In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that epistemically rational individuals might compose epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, epistemically rational groups might be composed of epistemically irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they together imply that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists might be logically independent of one another. We develop a formal model of scientific inquiry, define four (...) criteria for individual and group epistemic rationality, and then prove that the four definitions diverge, in the sense that individuals will be judged rational when groups are not and vice versa. We conclude by explaining implications of the inconsistency thesis for (i) descriptive history and sociology of science and (ii) normative prescriptions for scientific communities. (shrink)

Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rational, or not, in virtue of their accuracy or “closeness to the truth” (1998). The second is a shift from a numerically precise model of belief to an imprecise model represented by a set of probability functions (2010). We argue that both amendments cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To do so, we employ a (slightly-generalized) impossibility theorem of Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012), who show that (...) there is no strictly proper scoring rule for imprecise probabilities. -/- The question then is what should give way. Joyce, who is well aware of this no-go result, thinks that a quantifiability constraint on epistemic accuracy should be relaxed to accommodate imprecision. We argue instead that another Joycean assumption — called strict immodesty— should be rejected, and we prove a representation theorem that characterizes all “mildly” immodest measures of inaccuracy. (shrink)

We evaluate the asymptotic performance of boundedly-rational strategies in multi-armed bandit problems, where performance is measured in terms of the tendency (in the limit) to play optimal actions in either (i) isolation or (ii) networks of other learners. We show that, for many strategies commonly employed in economics, psychology, and machine learning, performance in isolation and performance in networks are essentially unrelated. Our results suggest that the appropriateness of various, common boundedly-rational strategies depends crucially upon the social context (if any) (...) in which such strategies are to be employed. (shrink)

A dynamical system is called chaotic if small changes to its initial conditions can create large changes in its behavior. By analogy, we call a dynamical system structurally chaotic if small changes to the equations describing the evolution of the system produce large changes in its behavior. Although there are many definitions of “chaos,” there are few mathematically precise candidate definitions of “structural chaos.” I propose a definition, and I explain two new theorems that show that a set of models (...) is structurally chaotic if it contains a chaotic function. I conclude by discussing the relationship between structural chaos and structural stability. (shrink)

Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.

It is common to assume that the problem of induction arises only because of small sample sizes or unreliable data. In this paper, I argue that the piecemeal collection of data can also lead to underdetermination of theories by evidence, even if arbitrarily large amounts of completely reliable experimental and observational data are collected. Specifically, I focus on the construction of causal theories from the results of many studies (perhaps hundreds), including randomized controlled trials and observational studies, where the studies (...) focus on overlapping, but not identical, sets of variables. Two theorems reveal that, for any collection of variables V, there exist fundamentally different causal theories over V that cannot be distinguished unless all variables are simultaneously measured. Underdetermination can result from piecemeal measurement, regardless of the quantity and quality of the data. Moreover, I generalize these results to show that, a priori, it is impossible to choose a series of small (in terms of number of variables) observational studies that will be most informative with respect to the causal theory describing the variables under investigation. This final result suggests that scientific institutions may need to play a larger role in coordinating differing research programs during inquiry. (shrink)

According to Quine, Charles Parsons, Mark Steiner, and others, Russell’s logicist project is important because, if successful, it would show that mathematical theorems possess desirable epistemic properties often attributed to logical theorems, such as aprioricity, necessity, and certainty. Unfortunately, Russell never attributed such importance to logicism, and such a thesis contradicts Russell’s explicitly stated views on the relationship between logic and mathematics. This raises the question: what did Russell understand to be the philosophical importance of logicism? Building on recent work (...) by Andrew Irvine and Martin Godwyn, I argue that Russell thought a systematic reduction of mathematics increases the certainty of known mathematical theorems (even basic arithmetical facts) by showing mathematical knowledge to be coherently organized. The paper outlines Russell’s theory of coherence, and discusses its relevance to logicism and the certainty attributed to mathematics. (shrink)

Audience segmentation is necessary in health communications to ensure equitable resource distribution. Peer crowds, which are macro-level teen subcultures, are effective psychographic segments for health communications because each crowd has unique mindsets, values, norms, and health behavior profiles. These mindsets affect behaviors, and can be used to develop targeted health communication campaigns to reach those in greatest need. Though peer crowd research is plentiful, no existing peer crowd measurement tool has been formally validated. As such, we developed and validated Virginia's (...) Mindset Lens Survey (V-MLS), a mindset-based teen peer crowd segmentation survey to support health communication efforts. Using an online convenience sample of teens (N = 1,113), we assessed convergent and discriminant validity by comparing the V-MLS against an existing, widely-used peer crowd survey (I-Base Survey®) utilizing a multi-trait multi-method matrix. (shrink)

