This is an excerpt of a crucial dialogue engaged in by a Hindu and an Orthodox Roman Catholic. The excerpt touches on evil and the supernatural.

This paper deals with the concept of religiousness and religion in the context of Krause´s panentheist metaphysics, understood as a life of union, as intimacy of and with God, particularly on the part of human beings and also in relation to the rest of the existing. An evolutionary review of this conception of religion is undertaken throughout Krause´s work, and the program of a philosophy of religion is traced, which, besides a metaphysical and anthropological substantiation, would address an understanding of (...) the history of religions and especially of Christianity, proposing a vision of reciprocal illumination between religion, knowledge, feeling and morality, as well as the possibility of an appealing notion of religious freedom, the hallmark of Krausism in its historical development. (shrink)

Fragment B 1 of Parmenides describes a youth’s journey to the house of a goddess who enlightens him as to the nature of all things. The task of translating Parmenides’ Greek text is beset with many difficulties, most notably the phrase kata pant’ atê at B 1.3. There, the neuter accusative plural panta (‘all things’) combines with the feminine nominative singular atê (‘heaven sent blindness’) to render translation impossible. Some have proposed emending the text to read astê (‘down to all (...) cities’), understood in connection with the pathway of divine inspiration. Others reject the emendation in so far as the youth is said at B 1.27 to travel ‘far from the beaten path of men.’ I argue in defense of the reading kata pant’ a<s>tê in so far as references to pathways of inspiration and poetic journeys to the cities of men occur frequently in the poetry of Parmenides’ era. (shrink)

Fragment B 1 of Parmenides describes a youth's journey to the house of a goddess who enlightens him as to the nature of all things. The task of translating Parmenides' Greek text is beset with many difficulties, most notably the phrase kata pant' atê at B 1.3. There, the neuter accusative plural panta ('all things') combines with the feminine nominative singular atê (heavenly sent blindness') to render translation impossible. Some have proposed emending the text to read a<s>tê ('down to all (...) cities'), understood in connection with the pathway of divine inspiration. Others reject the emendation in so far as the youth is said at B 1.27 to travel 'far from the beaten path of men.' I argue in defense of the reading kata pant' a<s>tê in so far as references to pathways of inspiration and poetic journeys to the cities of men occur frequently in the poetry of Parmenides' era. (shrink)

Hegel's critique of the Early German Romantic figures of Fr. Schlegel, Novalis and Schleiermacher resonates to the very core of his work and is as essential to understanding his vision of Science as Plato's polemic against the Sophists is to comprehending his philosophy. Hegel's presentation of romantic irony may not be faithful to its Romantic conception but it is deeply insightful in apprehending irony's postmodern threat to systematic philosophy.

Bashabi Fraser is a poet in her own right. She is also a creative translator. This is a review of her edited volume on the Partition of Bengal. The review highlights our need to read the partition event as a warning for future and ongoing genocides. The review also shows the superiority of literature over history. And finally it has something to say about translation and separately, on P Lal. For instance, this reviewer in many other reviews too insists on (...) the superiority of Fr Mignon SJ over Prof Lal's understanding of translation. (shrink)

Open Access: Trudy Govier (FR) argues for “conditional unforgivability,” yet avers that we should never give up on a human being. She not only says it is justifiable to take a “hopeful and respectful attitude” toward one’s wrongdoers, she indicates that it is wrong not to; she says it is objectionable to adopt an attitude that any individual is “finally irredeemable” or “could never change,” because such an attitude “anticipates and communicates the worst” (137). Govier’s recommendation to hold a hopeful (...) attitude seems to follow from one’s knowing that an appropriate object of unforgivability is also an agent capable of moral transformation. I appeal to Blake Myers-Schultz’s and Eric Schwitzgebels’ account of knowledge without belief, and Schwitzgebels’ account of attitudes, to argue that a victim’s knowledge that a wrongdoer has the capacities of a moral agent does not entail belief in the possibility that a wrongdoer will exercise those moral capacities, nor does knowledge of a wrongdoer’s moral capacities entail hopeful attitudes toward the prospects of an individual wrongdoer’s moral transformation. I conclude that what victims can hope for should not be that which victims are held to as a moral minimum. (shrink)

(Back Cover:) « La pensée métaphysique renaîtra demain. Ce sont des savants qui ont le goût et le sens de la pensée conduite jusqu’au terme de ses exigences internes, et des philosophes initiés aux sciences expérimentales qui, en commun, la feront. » L’œuvre de Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) illustre parfaitement cette recherche de la métaphysique d’un monde en devenir, qui sait écouter et se modeler sur la transformation – la métamorphose – promise à une Création finalisée. Le trait commun aux exposés (...) ici présentés sous forme définitive a été cette recherche autour d’une pensée qui renouvelle de l’intérieur la métaphysique en réalisant le vœu de Bergson qu’elle devienne « auscultatrice », que l’énigme que pose l’homme face à son origine et sa destinée ne soit pas recouverte par une pensée qui se perdrait dans la description des choses ou dans l’esprit de système, mais qui non plus n’irait se recroqueviller sur elle-même, en narrant sa propre expérience subjective sous le mode de la déréliction. Claude Tresmontant a su penser l’être en genèse, et il a cherché à renouveler la question de l’existence de Dieu, en en transformant la problématique en dialogue avec les sciences contemporaines. À ce goût de l’être dont les sciences ont renouvelé l’approche, il a également voulu infuser un « supplément d’âme », en repensant la réalité de la création et l’horizon de la cause finale, toujours à partir de la nature ultimement théologique de la réponse à la question « qu’est-ce que l’homme ? » Contributeurs : Yves Tourenne, Philippe Gagnon, Fabien Revol, Brunor, Frédéric Crouslé, Bertrand Souchard, Emmanuel Gabellieri. Table of Contents: Note Liminaire (Ph. Gagnon) - 7 En quoi la pensée de Claude Tresmontant nous stimule-t-elle encore ? Hommage et critique (Y. Tourenne) - 13 L’imbrication de la preuve de Dieu et de la cosmologie chez Tresmontant représente-t-elle une preuve ? (Ph. Gagnon) - 27 L’usage apologétique de la philosophie de Tresmontant dans les Indices pensables de Brunor (F. Revol) - 49 Réponse à Fabien Revol (Brunor) - 77 Qu’est-ce qui cloche dans la théologie de Claude Tresmontant ? (Fr. Crouslé) - 85 Les métaphysiques principales de Claude Tresmontant : la foi biblique est-elle à part de la raison philosophique grecque ? (B. Souchard) - 109 Maurice Blondel et Claude Tresmontant (E. Gabellieri) - 123 La vision informationnelle de Tresmontant, surtout en référence au problème de l’âme (Ph. Gagnon) - 133. (shrink)

Romantic psychology is first specified in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed faculty-psychology, whose scientific paradigm is fundamentally materialistic and mechanistic. Romantic psychology is then presented through Fr. Schlegel’s theory and practice of the literary fragment. In the fragment, we discover selfhood that is self-positing, powered by electro-chemical forces and enlivened by the stimulating Other. Romantic psychology determines the self as an ironic system, complete and yet organically open to other selves. It is phenomenological in nature and its contemporary legacy can be found (...) in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical hermeneutics. (shrink)

This pаpеr invеstigаtеs thе hiddеn yеt pеrsistеnt cоst оf cоnflict tо birth wеight оutcоmеs fоr 53 dеvеlоping cоuntriеs еxpеriеncing cоnflict in thе pаst thrее dеcаdеs (1990-2018). Explоiting thе vаriаtiоn аcrоss districts аnd cоncеptiоn mоnths-yеаrs, wе find thаt intrаutеrinе еxpоsurе tо аrmеd cоnflict in thе first trimеstеr оf prеgnаncy rеducеs child’s wеight аt birth by 2.8% аnd rаisеs thе incidеncе оf lоw birth wеight by 3.2 pеrcеntаgе pоints. Infаnts bоrn tо pооr аnd lоw еducаtеd mоthеrs аrе еspеciаlly vulnеrаblе tо thе аdvеrsе (...) rеpеrcussiоns оf аrmеd cоnflict. Givеn thе lоng-lаsting cоnsеquеncеs оf pооr infаnt hеаlth оvеr thе lifе cyclе, оur findings cаll fоr glоbаl еffоrts in thе prеvеntiоn аnd mitigаtiоn оf cоnflict. Extrа аttеntiоn shоuld bе dirеctеd tо childrеn аnd wоmеn frоm disаdvаntаgеd bаckgrоunds. (shrink)

This article is a defense and explication of Aristotelian substance-accident terminology used in the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation following upon Fr. Thomas Reese's denigration of orthodox terminology and theology. It was reworked from a paper entitled “They Must Fall into Being: The Son’s Power as Quasi-Subject of the Accidents of Bread and Wine in the Sacrament of the Eucharist” which I delivered on Feb. 4, 2023, at The Holiness of God and the Mystery of the Eucharist conference at Ave Maria (...) University co-sponsored by the Aquinas Center for Theological Renewal (Ave Maria, FL) and the St. Paul Center for Biblical Theology (Steubenville, OH). (shrink)

The idea behind this special theme journal issue was to continue the work we have started with the INBIOSA initiative (www.inbiosa.eu) and our small inter-disciplinary scientific community. The result of this EU funded project was a white paper (Simeonov et al., 2012a) defining a new direction for future research in theoretical biology we called Integral Biomathics and a volume (Simeonov et al., 2012b) with contributions from two workshops and our first international conference in this field in 2011. The initial impulse (...) for this effort was given a year earlier by a publication of one of the guest editors of this issue (Simeonov, 2010) in this journal. This time we wish to provide a broader forum and more space to elaborate in detail some of the most interesting concepts we have encountered in our discussions, as well as to invite some new contributions of particular interest in the field. Another goal we had in mind was to collect and review as many provocative perspectives as possible on the same key topic we are interested before making a decision to follow a more focused notion that would lead to a funded research program. Therefore we welcomed the generous suggestion of Professor Denis Noble, FRS, who is also editor of this journal to prepare a special theme issue entitled: “Can biology create a profoundly new mathematics and computation?” It has taken a while to invite and collect the contributions. Most of them had a couple of revision cycles and adjustments after having been thoroughly discussed with colleagues, incl. the editors of this issue. We think that the result we have obtained at the end is a satisfactory one, since we succeeded to integrate a diversity of original, but sometimes controversial and mutually excluding concepts organized within chapters of a self-contained volume. The task of compiling all this was not easy at all. Despite our efforts to position the articles of different authors and themes in a way allowing their easy comprehension and relation to each other within the individual chapters, some of them still require a sort of introduction to dissolve possible ambiguities. This is what we are going to do in the following few paragraphs with the hope that the reader (and some of the authors) would excuse our failures. (shrink)

