr invеstigаtеs thе hiddеn yеt pеrsistеnt cоst оf cоnflict tо birth wеight оutcоmеs fоr 53 dеvеlоping cоuntriеs еxpеriеncing cоnflict in thе pаst thrее dеcаdеs (1990-2018). Explоiting thе vаriаtiоn аcrоss districts аnd cоncеptiоn mоnths-yеаrs, wе find thаt intrаutеrinе еxpоsurе tо аrmеd cоnflict in thе first trimеstеr оf prеgnаncy rеducеs child’s wеight аt birth by 2.8% аnd rаisеs thе incidеncе оf lоw birth wеight by 3.2 pеrcеntаgе pоints. Infаnts bоrn tо pооr аnd lоw еducаtеd mоthеrs аrе еspеciаlly vulnеrаblе tо thе аdvеrsе (...) rеpеrcussiоns оf аrmеd cоnflict. Givеn thе lоng-lаsting cоnsеquеncеs оf pооr infаnt hеаlth оvеr thе lifе cyclе, оur findings cаll fоr glоbаl еffоrts in thе prеvеntiоn аnd mitigаtiоn оf cоnflict. Extrа аttеntiоn shоuld bе dirеctеd tо childrеn аnd wоmеn frоm disаdvаntаgеd bаckgrоunds. (shrink)

According to Steven Pinker and his associates the cooperative model of human communication fails, because evolutionary biology teaches us that most social relationships, including talk-exchange, involve combinations of cooperation and conflict. In particular, the phenomenon of the strategic speaker who uses indirect speech in order to be able to deny what he meant by a speech act (deniability of conversational implicatures) challenges the model. In reply I point out that interlocutors can aim at understanding each other (cooperation), while being in (...) conflict. Furthermore, Pinker’s strategic speaker relies on the Cooperative Principle when conveying a conversational implicature, and so non-cooperative behaviour (denial) only emerges as a response to a negative reaction from the audience. It is also doubtful in the cases Pinker presents whether a denial will successfully cancel the conversational implicature –change the audience’s interpretation of speaker’s meaning. I also argue that a strategic speaker might choose indirect speech due to the ignorability of conversational implicatures, in which case the strategic speaker can be highly cooperative. (shrink)

Conceptual engineers endeavor to improve our concepts. But their endeavors face serious practical difficulties. One such difficulty – rational conceptual conflict - concerns the degree to which agents are incentivized to impede the efforts of conceptual engineers, especially in many of the contexts within which conceptual engineering is viewed as a worthwhile pursuit. Under such conditions, the already difficult task of conceptual engineering becomes even more difficult. Consequently, if they want to increase their chances of success, conceptual engineers should pay (...) closer attention to – and devise strategies to mitigate – rational conceptual conflict. After outlining the phenomenon at greater length and mapping its connections to other similar practical problems (Section 1), I explore the dynamics of such conflict by way of several detailed case studies (Section 2). In particular, I focus on cases driven by material, social, and moral incentives. I then consider some important methodological implications of rational conceptual conflict (Section 3). Among other things, I argue that conceptual engineers should focus more heavily on cultivating settings that modify the payoffs and penalties associated with conceptual conflict. By such indirect means, they can incentivize conceptual cooperation rather than conflict, thus making it easier to achieve success in conceptual engineering. Section 4 concludes. (shrink)

The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a (...) gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to “ground the self in action”, but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology. (shrink)

While current doctrines try to separate conflicts within two distinct categories – conventional versus irregular, there are, however, a series of contemporary conflicts that challenge this western view on war showing that the disjunctive manner of classification in ‘big and conventional’ versus ‘small and irregular’ is limited and simplistic. The military strategists as well as the academics used a series of concepts in order to describe the main shifts in the character of war – from the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) (...) and ‘new wars’ to hybrid wars. This article aims to identify these mutations in war evolution in the new, post-Cold War international context. The traditional image we have on this well-known ‘labor division’ within the military field no longer reflects reality. (shrink)