En 1968 ocurrieron dos hechos sobre los cuales cabe hacer una reflexión orientada por la bioética: la llamada Revolución del 68 y la aparición de la Carta encíclica Humanae Vitae. El Concilio Vaticano II, que fue presentado como una actualización de la Iglesia católica al mundo moderno, fue el escenario de los estudios previos a la redacción del documento pontificio, donde Pablo VI dejó clara la postura del Magisterio de la Iglesia sobre la moral sexual y anticipa los errores prácticos (...) que se seguirían a planteamientos conceptuales antropológicos erróneos o equivocados sobre esa temática. Hay necesidad de rehabilitar la Humanae vitae para volver a percibir el acto conyugal en su “verdad inalterable”, donde no se puede separar el bien y la belleza de la donación mutua de los cónyuges, que redunda en el bien común de la sociedad para defender su célula básica y nuclear que es la familia. In 1968, two events occurred on which it is worth reflecting on bioethics: the so-called Revolution of 1968 and the appearance of the Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae. The Second Vatican Council, which was presented as an update of the Catholic Church to the modern world, was the scene of the studies prior to the drafting of the pontifical document, where Paul VI made clear the position of the Magisterium of the Church on sexual morality and it anticipates the practical errors that would follow erroneous or mistaken anthropological conceptual approaches on this subject. There is a need to rehabilitate Humanae vitae in order to re-perceive the conjugal act in its "unalterable truth", where good and beauty cannot be separated from the mutual donation of the spouses, which results in the common good of society to defend its basic and nuclear cell which is the family. (shrink)

Many epistemologists have argued that there is some degree of independence between individual and collective reliability (e.g., Kitcher 1990; Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks 2011; Dunn 2018). The question, then, is: To what extent are the two independent of each other? And in which contexts do they come apart? In this paper, I present a new case confirming the independence between individual and collective reliability optimization. I argue that, in voting groups, optimizing individual reliability can conflict with optimizing collective reliability. (...) This can happen even if various conditions are held constant, such as: the evidence jurors have access to, the voting system, the number of jurors, some independence conditions between voters, and so forth. This observation matters in many active debates on, e.g., epistemic dilemmas, the wisdom of crowds, independence theses, epistemic democracy, and the division of epistemic labour. (shrink)

One justification for preregistering research hypotheses, methods, and analyses is that it improves the transparent evaluation of the severity of hypothesis tests. In this article, I consider two cases in which preregistration does not improve this evaluation. First, I argue that, although preregistration can facilitate the transparent evaluation of severity in Mayo’s error statistical philosophy of science, it does not facilitate this evaluation in Popper’s theory-centric approach. To illustrate, I show that associated concerns about Type I error rate inflation (...) are only relevant in the error statistical approach and not in a theory-centric approach. Second, I argue that a preregistered test procedure that allows deviations in its implementation does not provide a more transparent evaluation of Mayoian severity than a non-preregistered procedure. In particular, I argue that sample-based validity-enhancing deviations cause an unknown inflation of the test procedure’s Type I (familywise) error rate and, consequently, an unknown reduction in its capability to license inferences severely. I conclude that preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity in Popper’s philosophy of science or when deviations are allowed. (shrink)

Este libro inaugura la serie Homenaje de la Colección La Fuente. Con él se busca reconocer, de manera particular, al pensador, dramaturgo y director brasileño Augusto Boal (1931-2009), creador del teatro y la estética del oprimido, genuina aportación cultural latinoamericana que mucho tiene que ver con ese particular lugar de enunciación que es Nuestra América y sus siempre actuales expectativas emancipadoras. El libro fue precedido y nutrido por un Coloquio que en mayo de 2014 reunió a importantes especialistas y (...) seguidores del legado teórico-práctico de Boal y que tuvo como tema principal el del rescate y la continuación de su obra. Incluye los más importantes trabajos allí presentados, junto a un estudio biográfico, una contribución enviada por su hijo, una entrevista a su esposa y dos obras del propio Boal que (una parcialmente y la otra de manera completa) se publican por primera vez. (shrink)