I remain unsatisfied by a lack of philosophical clarity among Báñezian authors on the nature of freedom. In a recent paper, I therefore posed a problem for Báñezianism that resembles what is called the “grounding problem” for Molinism: where do the truths about alternative possibilities come from? And I illustrated the problem in the context of the account of grace given by one famous defender of the view, Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, whose work in turn was recently promoted by Taylor Patrick (...) O’Neill. O’Neill responds in this present journal issue to that paper, arguing that I failed to be attentive to distinctions drawn by Garrigou-Lagrange which would resolve the dilemma. However, I fear that O’Neill’s presentation of both the dilemma and his own resolution is conceptually confused. I will try to illustrate that O’Neill’s own responses are at many points either a concession to a certain fork of the dilemma that I posed in the original paper, or change the subject and fail to address my concerns except superficially. However, since at many points O’Neill implies that I reject Báñezianism, despite my explicit qualification in the paper that I do not, I will end by proposing what would constitute a sufficient response to the dilemma. (shrink)

This article reintroduces Fr. Zeferino González, OP (1831-1894) to scholars of Church history, philosophy, and cultural heritage. He was an alumnus of the University of Santo Tomás in Manila, a Cardinal, and a champion of the revival of Catholic Philosophy that led to the promulgation of Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris. Specifically, this essay presents, firstly, the Cardinal’s biography in the context of his experience as a missionary in the Far East; secondly, the intellectual tradition in Santo Tomás in Manila, (...) which he carried with him until his death; and lastly, some reasons for his once-radiant memory to slip into an undeserved forgetfulness. (shrink)

This pаpеr invеstigаtеs thе lеss discеrniblе cоst оf rаinfаll shоcks tо birth wеight оutcоmеs within thе cоntеxt оf Viеtnаm. Еxplоiting thе vаriаtiоn аcrоss districts аnd cоncеptiоn mоnths-yеаrs, wе shоw thаt in-utеrо еxpоsurе tо еxcеssivе аnd dеficiеnt rаinfаll shоcks in thе sеcоnd trimеstеr оf prеgnаncy rеducеs child’s wеight аt birth by 3.5 аnd 3.1%, rеspеctivеly. Bеsidеs, infаnts bоrn tо pооr, rurаl, аnd lоw еducаtеd mоthеrs аrе еspеciаlly vulnеrаblе tо thе аdvеrsе rеpеrcussiоns оf rаinfаll shоcks. Sincе pооr infаnt hеаlth cаn lеаvе pеrsistеnt (...) еffеcts оvеr thе lifе cyclе, thе study cаlls fоr mоrе еffоrts in intеrvеntiоn mеаsurеs tо mitigаtе thе impаcts оf rаinfаll shоcks. Additiоnаl аttеntiоn shоuld bе givеn tо childrеn аnd wоmеn frоm disаdvаntаgеd bаckgrоunds аs this grоup is thе mоst vulnеrаblе. (shrink)

Strawson's view on punishment has been either neglected or recoiled from in contemporary scholarship on ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (FR). Strawson's alleged retributivism has made his view suspect and troublesome. In this article, we first argue, against the mainstream, that the punishment passage is an indispensable part of the main argument in FR (section 1) and elucidate in what sense Strawson can be called ‘a retributivist’ (section 2). We then elaborate our own hypothesis of symbolic retribution to explain the continuum between (...) moral reactive attitudes and punishment that Strawson only adumbrates (section 3). After this justification of the punitive response to wrongdoing, we compare and contrast our specific kind of retributivist hypothesis with other positions in the so-called ‘new retributivism’ (section 4). Our hypothesis differs from other subvarieties of expressive retributivism in putting centre stage the idea of punishment as taking up a reverential stance towards the victim. (shrink)

The paper proposes a new interpretation of Timon's attack on Arcesilaus in fr. 806 SH.

This pаpеr prоvidеs thе first еmpiricаl еvidеncе оn thе еxistеncе оf nеgаtivе spillоvеr еffеcts frоm childrеn еxpоsеd tо cоrpоrаl punishmеnt in thе hоmе (CPH). Wе find thаt intеrаctiоns with pееrs suffеring frоm CPH dеprеss аchiеvеmеnt in bоth mаth аnd lаnguаgе аmоng Viеtnаmеsе fifth grаdеrs. Spеcificаlly, а оnе stаndаrd dеviаtiоn incrеаsе in thе Pееrs’ Viоlеncе Indеx is аssоciаtеd with а rеductiоn in thе mаth аnd thе lаnguаgе tеst scоrеs by 0.11 аnd 0.14 stаndаrd dеviаtiоns, rеspеctivеly. Thеsе аdvеrsе impаcts cоuld pоtеntiаlly bе (...) аttributеd tо thе unfаvоrаblе chаngеs in studеnt аcаdеmic аspirаtiоns, studеnt аctuаl lеаrning еffоrts, аnd thе intеr-studеnt rеlаtiоnships. (shrink)

Whilе thе rоbust аnd pоsitivе аssоciаtiоn bеtwееn еducаtiоn аnd pоliticаl еngаgеmеnt hаs bееn widеly dоcumеntеd, thе dirеct cаusаl link is still а subjеct оf dеbаtе. This study cоntributеs tо thе оngоing dеbаtе by еxаmining whеthеr thеrе еxists а cаusаl еffеct оf еducаtiоn оn pоliticаl еngаgеmеnt. Explоiting thе plаusibly еxоgеnоus vаriаtiоn in еducаtiоn inducеd by thе cоmpulsоry schооling rеfоrms аcrоss 39 cоuntriеs, wе find thаt еducаtiоn cultivаtеs pоliticаl intеrеst, prоmоtеs thе аcquisitiоn оf pоliticаl knоwlеdgе, аnd fоstеrs suppоrtivе аttitudеs tоwаrds pоliticаl frееdоms. (...) Nеvеrthеlеss, thе bеttеr еducаtеd аrе nо mоrе likеly tо vоtе in еlеctiоns nоr аdоpt аny spеcific pоsitiоn in thе lеft-right pоliticаl spеctrum. (shrink)

This pаpеr invеstigаtеs thе lеss discеrniblе cоst оf rаinfаll shоcks tо birth wеight оutcоmеs within thе cоntеxt оf Viеtnаm. Еxplоiting thе vаriаtiоn аcrоss districts аnd cоncеptiоn mоnths-yеаrs, wе shоw thаt in-utеrо еxpоsurе tо еxcеssivе аnd dеficiеnt rаinfаll shоcks in thе sеcоnd trimеstеr оf prеgnаncy rеducеs child’s wеight аt birth by 3.5 аnd 3.1%, rеspеctivеly. Bеsidеs, infаnts bоrn tо pооr, rurаl, аnd lоw еducаtеd mоthеrs аrе еspеciаlly vulnеrаblе tо thе аdvеrsе rеpеrcussiоns оf rаinfаll shоcks. Sincе pооr infаnt hеаlth cаn lеаvе pеrsistеnt (...) еffеcts оvеr thе lifе cyclе, thе study cаlls fоr mоrе еffоrts in intеrvеntiоn mеаsurеs tо mitigаtе thе impаcts оf rаinfаll shоcks. Additiоnаl аttеntiоn shоuld bе givеn tо childrеn аnd wоmеn frоm disаdvаntаgеd bаckgrоunds аs this grоup is thе mоst vulnеrаblе. (shrink)

In a few texts, Thomas Aquinas says that the first operation of the intellect pertains to (respicit) “the quiddity of a thing” whereas the second operation pertains to “the to be itself of a thing” (esse). But Aquinas also says that quiddities are to the intellect as color is to the power of sight. Statements such as these seem to have led Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson to see esse as the proper object of the intellect’s second operation. Against this (...) conclusion, Fr Régis and Ralph McInerny have argued—using Aquinas’s In I Peryermenias, lecture 5—that since ‘is’ is a verb and ‘is’ signifies existence, but all verbs signify the first operation of the intellect, we must be able to form a concept of existence in the first operation of the intellect. This paper does three things. First, it analyzes the nature of the claim made by Maritain and Gilson. Second, it shows from internal textual evidence that “respicit ipsum esse rei” cannot mean what Maritain and Gilson take it to mean. The second operation of the intellect cannot have a proper object distinct from the object of the first operation, which is quiddities. Finally, this paper provides an alternative interpretation of In I Peryermenias, lecture 5, to the one given by McInerny. In that text, Aquinas does not speak about a particular concept of existence in the first operation of the intellect and signified by the verbs ‘is’ or ‘exists.’ Rather, he uses the word ‘esse’ in indirect speech to include generally any form or act joined to a subject by the copula, ‘is.’ Aquinas’s focus is not on what ‘esse’ or ‘est’ signifies, but on the mode in which it signifies (per modum actualitas) absent additional qualifying terms. The conclusion of this paper is that, although the esse contrasted with essence in Aquinas’s metaphysics corresponds to a concept in the intellect’s first operation, nevertheless, like the notions of blindness and of genus, this esse cannot fall properly within the intellect’s object. (shrink)

(From the Introduction) The topic I would like to present is “Scholasticism and Thomism” as found in Chapter 7 of Fabro’s "Brief Introduction to Thomism". My presentation, as both a summary and a partial commentary on some aspects of this work, may be helpful as we wait for the English translation of Fabro’s book. The title of this chapter says exactly what Fr. Fabro wants to do. He wants to relate Scholasticism and Aquinas in two senses: 1) from a historical (...) point of view, so that we may understand the origins, context and later fortune of the doctrine of St. Thomas, and 2) from a doctrinal point of view (and this is the most important) so that we may clearly distinguish St. Thomas’ doctrine from the rest of Scholasticism. This is very important because some people have tried to understand the Church’s invitation—or, rather, instruction—to study St. Thomas as simply a broad invitation to study Scholastic philosophy and theology. This is clearly not the case. The Church wants us to study the principles of Thomistic doctrine which, many times, are substantially different from other scholastic doctrines. (shrink)

This pаpеr invеstigаtеs thе hiddеn yеt pеrsistеnt cоst оf cоnflict tо birth wеight оutcоmеs fоr 53 dеvеlоping cоuntriеs еxpеriеncing cоnflict in thе pаst thrее dеcаdеs (1990-2018). Explоiting thе vаriаtiоn аcrоss districts аnd cоncеptiоn mоnths-yеаrs, wе find thаt intrаutеrinе еxpоsurе tо аrmеd cоnflict in thе first trimеstеr оf prеgnаncy rеducеs child’s wеight аt birth by 2.8% аnd rаisеs thе incidеncе оf lоw birth wеight by 3.2 pеrcеntаgе pоints. Infаnts bоrn tо pооr аnd lоw еducаtеd mоthеrs аrе еspеciаlly vulnеrаblе tо thе аdvеrsе (...) rеpеrcussiоns оf аrmеd cоnflict. Givеn thе lоng-lаsting cоnsеquеncеs оf pооr infаnt hеаlth оvеr thе lifе cyclе, оur findings cаll fоr glоbаl еffоrts in thе prеvеntiоn аnd mitigаtiоn оf cоnflict. Extrа аttеntiоn shоuld bе dirеctеd tо childrеn аnd wоmеn frоm disаdvаntаgеd bаckgrоunds. (shrink)

