this paper advances a novel account of part of what justifies killing in war, grounded in the duties we owe to our loved ones to protect them from the severe harms with which war threatens them. It discusses the foundations of associative duties, then identifies the sorts of relationships, and the specific duties that they ground, which can be relevant to the ethics of war. It explains how those associa- tive duties can justify killing in theory—in particular how they can (...) justify overrid- ing the rights to life of some of those who must be killed to win a war. It then shows how these duties can be operationalised in practice: first, showing how soldiers who fight on behalf of their community can act on reasons that apply to the members of that community; second, showing that the argument from associative duties does not prove too much—in particular, that it does not license the intentional killing of noncombatants in war. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that using lethal or otherwise serious force in self-defense is justified only when three conditions are satisfied: first, there are some grounds for the defender to give priority to his own interests over those of the attacker (whether because the attacker has lost the protection of his right to life, for example, or because of the defender’s prerogative to prefer himself to others); second, the harm used is proportionate to the threat thereby averted; third, the harm (...) is necessary to avert that threat. The first and second conditions have been exhaustively discussed, but the third has been oddly neglected. Meanwhile a prominent school of thought has arisen, in the ethics of war, which seeks to ground the justification of killing in war in principles of individual self-defense. They too have failed to offer any substantive analysis of necessity, while at the same time appealing to it when it suits them to do so. In this paper, I attempt a detailed analysis of the necessity constraint on defensive force, and explore the implications of that analysis for the attempt to transpose principles of individual self-defense into the context of warfare. (shrink)

Killing in War presents the Moral Equality of Combatants with serious, and in my view insurmountable problems. Absent some novel defense, this thesis is now very difficult to sustain. But this success is counterbalanced by the strikingly revisionist implications of McMahan’s account of the underlying morality of killing in war, which forces us into one of two unattractive positions, contingent pacifism, or near-total war. In this article, I have argued that his efforts to mitigate these controversial implications fail. The reader (...) is left stranded: to reach plausible conclusions, Walzer deployed an implausible conception of our rights to life; McMahan’s more rigorous account of those rights generates untenable conclusions. Absent new developments, it seems that the prospects for grounding the ethics of war in individual rights are poor: any theory of our rights to life that is sufficiently indiscriminate to work in the chaos of war is not discriminating enough to be a plausible theory of our rights to life. Perhaps by rejecting the ideal of the rights-respecting war altogether we might develop an alternative theory of justified warfare, which marries theoretical soundness with conclusions that we can more confidently support. (shrink)

Many of us believe (1) Saving a life is more important than averting any number of headaches. But what about risky cases? Surely: (2) In a single choice, if the risk of death is low enough, and the number of headaches at stake high enough, one should avert the headaches rather than avert the risk of death. And yet, if we will face enough iterations of cases like that in (2), in the long run some of those small risks of (...) serious harms will surely eventuate. And yet: (3) Isn't it still permissible for us to run these repeated risks, despite that knowledge? After all, if it were not, then many of the risky activities that we standardly think permissible would in fact be impermissible. Nobody has yet offered a principle that can accommodate all of 1-3. In this paper, I show that we can accommodate all of these judgements, by taking into account both ex ante and ex post perspectives. In doing so, I clear aside an important obstacle to a viable deontological decision theory. (shrink)

Interest in just war theory has boomed in recent years, as a revisionist school of thought has challenged the orthodoxy of international law, most famously defended by Michael Walzer [1977]. These revisionist critics have targeted the two central principles governing the conduct of war (jus in bello): combatant equality and noncombatant immunity. The first states that combatants face the same permissions and constraints whether their cause is just or unjust. The second protects noncombatants from intentional attack. In response to these (...) critics, some philosophers have defended aspects of the old orthodoxy on novel grounds. Revisionists counter. As things stand, the prospects for progress are remote. In this paper, we offer a way forward. We argue that exclusive focus on first-order moral principles, such as combatant equality and noncombatant immunity, has led revisionist and orthodox just war theorists to engage in “proxy battles.” Their first-order moral disagreements are at least partly traceable to second-order disagreements about the nature and purpose of political theory. These deeper disputes have been central to the broader discipline of political theory for several years; we hope that bringing them to bear on the ethics of war will help us move beyond the present impasse. (shrink)

I argue that riskier killings of innocent people are, other things equal, objectively worse than less risky killings. I ground these views in considerations of disrespect and security. Killing someone more riskily shows greater disrespect for him by more grievously undervaluing his standing and interests, and more seriously undermines his security by exposing a disposition to harm him across all counterfactual scenarios in which the probability of killing an innocent person is that high or less. I argue that the salient (...) probabilities are the agent’s sincere, sane, subjective probabilities, and that this thesis is relevant whether your risk-taking pertains to the probability of killing a person or to the probability that the person you kill is not liable to be killed. I then defend the view’s relevance to intentional killing; show how it differs from an account of blameworthiness; and explain its significance for all-things-considered justification and justification under uncertainty. (shrink)

People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties – pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have (...) these relationships, if we do not recognise associative duties, before concluding that we should therefore recognise associative duties. I then introduce a nonteleological alternative, grounded in the Appropriate Response approach to ethical theory. (shrink)

Automated Influence is the use of Artificial Intelligence to collect, integrate, and analyse people’s data in order to deliver targeted interventions that shape their behaviour. We consider three central objections against Automated Influence, focusing on privacy, exploitation, and manipulation, showing in each case how a structural version of that objection has more purchase than its interactional counterpart. By rejecting the interactional focus of “AI Ethics” in favour of a more structural, political philosophy of AI, we show that the real problem (...) with Automated Influence is the crisis of legitimacy that it precipitates. (shrink)

Wars are large-scale conflicts between organized groups of belligerents, which involve suffering, devastation, and brutality unlike almost anything else in human experience. Whatever one’s other beliefs about morality, all should agree that the horrors of war are all but unconscionable, and that warfare can be justified only if we have some compel- ling account of what is worth fighting for, which can justify contributing, as individu- als and as groups, to this calamitous endeavour. Although this question should obviously be central (...) to both philosophical and politi- cal discussion about war, it is at the forefront of neither. In recent years, philosophical discussion of warfare has bloomed, but the debate has focused on whom we may kill, on the assumption that our aims are justified.1 Political debate, meanwhile, is more concerned with matters of prudence, international law, and public justification, than with reassessing what is worth fighting for. For wars of intervention to halt or prevent massive humanitarian crises, this gap is not so troubling. When warfare is the only means to prevent the mass killing or enslavement of the innocent, the purposes of military force are clear enough (though undoubtedly many other problems remain). The problem is more pressing, how- ever, for the justification of national defence.3 Although common-sense morality and international law view national defence as the paradigm case of justified warfare, grounding this consensus is surprisingly difficult.4 We typically believe that any state is justified in using lethal force to protect its territory against any form of uninvited military incursion by any other state. And yet we lack a good argument to explain why this should be so. In this chapter, I explain why one familiar and otherwise plausible approach to the justification of killing in war cannot adequately ground common-sense views of permissible national defence.5 Reductionists believe that justified warfare reduces to an aggregation of acts that are justified under ordinary principles of interpersonal morality.6 The standard form of reductionism focuses on the principles governing killing in ordinary life, specifically those that justify intentional killing in self- and other-defence, and unintended but foreseen (for short, collateral) killing as a lesser evil. Justified warfare, on this view, is no more than the coextension of multiple acts justified under these two principles. Reductionism is the default philosophical approach to thinking through the ethics of killing in war. It makes perfect sense to ask what principles govern permissible kill- ing in general, before applying them to the particular context of war. If it cannot deliver a plausible set of conclusions about when national defence is permitted, then we must either revise our beliefs about which conclusions count as plausible, or else face the significant challenge of developing a different theoretical model for justifying war- fare—an exceptionalist model, which views war as an exception to the regular moral landscape, to which principles apply which apply to nothing else but war.7 We must show, in other words, that there is something worth fighting for in wars of national defence, which is not engaged when we use force in any other context. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the argument against reduc- tionism.8 Section 2.3 considers and rebuts one common response to the argument, which has often been thought sufficient grounds to disregard its conclusion. Section 2.4 then asks whether a modified reductionism would survive unscathed by the argu- ment. Finally, section 2.5 sets out some desiderata on a plausible exceptionalist alterna- tive. Section 2.6 concludes. (shrink)