La “Recomendación del Consejo de la OCDE sobre inteligencia artificial” es un conjunto de directrices y principios para el desarrollo y despliegue de sistemas de IA alineados con los valores y derechos humanos, la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas. Fue adoptada por el Consejo de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE) en mayo de 2019 e incluye cinco principios clave para la gobernanza de la IA. Ésta debe beneficiar a las personas y al planeta (...) impul- sando el crecimiento inclusivo, el desarrollo sostenible y el bienestar; los sistemas de IA deben respetar el estado de derecho, los derechos humanos, los valores democráticos y la diversidad; también deben ser transparentes para garantizar que las personas comprendan los resultados y puedan cuestionarlos; los sistemas deben ser sólidos, seguros y protegidos durante todo su ciclo de vida; y las partes interesadas deben colaborar para maximizar los beneficios de la IA y minimizar sus riesgos. Se concluye aquí que los Principios de IA de la OCDE han sido criticados por no ser vinculantes y carecer de un mecanismo formal de aplicación. Tampoco abordan preocupaciones sociales amplias, como el desplazamiento de puestos de trabajo y la concentración de poder en unas pocas empresas. Además, es posible que los principios no tengan en cuenta los retos a los que se enfrentan los países en desarrollo y estén demasiado centrados en los intereses de las economías avanzadas. Sin embargo, la Recomendación de la OCDE establece una serie de principios ampliamente aceptados y respaldados tanto por los miembros, como por los que no lo son. Entre los valores figuran la transparencia, la solidez, la seguridad, la responsabilidad, la justicia, la equidad y la determinación humana. Este conjunto compartido de principios proporciona una base sólida para el desarrollo responsable de la IA, más allá de las fronteras de los “países ricos”. (shrink)

The conflation of two fundamentally distinct issues has generated serious confusion in the philosophical and biological literature concerning the units of selection. The question of how a unit of selection of defined, theoretically, is rarely distinguished from the question of how to determine the empirical accuracy of claims--either specific or general--concerning which unit(s) is undergoing selection processes. In this paper, I begin by refining a definition of the unit of selection, first presented in the philosophical literature by William Wimsatt, which (...) is grounded in the structure of natural selection models. I then explore the implications of this structural definition for empirical evaluation of claims about units of selection. I consider criticisms of this view presented by Elliott Sober--criticisms taken by some (for example, Mayo and Gilinsky 1987) to provide definitive damage to the structuralist account. I shall show that Sober has misinterpreted the structuralist views; he knocks down a straw man in order to motivate his own causal account. Furthermore, I shall argue, Sober's causal account is dependent on the structuralist account that he rejects. I conclude by indicating how the refined structural definition can clarify which sorts of empirical evidence could be brought to bear on a controversial case involving units of selection. (shrink)

Este artículo busca efectuar una reflexión sobre un concepto supuestamente zanjado por la disciplina como es que la depreciación de un bien de capital conlleva a una pérdida de valor. Aunque hay consenso doctrinario en que los factores o recursos (imputs) necesarios para la producción industrial sufren una pérdida de valor al ser paulatinamente consumidos en un proceso productivo (sea maquinaria, vehículos o inmuebles), no se han encontrado referencias cuando los bienes sujetos al proceso son obras de arte, tal como (...) suele suceder en los museos o colecciones privadas abiertas al público. El último quinquenio, y en especial el año 2015, ha sido relevante para el mercado de arte, alcanzándose en mayo de 2015 un precio en subasta por la obra Las mujeres de Algers (versión O) de Pablo Picasso de 179,36 millones de dólares, así como fue batido el record de esculturas con la obra Hombre que señalaba de Alberto Giacometti, que fue subastada en 126 millones de dólares. Se analiza en este artículo desde el punto de vista teórico y conceptual los procesos que consumen, en forma de factores productivos, obras de arte, demostrando que una teoría que se basa en principios teóricos sólidos, como es la Teoría General del Costo, logra armonizar el concepto tradicional de depreciación con el mercado del arte, la producción que requiere de dichos factores, y el desgaste de las obras al ser sometidas a un proceso productivo . (shrink)

If the goal of statistical analysis is to form justified credences based on data, then an account of the foundations of statistics should explain what makes credences justified. I present a new account called statistical reliabilism (SR), on which credences resulting from a statistical analysis are justified (relative to alternatives) when they are in a sense closest, on average, to the corresponding objective probabilities. This places (SR) in the same vein as recent work on the reliabilist justification of credences generally (...) [Dunn, 2015, Tang, 2016, Pettigrew, 2018], but it has the advantage of being action-guiding in that knowledge of objective probabilities is not required to identify the best-justified available credences. The price is that justification is relativized to a specific class of candidate objective probabilities, and to a particular choice of reliability measure. On the other hand, I show that (SR) has welcome implications for frequentist-Bayesian reconciliation, including a clarification of the use of priors; complemen- tarity between probabilist and fallibilist [Gelman and Shalizi, 2013, Mayo, 2018] approaches towards statistical foundations; and the justification of credences outside of formal statistical settings. Regarding the latter, I demonstrate how the insights of statistics may be used to amend other reliabilist accounts so as to render them action-guiding. I close by discussing new possible research directions for epistemologists and statisticians (and other applied users of probability) raised by the (SR) framework. (shrink)

