El siguiente artı́culo intenta defender la tesis de que la distinción aristotélica entre enérgeia y kı́nesis debe ser comprendida de modo intensional (en contraposición a una lectura extensional), tomando como punto de partida su célebre aparición en Met IX 6. Sobre la base de la identificación del problema acerca del cual trata dicho pasaje, se toma en consideración otras apariciones de la distinción en Met IX 8, en la EE, en la EN y en otros textos, en orden a documentar, (...) en primer lugar, la vinculación de la distinción con la noción de érgon y, en segundo lugar, de qué modo dicha vinculación permite una lectura intensional de la distinción. Por último, se ofrece un argumento adicional para dicha lectura considerando la estructura teleológica de la acciones presentada por Aristóteles en EN I 1. (shrink)

This study aims to grasp the two distinct artworks one is from the literary field: Penal Colony, written by F. Kafka and the other one is from painting: The Large Glass, designed by M. Duchamp. This text tries to unravel the similarities betwe- en these artworks in terms of two main significations around “The Officer” from Penal Colony and “The Bachelors” from The Large Glass. Because of their vital role on the re-production of status-quo, this text asserts that there is (...) a similarity between them in the name of being part of the dispositions of body and desire. First of all, the text focuses on Penal Colony, especially on “The Officer” in or- der to observe his obsession towards the order that ruled by former and the late officer of colony. Deleuze & Guattari conceptualize it as “abstract-machines” and it refers to a contingent state of being which is produced as an obligatory entity. Besides, The Officers’ application via a “labeling machine” on inmates creates a framewok of a dispositif in Foucauldian terminology. Secondly, it is emphasized that The Bachelors from the Large Glass for his context, due to its reference for the concept of desire and a metaphorical connotation for desire as “cocoa”. The Large Glass is also turn around the dispositif in a different way: love. It is stated that criticizing the love to nowhere which belongs to The Bachelors and it can be found that there is an abstract-machine again in back of this practice and it converts The Bachelors’ energeia to make an apparatus possible and operative. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s concepts of dynamis and energeia (commonly translated as potentiality and actuality), and of the thematic progression of Metaphysics IX. I first raise the question of where motion fits in Aristotle’s categories and argue that the locus of motion in the system of categories are the categories of doing and suffering, in which case dynamis and energeia in respect of motion can also be understood as the dynamis and energeia of doing (...) and suffering. Next, I argue that the analogy that Aristotle draws in IX.6 is an analogy between the dynamis and energeia of doing and suffering and the dynamis and energeia of substance. Finally, I try to show that it is this analogy between the kinetic and non-kinetic variants of dynamis and energeia—and not the distinction between end-inclusive and end-exclusive activities—that provides the key to understanding the structure of Metaphysics IX. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of the relationship between dunamis and energeia in Aristotle’s ontology. Throughout his writings, Aristotle employs these terms to uncover what I call a proto-phenomenological description of the different ways of being. While contemporary scholarship has suggested the significance of dunamis and energeia for Aristotle’s understanding of being, the relationship between these terms has often been interpreted as mutually exclusive. Accordingly, dunamis would be understood as subordinate to energeia, which would function as the (...) sole primary term of Aristotle’s ontology. I argue that it is a mistake to consider dunamis and energeia as non-reciprocal and subordinate terms. Furthermore, I suggest that this mistake often leads to an underestimation of the dynamic character of Aristotle’s proto-phenomenological account of being. To recover this dimension of Aristotle’s thinking, I claim that dunamis and energeia ought to be understood as reciprocal and co-constitutive terms characterized by a constant and dynamic interrelation. To defend this interpretation, I turn to Aristotle’s conceptions of nature, movement, and soul as discussed in the Metaphysics, Physics, and De Anima. I argue that each of these key terms provide a concrete illustration of how dunamis and energeia function as co-constitutive principles for the manifestation of the being of natural beings. I propose that this proto-phenomenological approach to being remains Aristotle’s most significant and enduring contribution to Western ontology. (shrink)