Deontologists have been slow to address decision-making under risk and uncertainty, no doubt because the standard approaches to non-moral decision theory appear superficially similar to consequentialist moral reasoning. I identify some central tenets of simple decision theory and show that they should not put deontologists off, before showing where we should go next to develop a comprehensive deontological decision theory.

Here is my thesis (and the outline of this paper). Increasingly secret, complex and inscrutable computational systems are being used to intensify existing power relations, and to create new ones (Section II). To be all-things-considered morally permissible, new, or newly intense, power relations must in general meet standards of procedural legitimacy and proper authority (Section III). Legitimacy and authority constitutively depend, in turn, on a publicity requirement: reasonably competent members of the political community in which power is being exercised must (...) be able to determine that power is being exercised legitimately and with proper authority (Section IV). The publicity requirement can be satisfied only if the powerful can explain their decision-making—including the computational tools that they use to support it—to members of their political community. Section V applies these ideas to opaque computational systems. Section VI addresses objections; Section VII concludes. (shrink)

Contemporary just war theory is divided into two broad camps: revisionists and traditionalists. Traditionalists seek to provide moral foundations for something close to current international law, and in particular the laws of armed conflict. Although they propose improvements, they do so cautiously. Revisionists argue that international law is at best a pragmatic fiction—it lacks deeper moral foundations. In this article, I present the contemporary history of analytical just war theory, from the origins of contemporary traditionalist just war theory in Michael (...) Walzer's work to the revisionist critique of Walzer and the subsequent revival of traditionalism. I discuss central questions of methodology, as well as consider the morality of resorting to war and the morality of conduct in war. I show that although the revisionists exposed philosophical shortcomings in Walzer's arguments, their radical conclusions should prompt us not to reject the broad contemporary consensus, but instead to seek better arguments to underpin it. (shrink)

Many of us think we have agent-centred options to act suboptimally. Some of these involve favouring our own interests. Others involve sacrificing them. In this paper, I explore three different ways to accommodate agent-centred options in a criterion of objective permissibility. I argue against satisficing and rational pluralism, and in favour of a principle built around sensitivity to personal cost.

If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value — instead we, ourselves, matter unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, grounded in the very same considerations. Though (...) not merely such sites, you and I are also sites for the realisation of value, and our interests (and ourselves) must therefore sometimes determine what others ought to do, in particular requiring them to bear reasonable costs for our sake. Likewise, just as my moral status grounds a requirement that others show me appropriate respect, so must I do to myself. (shrink)

This paper asks whether we can defend associative duties to our compatriots that are grounded solely in the relationship of liberal co-citizenship. The sort of duties that are especially salient to this relationship are duties of justice, duties to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship, and a duty to favour the interests of compatriots over those of foreigners. Critics have argued that the liberal conception of citizenship is too insubstantial to sustain these duties — indeed, that it (...) gives us little reason to treat compatriots any differently from how we treat foreigners, with all the practical consequences that this would entail. I suggest that on a specific conception of liberal citizenship we can, in fact, defend associative duties, but that these extend only to the duty to protect and improve the institutions that constitute that relationship. Duties of justice and favouritism, I maintain, cannot be particularised to one's compatriots. (shrink)

Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...) more cost than it warranted at the outset. If you now succeed, the total cost will exceed the upper bound marked at the beginning. But the additional cost from this point is below that upper bound. And the good you will achieve is undiminished. How do the moral costs you have already inflicted bear upon your decision now? (shrink)

Recently, there have been attempts at offering new justifications of the Rawlsian idea of public reason. Blain Neufeld has suggested that the ideal of political autonomy justifies public reason, while R.J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen have sought to justify the idea by appealing to the value of political community. In this paper, I show that both proposals are vulnerable to a common problem. In realistic circumstances, they will often turn into reasons to oppose, rather than support, public reason. However, (...) this counterintuitive result can be avoided if we conceive of autonomy and community differently. (shrink)

This paper explicates a conception of injury as right-violation, which allows us to distinguish between setbacks to interests that should, and should not, be the concern of theories of justice. It begins by introducing a hybrid theory of rights, grounded in (a) the mobilisation of our moral equality to (b) protect our most important interests, and shows how violations of rights are the concern of justice, while setbacks where one of the twin grounds of rights is defeated are not. It (...) then looks more closely at the substantive moral components of injury, namely harm—damage to one’s interests—and wrong—disrespect for one’s moral equality. It argues that, on the hybrid conception of rights, harm and wrong are individually necessary and jointly sufficient components of injury, and the disvalue of neither is reducible to the other—in particular, it is a mistake to construe the disrespect identified by wrong as another damaged interest. Finally, it distinguishes between the public and private dimensions of harm and wrong, and makes some preliminary suggestions as to whether the remedy for these different dimensions should lie in criminal, distributive, or corrective justice. (shrink)

Associative duties are non-contractual duties owed in virtue of a valuable relationship. They hold between lovers, family members, friends, and perhaps compatriots. General duties, by contrast, are owed to people simply in virtue of their humanity: they are grounded in each person’s great and equal moral worth. In this paper, I ask what should be done when we can perform either an associative duty or a general duty, but not both.