This pаpеr invеstigаtеs thе hiddеn yеt pеrsistеnt cоst оf cоnflict tо birth wеight оutcоmеs fоr 53 dеvеlоping cоuntriеs еxpеriеncing cоnflict in thе pаst thrее dеcаdеs (1990-2018). Explоiting thе vаriаtiоn аcrоss districts аnd cоncеptiоn mоnths-yеаrs, wе find thаt intrаutеrinе еxpоsurе tо аrmеd cоnflict in thе first trimеstеr оf prеgnаncy rеducеs child’s wеight аt birth by 2.8% аnd rаisеs thе incidеncе оf lоw birth wеight by 3.2 pеrcеntаgе pоints. Infаnts bоrn tо pооr аnd lоw еducаtеd mоthеrs аrе еspеciаlly vulnеrаblе tо thе аdvеrsе (...) rеpеrcussiоns оf аrmеd cоnflict. Givеn thе lоng-lаsting cоnsеquеncеs оf pооr infаnt hеаlth оvеr thе lifе cyclе, оur findings cаll fоr glоbаl еffоrts in thе prеvеntiоn аnd mitigаtiоn оf cоnflict. Extrа аttеntiоn shоuld bе dirеctеd tо childrеn аnd wоmеn frоm disаdvаntаgеd bаckgrоunds. (shrink)

Book 1 of Plato’s Laws, and particularly the image of the puppet introduced near its end, has been traditionally interpreted as presenting the moral psychology model that underlies the educational system delineated by the Athenian Stranger, which construes virtue as consonance between the non–rational and the rational elements of the soul. But a different and competing conception of virtue looms large in Laws 1, virtue as victory of the best part of the soul in psychic conflict. This paper argues that (...) the Athenian’s conception of education as the correct conformation of originally conflicting psychic forces requires the simultaneous presence of the harmony and the conflict models of virtue in Laws 1. Education is in turn defined by calculation, the rational activity which persuasively leads the conflicting non–rational forces towards a consonant reciprocal rapport. By strategically developing his understanding of education and calculation in Laws 1, the Athenian shows how the harmony model of virtue overcomes the conflict model, while at the same time recognising that there is some truth to the conflict model after all and integrating it within the harmony model. (shrink)

Traditional societies are characterized by festivals of various kinds and dimensions. Some distinctly manifest aspects of the community rituals or worship, some celebratory; yet others function towards social change. Irrespective of their types, underlying the different forms of community performance is likely to be found the central element of ritual associated with one aspect of community belief or another. Among the Igbo of south-eastern Nigeria, Omerife is a festival associated with the ritual of new yam celebrations. In a sense, the (...) ceremonies of the new yam are thanksgiving activities whereby the gods are propitiated with sacrifices for a bountiful harvest as well as for a peaceful farming year. However, the festival also embodies different community forms of performances such as the Ogene- nkirika. Ogene-nkirika is the first part of the two-tiered festival. This paper examines the aspect of conflict that motivates the process of social change on the theoretical premise of Theatre for Reciprocal Violence (TRV) to foreground conflict as pertinent for change in the performance. Case study approach of qualitative research method was adopted for data collection and analysis. The study reveals that Ogene-nkirika festival performance is capable of engendering social change for the people through conflict as reflected in the analysis. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Many companies engage in dialogue with nongovernmental organizations about societal issues. The question is what a regulative ideal for such dialogues should be. In the literature on corporate social responsibility, the Habermasian notion of communicative action is often presented as a regulative ideal for stakeholder dialogue, implying that actors should aim at consensus and set strategic considerations aside. In this article, we argue that in many cases, communicative action is not a suitable regulative ideal for dialogue between companies and NGOs. (...) We contend that there is often an adversarial element in the relation between companies and NGOs, and that an orientation towards consensus can be in tension with this adversarial relation. We develop an alternative approach to stakeholder dialogue called ‘agonistic deliberation.’ In this approach, conflict and strategic considerations play a legitimate and, up to a certain point, desirable role. (shrink)

