This study discusses the use of non-human animals as photographic images and the issue of representation through the triad of photographer, photographed and spectator to bring a new perspective to the representation debates of photography. From Plato to Susan Sontag, our ways of seeing have been formulated in a human-centered way. Especially in terms of "representing reality", the emotional states of human beings are taken as a basis by photographers. The reflections of the desire to live, the good-evil problem, and (...) the photographic audience's reception of the photographic image according to their moral norms have been discussed from an anthropocentric perspective. This study attempts to overcome this anthropocentric view and argues that photographers who reveal the relations of non-human agents with violence should not be obscured by anthropocentric understanding. While the actions of human beings carry strong indicators of the socio-cultural structure, the actions of non-human agents are ignored and dealt with separately from culture, which raises doubts about the objectivity of impartial photographers, considered "gatekeepers of reality". This study both shows the agency of the photographed non-human actors and discusses the position of photographers and viewers in terms of speciesism. (shrink)

Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis of which is that the (...) subject’s intellectual abilities explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think that Turri misidentifies “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) Even if we assume that Turri’s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox view but can be accommodated by it. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...) fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to (...) clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson’s Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge of (...) an identity does not entail lacking any pieces of knowledge of worldly facts, physicalism is safe. I will argue that what Mary lacks in her room is not merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity and that some physicalists have failed to see this because of a failure to appreciate that Mary’s epistemic progress when she first experiences red has two different stages. While the second epistemic stage can perhaps be plausibly considered as acquiring merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, there is good reason to think that the first epistemic stage cannot be thus considered. (shrink)

Harman famously argues that a particular class of antifunctionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties (...) of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman’s attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the antifunctionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two. (shrink)

"Müfessirlerin Tarihsellikleri" ismini verdiğimiz işbu tez vesilesiyle öncelikle günümüzde Kur'ân ile yan yana anıldığına şahit olduğumuz "tarihsellik" kavramının esas itibariyle insana ait bir mefhum olduğuna, tefsir bünyesinde yaşanan birçok ihtilafın da "tarihsellik" tabirinin insana ait oluşunun tam manasıyla idrak edilemeyişinden kaynaklandığına dikkat çekilmiştir. Tefsir sahasında vuku bulan ve esasında insanın tarihselliğinden ileri gelen bu ihtilafların giderilmesi ile muhtemel yeni ihtilafların önüne geçilebilmesi, herkes gibi bir insan olan müfessirlerin tarihselliklerini inşa eden unsurların doğru tespitine bağlıdır. Bu sebeple müfessirlerin tarihselliklerini inşa ederek (...) onların tefsir tercihlerinde belirleyici olan ve müfessirleri tefsirde zorunlu olarak öznelliğe iten başlıca unsurlara tezimizin ilgili bölümlerinde örnekler üzerinden detaylı bir şekilde yer verilmiştir. Çalışmamızda nihai olarak ayetlerdeki kast-ı ilâhîye dair ve Kur'ân'ın nüzul ortamı hakkında zengin bir müktesebatı bize taşıyan sahih rivayetler ile nesnel tarihî malzemenin tefsir disiplininde müfessirlerin tefsir tercihlerini denetleyen birer otorite olarak tayin edilmesi sayesinde müfessirlerin kendi tarihselliklerine karşı eserlerini koruyabilecekleri sonucuna varılmıştır. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.