In a recent paper I proposed a novel relativity theory termed Information Relativity (IR). Unlike Einstein's relativity which dictates as force majeure that relativity is a true state of nature, Information Relativity assumes that relativity results from difference in information about nature between observers who are in motion relative to each other. The theory is based on two axioms: 1. the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames of reference (Special relativity's first axiom); 2. All translations of (...) information from one frame of reference to another are carried by light or by another carrier with equal velocity (information-carrier axiom). For the case of constant relative velocities, I showed in the aforementioned paper that IR accounts successfully for the results of a class of relativistic time results, including the Michelson-Morley's "null" result, the Sagnac effect, and the neutrino velocities reported by OPERA and other collaborations. Here I apply the theory, with no alteration, to cosmology. I show that the theory is successful in accounting for several cosmological findings, including the pattern of recession velocity predicted by inflationary theories, the GZK energy suppression phenomenon at redshift z ̴ 1.6, and the amounts of matter and dark energy reported in recent ΛCDM cosmologies. (shrink)

At first glance, hate speech and microaggressions seem to have little overlap beyond being communicated verbally or in written form. Hate speech seems clearly macro-aggressive: an intentional, obviously harmful act lacking the ambiguity (and plausible deniability) of microaggressions. If we look back at historical discussions of hate speech, however, many of these assumed differences turn out to be points of similarity. The harmfulness of hate speech only became widely acknowledged after a concerted effort by critical race theorists, feminists, and other (...) activists. Before the 1990s, slurs were widely considered socially acceptable behavior: mere jokes that weren’t intended to be harmful. Authors like Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda, and Charles Lawrence pushed back against this dismissal. In this chapter, I show that their arguments for the serious harmfulness of hate speech prefigure and provide support for current debates about the serious harmfulness of microaggressions. Exploring resonances with the 1980s hate speech debate will allow us to explain why microaggressions fall below the cutoff for legal liability but remain apt targets for moral blame. (shrink)

Epistemicists claim that vague predicates have precise but unknow- able cutoffs. I argue against against the standard, Williamsonian, answer, that appeals to metalinguistic safety: we can know that p even if our true belief that p is metalinguistically lucky. I then propose that epistemicists should be diagonalized epistemicists and show how this alternative formulation of the view avoids the chal- lenge. However, in an M. Night Shyamalan-style twist, I then argue we should not be diagonalized epistemicists either.

In his article “If Loud Aliens Explain Human Earliness, Quiet Aliens are also Rare”, Robin Hanson proposes the Grabby Alien Hypothesis, which proposes that extraterrestrial civilizations (ETIs) exist outside of our observable universe and are gradually expanding to fill the universe. The existence of such grabby aliens in our future expanding to fill all available niches puts a cosmic deadline on independently originating sources of life. This cosmic cutoff offers an explanation for why human observers seem to be relatively (...) early in spacetime, why the red dwarf stars seem to be inadequate for independently originating life, and why the Fermi Paradox remains unsolved. However, we should worry about Hanson’s proposal, since the Grabby Alien Hypothesis has its own paradoxical implication, namely that most observers in most reference classes should be grabby aliens themselves (Bostrom, 2002). Thus, oddly, finding ourselves not to be grabby alien observers, it seems Hanson is beholden to explain why we are not. Some possibilities for grabby alien observer alternatives can be offered, though none are particularly explanatorily appealing. In what follows, we will 1) attempt to restate in simple terms Hanson’s assumptions, and then 2) reassemble Hanson’s arguments, showing they lead to a paradox, and 3) consider which assumptions should be rejected and at what cost. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to show that there are many phenomena that pertain to the construction of truth-conditional compounds that follow characteristic patterns, and whose explanation requires appealing to knowledge structures organized in specific ways. We review a number of phenomena, ranging from non-homogenous modification and privative modification to polysemy and co-predication that indicate that knowledge structures do play a role in obtaining truth-conditions. After that, we show that several extant accounts that invoke rich lexical meanings to (...) explain such phenomena face problems related to inflexibility and lack of predictive power. We review different ways in which one might react to such problems as regards lexical meanings: go richer, go moderately richer, go thinner, and go moderately thinner. On the face of it, it looks like moderate positions are unstable, given the apparent lack of a clear cutoff point between the semantic and the conceptual, but also that a very thin view and a very rich view may turn out to be indistinguishable in the long run. As far as we can see, the most pressing open questions concern this last issue: can there be a principled semantic/world knowledge distinction? Where could it be drawn: at some upper level (e.g. enriched qualia structures) or at some basic level (e.g. constraints)? How do parsimony considerations affect these two different approaches? A thin meanings approach postulates intermediate representations whose role is not clear in the interpretive process, while a rich meanings approach to lexical meaning seems to duplicate representations: the same representations that are stored in the lexicon would form part of conceptual representations. Both types of parsimony problems would be solved by assuming a direct relation between word forms and (parts of) conceptual or world knowledge, leading to a view that has been attributed to Chomsky (e.g. by Katz 1980) in which there is just syntax and encyclopedic knowledge. (shrink)