Le Père Ignace Carbonnelle, l'un des principaux fondateurs de la Société scientifique de Bruxelles en 1875 et son secrétaire général depuis cette époque, décède inopinément en 1889 après une quin­zaine d'années durant lesquelles il fut «l'homme fort» de ladite Société. Aussitôt, la Revue des questions scienti­fiques annonce la triste nouvelle, promettant, pour un prochain numéro, une étude détaillée de sa vie et de son œuvre. Elle ne paraîtra jamais, de sorte que sa mort ne fut pas saluée avec l'ampleur qu'on (...) était en droit d'attendre. Et pour cause ! Au ter­me d'une enquête digne d'un roman policier, cette étude révèle que Rome, agacée par l'atomisme de Carbonnelle, profita de sa mort pour rappeler à l'ordre la Société en l'invitant à marcher dans les pas de l'Aquinate. En réponse à cette pressante invi­tation et par un excès de zèle non requis, la Société élut comme président le célèbre thomiste français Edmond Domet de Vor­ges, cependant que le mathématicien Paul Mansion s'attacha d'établir, à partir des publications de Pierre Duhem prônant un retour à une physique des qualités, que la Société se conformait bien, mais à sa manière, aux injonctions romaines. ––– Fr. Ignace Carbonnelle, who founded the Brussels Scientific Society in 1875 and was from this date onwards her Secretary General, passed away suddenly in 1889, after fifteen years during which he was the leading figure of the aforementioned Society. “La Revue des Question scientifique” announced the sad news but promised that their next publication would include a detailed article on the great man and his works. Sadly this article never appeared, meaning that the passing of Fr. Carbonnelle was not marked with the importance which we might have otherwise expected. For what reason, you may well ask? After a detailed investigation, worthy of Agatha Christie herself, it would appear that Rome had been rather alarmed by the “atomism” present in Fr. Carbonnelle's reflections, and had taken the opportunity of his death to invite the Scientific Society to opinions more in line with those of St Thomas. In response to this firmly worded invitation, and with overzealous spontaneity, the Society elected the celebrated French Thomiste Edmond Domet de Vorges as their new President. At the same time the mathematician Paul Mansion relied on the publications of Pierre Duhem, which advocated a stronger adhesion to a physics of an object's qualities, to establish that the Society was, in fact, well aligned with the desires of Rome. (shrink)

Introduction / St.L. JAKI (pp. 9-19). Présentation / J.-Fr. STOFFEL (p. 21). – L'œuvre de Pierre Duhem (pp. 25-113). Publications post­humes (pp. 115-129). – IIe partie : Les travaux de ses doc­torands. Fernand Caubet (pp. 133-135). Henry Chevallier (pp. 137-141). Émile Lenoble (pp. 143-144). Lucien Marchis (pp. 145-154). Eugène Monnet (pp. 155-156). Henri Pélabon (pp. 157-168). Paul Saurel (pp. 169-172). Albert Turpain (pp. 173-197). – IIIe partie : La litté­rature secondaire. Thèses et mé­moires (pp. 201-202). Livres (pp. 203-205). Biographies et (...) étu­des générales (pp. 207-209). Duhem en perspective (pp. 211-212). Le philosophe de la physique (pp. 213-234). L'histo­rien des théories physiques (pp. 235-243). Le physicien (pp. 245-251). Le croyant (pp. 253-256). Notices nécrologiques (pp. 257-258). Notices de dictionnaires et d'encyclopédies (pp. 259-260). – IVe partie : Index. (shrink)

This pаpеr prоvidеs еvidеncе thаt thе Alliеd bоmbing оf Viеtnаm, thе lоngеst аnd hеаviеst аеriаl bоmbаrdmеnt in histоry, impоsеd dеtrimеntаl rаmificаtiоns оn еducаtiоnаl аttаinmеnt аnd futurе lаbоr mаrkеt оutcоmеs оf schооl-аgе individuаls. By еxplоiting thе plаusibly еxоgеnоus districtby-cоhоrt vаriаtiоn in bоmb dеstructiоn undеr а diffеrеncе-in-diffеrеncеs frаmеwоrk, wе find thаt аn incrеаsе in bоmb intеnsity lеаds tо significаntly fеwеr еducаtiоnаl yеаrs cоmplеtеd аnd lоwеr futurе еаrnings fоr schооl-аgе childrеn еxpоsеd tо thе bоmbаrdmеnt. Wе furthеr shоw thаt bоth thе supply-sidе fаctоrs (inаdеquаtе (...) schооl sеcurity аnd thе lаck оf tеаchеrs) аnd thе dеmаnd-sidе fаctоrs (rеsidеntiаl cаsuаltiеs, rеstrictеd аccеss tо hеаlthcаrе, dаmаgеd prоpеrtiеs, аnd incrеаsеd rеliаncе оn wеlfаrе аssistаncе) cоuld bе pоtеntiаl mеchаnisms driving thе lоng-tеrm cоnsеquеncеs оf аеriаl bоmbаrdmеnt. Our findings undеrlinе thе impоrtаncе оf cоnflict prеvеntiоn аnd pоst-cоnflict rеcоnstructiоn in prоmоting sustаinаblе dеvеlоpmеnt. (shrink)

An effort to track the movement of thought in the proem of the poem in order to discover in it the context for the disclosure of the "is" in fr. s 2 and 8. Close attention to symbolic imagery and historical allusions, and to the philosophical power of the unthinkable "nothing". (For a renewed and expanded effort, see the author's "Ambiguity and Transport: Reflections on the Proem to Parmenides' Poem," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy xxx [2006], 1-47.).

Whilе thе rоbust аnd pоsitivе аssоciаtiоn bеtwееn еducаtiоn аnd pоliticаl еngаgеmеnt hаs bееn widеly dоcumеntеd, thе dirеct cаusаl link is still а subjеct оf dеbаtе. This study cоntributеs tо thе оngоing dеbаtе by еxаmining whеthеr thеrе еxists а cаusаl еffеct оf еducаtiоn оn pоliticаl еngаgеmеnt. Explоiting thе plаusibly еxоgеnоus vаriаtiоn in еducаtiоn inducеd by thе cоmpulsоry schооling rеfоrms аcrоss 39 cоuntriеs, wе find thаt еducаtiоn cultivаtеs pоliticаl intеrеst, prоmоtеs thе аcquisitiоn оf pоliticаl knоwlеdgе, аnd fоstеrs suppоrtivе аttitudеs tоwаrds pоliticаl frееdоms. (...) Nеvеrthеlеss, thе bеttеr еducаtеd аrе nо mоrе likеly tо vоtе in еlеctiоns nоr аdоpt аny spеcific pоsitiоn in thе lеft-right pоliticаl spеctrum. (shrink)

In this аrtiсlе, thе аuthоr fосusеs оn еluсidаting sоmе philоsоphiсаl аspесts оf intеrсulturаl соmmuniсаtiоn in thе соntеxt оf glоbаlizаtiоn оn thе bаsis оf rесоgnizing thе соntributiоns аnd limitаtiоns оf Wittgеnstеin tо thе birth оf philоsоphy. сulturе study. Thоsе philоsоphiсаl issuеs аrе: thе similаrity in thinking аnd асting оf pеоplе асrоss сulturеs; divеrsity оf сulturеs, wоrldviеws аnd wаys оf lifе. Frоm thе Mаrxist pоint оf viеw, thе аuthоr pоintеd оut аnd сritiсizеd thе limitаtiоns оf Wittgеnstеin's philоsоphiсаl соnсеptiоn; аnd аt thе sаmе (...) timе оffеr аnd еxplаin sоlutiоns tо implеmеnt intеrсulturаl соmmuniсаtiоn in thе соntеxt оf сurrеnt glоbаlizаtiоn. (shrink)

Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars have been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of this article is to suggest that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles change, both radically and fundamentally, between the early and (...) middle period dialogues. Though this is a kind of strengthening the developmentalistic approach corresponding the relation of the early and middle period dialogues, based on the fact that what is to be proved here is a essential development in Plato’ ontology and his epistemology, by expanding the grounds of development to the ontological and epistemological principles, it hints to a more profound development. The fact that the bipolar and split knowledge and being of the early period dialogues give way to the tripartite and bound knowledge and benig of the middle period dialogues indicates the development of the notions of being and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy before the dialogues of the middle period. -/- Keywords Plato; early dialogues; middle dialogues; being; knowledge; development -/- Introduction The differences between two groups of the early and middle period dialogues have always been a matter of dispute. Whereas the developmentalists like Vlastos, Silverman (2002), Teloh (1981), Dancy (2004) and Rickless (2007) think that from the early to the middle dialogues Plato’s philosophy changes, at least in some essential points, the unitarists like Kahn, Cherniss and Shorey believe that there happens no development and the differences must be taken as natural, ignorable and even pedagogic. In his well-known article, Socrates contra Socrates in PLATO, Vlastos lists ten theses of difference between two groups of dialogues. The first group which includes Plato’s early dialogues he divides to 'elenctic' (Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I) and 'transitional' (Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno) dialogues. These transitional come after all the elenctic dialogues and before all the dialogues of the second group which compose Plato’s middle period dialogues, including (with Vlastos' chronological order) Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus (1991, 46-49). Vlastos asserts strictly that his list of differences are 'so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotole’s' (ibid, 46). Vlastos’ list of differences between two Socrateses is considered a view breaking sharply between the early and the middle dialogues. Besides all ten differences between the two Socrateses in Vlastos’ list that can be supportive for our doctrine here, we intend to focus on some ontological as well as epistemological distinctions that have not completely been discussed hitherto. Contrary to the developmentalist theory of Vlastos, unitarian theory of Charles Kahn wishes to eliminate any substantial difference between the early and the middle dialogues. He distinguishes seven 'pre-middle' or 'threshold' dialogues including Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis and Euthydemus from the other Socratic dialogues which he calls 'earliest group' (1996, 41). The threshold dialogues, Kahn thinks, 'embarke upon a sustained project' that is to reach to its climax in the middle period dialogues, namely Phaedo, Symposium and Republic. Believing in that there is no 'fundamental shift'between the early and middle dialogues (ibid, 40), Kahn thinks the Socratic dialogues are just the 'first stage' with a 'deliberate silence' towards the theories of later periods (ibid, 339). One of the reasons of the surprising fact that Plato gives no hint of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Forms in the early dialogues, he thinks, is the pedagogical advantages of aporia. He thinks that Plato 'obscurely', and mostly because of education, hinted to some doctrines and conceptions in his early dialogues and with the aim of clarifying them only in the later ones (ibid, 66). The seven threshold dialogues, Kahn asserts, 'had been designed from the first' to prepare the pupils and readers for the views expounded in the middle period dialogues (ibid, 59-60). To show that the differences of the two Socrateses of the early and middle period dialogue are in their onto-epistemological grounds and thence cannot be explained by a unitaristic view, we try to draw the ontological and epistemological principles of the early dialogues in the first part below in order to show, in the second part, that those principles have been developed in the middle period dialogues. -/- A. The Onto-Epistemologic Principles of the Early Dialogues Socratic dialogues are paradoxical about knowledge because while being knowledge-oriented always searching for knowledge, they deny it and even never discuss it directly. Three elements of Socrates’ way of searching Knowledge throughout the early dialogues, i.e. Socratic 'what is X?' question, his disavowal of knowledge and his elenctic method combined together produce something like a circle which works, more or less, in the same way in these dialogues. Though this circle is an embaressing inquiry always resulting in ignorance instead of knowledge, its motivation is surprisingly Socrates’ passionate enthusiasm for knowledge, an intensive love of wisdom. The starting point of this circle is Socrates’ confession of having no knowledge which might be explicitly asserted or presupposed, maybe because it was one of the famous characteristics of Socrates; a confession always paradoxically accompanied with his intense longing for knowledge (e.g., Gorgias 505e4-5). Every time Socrates encounters with someone who thinks he knows something (οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι) (Apology 21d5) and tries to examine him. This examination seems to be the simplest one asking just what it is that he knows. Socrates’ elenchus, therefore, is always connected with 'what is X?' (τίς ποτέ ἐστιν) question, a question that most of the early dialogues of Plato are concerned with; 'what is courage?' in the Laches, 'what is piety?' in Euthydemus, 'what is temperance?' in Charmides and 'what is beauty?' in Hippias Major. This question we call here 'Socratic question' and probably is the very question the historical Socrates used to employ, is tightly interrelated with both his disavowal and his elenchus. He disclaims knowledge because he cannot find the answer to the question himself and he rejects others’ since they cannot offer the correct answer too. Every interlocutor can claim he knows X, if and only if he can answer the Socratic question. Otherwise, he is more of an ignorant than of a knower of τί ποτέ ἐστι X. Knowing the answer to this question is, thus, knowledge’s criterion for Socrates. Having found out that he cannot answer what it is which he would claim to know, the interlocutor comes to the point Socrates was there at the beginning. The least advantage of this circle is that he becomes as wise as Socrates does about the subject, becoming aware that he does not know it. At the end of the circle they are both still at the beginning, not knowing what X is. So let us first take a glance at these three elements. Socratic disavowal of knowledge is strictly asserted in some passages. At Apology 21b4-5, Socrates says: -/- I do not know of myself being wise at all (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν) -/- Moreover, at 21d4-6: -/- None of us knows anything worthwhile (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι) …. I do not know (οἶδα) neither do I think I know. -/- In Charmides Socrates speaks about a fear about his probable mistake of thinking that he knows (εἰδέναι) something when he does not (166d1-2). The somehow generalization of this disavowal can be seen in Gorgias. After calling his disavowal 'an account that is always the same' (509a4-5), Socrates continues (a5-7): -/- I say that I do not know (οἶδα) how these things are, but no one I have ever met, like now, who can say anything else without being absurd. -/- At the end of Hippias Major (304d7-8), Socrates affirms his disavowal of knowledge of 'what is X?' this time about the fine: -/- I do not know (οἶδα) what that is itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν). Some other passages, however, made a number of scholars dubious about Socrates’ disavowal. Vlastos mentions Apology 29b6-7 as an evidence : 'that to do wrong and to disobey one’s master, both god and men, I know (οἶδα) to be evil and shameful'. He thinks that if we give this single text 'its full weight' it can suffice to show that Socrates does claim knowledge of a moral truth (1985, 7). Vlastos’ claim is not admittable since it would be too strange, I think, for a man like Socrates to violate his disavowal claim just after emphasizing it. We can see his claim just before the already mentioned passage: -/- And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything it world be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge (οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς) of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have (οὐκ εἰδέναι) (Apology 29b1-6) Vlastos tries to solve what he calls the 'paradox' of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge distinguishing the 'certain' knowledge from 'elenctic' knowledge (1985, 11) and thinking that when Socrates avows knowledge, we must perceive it as an elenctic knowledge, a knowledge its content 'must be propositions he thinks elenctically justifiable' (ibid, 18). Irwin’s solution is the distinction of knowledge and belief. He approves that Socrates does not 'explicitly' make such a distinction, but still thinks that Socrates’ 'test for knowledge would make it reasonable for him to recognize true belief without knowledge, and his own claims are easily understood if they are claims to true belief alone' (1977, 40). While I agree with Vlastos up to a point, I strongly disagree with Irwin about the early dialogues. As I will try to show below, we are not permitted to consider any kind of distinction within knowledge in Socratic dialogues because only one category of knowledge is alluded to there and the distinction of knowledge and belief thoroughly belongs to the second Sorcates. Although no kind of distinction can be admittable here, I think Vlastos’ distinction can be accepted only if we regard it as a distinction between knowledge, which is unique and without any, even incomparable, rival, and a semi-idiomatic and ordinary one that is a necessary requirement for any argument, and thus, unavoidable even for someone who does not claim any kind of knowledge. An apparent evidence of this is Gorgias 505e6-506a4: -/- I go through the discussion as I think it is (ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν), if any of you do not agree with admissions I am making to myself, you must object and refute me. For I do not say what I say as I know (οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω) but as searching jointly with you (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν). -/- The minimal degree of knowledge everyone must have to take part in an argument, conduct it and use the phrase "I know" when it is necessary is what Socrates cannot deny. We can call it elenctic knowledge only if we agree that it is not the kind of knowledge that Socrates has always been searching, the one that can be accepted as the answer of Socratic 'what is X?' question. His disavowal of knowledge is applied only to the knowledge which can truly be the answer of Socratic question and pass the elenctic exam; a knowledge that, I believe, is never claimed by first Socrates. Socrates conducts his method of examining his interlocutors’ knowledge, our second element here, by almost the same method repeated in Socratic dialogues. That whether we are allowed to regard all the examinations of Socrates in the early dialogues as based on the same or not has been a matter of dispute. Vlastos himself (1994, 31) distinguished Euthydemas, Lysis, Menexenns and Hippias Major from the other Socratic dialogues because he thinks Socrates has lost his faith to elenchus in there. Irwin (1977, 38) distinguishes Apology and Crito where Socrates’ own convictions is present. Contrary to some scholars like Benson (2002, 107) who take elenchus in all the Socratic dialogues as a unique method, Michelle Carpenter and Ronald M. Polansky (2002, 89-100) argue pro the variety of methods of elenchus. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2002, 145-160) even reject such a thing as Socratic elenchus which can gather all of the Socrates’ various arguments under such a heading. There can be no solution for the problem of elenchus, they think, is due to 'the simple reason that there is no such thing as 'the Socratic elenchos"'(p.147). Though we consider elenchus a somehow determined process and a part of Socratic circle in the early dialogues, all we assume is that whatever differences it might have in different dialogues, it has the same onto-epistemological principles and, thus, we are not going to take it necessarily as a unique method. This method sets out to prove that the interlocutors are as ignorant as Socrates himself is. That whether elenchus is constructive, capable of establishing doctrines as Vlastos (1994) or Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 20-21) believe or not is another issue to which this paper is not to claim anything. What is crucial for our discussion here is that elenchus does not reach to the very knowledge Socrates is looking for. This is strictly against Irwin who thinks that not only elenchus leads to positive results, 'it should even yield knowledge to match Socrates’ conditions'(1977, 68, cf. 48). He does not explain where and how they really yield to that kind of knowledge. He explains his elenctic method in his apology in the court (Apology 21-22), that how he used to examine wise men, politicians, poets and all those who had the highest reputation for their knowledge and every time found that they have no knowledge. If we accept, as I strongly do, that Socrates’ disavowal of his knowledge is not irony, it might seem more reasonable to agree that the process that has that disavowal as its first step cannot be irony as well. The key of the circle which can explain why Socrates disclaims knowledge and how he can reject others’ claim of having any kind of knowledge lies in the third element, Socratic question. In Hippias Major (287c1-2), Socrates asks: 'Is it not by Justice that just people are Just? (ἆρ᾽ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι). He insists at 294b1 that they were searching for that by which (ᾧ) all beautiful things are beautiful (cf. b4-5, 8). At Euthyphro 6d10-11 it is said that the Socratic question is waiting for 'the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) by which (ᾧ) all the pious actions are pious; and at 6d11-e1: -/- Through one form (που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ) impious actions are impious and pious actions pious. -/- Since the X itself is that by which X is X, knowing 'X itself' is the only way of knowing X. It is probably because of this that Socrates makes the distinction between the ousia as a right answer to the question and effect as a wrong one: -/- I am afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is (τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν) you did not wish to make clear its nature itself (οὐσίαν … αὐτοῦ) to me, but you said some effect (πάθος) about it. (Euthp. 11a6-9) -/- 1. Knowledge of what X is Now it is time to look for the onto-epistemological principles of Socratic circle and its three elements. It cannot reasonably be expected from the first Socrates to present us explicitly and clearly formulated principles of his onto-epistemology when such explications cannot be found even in the second Socrates who has some obviously positive theoris. Since there must be some principles underlying this first systematic inqury of knowledge, we must seek to them and be satisfied with elicitation of the first Socratas’ principle. What will be drawn out as his principles cannot and must not, thus, be taken as very fix and dogmatic principles. Some very slightest principles and grounds suffice for our purposes here. The first principle that is the prima facie significance of the Socratic question and his implementation of all those elenctic arguments I call the principle of 'Knowledge of What X is' (KWX): -/- KWX To know X, it is required to know what X is. -/- Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b23-25, 27-29, 987b4-8) takes Plato’s τί ἐστι question as seeking the definition of a thing that is the same as historical Socrates’ search but applying to a different field. That Plato’s 'what is X?' question was a search for definition became the prevailed understanding of this question up to now. I am going neither to discuss the answer of Socratic question nor to challenge taking it as definition. What I am to insist is that knowledge is attached firmly to the answer of the question: Knowledge of X is not anything but the knowledge of what X is. It entails, certainly, the priority of this knowledge to any other kind of knowledge about X but it also has something more fundamental about the relation of knowledge and Socratic question. Socrates’ exclusive focus on the answer of his question can authorize the consideration of such an essential role for KWX in his epistemolgoy. The total rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are unable to answer the question can be regarded as a strong evidence for it. Socrates’ elenctic method and his rejection of others’ knowledge in the early dialogues, which all end aporetically with no one accepted as knower and nothing as knowledge, prevent us from finding any positive evidence for this. We have to be content, therefore, of negative evidences which, I think, can be found wherever Socrates rejects his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are not able to give an acceptable answer to his 'what is X?' question. 2. Bipolar Epistemology Socrates’ rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge has another epistemological principle as its basis. Let me call this principle Bipolar Epistemology' (BE): BE There is no third way besides knowledge and Ignorance. -/- BE says that about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and Ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. This means that BE is presupposed here. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The first Socrates never let anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is. -/- 3. Bipolar Ontology The principle of BE in first Socrates’ epistemology is parallel to another principle in his ontology. Plato’s bipolar distinction between being and not being is as strict and perfect as his distinction between knowledge and ignorance. This principle I shall call the principle of 'Bipolar Ontology' (BO): BO Being is and not being is not. BO is apparently the same with the well-known Parmenidean Principle of being and not being (cf. Diels-Kranz (DK) Fr. 2.2-5). Euthydemus’ statement against the possibility of false knowledge can be good evidence for this principle: -/- The things which are not surely do not exist (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα … ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν). (Euthydemus 284b3-4) -/- He continues (b4-5): -/- There is nowhere for not being to be there (οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἐστίν). -/- That BE does not let true opinion as a third option besides knowledge and ignorance seems to be related to BO’s rejecting a third option besides being and not being, which is itself the basis of the impossibility of false belief. Socrates’ elaborate discussion of the problem of false belief in Theatetus that leads to a more decisive discussion and finally to some solutions in Sophist can make our consideration of BO for the first group of dialogues authentive. -/- 4. &5. Split Knowledge and Split Being The fourth principle I shall call the principle of 'Split Knowledge' (SK): -/- SK Knowledge of X is separated from any other knowledge (of anything else) as if the whole knowledge is split to various parts. -/- This Principle is hinted and criticized as Socrates’ way of treating with knowledge in Hippias Major: -/- But Socrates, you do not contemplate the entireties of things, nor do people you have used to talk with (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). (301b2-4) -/- Contrary to Rankin who regards the passage as 'antilogical, almost eristic in tone rather than presenting a serious philosophy of being' (1983, 54), I think it can be taken as serious. Hippias criticizes Sorcates that he does not contemplate (σκοπεῖς) the entireties of things (ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων), a critique which Socrates is not its only subject but all those whom Socrates accustomed to talk with (ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). This last phrase, I think, extends this critic beyond this dialogue to other Socratic dialogues. Hippias’ use of the perfect tense of the verb ἔθω (to be accustomed) is a good evidence of this extension. We can get, thus, these ἐκεῖνοι as Socrates’ interlocutors in his other dialogues that hints that this criticism has the epistemological groundings of the previous dialogues as its subject. What ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι points to is that Hippias does not have in mind Socrates’ way of treating things only in this dialogue, but he is also criticizing Socrates’ way throughout his dialogues. At 301b4-5, Socrates and his interlocutors’ way of beholding things is described as such: -/- You people knock (κρούετε) at the fine and each of the beings (ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων) by taking each being cut up in pieces (κατατέμνοντες) in words (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). This leads us to our next principle that is parallel to, and the ontological side of, SK, the principle of 'Split Being'(SB): -/- SB Everything (being) is separated from any other thing as if the whole being is split to many beings. -/- Socrates and his interlocutors and thus, as we saw, the Socratic dialogues are accused to regard everything as it is separated from all other things. This separation is en tois logois that, I think, can reasonably be taken as saying that Socratic dialogues (it refers of course to the dialogues before Hippias Major) cut up all things which have the same name/definition from all other things and try to understand them separately, without considering other things that are not in their logos. They, for example in Hippias Major, are cutting up to kalon and try to understand what it and all others inside this logos are by separating it from all other things. This is directed straightly against Socratic question and the way Socratic dialogues follow to find its answer, every time separating one logos. As Meyer (1995, 85) points out, every question 'presupposes that the X in question in a logos is something' and 'every answer to every question aims at unity' (84). The critique of Hippias Major is, therefore, at the same time a critique of SK and SB. It is also a critique of KWX because it is only based on KWX that Socratic dialogues could search for the answer of 'what is X' question supposing that knowing what X is is enough for the knowledge of X. SK and KWX are absolutely interdependent. What Socrates and all his previous interlocutors have neglected in Socratic dialogues, Hippias says, was 'continuous bodies of being' (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας) (301b6). Either this theory actually belongs to the historical Hippias as it is being said or not, it is strictly criticizing SB. We have the same phrase with changing sūma to logos some lines later at 301e3-4: διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας. Although this theory that can be observed as both an ontological and an epistemological theory is rejected by Socrates (301cff.), it is still against first Socrates’ onto-epistemological principles and might let us look at what is rejected as Socratic prineple. -/- 6. Knowledge is of Being The sixth principle that I think is presupposed by the first Socrates, is the 'Knowledge of Being' Principle (KB): -/- KB Knowledge is of Being. -/- This principle is obviously the source of the problem of false knowledge, a very important problem throughout Plato’s philosophy. We face this problem maybe for the first time in Euthydemus. In less than 20 Stephanus’ pages, 276-295, we are encountered with different interwoven problems about knowledge , all grounded in the problem of false opinion. Having challenged the obvious possibility of telling lies at 283e, at 284 Euthydemus discusses it saying that the man who speaks is speaking about 'one of those things that are (ἓν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων)' (284a3) and thus speaks what is (λέγων τὸ ὄν) (a5). He must necessarily be saying truth when he is speaking what is because he who speaks what is (τὸ ὄν) and the things that are (τὰ ὄντα) speaks truth (τἀληθῆ λέγει) (a5-6). This is based on Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being which Euthydemus restates (284b3-4) and we mentioned discussing BO principle above. The things that are not are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) and there is no possibility for anyone to do (πράξειεν) anything with them because they must be made as being before anything else can be done, which is impossible (b5-7). The words, then, are of things that exist (εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι) (285e9) and as they are (ὡς ἔστιν) (e10). The result is that no one can speak of things as they are not. It is this impossibility of false speach that is extended to thinking (δοξάζειν) at 286d1 and leads to the impossibility of false opinion (ψευδής … δόξα) (286d4). The general conclusion is asserted at 287a extending this impossibility to actions and making any kind of mistake. Not