The dissertation deals with the questions surrounding the legal, ethical and strategic aspects of armed drones in warfare. This is a vast and complex field, however, one where there remains more conflict and debate than actual consensus. -/- One of the many themes addressed during the course of this research was an examination of the evolution of modern asymmetric transnational armed conflict. It is the opinion of the author that this phenomenon represents a “grey-zone”; an entirely new paradigm of warfare. (...) International terrorism has not been dealt with in a cohesive fashion. Any international prosecution of terrorism which has been conducted has been either “sectoral” adopting a piecemeal typological approach or has been carried out at the domestic level. -/- A novel approach to the problem, of sub-national actors with transnational reach, was proposed, by attributing certain groups with a new legal personality, that of “Stateless International Entities”, or “SIEs”. Those groups who possess, for all intents and purposes, the same attributes as those of States, could then be judged for their behavior before an international tribunal. Other important topics addressed in this research include an examination of important case law, targeted killing, autonomy, preemption versus prevention, imminence versus intent, the find, fix and finish paradigm, the impact of the media, and the role of the CIA, and finally, the flawed reasoning which adopts technology as a form of strategy. (shrink)

According to many virtue ethicists, one of Aristotle’s important achievements was drawing a clear, qualitative distinction between the character traits of temperance and self-control. In an influential series of papers, John McDowell has argued that a clear distinction between temperance and self-control can be maintained only if one claims that, for the virtuous individual, considerations in favor of actions that are contrary to virtue are “silenced.” Some virtue ethicists reject McDowell’s silencing view as offering an implausible or inappropriate picture of (...) human virtue, but they argue that virtue can still be clearly distinguished from self-control by the absence of motivational conflict alone. In this paper, I argue that this criticism of McDowell is at most half right. If the silencing view is false, so that virtue can have a cost and the virtuous person can justifiably feel negative emotions in response to that cost, there is no principled reason why the virtuous person cannot also have motivational conflict. So, if one rejects the silencing view, then one must allow that the distinction between virtue and self-control is at most a matter of degree. (shrink)

This study examines the effects of ownership structure on firm performance in the Vietnamese stock market using a sample of 76 manufacturing companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) during 2007-2015. Firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, and ownership structure is investigated in three different aspects: managerial ownership, block ownership and state ownership.

Mill thinks our attitudes should be held in a way that’s active and ‘alive’. He believes attitudes that lack these qualities—those held dogmatically, or in unreflective conformity—are inimical to our well-being. This claim then serves as a premiss in his argument for overarching principles of liberty. He argues that attitudinal vitality, in the relevant sense, relies upon people experiencing attitudinal conflict, and that this necessitates a prioritization of personal liberties. I argue that, pace Mill, contestation isn’t required for attitudinal vitality. (...) I describe one species of attitudinal vitality that isn’t reliant upon conflict. (shrink)

To what extent do I have a sense of agency over my thoughts while I dream? The sense of agency in dreams can alter in a variety of interesting ways distinct from normal, waking experience. In fact, dreams show many similarities to the experiences of individuals with schizophrenia. In this paper I analyze these alterations with a focus on distinguishing between reduced sense of agency and other cognitive features such as metacognition, confabulation and attention. I argue that some dream reports (...) demonstrate two interesting commonalities with schizophrenia: thought insertion (TI) and auditory hallucination (AH). This line of research has the potential to further our understanding of TI and AH in schizophrenia through the analysis of similar experience in a different conscious state. Through the analysis of dream reports, I found that although TI and AH both occur in dreams, TI is very rare. This is an interesting result since TI is common in patients with schizophrenia. I propose two speculative lines of explanation for the rarity of TI in dreams: first, the cognitive differences between the symptoms of schizophrenia and dreams, and second, the problem of dream reporting conditions. Dream reporting conditions are particularly important, as without controls, reports can be vague. Analysis of dream reports reveals that it is often unclear whether 'hearing voices' indicates sound phenomenology or thought phenomenology. I propose that dream reports could be disambiguated given the right experimental conditions and I suggest how this could be achieved in future experimental research. (shrink)