A person with one dollar is poor. If a person with n dollars is poor, then so is a person with n + 1 dollars. Therefore, a person with a billion dollars is poor. True premises, valid reasoning, a false a conclusion. This is an instance of the Sorites-paradox. (There are infinitely many such paradoxes. A man with an IQ of 1 is unintelligent. If a man with an IQ of n is unintelligent, so is a man with an IQ (...) of n+1. Therefore a man with an IQ of 200 is unintelligent.) Most attempts to solve this paradox reject some law of classical logic, usually the law of bivalence. I show that this paradox can be solved while holding on to all the laws of classical logic. Given any predicate that generates a Sorites-paradox, significant use of that predicate is actually elliptical for a relational statement: a significant token of "Bob is poor" means that Bob is poor compared to x, for some value of x. Once a value of x is supplied, a definite cutoff line between having and not having the paradox-generating predicate is supplied. This neutralizes the inductive step in the associated Sorites argument, and the would-be paradox is avoided. (shrink)

The difference principle, introduced by Rawls (1971, 1993), is generally interpreted as leximin, but this is not how he intended it. Rawls explicitly states that the difference principle requires that aggregate benefits (e.g., average or total) to those in the least advantaged group be given lexical priority over benefits to others, where the least advantaged group includes more than the strictly worst off individuals. We study the implications of adopting different approaches to the definition of the least advantaged group and (...) show that, if acyclicity is required, several seemingly plausible approaches lead to something close to leximin. We then show that significant aggregation is possible, if the least advantaged group is defined as those with those with less benefits than some strictly positive transform of the lowest level of benefits. Finally, we discuss the implications of requiring that, in comparing two alternatives, the cutoff for the least advantaged group of one alternative be the same as that for the other alternative. (shrink)

The cosmological constant problem arises because the magnitude of vacuum energy density predicted by the Quantum Field Theory is about 120 orders of magnitude larger then the value implied by cosmological observations of accelerating cosmic expansion. We pointed out that the fractal nature of the quantum space-time with negative Hausdorff-Colombeau dimensions can resolve this tension. The canonical Quantum Field Theory is widely believed to break down at some fundamental high-energy cutoff ∗ Λ and therefore the quantum fluctuations in the (...) vacuum can be treated classically seriously only up to this high-energy cutoff. In this paper we argue that the Quantum Field Theory in fractal space-time with negative Hausdorff-Colombeau dimensions gives high-energy cutoff on natural way. We argue that there exists hidden physical mechanism which cancels divergences in canonical QED4 ,QCD4 , Higher-Derivative-Quantum gravity, etc. In fact we argue that corresponding supermassive Pauli-Villars ghost fields really exist. It means that there exists the ghost-driven acceleration of the universe hidden in cosmological constant. In order to obtain the desired physical result we apply the canonical Pauli-Villars regularization up to ∗ Λ . This would fit in the observed value of the dark energy needed to explain the accelerated expansion of the universe if we choose highly symmetric masses distribution between standard matter and ghost matter below the scale ∗ Λ , i.e. , ( ) ( ) . . eff eff s m g m , , , f μ f μ μ mc μ μ μ c ∗  − = ≤ < Λ The small value of the cosmological constant is explained by tiny violation of the symmetry between standard matter and ghost matter. Dark matter nature is also explained using a common origin of the dark energy and dark matter phenomena. (shrink)