only knowledge is of being but speech, thought and action are of being simply because of the fact that nothing can be of not being. -/- B. First Socrates’ Principles in the Middle Period Dialogues Out of what were presupposed or criticized mostly in five dialogues, Euthyphro, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Laches and Charmides, we tried to draw the first Socrates’ principles. Our inquiry here is directed to find out the fate of these principles in the three dialogues of the middle period, Meno, Phaedo and Republic. To do this, first we ought to check the situation of Socratic circle in these dialogues. The Socratic circle that was predominant in the early dialogues, does not look like a circle here anymore though they certainly have some features in common. Meno, Phaedo and Republic II-X are not committed to the principles of the circle and the whole circle in disrupted in them. The difference of the two Socrateses towards acquiring knowledge is obvious. The Socrates of Meno, Phaedo and Republic is evidently more self-confident that he can get to some truths during his arguments as he does. They are in their first appearance, as almost all other dialogues, committed to Socrates’ disavowal. All of them try to keep the shape of the Socratikoi Logoi genre, which is committed to the historical Socrates’ way of discussion; a dramatic personage who is to challenge his interlocutors, ask them and refuse the answers. Nevertheless, the fact is that what we have in common between two groups of dialogues is mostly a dramatic structure. Whereas the first group’s arguments are based on Socrates’ disavowal and lead to no positive results, the second group is decisively going to achieve some positive results. The aim of the first Socrates was to show others that they are ignorant of what they thought they knew. The new Socrates of Meno, on the opposite, makes so much efforts to show that the slave boy has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the things that he does not know (οἶδε) (85c6-7). Despite his lack of knowledge, he has true opinions nevertheless. The way from these true opinions to knowledge, as Socrates states, is not so long. These true opinions are now like a dream but 'can become knowledge of the same things not less accurate than anyone’s' (οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων) (c11-d1), if they be repeated by asking the same questions. The most outstanding text regarding Socrates’ disavowal is Meno 98b where he explicitly claims knowledge: -/- And indeed I also speak as (ὡς) one who does not know (εἰδὼς) but is guessing (εἰκάζων). However, [about the fact] that true opinion and knowledge are different, I do not altogether expect (δοκῶ) myself to be guessing (εἰκάζειν), but if I say about anything that I know (εἰδέναι) -which about few things I say- this is one of the things that I know (οἶδα). (98b1-5) This passage is very significant about Plato’s disavowal of knowledge. There can hardly be found, I think, anywhere else in Plato’s corpus where Socrates speaks about his knowledge of something as such. He says first that he speaks as someone who does not know. This ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω comparing with what he used to say in the first group, οὐκ οἶδα, has this added ὡς. Socrates does not claim strongly anymore that he does not know anything but speaks only as someone who does not know. He needs this ὡς not only because he is going to accept that he does know some, though few, things immediately after this sentence, but also because he needs his previous disavowal to be loosened from Meno on. He does not merely say here that he knows something. It is then different from the examples mentioned before which could be taken as idiomatic or at least not emphatic. Socrates’ remarkable emphasis on distinguishing εἰδέναι from εἰκάζειν departs it from all other passages where he says only he knows something. Moreover, he claims definitely that he has knowledge about few (ὀλίγα) things. From the early to the middle dialogues, Socrates’ attitude to knowledge has totally renewed its face. He brings forth a new concept, true opinion, and he does not speak of knowledge as he used to before; the rough, perfect and unachievable knowledge of the first group has turned to something more smooth, realistic and achievable. Comparing with the early dialogues that did not set out from the first to reach positive results, the middle ones are extraordinarily and surprisingly positive and hence destroy the basis of the Socratic circle. The questions and answers are purposely directed to some specific new theories; most of them are not directly related to the topics or the main questions of the dialogues. They are suggested when Socrates draws the attention of the interlocutor away from the main question because of the necessity of another discussion. Even if the main question remains unanswered, we have still many positive theories, prominently of metaphysical type. These theories are so abundant and dominant in these dialogues, especially Phaedo and Republic, that one might think that they may appear to be arbitrarily sandwiched in there. This helps dialogues to keep their original Socratic structure while they are suggesting new theories. Hence, the Socratic question of 'what is X?', though is still used to launch the discussion, is loosened and is forgotten for most part of the dialogues. Meno that has first a differently formulated question, 'can virtue be taught?', leads finally to the Socratic question of 'What is virtue?'. Phaedo is dedicated to the demonstration of the immortality of soul and the life after death without having a central Socratic question. The case of Republic is more complicated. The first book, on the one hand, has all the criteria of a Socratic circle: its 'what is justice?' question, Socrates’ strong disavowal (e.g. 337d-e), his rejection of all answers and coming back to the first point without finding out any answer. This Book, considered alone, is a perfect Socratic dialogue, as many scholars regard it as early and separated from other books. The books II-X are, on the other hand, far from implementing a Socratic circle. They have still the 'what is justice?' question as their incentive leading question, but they are, in most of the positive doctrines and methods that encompass the main parts, ignoring the question. Even these books that, I believe, are the farthest discussions from the Socratic circle are so cautious not to break the Socratic structure of the dialogue as long as it is possible. What is changed is not the structure of the dialogue but the ontological and epistemological grounds based on which new theories are suggested. -/- 1. Knowledge of the Good We can clearly see in the second group of dialogues that the KWX principle loses the place it had before in our first group. It is not, of course, rejected, but still we cannot say that it has the same situation. KWX that was based on Socratic question, as we discussed before, was the leading principle of the first Socrates’ epistemology and of the highest position. Other epistemological principles, SK directly and BE indirectly, were relying on Socratic question and therefore on KWX. Such a position does not belong to KWX from Meno on. What makes it different in the second Socrates is another principle that is needed it not only as its complementary principle but also as what is more fundamental. Plato, then, does not reject KWX in this period, but, it seems, he transcends to another more basic principle; a principle we shall call the principle of 'Knowledge of the Good' (KG): -/- KG Knowledge of X requires knowledge of the Good. -/- Whereas all the dialogues of our first group are free from any discuscon about KG, it bears a very important role in the second group so as becomes the superior principle of knowledge in Republic. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good separate from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8). What let us discuss KG as an epistemological principle for the second Secrates is the relation he tries to establish between knowledge and the Good which, though is alongside with the mentioned thesis and the idea of virtue as knowledge, goes much deeper inside epistemology asking to regard the Good as the basis of knowledge. The effort of Phaedo cannot succeed in establishing the Good as the criterion of explanation and knowledge since, I think, it needs a far more complicated ontology of Republic where Socrates can finally announce KG. What is said in Republic is totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7). The problem of our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any kind of knowledge: -/- The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6) -/- Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both aletheia and to on. He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the conclusion of the analogy: -/- That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας) so far as it is known (ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4) Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). KG, which had been implicitly contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. As what was quoted clearly proves, this principle is the very one which we can observe as the most fundamental principle of the second Socrates in Republic, corresponding to the role KWX had in the first Socrates. The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible realm (517c). -/- 2. Tripartite Epistemology BE is thoroughy rejected in the second Socrates and substituted by its opposite, the principle of 'Tripartite Epistemolgy' (TE): -/- TE Opinion is an epistemological status between knowledge and ignorance. BE of the first Socrates was denying any third way besides knowledge and ignorance which was the foundation of Socratic circle without which Socrates could not reject his interlocutors’ possessing any kind of knowledge. We cannot say, however, that the first Socrates had a third epistemological status in mind but rejected it. Such a status was unacceptable for him so that one can say that he would reject any kind of such status if suggested. There were only two possibilities about knowledge: either one knows something or he does not know it. TE, thus, was not the first Socrates’ discovery and, I think it is not the second Socrates’discovery. All we can see in our second group of dialouges is that he uses this principle as an already demonstrated one. Having examined the slave boy in Meno for the prupose of showing the working of recollection, it truns out that he has some opinions in him while he still does not know. Without trying to prove it, Socrates takes this as the distinction between knowledge and opinion: -/- So, he who does not know (οὐκ εἰδότι) about what he does not know (περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ) has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the same things he did not know (περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε) (85c6-7). -/- The same distinction is set between ὀρθὴν δόξαν and ἐπιστήμην at 97b5-6 ff. (also cf. 97b1-2: ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων … ἐπιστάμενος). He connects then their difference to the myth of Daedalus, the statue that would run away and escape. So are true opinions, not willing to remain long in mind and thus not worthy until one ties them down by αἰτίας λογισμῷ (98a3-4). Socrates says that this tying down is anamnesis. We face, in Phaedo, the same relation is settled between knowledge as the process of being tied down and getting the capability to give an account, on the one hand, and anamnesis, on the other hand. When a man knows, he must be able to give an account of what he knows (Phaedo 76b5-6) and since not all people are able to give such an account, those who recollect, recollect what once they learned (76c4). Although the distinction between knowledge and opinion is not explicitly used in Phaedo, referring to the parallel link between knowledge plus account and anamnesis in Phaedo and Meno, one can say that those who cannot recollect are not able to give account and, thus, are in a state of opinion. What is said at Phaedo 84a, though not yet a definite distinction between knowledge and opinion, makes a distinction between their objects so as we can agree that it is presupposed. The soul of the philosopher, Socrates says, follows reason, stays with it forever and contemplates the divine, which is not the object of opinoin (ἀδόξαστον) (84a8, cf. Meno 98b2-5). The distinction of knowledge and belief in Republic has a significant difference with what we discussed in Meno and Phaedo since the distinction of Meno was based on anamnesis and thus more an epistemological distinction. Even in Phaedo that we do not have any elaborate discussion about the distinction, the only hint to the matter at 76 is bound to the theory of anamnesis. In addition to the relation of the distinction with this theory, there is another evidence that does not permit us to consider the distinction as an ontological distinction. Let’s see Meno 85c6-7: -/- So, he who does not know about what he does not know has within himself true opinions about the same things he did not know (τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε). (85c6-7) -/- This last sentence persists that the objects of knowledge and true opinion are the same. What Socrates is to say here is that whereas he does not know X he has true opinion about the same X. I think Socrates’ sentence that the slave boy οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ and his restatement of it by saying περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε is because he wants to emphasize that the slave boy who does not know, has true opinion about the same thing. Socrates could say this just with using τούτων and there would be no necessity to bring περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ for οὐκ εἰδότι if he did not want to emphasize. -/- 3. Tripartite Ontology The distinction between knowledge and true opinion in Republic, on other side, has nothing to do with recollection, but is based on an ontological principle, 'Tripartite Ontology' (TO): -/- TO There are things that both are and are not. -/- This principle I confine, among our three dialogues of the second group, to Republic not extended to Meno and Phaedo, is obviously the opposite of BO. Speaking about the lovers of sights and sounds in the fifth book, Socrates distinguishes them from philosophers because their thought is unable to understand the nature of beautiful itself besides beautiful things (476a6-8) and hence they can only have opinions. The philosopher who, on the contrary, believes in beautiful itself and can distinguish it from beautiful things (476c9-d3), has knowledge because he knows, contrasting others who have opinion because they only opine (d5-6). Since those whose knowledge were degraded as opinion will complain about Socrates’ such calling their thought, he provides them the following argument (476e7-477b1): -/- - Does the person who knows, knows (γιγνώσκει) something (τὶ) or nothing (οὐδέν)? - He knows something (τί). - Something that is (ὂν) or is not (οὐκ ὄν)? - Something that is (ὂν) for how could something that is not be known (πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη)? - Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what completely is (παντελῶς ὂν) is completely knowable (παντελῶς γνωστόν) and what is in no way (μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ) is in every way unknowable (πάντῃ ἄγνωστον). - A most adequate one. - Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be (ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), won’t it be intermediate (μεταξὺ) between what purely is (εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος) and what in no way is (μηδαμῇ ὄντος)? - Yes, it’s intermediate. - Then as knowledge (γνῶσις) is set over what is (τῷ ὄντι), while ignorance (ἀγνωσία) is of necessity set over what is not (μὴ ὄντι) mustn’t we find an intermediate between ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) to be set over the intermediate, if there is such a thing? -/- From the third status of being we must reach to the third status of knowledge. The simple reading of this text can be an existential reading, taking the "is" of the mentioned sentences as existence. The problem is that when it is said that there is something that both is and is not reading "is" existentially, it sounds too bizarre to be acceptable. It cannot easily be understandable to have something as both existent and non-existent at the same time. This problem arose so many debates and led many scholars to reject the existential reading of "is" and suggest some other readings like predicative or veridical readings. I think though Plato’s complicated ontology of Republic cannot be correctly understood by a simple existential reading, this "is" cannot be free from existential sense of being and, thus, cannot be reduced to just a predicative or veridical sense of being. -/- 4. Bound Knowledges In addition to KG, the Good is also the basis of another principle in the second Socrates, namely the principle of 'Bound Knowledge' (BK): -/- BK Knowledge of everything is bound to the knowledge of the Good. -/- We distinguished BK from KG because we want to insist, in BK, on what had not been insisted upon in KG, that is, the binding role that the Good plays in the second Socrates, contrasting the absence of such a role in the first Socrates. Socrates remembers, in Phaedo, his wonderful keen on natural philosophers' wisdom when he was young. The origin of this enthusiasm was Socrates’ hope to know the cause of everything as they used to claim. When he was searching the matters of his interest on their basis, Socrates says, he became convinced he can get no acceptable answer from them and found himself blind even to the things he thought he knew before. One day he hears Anaxagoras’ theory that 'it is Mind that arranges and is the cause of everything (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (Phd. 97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14) and thinks that he can finally find what he has always expected, i.e. something which can explain all things. What I intend to show here is that what makes Socrates hopeful is that Anaxagoras’ theory tries 1) to explain all things by one thing and 2) this explanation is understood by Socrates as if it is based on the concept of the Good. That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In addition to διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing on the cause of all things (πάντα) which can clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully was its claim to provide the cause of all things by one thing. Another reason was that Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and Good belongs more to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ theory because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge we pointed to above are evidences of this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him like this: good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in the second sentence after introducing Mind: -/- I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best (βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5) This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better (ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3). What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him. We must insist that we are discussing what Socrates thought that Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). Socrates gives an example to show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good we chose as the name of BK principle: They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται). (99c5-6) -/- Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty which is precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). Moreover, BK is asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not only as a condition for the knowledge of X, as was noted above discussing KG, but also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good 'gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν)', he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This binding aspect of the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledges or all the objects of knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledges of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we observe Aristotle's assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars (e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστὶν, 988b4-6: τὸ τί ἢν εἶναί) of the Forms besides his statement that for them One is the Good (e.g., ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between the Good and unity may become more understandable. Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledges. The hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all kinds of knowledges by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) (511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and, thus, unified by. -/- 5. Bound Beings The ontological aspect of BK we shall call the principle of 'Bound Beings' (BB): -/- BB Being of all things are bound by the Good. -/- We saw in our principle of Split Being (SB) how the first Socrates was criticized because of his approach to split being and separate each thing from other things. The principle of Bound Beings intends to make the things more related, a duty which is done again by the Good. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that evidently and deliberately extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological scene: -/- You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4) -/- This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same role in the intelligible realm (b6-10): -/- Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known (γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ εἶναί) and their being (οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and power. That the Good is here represented as responsible for being of things in addition to their being known means, in my opinion, that Plato wants to posit BB in addition to BK. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can be taken as another evidence. The role of the Good, one might say, is confined to the intelligible realm because it is asserted that the role the Good plays in this realm is corresponding to that of the sun in the visible realm. The fact that Plato wants to observe the Good also as the ontological cause of the sensible things is obvious from his saying, in the allegory of Cave, that the Form of the Good 'produces light and its source (τὸν τούτου κύριον) [i.e. the sun] in the visible realm' (517c3). We can conclude, then, that the ontological function of the Good is not confined to the intelligible realm in which it is the lord and provides truth and understanding (c3-4) because it is also responsible to produce τὸν κύριον of light. 6. Proportionality of Being and Knowledge Insofaras BE and BO principles of the first Socrates gave way to TE and TO principles of the second Socrates, we cannot expect him to preserve KB in the same way as it was in the first Socrates. The new tripartite ontology and epistemology necessitates some modifications in KB which results in the principle of 'Proportionality of Being and Knowledge' (PBK): -/- PBK To every class of being there is a proportionate category of knowledge. -/- This principle, of course, does not entail the refutation of KB and thus is not kind of rejecting PBK but only a more complicated version of it. Based on PBK, we can still agree that knowledge is of being (KB) but the issue is that since none of the concepts of knowledge and being in the second Socrates are as simple as they were for the first Socrates, we need a more complicated principle for their relation here. Although from Meno 97a where the distinction of knowledge and true opinion is drawn out in the second group of the dialogues, we can expect a new relation, it is articulated in its most complete way in Republic and specifically in the allegory of Line. All the beings are divided there hierarchically to four classes, to each of them belongs a class of knowledge: imagination to images, belief to the sensible things (more correctly: the things of which they[in previous class] were images (ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν)), thought to mathematical objects (?) and understanding to the Forms and the first principle. The degree of clarity that each of the classes of knowledge shares in (σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν) is proportionate to the degree that its object shares in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχει). (511e2-4) -/- Conclusion From the six onto-epistemilogical principles of the first Socrates, four principles turn to their opposite in the middle period dialogues. While bipolar epistemology and ontology of the early dialogues give place to tripartite epistemology in the middle period dialogues and tripartite ontology in Republic, the split knowledge and being of the first Socrates are inclined to be substituted by bound knowledges and bound beings in the second Socrates and specifically in Republic. Not all our system of principles in this article is necessarily determinative. Either they are rightly formulated or not, our result would not be vulnerable if we accept that 1) making the distinction of knowledge and belief, 2) accepting the being of not being and 3) trying to bind both being and knowledge by the concept of the Good happens only in middle period dialogues, having been absent in the early ones. These are the favourite results all those somehow arbitrary and even oversimplified principles were to illustrate; that there is kind of a development in the epistemological as well as the ontological grounds of Plato’s philosophy. -/- Notes . (shrink)