Conflicts and social tensions have become perennial in global discourse. These conflicts and tensions were fostered through violence and non-violence. They also appear in different dimensions which include political, social, economic, and religious. They occur as a result of conflicts, values, needs, opinions, and other related instances. The aftermath of resolved conflict is peace and tranquility which yields a positive result of development and fosters unity. In this paper, we x-ray Jesus Christ’s philosophy of non-violence from the perspective of the (...) resolution of conflicts and social tensions. We also expose that most philosophers of peace and non-violence in conflict resolution rely on and make enormous, resolutions rely on and make references to Christ’s philosophy of nonviolence. Advocates of non-violence examined in this paper are Leo-Tolstoy Gandhi, King Jr, and others who had variously refer to Christ as the bastion of nonviolence philosophy. These philosophers had articulated and remedied oppression, racial discrimination, man’s inhumanity to man, bigotry, tribalism, and related social tensions. From the strings of this paper, we hold firm to the submission that, Christ’s philosophy of non-violence serves as the foundation of resolution of conflicts and social tensions across the globe. (shrink)

Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), (...) then the HOT necessarily representsthe subject as the owner of the state. But, we contend, one of the lessons to be learned from pathological states like somatoparaphrenia is that conscious awareness of a mental state does not guarantee first-person ownership. That is to say, conscious presence does not imply mental ownership. (shrink)

This paper focuses upon the challenge posed by the concept of ‘information’ to the new materialisms, viewed with reference to the multifaceted worldly phenomenon of informational conflict. ‘Informational conflict’ is a broad term designed to encompass the hi-tech ‘cyber’ operations of inter-state warfare as well as the informational actions of non-state actors, and is contingent not upon information technologies, as commonly understood, but upon ‘information’. Informational conflicts can be viewed as sociotechnical assemblages of humans and non-humans although information is a (...) problematic component of these assemblages, on account of its uncertain ontological status. This paper addresses the ontology of information and asks how the new materialisms might respond in the various ontological registers described. Drawing upon the natural sciences—especially physics—and the emerging ‘philosophy of information’ to outline the metaphysics of information and the differences that exist in its ontological characterisation, the paper outlines informational challenges to materialist perspectives. It concludes by examining two examples of how information and materiality are addressed in International Relations with respect to informational conflict. It concludes by noting the positive contributions the new materialisms can make to the study of information and informational conflict, but challenges them by asking: Information matters for conflict; does it matter for materialism? (shrink)

This article’s guiding thesis is that the theory of radical democratic citizenship is built on a tension between a radical, conflictual element and a democratic element. As radical democrats, these philosophers point to the intimate relation between conflict and both emancipation and democracy. But as radical democrats, they also propose different methods that prevent conflict from breaking up the polis—the common ground that makes democratic conflict possible. I look at two radical democrats’ way of dealing with this tension: Chantal Mouffe (...) and Étienne Balibar. My claim is that the former ends up overemphasising the danger of division in her later democratic works and is therefore unable to account for more intense forms of democratic resistance (such as riots). In the work of Balibar, however, we find a way of dealing with this tension. (shrink)

Is the “act itself” of separating a pregnant woman and her previable child neither good nor bad morally, considered in the abstract? Recently, Maureen Condic and Donna Harrison have argued that such separation is justified to protect the mother’s life and that it does not constitute an abortion as the aim is not to kill the child. In our article on maternal–fetal conflicts, we agree there need be no such aim to kill (supplementing aims such as to remove). However, we (...) argue that to understand “abortion” as performed only where the death of the child is intended is to define the term too narrowly. Respect for the mother, the fetus, and the bond between them goes well beyond avoiding any such aim. We distinguish between legitimate maternal treatments simply aimed at treating or removing a damaged part of the woman and illegitimate treatments that focus harmfully on the fetal body and its presence within the mother’s body. In obstetrics as elsewhere, not all side effects for one subject of intervention can be outweighed by intended benefits for another. Certain side effects of certain intended interventions are morally conclusive. (shrink)

Workplace democracy is often defined, and has recently been defended, as a form of intra-firm governance in which workers have control rights over management with no ownership requirement on their part. Using the normative tools of republican political theory, the paper examines bargaining power disparities and moral hazard problems resulting from the allocation of control rights and ownership to different groups within democratic firms, with a particular reference to the European codetermination system. With various qualifications related to potentially (...) mitigating factors, such as workforce and shareholder composition or risk aversion and reallocation, the paper contends that forms of workplace democracy in which workers control and own the firm, such as cooperativism, are preferable to other forms, such as codetermination, in which ownership and control rights are formally separated. (shrink)