Posing qualia as the mark of the mental presents problems for both reductionist and non-reductionist views of the mind. An alternative platform to understand the ontology of mental states is presented using Polo's retrieval of Aristotle's notion of energeia. I propose that mental states are characterized in terms of temporal integration, a feature of mental states that happen in time but do not require duration in time. Other features like simultaneity, commensurability, and non-failure are derived from this 'zero-time' that (...) characterizes mental states. Some consequences that the 'zero-time' approach entails for a theory of the mind, especially for our understanding of the relationships between consciousness and intentionality and the structure of the mind, are presented. (shrink)

On the standard interpretation of Metaphysics IX, Aristotle proceeds from the original sense of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια to an ontological conception of these terms. This should raise the question of what is not ontological about the former and what is ontological about the latter. To address these questions I discuss the commentaries by Heidegger and Menn, which alone come close to addressing these issues. But their readings cannot neatly distinguish between the two senses of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια that we find (...) in the Aristotelian text, thus compelling us to seek a better way of clarifying the standard interpretation, which I argue can be more precisely understood in the following way: δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in their customary meaning cannot be considered ontological in the sense that they have a particular locus among the categories, which is what sets them apart from their newer, ontological meaning. I conclude therefore that the text of Metaphysics IX can be understood as proceeding from an intracategorial conception of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια toward a transcategorial conception of these terms. (shrink)

This chapter is an overview of Giorgio Agamben's engagement, in the Homo Sacer series (1995–2014), with Aristotelian philosophy. It specifically studies Agamben's attempt to deconstruct two Aristotelian conceptual oppositions fundamental for the Western tradition of political thought: (1) that between the bare fact of being alive and "qualified" living (associated by Agamben with an alleged distinction between zōē and bios) and (2) that between potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). Agamben's concept of form-of-life (forma-di-vita), a life that is never "bare" (...) but always in the process of qualifying itself, is designed to deactivate and overcome these distinctions. In the final volume of the series, The Use of Bodies (2014), this is done with the help of the Aristotelian concepts of use (chrēsis) and habit (hexis). (shrink)

In the Eudemian Ethics II 1, 1219a34–b8, Aristotle defines happiness as ‘the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue’. Most scholars interpret a complete life as a whole lifetime, which means that happiness involves virtuous activity over an entire life. This article argues against this common reading by using Aristotle’s notion of ‘activity’ (energeia) as a touchstone. It argues that happiness, according to the Eudemian Ethics, must be a complete activity that reaches its end at any (...) and every moment. The upshot of this reading is that life reaches completeness within a lifetime and that death cannot be the requirement for making life complete. (shrink)

In 'Metaphysics IX.6' (1048b 18-35) Aristotle presents a test to distinguish between "kinesis" and "energeia," based on relations between the perfective and the imperfective aspect of the verb. This passage has been interpreted as drawing a linguistic distinction between classes of verbs (e.g., stative verbs) by means of a linguistic criterion (Ackrill, Graham). But such an interpretation is in conflict with the text. Aristotle's test must, therefore, be understood as a metaphysical criterion between items in the world (rather than (...) lingual items) by means of a metaphysical criterion, exploiting properties of these items. These items are events, and 'Metaphysics IX.6' exhibits Aristotle's awareness to certain topics discussed in modern event ontology. (shrink)

The differences between the theories of hearing held by Aristotle and by Alexander of Aphrodisias are explored. Alexander appears to have a more systematic approach which avoids the dilemma faced by Aristotle in deciding whether the hearing process constitutes a time-taking kinesis or an instantaneous energeia.