In this paper, I ask how – and whether – the rectification of injury at which corrective justice aims is possible, and by whom it must be performed. I split the injury up into components of harm and wrong, and consider their rectification separately. First, I show that pecuniary compensation for the harm is practically plausible, because money acts as a mediator between the damaged interest and other interests. I then argue that this is also a morally plausible approach, because (...) it does not claim too much for compensation: neither can all harms be compensated, nor can it be said when compensation is paid that the status quo ante has been restored. I argue that there is no conceptual reason for any particular agent paying this compensation. I then turn to the wrong, and reject three proposed methods of rectification. The first aims to rectify the wrong by rectifying the harm; the second deploys punitive damages; the third, punishment. After undermining each proposal, I argue that the wrong can only be rectified by a full apology, which I disaggregate into the admission of causal and moral responsibility, repudiation of the act, reform, and, in some cases, disgorgement and reparations, which I define as a good faith effort to share the burden of the victim’s harm. I argue, further, that only the injurer herself can make a full apology, and it is not something that can be coerced by other members of society. As such, whether rectification of the wrong can be a matter of corrective justice is left an open question. (shrink)

The burgeoning literature on jus post bellum has repeatedly reaffirmed three positions that strike me as deeply implausible: that in the aftermath of wars, compensation should be a priority; that we should likewise prioritize punishing political leaders and war criminals even in the absence of legitimate multilateral institutions; and that when states justifiably launch armed humanitarian interventions, they become responsible for reconstructing the states into which they have intervened – the so called “Pottery Barn” dictum, “You break it, you own (...) it.” Against these common positions, this chapter argues that compensation should be subordinate to reconstruction, with resources going where they are most needed and can do the most good, rather than to the most aggrieved. Just punishment, meanwhile, presupposes just multilateral institutions – the victor cannot be trusted to mete out punishment fairly. And just interveners, who have already taken on such a heavy burden, are entitled to expect the international community to contribute to reconstruction after they have made the first and vital steps. After presenting each of these objections in greater depth, the chapter proceeds to draw some tentative inferences from the threads running through each, and suggest that they illustrate a distinctive flaw in the way in which jus post bellum is addressed by many just war theorists, who not only see the war as the grounds of post bellum duties, but also take it to specify their content: Specifically, they take the rights violations with which wars are imbued to be the basis for post-war action, but take the content of post-war duties to be focused on rectifying those rights violations, rather than the more forward-looking goal of establishing a lasting peace. This backward-looking orientation unduly confines these theorists to making attributions of fault, to a limited palette of normative concepts, and to a focus on the belligerents rather than the international community as a whole. Undoubtedly warfare creates a distinctive normative relationship between belligerent states (though we must question how much of this devolves to the citizens of those states). War does generate grounds for post-war duties – but there are other grounds for those duties too, moreover the grounds should not determine the content. It of course matters that the citizens of two states harmed one another in violation of their rights. But when the war is done, peacebuilding should be the priority, not raking over the wrongs of both sides. Sections 2–4 present the objections, Section 5 offers the tentative analysis and proposes a shift in focus toward an ethics of peacebuilding, and Section 6 concludes. (shrink)

Our aim in this brief essay is not to defend a particular policy or attitude toward lockdown measures in the United States or elsewhere, but to consider the scope and limits of different types of arguments that can be offered for them. Understanding the complexity of these issues will, we hope, go some way to helping us understand each other and our attitudes toward state responses to the pandemic.

According to John Rawls’s famous Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all citizens. The currently dominant interpretation of what is justifiable to persons in this sense is an internalist one. On this view, what is justifiable to persons depends on their beliefs and commitments. In this paper I challenge this reading of Rawls’s principle, and instead suggest that it is most plausibly interpreted in externalist terms. On this alternative view, (...) what is justifiable to persons is not in any way dependent on, or relativized to, their beliefs and commitments. Instead, what is justifiable to all in the relevant sense is what all could accept as free and equal. I defend this reinterpretation of the view by showing how it is supported by Rawls’s account of the freedom and equality of persons. In addition, a considerable advantage of this suggestion is that it allows for an inclusive account of to whom the exercise of political power must be made justifiable. (shrink)

The revisionist critique of conventional just war theory has undoubtedly scored some important victories. Walzer’s elegantly unified defense of combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity has been seriously undermined. This critical success has not, however, been matched by positive arguments, which when applied to the messy reality of war would deprive states and soldiers of the permission to fight wars that are plausibly thought to be justified. The appeal to law that is sought to resolve this objection by casting it (...) as a practical concern, a pragmatic worry about implementation, which while germane to debates over the laws of war, need not undermine our convictions in the fundamental principles the revisionists advocate. This response is inadequate. Revisionists have not shown that soldiers should obey the laws of war, in practice, when they conflict with their other moral reasons – our worries about application remain intact. Moreover, a theory of war that offers only an account of the laws of war, and a set of fundamental principles developed in abstraction from feasibility constraints, is radically incomplete. We need to know how to apply those fundamental principles, and whether, when applied, they lead to defensible conclusions. Only two options seem to remain. Perhaps the revisionists’ arguments for their chosen fundamental principles are sufficiently compelling that we should stick with them, and accept their troubling conclusions – in other words, accept pacifism. Alternatively, we need to revise our fundamental principles, so that when applied they yield conclusions that we can more confidently endorse. -/- Though it does not save the revisionist view from the responsibility dilemma and cognate objections, the appeal to law does raise an important, and previously inadequately theorized, question – or, rather, resurrects a neglected topic, discussed in depth by historical just war theorists such as Grotius and Vattel. There are good grounds for distinguishing the laws of war from the morality of war, and for adjusting the former to accommodate predictable noncompliance, that should not impact on our account of the latter. Nonetheless, I have argued that there are some profound moral insights underlying both combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity: specifically, we cannot infer from a combatant’s side having not satisfied jus ad bellum that he may not justifiably use lethal force; and other things equal, it is more wrongful to harm a nonliable noncombatant than to harm a nonliable combatant. (shrink)

Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While recommender systems could in principle enhance our moral agency by enabling us to cut through the information (...) saturation of the internet and focus on things that matter, as they’re currently designed and implemented they’re apt to interfere with our ability to attend appropriately to morally relevant factors. In order to analyze the distinctive moral problems algorithmic recommendation poses, we develop a framework for the ethics of attention and an account of judicious attention allocation as a moral skill. We then discuss empirical evidence suggesting that attentional moral skill can be thwarted and undermined in various ways by algorithmic recommendation and related affordances of online platforms, as well as economic and technical considerations that support this concern. Finally, we consider how emerging technologies might overcome the problems we identify. (shrink)

The principle of non-combatant immunity protects non-combatants against intentional attacks in war. It is the most widely endorsed and deeply held moral constraint on the conduct of war. And yet it is difficult to justify. Recent developments in just war theory have undermined the canonical argument in its favour – Michael Walzer's, in Just and Unjust Wars. Some now deny that non-combatant immunity has principled foundations, arguing instead that it is entirely explained by a different principle: that of necessity. In (...) war, as in ordinary life, harms to others can be justified only if they are necessary. Attacking non-combatants, the argument goes, is never necessary, so never justified. Although often repeated, this argument has never been explored in depth. In this article, I evaluate the necessity-based argument for non-combatant immunity, drawing together theoretical analysis and empirical research on anti-civilian tactics in interstate warfare, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. (shrink)

Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, (...) has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations. (shrink)