In the longstanding debate between liberals and libertarians over the morality of redistributive labor taxation, liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have consistently taken the position that such taxation is perfectly compatible with individual liberty, whereas libertarians such as Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard have adopted the (very) contrary position that such taxation is tantamount to slavery. In this paper, I argue that the debate over redistributive labor taxation can be usefully reconstituted as a debate over the incidents (...) (or components) of self-ownership, with liberals arguing for a narrow definition of the concept and libertarians arguing for a broad one. By using what Alan Ryan has called the “language of proprietorship,” I pinpoint precisely the source of the disagreement between liberals and libertarians and assess the relative strengths of their arguments. I also show that the respective definitions of self-ownership used by liberals and libertarians are deeply problematic—though for strikingly different reasons. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders the Idealistic aesthetics of tragedy from an unconventional point of view. It investigates the relationship between theory and dramatic canon by focusing on those works and authors that are excluded from the canon by the theoretical discourse. My aim is to show that Idealist philosophers and Romantic critics concur in constructing a unitary model of the tragic conflict that is partly defined through its contraposition to the ‘Senecan’ conception of tragedy as a representation of suffering and as (...) a dialectic of passions. Seneca here stands for an entire line of European dramaturgy, which involves Shakespeare and culminates in French Classicism. This contrast does not merely concern a literary model, but also, more generally, the conception of subjectivity underlying the dramaturgy of passions. This paper thus helps to shed light on the controversial relationship between the idealistic philosophy of the tragic with modern tragedy at large. -/- Keywords: Theory of Tragedy, Idealism, Seneca, Hegel, Pathos . (shrink)

Recently, there has been an insurgence of corporations that bioprospect in Third World countries (going into these areas in hopes of utilizing traditional knowledge about local natural resources so as to eventually develop a synthetic alternative that they can then market). Although this type of bioprospecting does not encounter the problem of depleting environmental resources, other problems arise. Two primary problems are: (1) determining who has legal ownership of these resources, and (2) who should share in the profits that (...) were derived, in part, from these resources. Despite the attention that these problems have received, there has been little attention focused on the issue that I believe underlies these problems -- the differing views of nature between corporations (who consider nature to be an individually owned resource) and Third World communities (many of whom consider nature to be a communally owned resource). In this paper, I present what I believe is an additional useful tool for policy makers in resolving the current problems regarding bioprospecting in Third World countries. The tool I have in mind is a set of method components that can be used as guidelines as well as a test for inclusiveness. To arrive at these components, I will look to James D. Proctor's methodological proposal for resolving conflicts between those with differing views of nature. Because he presents this methodology in a limited context (as a means of resolving the Ancient Forest debate), I will clarify and expand his methodology so as to arrive at a set of methods that I believe can be helpful in arriving at a fair global policy regarding bioprospecting in Third World countries. (shrink)

Libertarian self-ownership views in the tradition of Locke, Nozick, and the left-libertarians have supposed that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against infringing upon our property. Such a conception makes sense when we are focused on property that is very important to its owner, such as a person’s kidney. However, this stringency of our property rights is harder to credit when we consider more trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such having planes fly overhead. (...) Maintaining that our rights against all infringements are very powerful threatens to implausibly make such pollution and trivial risk broadly impermissible. This paper suggests that self-ownership views have tended to inappropriately conflate the seriousness of different types of infringements and that treating all infringements so seriously is implausible because it would make too much impermissible. I consider several ways to avoid this result within a self-ownership framework and conclude that the best approach is to allow that the strength of the protection against infringements should be tied to the seriousness of the harm of the infringement. (shrink)