Resumen: En La actualidad de lo bello, Gadamer hace una referencia reveladora a la improvisación musical y a la importancia de la escucha musical, además de poner en primer plano la necesidad de justificación del arte. Situando este debate a través de Goethe y Platón, junto con las Lecciones de Estética de Adorno de finales de la década de 1950 y una discusión sobre Nietzsche y la Antigüedad, es posible establecer que lo que está en juego es la afinación, así (...) como una tensión que invita a un debate ulterior tanto sobre la detención del amante en Carson como el demorarse en Heidegger. Al revisar la hermenéutica gadameriana de la programación y la interpretación musical, incluida la improvisación y el desafío de la nueva música, las reflexiones de Gadamer sobre la cultura musical en el contexto de la cultura social y su reflexión no solo pueden ser leídas a través de Platón y Goethe, sino también a partir de las concepciones de "lo bello" en Hölderlin y Rilke. Se trata de una "conversación" cultural en la que la contribución del público puede estar en tensión con la programación musical progresiva, además de la dinámica de respuesta que surge en la energeia de la improvisación tanto para el intérprete como para el oyente.// Abstract: Gadamer’s On the Relevance of the Beautiful makes telling reference to musi-cal improvisation and the importance of musical listening in addition to fore-grounding the need for justification. Situating this discussion via Goethe and Plato along with Adorno’s late 1950s lectures on Aesthetics together with a discussion of Nietzsche and antiquity, what is at stake is attunement and a tension which invites a discussion of Carson on the lover’s arrest and Heidegger on tarrying. By reviewing Gadamer’s hermeneutic of musical pro-gramming and performance, including improvisation and the challenge of new music, Gadamer may be read on music culture in the context of social culture and his reflection not only via Plato and Goethe but Hölderlin and Rilke on ‘the beautiful.’ At work is a cultural ‘conversation’ where audience input can be in tension with progressive musical programing along with the dynamic of response emergent in the energeia of improvisation for performer and listener. (shrink)

Plotinus resolved the paradox of the immanent transcendence, characterizing the relation between the One and the universe, through his theory of the two energeiai. According to this doctrine, all existents have an internal activity and an external activity: the internal activity comprises the true essence and substance of each being; the external activity is emitted outwards as its image. The source of the emission is thus present in the lower layer of being by virtue of its manifold images. The prominence (...) given to light in elucidating this solution led to a distinction between two types of lights: an original light, corresponding to the internal energeia of every existent, and a secondary light, which is the outflow and image of the first light, existing outside of the luminous body.This paper demonstrates the striking similarity between these two Plotinian lights and the concepts of lux and lumen developed by two thirteenth-century philosophers: Robert Grosseteste and Albertus Magnus. Moreover, the paper contends that the purpose of these two medieval concepts of light was identical to what Plotinus had in mind when he first made the distinction: to account for the relation between the one and the many.Keywords: Plotinus; Albertus Magnus; Robert Grosseteste; Light; Lux; Lumen. (shrink)

In book Λ. of the Metaphysics, Aristotle suggests that an unmoved, unmoving being (God) is the source of all movement in the cosmos. He explains that this being instigates movement through desire. But how does desire affect movement? And what would make Aristotle’s God an object of desire? I attend to both questions in this paper, arguing that God’s existence as pure actuality (energeia) is crucial to understanding God’s status as the primary and ultimate source of wonder, and that (...) it is as the ultimate source of wonder that we can make sense of how God affects desire. (shrink)

The belief that Aristotle opposes potency (dunamis) to actuality (energeia or entelecheia) has gone untested. This essay defines and distinguishes forms of the Opposition Hypothesis—the Actualization, Privation, and Modal—examining the texts and arguments adduced to support them. Using Aristotle’s own account of opposition, the texts appear instead to show that potency and actuality are compatible, while arguments for their opposition produce intractable problems. Notably, Aristotle’s refutation of the Megarian Identity Hypothesis applies with equal or greater force to the Opposition (...) Hypothesis. For Aristotle, then, potency and actuality are compatible. (shrink)

Of Aristotle’s core terms, potency (dunamis) and actuality (energeia) are among the most important. But when we attempt to understand what they mean, we face the following problem: their primary meaning is movement, as a source (dunamis) or as movement itself (energeia). We therefore have to understand movement in order to understand them. But the structure of movement is itself articulated using these terms: it is the activity of a potential being, as potent. This paper examines this hermeneutic (...) circle, and works out a strategy for reading Aristotle based on his conception of our epistemological predicament. This hermeneutic approach helps us gain access to the phenomena of movement and its sources (potency, and energeia). The paper closes with a review of the conceptual resources we deploy to think about movement: homogeneity, space and time, impulse, relativity, the blend of sameness and difference, and being and non-being. Showing that Aristotle uses none of these clears the landscape for a fresh inquiry into his account of movement. (shrink)