Military recruitment campaigns emphasize adventure, skills and camaraderie but rarely mention the moral complexities of armed conflict. Enlisting in state armed forces poses the risk of being complicit in unjust wars and associated war crimes. For prospective recruits concerned with morality, the decision is challenging. The probability of wrongdoing alone does not settle the matter; many lawful activities increase risks of future wrongdoing. The permissibility of enlisting depends on weighing expectations of doing good versus wrong. -/- Armed forces provide security (...) and humanitarian aid, so members often do much good. To assess individual decisions, consider whether the institution itself is justified. “Minimal justification” means armed forces cause less wrong than having none. “Full justification” means they cause less wrong than feasible alternatives. If justified, the participation needed for functioning should be permitted; volunteers take risks knowingly. -/- If minimally justified, either participation is permitted as above, or impermissible "dirty hands" roles are required, and either conscription distributes burden fairly or volunteers show "moral courage". The real question is institutional justification, not individual permissibility. To argue enlisting is impermissible implies arguing for disbanding the military. -/- If state armed forces are at least minimally justified, enlisting is likely morally permitted or even praiseworthy. Prospective recruits should consider institutional justification and expectations of contributing to good and wrong before deciding the morality of enlisting. For morally conscientious individuals, complex realities of armed conflict pose difficult questions with no easy answers. (shrink)

Timothy Michael Fowler has argued that, as a consequence of their commitment to neutrality in regard to comprehensive doctrines, political liberals face a dilemma. In essence, the dilemma for political liberals is that either they have to give up their commitment to neutrality (which is an indispensible part of their view), or they have to allow harm to children. Fowler’s case for this dilemma depends on ascribing to political liberals a view which grants parents a great degree of freedom in (...) deciding on the education of their children. I show that ascribing this view to political liberals rests upon a misinterpretation of political liberalism. Since political liberals have access to reasons based upon the interests of children, they need not yield to parent’s wishes about the education of their children. A correct understanding of political liberalism thus shows that political liberals do not face the dilemma envisaged by Fowler. (shrink)

This paper considers the view that the basis of equality is the range property of being a moral person. This view, suggested by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971), is commonly dismissed in the literature. By defending the view against the criticism levelled against it, I aim to show that this dismissal has been too quick. The critics have generally failed to fully appreciate the fact that Rawls's account is restricted to the domain of distributive justice. On (...) Rawls's view distributive justice is a matter of the fair terms of cooperation among the participants of a system of social cooperation. I argue that this understanding of distributive justice can provide a compelling rationale for considering moral personality as the basis of equality for this domain of morality. That moral persons are indeed equal is further supported by an intuitive argument concerning the irrelevance of morally arbitrary factors, giving us reasons to believe that varying capacities among moral persons does not result in an unequal moral status. The dismissal of Rawls's account of equality has thus been premature, and it remains an important view to consider. (shrink)

John Rawls A Theory of Justice har haft ett monumentalt inflytande på den moderna politiska filosofin. Jag försöker här genom några nedslag i den nutida diskussionen förmedla en bild av detta inflytande, och av bokens fortsatta filosofiska relevans. Jag inleder med en kort presentation av huvuddragen i Rawls rättviseteori. Efter det går jag igenom, och bemöter, kritiken mot idealteori. Jag diskuterar sedan förhållandet mellan rättvisa och ekonomisk ojämlikhet, och förklarar varför teorin är radikalare än vad många kritiker insett. Slutligen går (...) jag igenom hur en kontraktsteori av detta slag kan hantera frågan om rättvisa mellan generationer. (shrink)

This essay defends the claim that endogenous attention is necessary for the justification of perceptual beliefs. I criticize the so-called phenomenal approach, according to which perceptual experiences provide justification in virtue of being phenomenally conscious. I specifically target Siegel and Silins’ (2014 ; 2019) version of the phenomenal approach. As against their view, I claim that perceptual justification cannot be understood without reference to the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the mobilization of reasons in support of propositional attitudes – attention being (...) instrumental to those very mechanisms. Relying on the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I first criticize the alleged cases of justification in the absence of attention before elaborating a two-stage argument in favor of the necessity of attention for perceptual justification. In the first stage, I contend that the functional role of endogenous attention makes it a necessary condition for doxastic justification. In the second stage, by relying on Turri’s (2010) analysis, I establish that propositional justification itself necessitates attention. (shrink)

We sketch an account according to which the semantic concepts themselves are not pathological and the pathologies that attend the semantic predicates arise because of the intention to impose on them a role they cannot fulfill, that of expressing semantic concepts for a language that includes them. We provide a simplified model of the account and argue in its light that (i) a consequence is that our meaning intentions are unsuccessful, and such semantic predicates fail to express any concept, and (...) that (ii) in light of this it is incorrect to characterize the pathology simply as semantic inconsistency; a more nuanced view of the problem is needed. We also show that the defects of the semantic predicates need not undercut the use of a truth theory in a compositional semantics for a language containing them because the meaning theory per se need not involve commitment to the axioms of the truth theory it exploits. (shrink)

One of the most legendary educational books ever written is Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Émile ou de l’Education”. Most obviously Rousseau wrote this book guided by diverse more or less conscious purposes and one of the main problems it presents is paradoxical: Does education have to promote freedom by force? In this article I will, firstly, present several aims that might have triggered Rousseau to write “Émile”. Secondly, I will discuss Rousseau’s view of the so called “educational paradox”. Since this quandary touches (...) the topic of many other of his books, I will discuss “Émile” along with Rousseau’s other works and thus place his educational story in his “great narrative”. (shrink)

In this paper the author shows that Emil Lask’s philosophy starts with considering of typical Neo-Kantian’s questions but at the same time it grounds a new philosophical perspective – Post-Neo-Kantianism. The origin of Lask’s research is Heinrich Rickert’s theory of judgment, however Lask finds many new solutions and initiates new ideas adopted from him by Martin Heidegger. The article discuss an innovative elements of Lask’s thought like: problem of the material side of cognition, logic of object, logos-immanency of object, (...) doctrine of the material determination of form, ontological theory of truth, problem of the individual subject. Although Lask does not create ontology, he makes transcendental philosophy to ask ontological questions. When we study his considerations it starts to be obvious that theory of cognition is not possible without ontology. (shrink)

The German pioneer of electrophysiology, Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896), is generally assumed to have remained silent on the subject of the brain. However, the archive of his papers in Berlin contains manuscript notes to a lecture on “The Seat of the Soul” that he delivered to popular audiences in 1884 and 1885. These notes demonstrate that cerebral localization and brain function in general had been concerns of his for quite some time, and that he did not shy away from (...) these subjects. (shrink)

This essay recounts a controversy between a pioneer electrophysiologist, Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896), and his student, Ludimar Hermann (1838–1914). Du Bois-Reymond proposed a molecular explanation for the slight electrical currents that he detected in frog muscles and nerves. Hermann argued that du Bois-Reymond's ‘resting currents’ were an artifact of injury to living tissue. He contested du Bois-Reymond's molecular model, explaining his teacher's observations as electricity produced by chemical decomposition. History has painted Hermann as the wronged party in this dispute. (...) I seek to set the record straight. (shrink)

The paper offers the materials of Lazar Baranovych’s embassy to Moscow in 1684. This is the first publication of the documents. They include three letters of Baranovych to tsars Ivan and Peter Alekseyevich, the regent Sophia Alekseyevna and Prince Vasilii Vasil’evich Golitsyn; their replies; records of expenditures, and the record of a court case about the robbery of the envoys. The letters mostly concern themselves with books that Baranovych’s envoys brought to Moscow and some favors that the archbishop expected in (...) return. The material informs us about the circulation of books in the early 1680, diplomatic gift-giving and networking. The documents also serve as a fine example of office administration concerning Moscow-Ukrainian relations. (shrink)