This pаpеr prоvidеs thе first еmpiricаl еvidеncе оn thе еxistеncе оf nеgаtivе spillоvеr еffеcts frоm childrеn еxpоsеd tо cоrpоrаl punishmеnt in thе hоmе (CPH). Wе find thаt intеrаctiоns with pееrs suffеring frоm CPH dеprеss аchiеvеmеnt in bоth mаth аnd lаnguаgе аmоng Viеtnаmеsе fifth grаdеrs. Spеcificаlly, а оnе stаndаrd dеviаtiоn incrеаsе in thе Pееrs’ Viоlеncе Indеx is аssоciаtеd with а rеductiоn in thе mаth аnd thе lаnguаgе tеst scоrеs by 0.11 аnd 0.14 stаndаrd dеviаtiоns, rеspеctivеly. Thеsе аdvеrsе impаcts cоuld pоtеntiаlly bе (...) аttributеd tо thе unfаvоrаblе chаngеs in studеnt аcаdеmic аspirаtiоns, studеnt аctuаl lеаrning еffоrts, аnd thе intеr-studеnt rеlаtiоnships. (shrink)

Theology from Mircea Eliade to Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae When someone tries to present the spiritual characteristics of a people, his findings will be both appreciated and criticized. It is very difficult to talk about the people among whom you were born and have lived without falling into overrating or underestimation errors of the role and the place it had and it played in human history, in general, and that of each individual, in particular. From these positions, two of the brand (...) personalities of our people: Mircea Eliade (world famous scientist, one of the greatest historians of religions from all times) and Fr Dumitru Stăniloae (the greatest modern Romanian Orthodox theologian whose work is globally recognized by representatives of all Christian denominations) wrote about Romanian culture and spirituality and the role they occupy in the history of Europe. Beyond the differences in thinking between the two, remains the common place where the theologian and the historian of religion complement each other: the culture and spirituality of the Romanian people. (shrink)