The closing chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x are regularly described as “puzzling,” “extremely abrupt,” “awkward,” or “surprising” to readers. Whereas the previous nine books described—sometimes in lavish detail—the multifold ethical virtues of an embodied person situated within communities of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, NE x 6-8 extol the rarified, god-like and solitary existence of a sophos or sage (1179a32). The ethical virtues that take up approximately the first half of the Ethics describe moral exempla who experience fear fighting for (...) their communities, are sensitive to the esteem and recognition of others, and feel love for a desire to live together with a wide variety of kinds of friends. Such good people take pleasure in prudently expending sums to improve their communities—communities in which they exchange goods and participate in ruling and being ruled in a cooperative fashion. The exemplum of x 7-8, by contrast, is a person whose activity consists almost entirely in exercising his or her mind (nous)—a part of one’s soul that Aristotle explicitly notes is disconnected from human emotions and that can be exercised, insofar as one as wise, in a wholly solitary fashion (1178a15-16, a19-20; 1177a33-34). Although Aristotle’s claim that a “life in accord with the mind” is best and most pleasant (1178a6-7) may jar the intuitions of many people—he himself endorses Anaxagoras’ claim that the happy person will appear as “someone who is absurd” (atopos, 1179a15) to most people—it is false to claim that his conclusions in NE x 6-8 are unexpected or unanticipated, or that the text is in any way discontinuous with what precedes it. The Nicomachean Ethics exhibits aspects of ring-composition both within the work as a whole and within book 10. In NE i 5 Aristotle introduces his rendition of a trope that he inherits (most immediately) from Plato, viz. that the problem of the good can be considered like a contest between three different kinds of life—the life of enjoyment (apolaustikos), the life of politics (politikos), and the life of contemplation (theôrêtikos). NE x 6-8 returns to that contest, rendering a verdict about which life takes first, second, and third place. As the opening lines of NE x 6 note, that verdict presupposes central claims articulated between the first and last books of the Ethics, specifically about the nature of the virtues, the nature of friendship, and the nature of pleasure. NE i 5 and x 6-8 thus serve as “bookends” which encase arguments and proposition located between them. Book 10 exhibits a similar ring-composition. NE x opens with methodological reflection on the gap between the theoretical positions that thinkers articulate and the way they live their lives (especially in the case of scolds who simultaneously criticize pleasure on a scientific level but seek it on a practical level [1172a33-b8]). Chapter 8 concludes with an explicit reiteration of the methodological point, a reiteration that underscores how Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives incorporates central aspects of the discussion of pleasure in NE x 1-5. Aristotle’s reiteration of the problem of a gap between theory and practice also draws attention to the centrality of his treatment of pleasure in his adjudication of the three lives. Although the life of pleasure takes a distant third in the contest of lives, the contemplative life wins the contest in part because it itself is the most pleasant form of life. The central philosophical problem looming behind Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives concerns the relationship between the notion of activity (energeia) and the notion of a way of life (bios). In the last four decades, much of the scholarship on NE x 6-8 has sought to address the question of what activities a certain way of life includes or excludes. “Monistic” or “dominant” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including only contemplative activities whereas “inclusivist” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including non-contemplative activities. Although this chapter largely side-steps this debate—partially because there are ample recent first-rate introductory treatments of the debate, partially because I have addressed the question elsewhere in my own writing —I argue that focusing solely on the contest between the two best ways of life overshadows the way that Aristotle incorporates insights from the third way of life into the best way of life. Although the notion of a contest among different kinds of lives presupposes that the lives are mutually exclusive, Aristotle has no problem saying that the contemplative life trumps the life of pleasure because the contemplative life is more pleasant. I proceed in two parts. In the first part I examine what I will call the “outer” ring of the Ethics, namely the relationship between the contest of lives proposed in NE i 5 and its overall resolution in x 6-8. I show how i 5 and x 6 establish the framework for the contest, how x 7 adjudicates that contest in large part by relying upon premises articulated in the interim between books 1 and 10, and how x 6 and x 8 determine the second and third place positions in the contest. In the second part I focus on what I will call the “inner” ring of NE x. More than half of NE x struggles with the nature of pleasure, its role in a happy life, and the methodological problems of examining pleasure within a practical science. I show how x 1 and x 8 are “bookends” that underscore the methodological problem of examining pleasure and how the contest of lives draws upon the proximate conclusions concerning the nature of pleasure in NE x 1-5. (shrink)