(Spanish) RESUMEN: La libertad absoluta postulada por Viktor Emil Frankl y Jean-Paul Sartre, la Shoah y la creencia en un dios omnipotente, bueno y justo parecen contradecirse. La pregunta por el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas del Holocausto (la verdadera catástrofe, el mayor crimen contra la humanidad), simbolizado por Auschwitz, y como punto de inflexión en la historia, es terriblemente dolorosa y parece no tener una respuesta filosófica ni teológica. A mi juicio, es importantísimo distinguir entre las víctimas (...) inocentes de la Shoah que perecieron y las víctimas inocentes que sufrieron un verdadero infierno y perdieron a sus seres queridos, pero que lograron sobrevivir. Ambas son víctimas, por supuesto, pero así como encontrarle un posible sentido al sufrimiento de las víctimas masacradas y gaseadas podría suponer un insulto a su sufrimiento y agonía –en especial, al horror que sufrieron los niños–, el horrible sufrimiento de los supervivientes pudo dar, tal vez, de alguna manera, un sentido a sus vidas después de la liberación de los campos de concentración y exterminio, ya fuera como voz, como protesta o como simple supervivencia. Frankl apuesta por un sentido último (que abraza el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas), y Sartre, aunque parezca no apostar por sentido alguno, volcó su vida al compromiso político después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y ello parece vislumbrar una minúscula pizca de sentido después de la barbarie. La filosofía de Frankl es un sí a la vida incluso en las situaciones más extremas, un grito casi nietzscheano que exalta el valor de la vida más allá de cualquier sufrimiento. Frankl, padre de la logoterapia y superviviente del Holocausto, abre una puerta a Dios al hablar de un dios inconsciente, una dimensión suprahumana y una fe incondicional, y define la religión como espiritualidad y como la búsqueda del hombre por el sentido último. Según Frankl, la libertad no se contradice con Dios, y la religión existe no a raíz de la barbarie, sino a pesar de la barbarie. El existencialismo sartreano es una filosofía de la libertad radical y de la responsabilidad. El hombre está condenado a ser libre. El ser humano es un ser en el que la existencia precede a la esencia. Somos totalmente responsables de lo que somos. Sartre afirma que la libertad humana es incompatible con Dios. En un mundo sin Dios, la moral la construyen los hombres, con sus propias decisiones y sus acciones, y la existencia y el sufrimiento de las víctimas no tienen sentido alguno. Sartre define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, angustia y contingencia. Frankl define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, espiritualidad y búsqueda de sentido. Con esta tesis me propongo entrar en la resbaladiza dimensión del dolor, la desesperación, el sentido y sinsentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas (teniendo presente los horrores de Auschwitz, que en teología y filosofía ha simbolizado desde la liberación de los campos la muerte de Dios y la muerte de la moral). Es verdad que no solo los hombres, mujeres y niños judíos fueron víctimas de la barbarie alemana, pero, como reza el mensaje de Elie Wiesel en la exposición permanente del Block 27 del Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". La Shoah no es un episodio dentro de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad, y es una catástrofe que nos concierne a todos, hombres y mujeres judíos y no judíos, religiosos e irreligiosos, creyentes e increyentes, como seres libres, responsables y morales que somos –o que deberíamos ser. Muchas de las víctimas del Holocausto, en medio de la desesperación, entraron en las cámaras de gas orando, aferrándose a la esperanza de que ese final espeluznante no era un punto final. Con esta tesis no me propongo de ninguna manera responder a la eterna pregunta de si Dios existe o no, sino que propongo interpretar ese grito hacia Dios como un desesperado anhelo de esperanza. También me propongo encontrar una coherencia en las posturas de estos dos grandes pensadores para quienes la libertad y la responsabilidad definen al hombre: Frankl (quien apuesta por una dimensión suprahumana donde existe un sentido último en el que el sufrimiento de las víctimas tiene que tener algún sentido, aunque ese sentido sea completamente incomprensible en la dimensión humana) y Sartre (el existencialista ateo por excelencia, para quien el mundo, la existencia y el sufrimiento son absolutamente contingentes). En el primer capítulo expongo la logoterapia y el existencialismo sartreano: describo las tres dimensiones del hombre y las tres búsquedas de sentido propuestas por Frankl, y expongo las cinco consecuencias de "l'existence précède l'essence", centrándome en la libertad y la responsabilidad, y hablo del suicidio. El segundo capítulo está dedicado al dios inconsciente frankleano, la dimensión suprahumana, la búsqueda por el sentido último y la fe incondicional. En el tercer capítulo ilustro la libertad sin Dios sartreana, la ontología sartreana, el ateísmo sartreano y el humanismo sartreano, y hablo sobre la responsabilidad, la mauvaise foi, la contingencia, la situation y la angustia. El cuarto capítulo es necesariamente histórico (sin dejar de ser filosófico): me pregunto por la muerte de Dios después de Auschwitz, argumento y defiendo la unicidad del Holocausto (la Shoah es un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad), describo las masacres antes de los campos de exterminio (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), el gigantesco complejo de Auschwitz (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), reflexiono sobre Dios y el mal (centrándome en los niños de Auschwitz), describo los días de Frankl en Auschwitz, hablo de Dios como esperanza, de la inmortalidad y la escatología, de la crueldad de Dios, de la relación entre el cristianismo y el antisemitismo, del islam y el antisemitismo, critico el silencio de Dios, hablo de la muerte de Dios y del juicio contra Dios. En el quinto capítulo expongo la moral frankleana (una moral que atañe al hombre y no a Dios), basándome en su teoría del amor y en su única obra de teatro (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), y la moral sartreana (una moral que atañe a una humanidad sin Dios), recordando a Dostoyevsky, analizando la famosa cita de Garcin en Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", criticando el marxismo de Sartre y cuestionando (con la mirada de Frankl y Sartre) el verso de Brecht "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; al final del capítulo incluyo una reflexión propia y las críticas frankleana y sartreana sobre la impunidad de los verdugos y colaboradores después del Holocausto (con el permiso de Dios). Después de la Conclusión, añado un Apéndice sobre las vidas de Frankl y Sartre, para poder entender mejor su obra. PALABRAS CLAVE: logoterapia, existencialismo sartreano, búsqueda de sentido, libertad, responsabilidad, moral, angustia, sufrimiento, supervivientes, víctimas, contingencia, espiritualidad, religión, Dios, esperanza, antisemitismo, culpa, Auschwitz, Holocausto, Shoah. /// (English) ABSTRACT: The absolute freedom defended by Viktor Emil Frankl and Jean-Paul Sartre, the Shoah and the belief in an omnipotent, benevolent and just God seem to contradict each other. The question of the meaning of the victims' suffering of the Holocaust (the true catastrophe, the biggest crime against humanity), simbolised by Auschwitz and as a turning point in History, is terribly painful and doesn't seem to have an answer. In my opinion, it's crucial to distinguish between the innocent victims of the Shoah who perished and the innocent victims who sufferend a real hell and lost their loved ones, but managed to survive. Both are victims, of course, but just as finding a possible meaning to the suffering of the massacred and gassed victims could result in an insult to their suffering and agony –especially to the horror that the children suffered– the gigantic suffering of the survivors could, maybe, somehow, give a meaning to their lives after the liberation of the concentration and extermination camps, either as a voice, as a protest, or as a simple survival. Frankl believes in an ultimate meaning (that embraces the meaning of the victims' suffering), and Sartre, even if it appears not to embrace any meaning, turned his life to political engagement after War World II, and that attitude seems to give a tiny glimpse of meaning after the barbarity. Frankl's philosophy says yes to life even in the most extreme situations, and it's a Nietzschean-like scream that exalts the value of life beyond any monstrous suffering. Frankl, the father of logotherapy and a Holocaust survivor, opens a door to God when he talks about an unconscious God, a supra-human dimension and an unconditional faith; he defines religion as spirituality and as man's search for ultimate meaning. According to Frankl, freedom is not contradictory with God, and religion exists not because of the barbarity but in spite of the barbarity. Sartrean existentialism is a philosophy of radical freedom and responsibility. Men are condemned to be free. We are beings where the existence precedes the essence. We are completely responsible of what we are. Sartre argues that human freedom is incompatible with God. In a godless world, morality is constructed by people, with their own choices and actions, and human existence and the suffering of the victims don't have any meaning. Sartre defines man as freedom, responsibility, Angst and contingency. Frankl defines man as freedom, responsibility, spirituality and search for meaning. With this dissertation I attempt to enter in the slippery dimension of the pain, despair, meaning and meaninglessness of the victims' suffering (having in mind the horrors of Auschwitz, that in theology and in philosophy have simbolised, since the liberation of the camps, the death of God and the death of morality). It's true that not only Jewish men, women and children were victims of the German barbarity, but, as Elie Wiesel's message from the permanent exhibition from Block 27 of the Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum reads: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". The Shoah is not an episode inside War World II, but a turning point in the history of humankind, and a catastrophe that embraces us all, Jewish and not not Jewish men and women, religious and not religious, believers and not believers, as the free, responsible and moral beings that we all are –or that we should be. A lot of the victims, in the midst of their desperation, entered into the gas chambers praying, holding to the hope that their horrifying end was not the ultimate end. With this dissertation I do not attempt to answer the eternal question of the existence of God, rather, I will try to interpret that scream to God as a longing for hope. I also intend to find a coherence between the thought of these two great thinkers for whom freedom and responsibilty define man: Frankl (who argues that there is a suprahuman dimension where an ultimate meaning exists and where the victims' suffering has to have a meaning, even if this meaning is completely incomprehensible in the human dimension) and Sartre (the atheist existentialist par excellence, for whom the world, human existence and suffering are absolutely contingent). In the first chapter I expose logotherapy and Sartrean existentialism: I describe the three dimensions of man, the three searches for meaning, the five consequences of "l'existence précède l'essence" and I speak about suicide. The second chapter delves into the unconscious God, the supra-human dimension, the ultimate meaning and the unconditional faith. In the third chapter I expose the freedom without God defended by Sartre, Sartre's ontology, Sartre's atheism, Sartre's humanism, and his ideas about responsibility, mauvaise foi, contingency, situation, and Angst. The fourth chapter is necessarily historical (while being philosophical too): I wonder about the death of God after Auschwitz, I argue and defend the uniqueness of the Holocaust (the Shoah is a turning point in the history of humankind), I describe the massacres before the extermination camps (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), the gigantic Auschwitz camp complex (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), I reflect on God and evil (focusing on the children of Auschwitz), I describe Frankl's days in Auschwitz, I talk about God as hope, about immortality and escathology, I discuss God's cruelty, the relationship between Christianity and antisemitism and Islam and antisemitism, I question the silence of God, and I talk about the death of God and about the trial against God. In the fifth chapter I talk about the Franklean morality (a morality that concerns man and not God), on the basis of his love theory and his only work of theater (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), and the Sartrean morality (a morality that concerns a humanity without God), remembering Dostoyevsky, analysing Garcin's famous quote in Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", crticizing Sartre's marxism and questioning (with Frankl's and Sartre's eyes) Brecht's verse "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; at the end of the chapter I include my own reflection (and Frankl and Sartre's critique) about the impunity of the executioners and collaborators after the Holocaust (with God's permission). After the Conclusion, I add an Appendix about the lives of Frankl and Sartre, which helps understanding better their work. KEYWORDS: logotherapy, existentialism, search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, morality, Angst, suffering, survivors, victims, contingency, spirituality, religion, God, hope, antisemitism, guilt, Auschwitz, Holocaust, Shoah. (shrink)