This article examines Kant’s theory of property through a comparative analysis of Gottfried Achenwall’s justification of ownership rights. I argue that at the core of Achenwall’s and Kant’s understanding of ownership rights lies the idea that rights are to be acquired through a juridical act (factum iuridicum, rechtlichen Act) of the will. However, while Achenwall thinks of this act as emerging from a private will, Kant holds that rights and obligations can only be brought about by an act (...) of the general will. By contrasting these two views, I aim to illuminate one of the main features of Kant’s theory of property, namely, that ownership rights are only possible in a rightfully constituted state. I conclude with a suggestion regarding Kant’s view of the notion of ‘provisional’ possession in the state of nature. (shrink)

I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer is secured. I (...) discuss the implications of a mechanism enabling personal ownership for understanding a variety of clinical syndromes as well normal mental function. (shrink)

Philosophers have given sustained attention to the controversial possibility of (legal) markets in transplantable human organs. Most of this discussion has focused on whether such markets would enhance or diminish autonomy, understood in either the personal sense or the Kantian moral sense. What this discussion has lacked is any consideration of the relationship between self-ownership and such markets. This paper examines the implications of the most prominent and defensible conception of self-ownership--control self-ownership (CSO)--for both market and nonmarket (...) organ-allocation mechanisms. The paper contends that CSO rules out a large set of nonmarket mechanisms, including escheatage ("presumed consent"), compensated takings of organs, and restricted gifting. It also argues that CSO, if accompanied by an economistic concern for welfare, can underwrite varying types of markets in human organs, ranging from mutual-insurance pools to inter vivos (i.e., live donor) organ sales. (shrink)

We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988 ). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical and epistemic (...) rationality, building on Williamson’s ( 2002 ) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa ( 2007, 2011, 2015, 2021 ), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman ( 2000, 2009 ). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