One bi-lingual - hungarian-ENGLISH - meditation and research about the Illness and the Living Being. Concentrated, of course, to the specific HUMAN reporting to them. The book investigates philosophically the issue of human illness and its organic pertinence to the meaning of human life starting from the recognition that the dangerous encounter with the experience of illness is an unavoidable – and as such crucial – experience of the life of any living being. As for us humans, there is probably (...) no mortal man who has never suffered of some – any! – kind of disease from his birth to the end of his life… Illness is therefore an experience or outright a danger of existence and its possibility, as well as a way of being that nobody has ever been and will ever be ontological or existentially exempted from. So, it may well be “arbitrary” or “accidental” which disease affects which being or person, when and to what degree, in what way, etc., but it is factually unavoidable that in the course of one’s entire life – from its very beginning to its very end – one would never fall ill in some respect. The paper discusses this issue by the ontological investigation of possibility. Together with the analyses about of the origins and history of the MEDICINE. -/- The english CONTENTS -/- Illness – A Possibility of the Living Being Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Human Illness ............................................. 127 -/- Excursus Sketchy considerations regarding the problems of Christian medicine and Christian healing ...................................................... 135 -/- A dialogue-attempt with Aristotle: Dynamis, energeia, entelecheia, and steresis ...................................................... 147 . (shrink)

Wie an Politik I 2 in Verbindung mit anderen Passagen aus dem Corpus Aristotelicum, v.a. aus seinen zoologischen Schriften, gezeigt werden kann, ist die besondere Fähigkeit des Menschen, sich mitzuteilen, nicht ohne seine spezifische Zoologie denkbar. Ebensowenig ist daher die besondere menschliche Art, Haus- und Staatswesen zu bilden, ohne seine zoologischen Besonderheiten vorstellbar. Die menschliche Fähigkeit, sich mitteilen zu können, weist so in seine spezifische Art des Mitseins und eröffnet dadurch das, was er mitzuteilen vermag, z.B. Recht und Unrecht. Im (...) Unterschied zur Interpretation bei Thomas, der in der Art des Mitteilbaren das spezifische Mitsein des Menschen gegründet sieht, deutet sich dergestalt umgekehrt das Mitsein des Menschen sowie die Art seiner Teilhabe am Dasein überhaupt als Grundzug seiner Mitteilung und des durch sie Mitteilbaren an. Der Beitrag enthält im Anhang einige für die Erörterungen wichtige Begriffsbestimmungen, so u.a. zu den aristotelischen Begriffen 'autarkeia' und 'energeia/entelecheia'. (shrink)

This paper looks at the causal activity of the unmoved mover of Aristotle. The author affirms both the efficient causality of God and his teleological role. According to Aristotle, the main explanation, by describing God, is ‘thinking on thinking’. That means his most important factor to act cannot only ‘be aimed’ but must also ‘be thought’. The final causality is based on the higher energeia what owns the efficient cause, since the energeia itself is regarded by Aristotle as (...) good. God as unmoved mover not moves as a form such the idea of the Good, but as individual and active substance. The goal of the divine activity is God himself, while the other immaterial substances move the spheres as instruments for the change in the world. Insofar those substances are intelligent agents, they are ends for themselves and for their effects. Many new texts to defend such as an efficient causal interpretation are quoted. (shrink)