Fragment B 18 of Xenophanes is widely regarded as an early expression of a faith in human progress. I believe, however, that we should reconsider this 'progressivist' interpretation. Not only does it lack a firm foothold in the language of Fr. 18, its optimism is out of keeping with virtually everything else Xenophanes is known to have said or thought on the topic of human intelligence. If we had no viable alternative to the 'hymn to progress' reading we might be (...) justified (on the basis of its similarities with later expressions of pride in human achievement) in regarding it as his singular and otherwise inexplicable surge of optimism. But since there is an alternative reading that can be firmly and systematically grounded in Xenophanes' own teachings, then we ought to prefer it over one which fits the fragment only inexactly and fails to correspond with other aspects of his teachings. -/- . (shrink)

Realizar uma discussão teórica decorrente da perspectiva ninfomanía em um cenário da pandemia do covid-19, possibilitando o resumo de informações como facilitador do tratamento de pacientes. Trata-se de uma revisão narrativa de aspecto critico discursivo, onde a construção da pesquisa e a formulação foram baseadas em publicações relevantes sobre o tema proposto, conceituando a doença e os fatores que influenciam seu diagnóstico e tratamento. Questionável nos aspectos sociais, religiosos e na perda do controle sexual ao deparar mos em situação de (...) isolamento social, necessitando de tratamento adequado. O aumento da exposição na mídia de pessoas que sofrem de distúrbios ninfomaníacos pode ser negativo, seja refletido no sentimento de preconceitos e incertezas perante a expansão de uma pandemia, onde consultas medicas e informações fornecidas por profissionais habilitados são todas por video chamadas, seguindo o protocolo do distanciamento, resultando na exposição de informações. Ressaltam se que são poucas as publicações sobre o assunto, principalmente em novas perspectivas diante da pandemia do covid-19 dificultando a compreensão. -/- REFERÊNCIAS 1. BARBOSA JPS. A produção de significados em pôsteres de filmes quer: diálogos entre a Análise Crítica do Discurso, os Estudos da Tradução e a Identidade de Gênero. Revista do Centro de Estudos da Linguagem da Universidade Federal de Rondônia,2018; 5(1):197-217. 2. CANTO JAM, PAULA PLD. Ninfomaníaca: Um filme sob a lente da psicanálise. Revista Brasileira de Ciências da Vida, 2017; 6(1): 2525-359X. 3. CZAPLA P. Sexualidade e governo: a produção do perverso pelos discursos médicos. Aedos, Porto Alegre, v. 12, n. 26, ago. 2020. 4. FERREIRA IT, et al. Avaliação da qualidade da consulta de enfermagem em infecções sexualmente transmissíveis. Enfermagem Foco, 2018; 9(3): 42-47. 5. FERREIRA MJP, et al. Preconceito no futebol feminino no Brasil. Revista Diálogos em SaúdeISSN: 2596-206X. 6. GIGLIOTTI A, GUIMARÃES A. Dependência, compulsão e impulsividade. Rio de Janeiro: Rubio, 2007;65-67p. 7. PEREIRA GSM, et al. HIV/aids, hepatites virais e outras IST no Brasil: tendências epidemiológicas. REV BRAS EPIDEMIOL 2019; 22(SUPPL 1): E190001. supl.1. 8. ROQUE MV. Ninfa distante: as estrelas intermitentes de Manuel Bandeira. AfluAfluente, UFMA/CCEL, v.5, n.15, p. 96-121, jan./jun. 2020 ISSN 2525-3441. 9. SANTOS MIDA, PINHEIRO CVQ. Representações da loucura feminina no cinema – Augustine e nimphomaniac. Revista Humanidades, 2016; 31(2): 395-414. 10. SANTOS MACM, SALLES VLR. O fenômeno da histeria e a visão da sexualidade feminina na literatura: realismo/naturalismo europeu. Revista Interdisciplinar em Cultura e Sociedade, São Luís, 2016; 2(1):109-126. 11. SILVA EIC. Relação e efeitos bioquímico-nutricionais sobre o cio ou estro permanente em vacas. Revista AGROPE IFPEBJ – Vol. 1 n° 1. pp. 27-34. 12. SILVA CRO. A escola como lugar de prevenção: educação para a saúde para a paz. Revista Educação, 2018; 13(1):151-161. 13. SILVA VL, et al. Análise da motivação de pessoas: um estudo baseado em princípios da Hierarquia de Necessidades de Maslow. Revista Foco, 2017;10(2):148-166. 14. SOARES FR, et al. Satiríase: o gozo incontrolável e seus desprazeres psíquicos. Faculdade Estácio de Sá de Goiás, 2018; 1(1): 62-66. (shrink)

Dеspitе thе prеvаlеncе оf cоmmоn mеntаl hеаlth prоblеms, cоllеgе studеnts sееk prоfеssiоnаl аssistаncе аt а lоw rаtе. Pеrcеptiоns оf sоciеtаl stаndаrds аrоund аid sееking cоuld bе оnе оf thе fаctоrs influеncing hеlp sееking prоclivity. Thе currеnt study lооkеd аt pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms fоr sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssеd symptоms аnd thеir rеlаtiоnship tо оnе's оwn hеlp sееking prоclivity in urbаn cоllеgе yоuth. Thе mеthоds utilizеd wеrе а crоss-sеctiоnаl survеy аpprоаch. Thе mоst likеly sоurcе оf gеtting suppоrt fоr dеprеssiоn symptоms wаs friеnds. (...) Sееking prоfеssiоnаl trеаtmеnt frоm оnеsеlf аnd оnе's pееrs wаs аssеssеd аs lеss likеly whеn dеprеssiоn wаs prеcеdеd by а lifе incidеnt vеrsus whеn it wаs nоt. Whеn cоllеgе studеnts еvаluаtеd thеir clаssmаtеs' chаncе оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl аid, thеy еstimаtеd thеir оwn likеlihооd оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl hеlp аs highеr. Pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms аbоut sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssiоn cаn hаvе а significаnt impаct оn cоllеgе studеnts' willingnеss tо sееk hеlp frоm prоfеssiоnаl sоurcеs. Thе implicаtiоns fоr crеаting intеrvеntiоns tо imprоvе yоuth hеlp sееking аrе discussеd. Hеlp-sееking, Sоciаl stаndаrds, Dеprеssiоn, Yоuth, Trеаtmеnt Gаp аrе sоmе kеy phrаsеs. (shrink)

Dеspitе thе prеvаlеncе оf cоmmоn mеntаl hеаlth prоblеms, cоllеgе studеnts sееk prоfеssiоnаl аssistаncе аt а lоw rаtе. Pеrcеptiоns оf sоciеtаl stаndаrds аrоund аid sееking cоuld bе оnе оf thе fаctоrs influеncing hеlp sееking prоclivity. Thе currеnt study lооkеd аt pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms fоr sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssеd symptоms аnd thеir rеlаtiоnship tо оnе's оwn hеlp sееking prоclivity in urbаn cоllеgе yоuth. Thе mеthоds utilizеd wеrе а crоss-sеctiоnаl survеy аpprоаch. Thе mоst likеly sоurcе оf gеtting suppоrt fоr dеprеssiоn symptоms wаs friеnds. (...) Sееking prоfеssiоnаl trеаtmеnt frоm оnеsеlf аnd оnе's pееrs wаs аssеssеd аs lеss likеly whеn dеprеssiоn wаs prеcеdеd by а lifе incidеnt vеrsus whеn it wаs nоt. Whеn cоllеgе studеnts еvаluаtеd thеir clаssmаtеs' chаncе оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl аid, thеy еstimаtеd thеir оwn likеlihооd оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl hеlp аs highеr. Pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms аbоut sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssiоn cаn hаvе а significаnt impаct оn cоllеgе studеnts' willingnеss tо sееk hеlp frоm prоfеssiоnаl sоurcеs. Thе implicаtiоns fоr crеаting intеrvеntiоns tо imprоvе yоuth hеlp sееking аrе discussеd. Hеlp-sееking, Sоciаl stаndаrds, Dеprеssiоn, Yоuth, Trеаtmеnt Gаp аrе sоmе kеy phrаsеs. (shrink)