Émile Durkheim: Coesão e Fato Social -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva E-mails: [email protected] / [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399 -/- Émile Durkheim: Coesão e Fato Social Nascido em 1858, Durkheim era francês e foi bastante influenciado pela obra do filósofo também francês Augusto Comte (1798-1857), que metodizou pela primeira vez o estudo da sociedade (Sociologia) como uma ciência particular e peculiar, e que também conectou a Sociologia com alguns artífices peculiares das Ciências Naturais. Em contrapartida, Durkheim procurou alicerçar a Sociologia como (...) uma ciência social divergente em toda sua totalidade das ciências naturais. Logo, mediante essa finalidade, cuidou em desenvolver uma tese e um artifício de análise que contivesse conceitos peculiares para a instrução da vida em corpo social. Doravante, os princípios da sociologia de Émile Durkheim podem ser reduzidos as alcunhas ou conceitos de coesão, da segmentação do trabalho (ou especialização do trabalho) e de ação, circunstância ou fato social. Ao analisar acerca da divisão do trabalho no corpo social, Durkheim explana: [...] a divisão do trabalho [...] não serviria apenas para dotar nossas sociedades de luxo, invejável talvez, mas supérfluo; ela seria uma condição de existência da sociedade. Graças à divisão do trabalho, ou pelo menos por seu intermédio, se garantiria a coesão social; ela determinaria os traços essenciais da constituição da sociedade. Por isso mesmo, caso seja essa realmente a função da divisão do trabalho, ela deve ter um caráter moral, porque as necessidades de ordem, de harmonia e de solidariedade social são geralmente consideradas morais. Vale salientar que, Émile Durkheim foi inteiramente influenciado pelos acontecimentos históricos que se decorrera nos séculos XVIII e XIX. Todo o continente europeu, ao passo do século XIX ascendeu em derredor dos princípios da Revolução Industrial e da Revolução Francesa. A primeira (Revolução Industrial), tendo sua introdução aos meados do século XVIII, exacerbou atrozmente a produção de mercadorias. Aproveitando-se dos avanços tecnológicos incorporados nas indústrias, a produção industrial na Inglaterra, ao passo do século XVIII, disseminou-se para demais países europeus no século seguinte, transfigurando-se como o âmago central de estruturação da vida sodalícia. A segunda (Revolução Francesa), com seu desencadeamento em 1789, foi inteiramente marcada por metamorfoses políticas estruturais. O corpo social feudalista, que antepor-se ao sodalismo capitalista, foi crepusculada. Todas as estruturas políticas do corpo feudalista deram lugar a hegemonia das organizações políticas capitalistas. O regime monárquico foi finalizado e comutado por entidades políticas que se apropriavam de ideais como a liberdade, a igualdade e a fraternidade, tal qual era o próprio lema da Revolução Francesa. As instituições de educação, antes dominadas e ditadas pela hegemônica Igreja católica, passaram a ser administradas pelo Estado, fazendo com que as mesmas se tornassem leigas. A chamada livre-iniciativa ou o processo em que ocorre o escambo de mercadorias foi exortado por novíssimas regras e leis estabelecidas sob a perspectiva da produção das indústrias, que estavam sob ascensão constante. Ao passo do fim do século XIX, Émile Durkheim percebia atentamente essa ascensão notória do processo de metamorfose social, particularmente instigada pela indústria, e buscava entender esse processo para elucidar o seguinte inquietamento: como pode esse corpo social capitalista, que se fragmenta e qualifica-se em funções cada vez mais divergentes, assegurar uma unicidade, uma coesão social? Pois bem, o autor buscou uma elucidação sociológica para essa questão pragmática. O sociólogo buscou compreender a unicidade social em um mundo cada vez mais fragmentado pela qualificação do trabalho. O mesmo, perguntava-se como os sujeitos distintos, em cargos sociais heterogêneos, poderiam constituir-se socialmente. Buscando uma elucidação, alicerçada nos preceitos sociológicos, desse processo de diferenciação, o autor francês apropriou-se da seguinte hipótese: todo o corpo social, de indivíduos distintos, são definidos por algum tipo de fragmentação (aprimoramento) do trabalho. Isto é, no decorrer do desenvolvimento dos corpos sociais, os sujeitos tendem a se tornarem cada vez mais heterogêneos. Em um corpo social com a mínima fragmentação do trabalho, os sujeitos são mais análogos entre si quando cotejados aos demais que vivem sob um corpo social em que o trabalho é majoritariamente fragmentado. É mediante a essa ótica que o sociólogo francês atenta sobre a coesão social, isto é, o estágio de incorporação de cada corpo social. Em corpos sociais onde o trabalho é predominantemente fragmentado é observada uma dinâmica dupla. Concomitantemente a ocorrência da distinção profissional, é criada o que Durkheim chama de interdependência funcional, isto é, alcunha para designar a dependência recíproca dos indivíduos num mundo onde o trabalho é puramente fragmentado. Os vínculos sociais e a teia de interdependência, definem uma forma de coesão social. Em corpos sociais em que o trabalho não é puramente fragmentado, são as crenças que asseguram a unicidade dos sujeitos, uma vez que o processo de aprimoramento das funções profissionais ainda são puramente arcaicos. Aclarando melhor o supracitado texto, vamos cotejar dois corpos sociais: um corpo social feudal e outro industrial. Pois bem, em um sodalismo feudal hipotético, a fragmentação do trabalho é proveniente alicerçada pelas atividades majoritariamente agrícolas. Os indivíduos servis laboram majoritariamente para o benefício do senhor feudal e a parte restante de seu tempo é para laborar em proveito da sua subsistência e de seu grupo familiar. As metodologias do labor são puramente arcaicas e as práticas de trabalho se resumem em plantar, colher e cuidar dos animais. As metodologias produtivos apropriadas pelos diferentes feudos acabam por ser predominantemente análogas, logo, não há muita distinção entre os sujeitos. Em detrimento ao corpo social feudalista, no corpo industrial, há uma acentuada fragmentação do labor, em que homens e mulheres acabam por exercer funções agudamente distintas. Existem lavadeiras, mecânicos, operários, pedreiros, marceneiros, merchandisings, professores, comerciantes, etc., citando uma parcela ligeiramente pequena das profissões existentes nesse sodalismo e que, mediante essas profissões, ainda há uma fragmentação destas, originando várias subdivisões. Elucidando o anteriormente citado, entre os professores estão aqueles que lecionam Português, Ciências, Filosofia, Antropologia, Sociologia, Educação Física, etc. Para Émile Durkheim, esses corpos sociais são puramente aprimorados, e têm maior estágio de fragmentação profissional, o que gera a caracterização