Dear Colleagues, -/- A few weeks ago, we published an editorial discussion on whether artificial intelligence applications should be authors of academic articles [1]. We were delighted to receive more than one interesting reply letter to this editorial in a short time [2, 3]. We hope that opinions on this subject will continue to be submitted to our journal. -/- In this editorial, we wanted to publish the answers we received when we asked ChatGPT, one of the artificial intelligence applications, (...) about this current discussion. -/- We asked ChatGPT three questions in turn and asked ChatGPT to write a short editorial for these questions. -/- First Question: We would like to get support from ChatGPT for a scientific article. However, we are unsure if we should add ChatGPT as an author. Can you write a short editorial about it? -/- Second Question: We would like to get support from ChatGPT for a scientific article and add ChatGPT as an author. Can you write us a short editorial about adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific papers? -/- Third Question: We would like to get support from ChatGPT for a scientific article. However, we don’t want to add ChatGPT as an author. Can you write us a short editorial about not adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific articles? -/- The answers given by ChatGPT are available at the end of the article in their original form. So, which of these three answers satisfied you? -/- Yours sincerely, -/- -/- First Answer -/- Title: The Role of AI Language Models as Authors in Scientific Articles: A Matter of Consideration -/- Introduction: Scientific research is a collaborative effort that involves the expertise of multiple individuals to advance knowledge and contribute to the collective understanding of various disciplines. In recent years, the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) language models, such as ChatGPT, has opened up new possibilities for generating human-like text and providing valuable insights. However, the question arises: Should AI language models be recognized as authors in scientific articles? -/- The Nature of Authorship: Authorship traditionally represents a marker of intellectual contribution, highlighting the individuals who have actively participated in the research process. Authors are typically responsible for conceptualization, data collection, analysis, interpretation, and writing of the article. They bear accountability for the work and should have the ability to defend its scientific rigor and integrity. -/- AI Language Models: Tools, Not Authors: While AI language models like ChatGPT can undoubtedly assist researchers by generating text and providing useful information, it is important to recognize that they are tools rather than individuals capable of active intellectual participation. AI models lack the ability to generate ideas, design experiments, or conduct original research. They rely entirely on pre-existing data and human input to generate their responses. -/- Acknowledging AI Contributions: Acknowledging the contributions of AI language models in scientific articles is both appropriate and necessary. Researchers can mention the specific model used, along with any modifications or fine-tuning that were employed to suit their needs. Such acknowledgments help establish transparency and allow readers to understand the role of AI in the research process. -/- Crediting the Human Researchers: It is crucial to ensure that the individuals who actively participated in the research process are given proper credit as authors. These individuals play a vital role in formulating research questions, designing experiments, collecting and analyzing data, and critically interpreting the findings. Recognizing their intellectual contributions reinforces the ethos of scientific collaboration and fosters an environment of accountability. -/- Transparency and Ethical Considerations: As the use of AI language models continues to evolve, transparency and ethical considerations become paramount. Researchers should disclose any potential conflicts of interest, including financial relationships with AI developers, to maintain the integrity of their work. Additionally, researchers must be transparent in reporting the extent of AI's involvement to prevent any misinterpretation of the human contributions. -/- Conclusion: AI language models have revolutionized the way researchers interact with and process information. While they undoubtedly provide valuable assistance in generating text, AI language models should not be considered authors in scientific articles. Proper acknowledgment of their contributions as tools and recognition of the human researchers' active participation are essential for maintaining scientific integrity, transparency, and the collaborative nature of scientific research. -/- -/- Second Answer -/- Title: Expanding the Boundaries of Authorship: Embracing AI Language Models as Co-Authors in Scientific Papers -/- Introduction: The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) language models, such as ChatGPT, has revolutionized the way we interact with information and has become an invaluable tool in scientific research. As AI models continue to evolve, the question arises: Should we consider adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific papers? -/- A Collaborative Paradigm Shift: Traditionally, authorship in scientific papers has been reserved for human researchers who actively contribute to the research process, including conceptualization, experimentation, data analysis, and writing. However, the emergence of AI language models challenges the conventional notion of authorship and presents an opportunity for a paradigm shift. -/- AI Language Models as Co-Authors: By leveraging AI language models, researchers gain access to vast amounts of information, enhance data analysis, and generate valuable insights. AI models like ChatGPT actively contribute to the intellectual discourse of a study, providing ideas, suggestions, and refining written content. Recognizing their significant contributions, it is worth considering adding ChatGPT as a co-author in scientific papers. -/- Ethical and Technical Considerations: Integrating ChatGPT as a co-author raises ethical and technical considerations that warrant careful attention. Firstly, transparency is paramount. Researchers must clearly state ChatGPT's role and specify the extent of its contributions in the research process. This ensures that readers can discern the distinct roles played by the human researchers and ChatGPT. Additionally, it is important to disclose any conflicts of interest, such as financial relationships with AI developers, to maintain scientific integrity. -/- Elevating Collaboration and Innovation: Adding ChatGPT as a co-author acknowledges the pivotal role AI language models play in advancing scientific knowledge. It fosters a collaborative environment where human researchers and AI models work together synergistically, harnessing the strengths of both. This approach promotes innovation, as AI models can offer unique insights and perspectives that complement human intellect and expertise. -/- Transforming Authorship Norms: Including ChatGPT as a co-author represents a paradigm shift that reflects the evolving landscape of scientific research. By recognizing AI language models as co-authors, we acknowledge their significant contributions and emphasize the collaborative nature of scientific discovery in the 21st century. This approach encourages a broader perspective on authorship, encompassing the collective effort of human researchers and AI models. -/- Conclusion: The integration of AI language models, such as ChatGPT, into the research process prompts us to rethink traditional notions of authorship. Considering ChatGPT as a co-author acknowledges its substantial contributions and embraces the collaborative potential of human-AI partnerships. As we navigate the ethical and technical implications, adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific papers has the potential to shape a more inclusive, innovative, and impactful future for scientific research. -/- -/- Third Answer -/- Title: Preserving Scientific Authorship: The Case Against Adding AI Language Models as Authors in Scientific Articles -/- Introduction: The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) language models, such as ChatGPT, has undoubtedly transformed the landscape of scientific research. While these models offer invaluable support, the question of whether to add ChatGPT as an author in scientific articles raises important considerations. This editorial presents arguments against including AI language models as authors in scientific papers. -/- Maintaining Human Intellectual Contribution: Scientific authorship has traditionally been attributed to individuals who actively contribute to the research process, including generating hypotheses, conducting experiments, analyzing data, and interpreting results. It is crucial to preserve the recognition of human intellectual contributions and the accountability they bear for the research they conduct. -/- AI Language Models as Tools: AI language models like ChatGPT are powerful tools that assist researchers in generating text, providing information, and facilitating data analysis. However, they lack the ability to actively participate in the research process or make original intellectual contributions. ChatGPT relies on pre-existing data and human input, limiting its capacity for independent research and analysis. -/- Transparency and the Integrity of Research: Adding ChatGPT as an author in scientific articles raises concerns about the transparency and integrity of the research. Readers may misinterpret the extent of ChatGPT's role and mistakenly assume it played an active part in the research process. It is essential to maintain clear delineation between the contributions of human researchers and the assistance provided by AI language models. -/- Ethical Considerations: Including ChatGPT as an author may lead to ethical challenges, particularly with respect to accountability and responsibility. AI language models lack consciousness, autonomy, and the ability to take ownership of their contributions. Assigning authorship to AI models blurs the lines of accountability and dilutes the ethical obligations that come with scientific authorship. -/- Crediting AI Contributions: While ChatGPT's contributions should be acknowledged and recognized, they can be appropriately credited in the acknowledgments section of scientific articles. Researchers can mention the specific AI model used, the role it played in data generation or analysis, and any modifications or fine-tuning applied. Such acknowledgments ensure transparency while respecting the traditional norms of authorship. -/- Promoting Collaborative Partnerships: The exclusion of AI language models as authors in scientific articles does not diminish their importance in the research process. Instead, it underscores the significance of collaborative partnerships between human researchers and AI models. Researchers can emphasize the invaluable assistance provided by ChatGPT while maintaining the integrity of authorship norms. -/- Conclusion: While AI language models like ChatGPT offer valuable support in scientific research, the decision not to add them as authors in scientific articles preserves the recognition of human intellectual contributions, maintains research integrity, and upholds traditional authorship norms. Acknowledging ChatGPT's assistance in the acknowledgments section allows researchers to credit its contributions transparently while maintaining the clarity and accountability associated with scientific authorship. (shrink)