Giving justice to Maximus any philosophy wich does not include mysticism will be false as philosophy. Our metaphysics must be mystical in order to be rational. In Maximus’ doctrine, then, Christ comes not to destroy but to fulfill the metaphysics of mystery elaborated by the philosophers. For him there can be no separation between philosophy and theology, or between natural and revealed theology. Thereby, Christology and liturgical mysticism are not additional to a neoplatonic, aristotelian, and other methaphysics. Maximus concern was (...) to continue, not the philosophical tradition of the Aristotelian commentators, but the theological one of the Fathers. He was not an Aristotelian commentator himself. The union and distinction are basic logical concepts in Maximus’ thinking, but the Chalcedonian logic is the application of these concepts. Only in this way one can talk about Christianization of aristotelian logic. St. Maximus the Confessor synthesized Aristotelianism influences with those of Platonism in order to exceed the daring speculations of cosmology origeniene. He had an extraordinary ability to combine metaphysical requirements with the effort of defining the faith dogma, and the monastic experiences with the depth thinking, succeeding to propose a new conception in which converge all cultural and religious influences. This study is analyzing the relationship between logoi and energeia (the intentional or “logical” energeia and the ontology of divine energy as ontological “logic”) within the maximian cosmology, by referring to the palamite theology. The concept of logoi for St. Maximus play a role similar in many respects to that of energy (energeiai) in Cappadocian Fathers, but the functional similarity it should not lead to the identification rationales with the energies. (shrink)

Wie an Politik I 2 in Verbindung mit anderen Passagen aus dem Corpus Aristotelicum, v.a. aus seinen zoologischen Schriften, gezeigt werden kann, ist die besondere Fähigkeit des Menschen, sich mitzuteilen, nicht ohne seine spezifische Zoologie denkbar. Ebensowenig ist daher die besondere menschliche Art, Haus- und Staatswesen zu bilden, ohne seine zoologischen Besonderheiten vorstellbar. Die menschliche Fähigkeit, sich mitteilen zu können, weist so in seine spezifische Art des Mitseins und eröffnet dadurch das, was er mitzuteilen vermag, z.B. Recht und Unrecht. Im (...) Unterschied zur Interpretation bei Thomas, der in der Art des Mitteilbaren das spezifische Mitsein des Menschen gegründet sieht, deutet sich dergestalt umgekehrt das Mitsein des Menschen sowie die Art seiner Teilhabe am Dasein überhaupt als Grundzug seiner Mitteilung und des durch sie Mitteilbaren an. Der Beitrag enthält im Anhang einige für die Erörterungen wichtige Begriffsbestimmungen, so u.a. zu den aristotelischen Begriffen 'autarkeia' und 'energeia/entelecheia'. (shrink)

Professor Garver’s “Living Well and Living Together” sheds light on one of the more confusing sections in Aristotle’s Politics, namely the discussion of the best way of life for individuals and city in Politics VII.1-3. At a distance, the conclusion of Aristotle’s remarks seem relatively clear: He endorses the claim that the most choice-worthy life and happiness of a city and an individual are the same. Further, the implications of such a claim for Aristotle’s political philosophy also seem clear: Aristotle’s (...) view of an “internally active” city amounts to a thorough critique of expansionist imperialism. But how these two surface level views—the best way of life for a city and the critique of imperialism—fit together is less than perspicuous. Garver’s paper goes after this text through the lens of two problems. First, Aristotle apparently argues from the nature of the best way of life or happiness for an individual to the best way of life for a city. But as Aristotle himself points out in his critique of the Republic, such an argument seems in danger of falling into a fallacy of composition. In response to such a perceived fallacy, Garver argues that Aristotle incorporates into his argument a third thing—what is the best life for a citizen or what Garver calls “common life” (p. 5, 6, of Garver’s text)—which mediates between the best life for a separate individual and for the city. As Garver puts it at one point “the best life for the citizen will be our means for discovering those [other] two” (p. 5, Garver’s text). The second problem which Garver raises concerns Aristotle’s apparent inference from energeiai to dunameis. Aristotle’s argument in Politics VII.1-3 begins from the claim that a city and individual have the same kind of happiness—namely, a sort of energeia—and extends to a claim about the structure which serves as the basis of that activity. The problem, according to Garver, is that “the virtues of the state cannot be energeiai of that part of its soul, because states don’t have souls” (p. 6, Garver’s text). The comparison between city and individual works—if it does work—only if “the psychological aspects of the virtue central to the Ethics become politically irrelevant” (p. 7, Garver’s text). Thus, Garver suggests that Aristotle’s comparison of city and individual comes at a cost, viz. that “Aristotle can talk about states being virtuous and happy only because of this psychological superficiality” (p. 9, Garver’s text). (shrink)