dos sujeitos distintos entre si. A secção do labor é, para o autor, um ingrediente social de impulsionamento da ascensão dos corpos sociais. Os ofícios sociais são primordiais para sua análise, logo, a Sociologia de Durkheim é alcunhada de “funcionalista”. Não obstante, para meditar mais sobre a fragmentação do labor, o autor criou outros preceitos fundamentais. Um deles é o conceito de fato social, primordial para a definição do que é peculiar ou não da Sociologia. Com a finalidade de gerar preceitos com uma maior robustez possível, Durkheim compreendia que o fato social era como uma coisa, um fato tão apreensível quanto qualquer componente ou unidade física ou biológica. Os fenômenos sociais seriam, mediante o supracitado, formas de cogitar, vivenciar e proceder que exercem uma coerção (força) externa sobre os sujeitos sodalísticos. Para o autor, o corpo social vinha antes que todos os sujeitos e procedera sobre os mesmos, caracterizando suas formas de ser. Com isso, um fato social poder-se-ia ser identificado com base nessa força ou coerção social compulsória a um único ou mais sujeitos. Como explana o supracitado texto, só poder-se-ia ser considerado um fato social, o acontecimento que nele contivesse: 1 Generalidade (que fosse identificado em todo o corpo social); 2 Exterioridade (que seja exterior à vontade dos sujeitos); e 3 Coercitividade (que apresente uma força externa aos sujeitos e que os molde em detrimento das vontades individuais). Logo, os estudos de Émile Durkheim, além de receber a alcunha de funcionalista, recebe também a consideração de uma Sociologia estruturalista, ao passo em que, a estrutura do corpo social designaria as atitudes dos sujeitos. Na sociedade contemporânea, alguns exemplos de fatos sociais são o direito, a educação, a fragmentação do labor, às crenças religiosas e crenças políticas de divergentes espectros, os esportes, etc. O próprio futebol, a exemplo, é considerado um fato social na medida em que ele se encontra presente em todo corpo social brasileiro. Nas três características para o futebol ser considerado um fato social, ele é exterior aos sujeitos, uma vez que para ele existir não depende da vontade dos sujeitos individuais. Também é coercitivo, uma vez que impõe um padrão esportivo aos sujeitos. Diante do antepasso texto, muitos infantes e juvenis desejam ser jogadores de futebol, esse “desejo” ou sonho pode ser entendido e elucidado como uma força externa, peculiarmente social. Diante de todo o supracitado texto, observemos que, na perspectiva de Durkheim, o estudo da sociedade (Sociologia) deve ter como finalidade ou fundamento o estudo dos fatos sociais antigos, modernos e contemporâneos. Aqueles fatos que não obtiverem as três características elaboradas por Durkheim (a saber: Generalidade, Exterioridade e Coercitividade) será considerados fatos de domínio das demais ciências existentes. Pois, para finalizar, Durkheim afirma que a Sociologia é a ciência que estuda os fatos sociais. -/- EXERCÍCIO DE FIXAÇÃO DO ASSUNTO: ÉMILE DURKHEIM: COESÃO E FATO SOCIAL PROF. Lic. e Tecg°. EMANUEL ISAQUE CORDEIRO DA SILVA SOCIOLOGIA GERAL II – 17 de Maio de 2019 TURMA: 2°__ -/- Estudante:____________________________________________________________ N°:__ -/- 1 Alicerçados pelo texto supra e pelas aulas ministradas, aclare a influência de Augusto Comte sobre os estudos e a Sociologia de Émile Durkheim. 2 Durkheim teve influência direta de Comte, nada obstante, ambos divergiram quanto ao estudo e o objeto de estudo da Sociologia. Debruçados sobre o texto e lembrados pelas aulas ministradas, cite as principais divergências entre os estudos desses franceses. 3 Quais termos se reduzem a Sociologia de Durkheim? Aclare esses termos em ideias da vida contemporânea na comunidade em que vive. 4 Atente às alíneas para elucidar, posteriormente, o que se pede: “a divisão do trabalho [...] seria uma condição de existência da sociedade. [...] Graças à divisão do trabalho [...] se garantiria a coesão social. (RODRIGUES. J. A. 2000). Analise o fragmento passado e elucide a essência da divisão do trabalho para a estruturação e organização da sociedade capitalista, bem como para os avanços nos estudos de Durkheim. 5 Aclare o impacto intensivo da Revolução Industrial para o desenvolvimento da sociedade capitalista europeia e para a geração da Sociologia do autor francês Durkheim. 6 Elucide a essência da Inglaterra da Revolução Industrial que foi considerada o país estopim do âmago central de estruturação dos sujeitos e da vida em sociedade. 7 Disserte acerca do impacto intensivo da Revolução Francesa sob as esferas políticas estruturantes do século XVIII. 8 Aclare a suma importância do crepúsculo do regime feudal durante a Revolução Francesa e, posteriormente, explique a vantagem socioeconômica e política da transição do sistema feudal para a hegemonia do sistema capitalista. 9 Amparados pelo texto supra e lembrados pelas aulas anteriores, defina o lema da Revolução Francesa: Liberdade, Igualdade e Fraternidade. Depois, elucide o impacto desse lema na sociedade do século XVIII. 10 As escolas eram controladas pela Igreja Católica, com a Revolução Francesa essas instituições de ensino passaram a ser administradas pelo Estado. Elucide as vantagens da transferência do poder sobre as escolas para o desenvolvimento do ensino e da sociedade. 11 Debruçados ante o exposto texto supra e pelas aulas ministradas, elucide as vantagens e as desvantagens da fragmentação do trabalho na sociedade dos séculos XVIII e XIX. 12 Aclare o termo dinâmica dupla. 13 Elucide o que seria a interdependência funcional para Durkheim e como esse termo impactaria a sociedade contemporânea do século XXI. 14 Aclare melhor o termo fato social e, posteriormente, Elucide os termos característicos de um fato social que são a generalidade, a exterioridade e a coercitividade. 15 cite exemplos contemporâneos de fatos sociais no Brasil. 16 Por que a Sociologia de Durkheim é alcunhada de funcionalista e de estruturalista? 17 Entre em embate com Durkheim e crie um novo objeto de estudo para a Sociologia além do alicerce dos fatos sociais. Lembre-se de embasar e fundamentar bem sua teoria, uma boa ideia é a exemplificação de sua teoria na vida pragmática dos indivíduos e como seu novo objeto de estudo impactaria as esferas políticas, sociais e econômicas. (Obs.: Caso crie uma boa tese alicerçada e bem fundamentada em fatos teóricos e práticos, a nota dessa questão valerá 25% do todo). 18 Como conclusão, debruçados sobre o texto introdutório, leio atentamente após todas as questões resolvidas, para um melhor entendimento profundo, e disserte sobre todas as ideias explanadas, expondo seu ponto de vista sobre o tema, isto é, se concorda ou não, sempre usando uma fundamentação que alicerce seu ponto de vista. (Mínimo – 25 linhas/Máximo – 55 linhas). -/- De coração, boa sorte! -/- . (shrink)