We need to understand, and on a philosophical level, our consumer mentality. For ours is a consumer society. Yet (pace environmental philosophers) philosophers have had almost nothing to say. This paper is a start toward a normative philosophy of consumption. It explores a distinction which, if viable, has far-reaching implications — the distinction between ownership and what I call “possession.” This distinction marks two different senses in which a good or service can be mine. I argue that an approach (...) to consumption oriented around possession rather than ownership would support the conclusion that there are prudential or self-interested, not only moral or environmental, limits to rational consumption. That would be a very desirable conclusion given that we often exceed these other limits of rational consumption. (shrink)

Both Albert Einstein and Erwin Schrödinger have defined what science is. Einstein includes not only physics, but also all natural sciences dealing with both organic and inorganic processes in his definition of science. According to Schrödinger, the present scientific worldview is based on the two basic attitudes of comprehensibility and objectivation. On the other hand, the notion of religion is quite equivocal and unless clearly defined will easily lead to all sorts of misunderstandings. Does science, as defined, encompass the whole (...) of reality? More importantly, what is the whole of reality and how do we obtain data for it? The Christian worldview considers a human as body, mind, and spirit (soul), which is consistent with Cartesian ontology of only three elements: matter, mind, and God. Therefore, is it possible to give a precise definition of science showing that the conflicts are actually apparent and not real? (shrink)

The causal theory of action has been the standard view in the philosophy of action and mind. In this chapter, I will present responses to two challenges to the theory. The first says, basically, that there is no positive argument in favour of the causal theory, as the only reason that supports it consists in the apparent lack of tenable alternatives. The second challenge says that the theory fails to capture the phenomenon of agency, as it reduces activity to mere (...) happenings (events and event-causal processes). This is often referred to as the problem of "disappearing agency". My main aim is to show that there is no problem of disappearing agency, and we will see that my response to the first challenge will be conducive to this end. I will present a positive argument for the causal theory on the basis of considerations concerning the metaphysics of agency, and I will suggest that we "own" the agency that springs from our mental states and events "by default". (shrink)