ecientemente hemos podido asistir a una revitalización del debate sobre la primacía del Derecho de la Unión Europea y los eventuales límites de la misma que algunos tribunales constitucionales defienden para preservar la identidad constitucional y otros principios esenciales del orden jurídico interno. -/- El Tribunal Constitucional Federal alemán ha declarado, en sentencia de 5 de mayo de 2020, que la sentencia Weiss y otros del Tribunal de Justicia de la UE es ultra vires. La reacción mayoritaria institucional y (...) doctrinal ha sido la de cuestionar la decisión del Tribunal alemán, así como el pluralismo constitucional que entienden está detrás de la misma. -/- Este trabajo, desde una perspectiva abierta y plural, trata de aproximarse al debate constitucional, identificar algunos de los problemas existentes en el orden jurídico multinivel europeo, y defender que, no siendo las cosas fáciles, se hace más necesario que nunca huir de posiciones absolutas y buscar el diálogo entre tribunales. (shrink)

La Sentencia del TJUE de 13 de mayo de 2014, Google Spain (C-131/12) ha supuesto un hito muy relevante en el sistema de protección de derechos fundamentales de la Unión Europea, dando origen al derecho al olvido, y abriendo un camino del que queda mucho por explorar. Una de las cuestiones más controvertidas es determinar el alcance territorial del derecho al olvido, que está vinculado al alcance territorial de una sentencia que no tenemos derecho a olvidar.

Ante el Problema de Duhem, dos de los caminos que pueden tomarse son los siguientes: (1) exigir que la hipótesis explique las observaciones; (2) exigir que las alternativas a la hipótesis sean descartables. Este trabajo pretende comparar ambas alternativas concretadas cada una en un caso. En representación de la estrategia de la explicación (1), se usa un artículo de Weber quien defiende la estrategia de la inferencia de la mejor explicación. El representante elegido para la estrategia (2) es el experimentalismo (...) de D. Mayo y su estadística del error. (shrink)

Hace tres años que la Facultat de Filosofia i Ciències de l’Educació de la Universitat de València acogió las II Jornadas Internacionales sobre la obra filosófica de José Gaos. Concretamente, el acontecimiento transcurrió durante los días 11, 12 y 13 de Mayo, y como consecuencia de tales jornadas —reseñadas éstas en un número anterior de la Revista—, no sólo ha aumentado el interés por la obra de nuestro asturiano universal José Gaos (1900-1969), sino que debemos agradecer a la excelente (...) editorial Biblioteca Nueva que, en su Colección “Pensar en Español” (dirigida por Jacobo Muñoz y Francisco José Martín), haya publicado una nutrida colección de textos en torno a.... (shrink)

I argue that political forgiveness is sometimes, but not always, compatible with public commemoration of politically motivated wrongdoing. I start by endorsing the claim that commemorating serious past wrongdoing has moral value and imposes moral demands on key actors within post-conflict societies. I am concerned with active commemoration, that is, the deliberate acts of bringing victims and the wrong done to them to public attention. The main issue is whether political forgiveness requires forgetting and conversely whether remembrance can be an (...) impediment to political forgiveness. The notion of political forgiveness, its definition, very possibility and desirability are contentious issues in the contemporary literature. I develop a multidimensional account of political forgiveness with a core element. The core element of political forgiveness involves taking a non-adversarial stance towards perpetrators in the sense of committing to stop holding their wrongdoing against them. The core element of forgiveness is usually combined with other attitudes and practices, which are appropriate depending on the circumstances. This is due to the fact that there are different ways of holding a wrong against an offender. I argue that forgiving perpetrators is not compatible with continue to punishing them, refusing to reconcile with them, and/or reminding them of their misdeed if perpetrators refuse to accept punishment, deny the importance of commemorating the past or wish to reconcile against the victim’s desires. I show that some forms of political forgiveness are not morally legitimate because they conflict with moral demands to punish perpetrators, commemorate atrocities and respect victims. This conclusion is less alarming than it might initially seem because the refusal to forgive politically motivated wrongdoing does not necessarily lead to the perpetuation of violence and conflict. I briefly draw on the example of Argentina in order to show how some forms of political un-forgiveness can be morally legitimate and effective ways for victims to uphold these demands. (shrink)