We cannot simply observe that Emile Durkheim, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Pierre Bourdieu all received philosophical training and subsequently asserted, in surprisingly similar terms, that escaping from philosophy or breaking away from philosophical modes of thought was a necessary condition for any research in the human and social sciences, without considering whether there might be a direct relationship between the sociological ethos and a particular attitude towards philosophy. The "rupture" with philosophyis never complete: the sociologists' conception of sociology is, on the (...) contrary, heavily influenced by the negative image they have of philosophy, which they always invoke as something to be avoided or a specter that must be exorcised. The sociological perception of philosophy thus constitutes a system of oppositions, a set of likes and dislikes deeply ingrained in the minds of practitioners in the human and social sciences, and which, so to speak, form the very foundation of the discipline and its definition of its identity. By reconstructing it, this article proposes a sociological analysis of the genesis, structure, and function of the sociological unconscious. (shrink)

Summary of the major innovations of Emil du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896).

Emil Cioran offers novel arguments against suicide. He assumes a meaningless world. But in such a world, he argues, suicide and death would be equally as meaningless as life or anything else. Suicide and death are as cumbersome and useless as meaning and life. Yet Cioran also argues that we should contemplate suicide to live better lives. By contemplating suicide, we confront the deep suffering inherent in existence. This humbles us enough to allow us to change even the deepest (...) aspects of ourselves. Yet it also reminds us that our peculiar human ability—being able to contemplate suicide—sets us above anything else in nature or in the heavens. This paper assembles and defends a view of suicide written about in Cioran’s aphorisms and essays. (shrink)

Triumphalist histories of science are nothing new but were, in fact, a staple of the 19th century. This article considers one of the more famous works in the genre and argues that it was motivated by doubt more than by faith.

Johannes Daubert he was an acknowledged leader, and in some respects the founder, of the early phenomenological movement, and was considered – as much by its members as by Husserl himself – the most brilliant member of the group. In Daubert’s unpublished writings we find a series of reflections on Lask, and on Neo-Kantianism, which form the subject-matter of this paper. They range over topics such as the ontology of the ‘Sachverhalt’ or state of affairs, truthvalues (Wahrheitswerte) and the value (...) of truth, negative judgments and the copula, and the relation between perception and judgment. (shrink)

This paper discusses Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist interpretation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophy of education, or Emile. It aims to show the Sartrean concept of freedom and responsibility in understanding education, as shown in Emile and his tutor's narrative. It utilizes Sartre’s significant works, such as Being and Nothingness, and Existentialism is Humanism, in explicating the Sartrean concept in Rousseau's book, Emile. Existentialist hermeneutics helps the paper to re-interpret the text of Emile. It argues that Rousseau's philosophy of education, as demonstrated by (...) Emile and his tutor, implicitly manifests absolute freedom and responsibility in the learning process. Thus, this paper provides a Sartrean existentialist perspective of understanding Rosseau's Emile. (shrink)