Based on the Aristotelian dynamis-energeia-differentiation, a concept issuing dynamic coherence providers as the sub-level of individual realizations. This logical sub-level is given for any kind of realizations. Based on this two-level approach, to some degree similar to the two-level approach developed by Polanyi, model of biopsychosocial interaction is established. It is suggested as the theoretical basis for a person-centered approach in healthcare, integrating science and humanitites.

This paper focuses on the rule of metaphor in Paul Ricoeur's philosophy of language. In his MultiDisciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning in Language (1975), the French philosopher shows the fundamental power of human language in constructing the world we perceive. He reveals the processes by which linguistic imagination creates and recreates meaning through metaphor. He develops a "linguistic philosophy of freedom," and a hermeneutics of the subject based on human capabilities. According to Ricoeur, to exist is to act: (...) speaking, doing, telling, and assuming responsibility for the act committed. The very "being" of human beings is to act and the effort to be. In this perspective, the human interiority is considered as dynamic production (enérgeia, conatus): it is a complex ontology of homo capax based on the human freedom and possibilities of language. Being as act and potentiality is the dominant meta-category that governs Ricoeur's philosophical anthropology, widely developed in the work Oneself as Another (1990). (shrink)

This review focuses primarily on Kosman’s idea that energeia in Aristotle has to be understood in terms of activity.

This paper is a critical study of Strobach's (1998) monograph. I argue that Strobach's analysis of Aristotle's concept of the primary time of an event is to narrow and that it unnecessarily excludes activities (which Aristotle calls energeia as opposed to kinesis). Special attention is also given to Strobach's definition and use of his State-prefix and to the formalization of his concept of empirical limes.

La distinción entre acto y movimiento que enuncia Aristóteles en Metafísica IX 6, 1048b18–35, ha causado una gran polémica entre los intérpretes aristotélicos contemporáneos. En este artículo defendemos que la distinción no está en conflicto con el resto del libro IX, ni con el Corpus Aristotelicum en general. De hecho, aparece también en ética a Nicómaco X 4 y De Anima III 7. Además, sin esta distinción no sería posible entender la inmovilidad del primer motor defendida en Metafísica XII, puesto (...) que allí se afirma que este motor es vida y que su actividad es placer y pensamiento. -/- Palabras clave: acto, movimiento, pasaje, actividad, metafísica -/- The distinction between act and movement stated in Metaphysics IX 6, 1048b18–35, has been the subject of a major controversy among contemporary interpreters. In this article I defend that the distinction does not conflict with the rest of book IX, nor with the Corpus Aristotelicum in general. Indeed, the distinction also appears in Nicomachean Ethics X 4 and in De Anima III 7. Furthermore, without this distinction the immobility of the first mover defended in Metaphysics XII would be unintelligible, since Aristotle says that the first mover is life, and that his activity is pleasure and thinking. -/- Key words: act, movement, passage, activity, metaphysics. (shrink)

The temporality of human action is very peculiar: different from the cosmic time and even paradoxical, inasmuch as it is really a circular time. The aim of this essay is to study this circularity in the sphere of human activity through the relations between the notions of potency and habit in the Aristotelian Ethics, among others structural conditions of the action. These structural conditions are explored by Aristotle as those which make possible to judge the actions.