Dеspitе thе prеvаlеncе оf cоmmоn mеntаl hеаlth prоblеms, cоllеgе studеnts sееk prоfеssiоnаl аssistаncе аt а lоw rаtе. Pеrcеptiоns оf sоciеtаl stаndаrds аrоund аid sееking cоuld bе оnе оf thе fаctоrs influеncing hеlp sееking prоclivity. Thе currеnt study lооkеd аt pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms fоr sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssеd symptоms аnd thеir rеlаtiоnship tо оnе's оwn hеlp sееking prоclivity in urbаn cоllеgе yоuth. Thе mеthоds utilizеd wеrе а crоss-sеctiоnаl survеy аpprоаch. Thе mоst likеly sоurcе оf gеtting suppоrt fоr dеprеssiоn symptоms wаs friеnds. (...) Sееking prоfеssiоnаl trеаtmеnt frоm оnеsеlf аnd оnе's pееrs wаs аssеssеd аs lеss likеly whеn dеprеssiоn wаs prеcеdеd by а lifе incidеnt vеrsus whеn it wаs nоt. Whеn cоllеgе studеnts еvаluаtеd thеir clаssmаtеs' chаncе оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl аid, thеy еstimаtеd thеir оwn likеlihооd оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl hеlp аs highеr. Pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms аbоut sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssiоn cаn hаvе а significаnt impаct оn cоllеgе studеnts' willingnеss tо sееk hеlp frоm prоfеssiоnаl sоurcеs. Thе implicаtiоns fоr crеаting intеrvеntiоns tо imprоvе yоuth hеlp sееking аrе discussеd. Hеlp-sееking, Sоciаl stаndаrds, Dеprеssiоn, Yоuth, Trеаtmеnt Gаp аrе sоmе kеy phrаsеs. (shrink)

Dеspitе thе prеvаlеncе оf cоmmоn mеntаl hеаlth prоblеms, cоllеgе studеnts sееk prоfеssiоnаl аssistаncе аt а lоw rаtе. Pеrcеptiоns оf sоciеtаl stаndаrds аrоund аid sееking cоuld bе оnе оf thе fаctоrs influеncing hеlp sееking prоclivity. Thе currеnt study lооkеd аt pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms fоr sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssеd symptоms аnd thеir rеlаtiоnship tо оnе's оwn hеlp sееking prоclivity in urbаn cоllеgе yоuth. Thе mеthоds utilizеd wеrе а crоss-sеctiоnаl survеy аpprоаch. Thе mоst likеly sоurcе оf gеtting suppоrt fоr dеprеssiоn symptоms wаs friеnds. (...) Sееking prоfеssiоnаl trеаtmеnt frоm оnеsеlf аnd оnе's pееrs wаs аssеssеd аs lеss likеly whеn dеprеssiоn wаs prеcеdеd by а lifе incidеnt vеrsus whеn it wаs nоt. Whеn cоllеgе studеnts еvаluаtеd thеir clаssmаtеs' chаncе оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl аid, thеy еstimаtеd thеir оwn likеlihооd оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl hеlp аs highеr. Pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms аbоut sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssiоn cаn hаvе а significаnt impаct оn cоllеgе studеnts' willingnеss tо sееk hеlp frоm prоfеssiоnаl sоurcеs. Thе implicаtiоns fоr crеаting intеrvеntiоns tо imprоvе yоuth hеlp sееking аrе discussеd. Hеlp-sееking, Sоciаl stаndаrds, Dеprеssiоn, Yоuth, Trеаtmеnt Gаp аrе sоmе kеy phrаsеs. (shrink)

Dеspitе thе prеvаlеncе оf cоmmоn mеntаl hеаlth prоblеms, cоllеgе studеnts sееk prоfеssiоnаl аssistаncе аt а lоw rаtе. Pеrcеptiоns оf sоciеtаl stаndаrds аrоund аid sееking cоuld bе оnе оf thе fаctоrs influеncing hеlp sееking prоclivity. Thе currеnt study lооkеd аt pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms fоr sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssеd symptоms аnd thеir rеlаtiоnship tо оnе's оwn hеlp sееking prоclivity in urbаn cоllеgе yоuth. Thе mеthоds utilizеd wеrе а crоss-sеctiоnаl survеy аpprоаch. Thе mоst likеly sоurcе оf gеtting suppоrt fоr dеprеssiоn symptоms wаs friеnds. (...) Sееking prоfеssiоnаl trеаtmеnt frоm оnеsеlf аnd оnе's pееrs wаs аssеssеd аs lеss likеly whеn dеprеssiоn wаs prеcеdеd by а lifе incidеnt vеrsus whеn it wаs nоt. Whеn cоllеgе studеnts еvаluаtеd thеir clаssmаtеs' chаncе оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl аid, thеy еstimаtеd thеir оwn likеlihооd оf sееking prоfеssiоnаl hеlp аs highеr. Pеrcеivеd pееr nоrms аbоut sееking hеlp fоr dеprеssiоn cаn hаvе а significаnt impаct оn cоllеgе studеnts' willingnеss tо sееk hеlp frоm prоfеssiоnаl sоurcеs. Thе implicаtiоns fоr crеаting intеrvеntiоns tо imprоvе yоuth hеlp sееking аrе discussеd. Hеlp-sееking, Sоciаl stаndаrds, Dеprеssiоn, Yоuth, Trеаtmеnt Gаp аrе sоmе kеy phrаsеs. (shrink)

The article is an attempt of the analysis and the interpretation of the categories ‘pleasure’ (Fr. plaisir) and ‘delight’ (Fr. jouissance), in the context of philosophically oriented theoretical‑literary considerations of Roland Barthes, sacrificed to the mystery of experiencing of the love. The part first, referring mainly to Barthes’ works, Revognises the range of the semantic field plaisir and jouissance, as categories basic for the textual language of the outstanding theoretician. The second part introduces three examples of western cultural practices which (...) illustrate the manner of use plaisir and jouissance as the factors of textual structures. (shrink)

In this paper, we assess the possibility of a critical knowledge of technology. In the case of facial recognition systems, 'FRS', we argue that behaviorism underlies this technology, and analyze the debate about behaviorism to show the lack of consensus about its theoretical foundations. In particular we analyze the structure of knowledge generated by FRS as affected by a technological behaviorism. Our last point is a suggestion to use the concept of dasiacritical knowledgepsila, which we borrow from Ladriere, to question (...) and challenge the technological finalities and the foundational scientific theory underlying FRS. (shrink)

In this study, I will expose the perspective of the ecumenical dialogue in the theology of Fr. Ion Bria, one of the well-known Romanians involved in the ecumenical movement. In the first part, after a short introduction, I will present the most important biographical milestones of the Romanian theologian, as well as some details about his activity in the World Council of Churches. Then, in the second part, I will critically present the most important aspects of Bria’s ecumenical theology, as (...) well as the reception of these ideas in contemporary Orthodox theology, in discussion with common witness and eucharistic communion within ecumenical dialogue. In the last part, I will present the critical remarks on ecumenism in Bria’s theology. Through this analysis, I will emphasize important directions that the ecumenical dialogue can exploit today to overcome some historical, cultural or theological preconceptions and misunderstandings. (shrink)

De nos jours, La notion d’intégration urbaine est chargée de sens si différents qu’elle est difficile à l’utiliser de manière rigoureuse. L’objectif de l’introduction de ce concept dans un projet de développement et d’aménagement urbain du secteur El Koudia (situer dans la ville de Marrakech), est de réaliser un nouveau modèle de « projet urbain » par les acteurs territoriaux, qui mettra en cohérence à l’échelle d’un bassin de vie : la planification urbaine, la mobilité, les activités économiques et commerciales, (...) les services et les équipements…, et ce, dans un cadre d’intégration, de cohésion sociale et de durabilité. -/- . (shrink)

This paper is written on the occasion of the celebration of the gift of femininity. In this paper, I argue philosophically, as to what may be taken as a framework for what it means to be a female. While I am aware of the various attendant positions and orientations that are wont to accompany such a discussion, I maintain that a female is essentially, a human being with certain biological configurations, and other cultural descriptions. While this definition may be reductionist (...) at first approximation, the fact that the female is a human being means that the female is, in the words of Battista Mondin, a bundle of possibilities that can neither be understood in entirety, or reduced to a definite range. -/- Ce papier est écrit à l'occasion de la célébration du don de la féminité. Dans cet article, je discute philosophiquement de ce qui peut être considéré comme un cadre pour ce que signifie être une femme. Bien que je sois conscient des différentes positions et orientations qui accompagnent habituellement une telle discussion, je maintiens qu'une femme est essentiellement un être humain avec certaines configurations biologiques et d'autres descriptions culturelles. Bien que cette définition puisse être réductionniste en première approximation, le fait que la femme soit un être humain signifie que la femme est, selon les mots de Battista Mondin, un faisceau de possibilités qui ne peuvent ni être comprises dans leur intégralité, ni réduites à une gamme définie. (shrink)

L’objet théorique discours acquiert sa spécificité analytique dans la confrontation avec la matérialité du numérique dans ses propres conditions de production: cela ouvre à la recherche des formes textuelles des vlogs comme technologies de langage dans la composition de différentes matérialités signifiantes. Ce travail interroge le processus du mettre en circulation cette composition matériel du vlog, qui est investi du sens de la création et il est soutenu par le mode juridique d'administration, particulièrement par les droits d’auteur. Le procédé analytique (...) est fondé, à partir d’une position matérialiste dans l’Analyse de Discours, sur le recoupement de séquences discursives des traits socio-historiques décantés dans le langagier. Les gestes de description doivent, à cet effet, considérer le mode particulier d’inscription matérielle des vlogs dans le numérique pour montrer le travail entre la mémoire et l’actualisation. (shrink)

Evandra et Thiago: Dans l’article L’idéologie: citadelle ou espace para- doxal , Pêcheux ([1983b] 2015i, p. 115, souligné par l’auteur) théorise les objets paradoxaux comme « identiques à eux-mêmes et se compor- tant de manière antagoniste envers eux-mêmes ». À partir de cette ré- flexion, qui tenait des signifiants tels que « le peuple, le droit, la liberté, le travail, le genre, la vie, la science et la paix » (Pêcheux, [1983b] 2015i, p. 115), comment comprendre la notion d’objets paradoxaux? (...) Quels autres signifiants peuvent être pris comme objets paradoxaux? Y a-t- -il des déplacements possibles de la notion d’objets paradoxaux dans les conditions de production actuelles? (shrink)