Simple claims with the verb ‘seem’, as well as the specific sensory verbs, ‘look’, ‘sound’, etc., require the speaker to have some relevant kind of perceptual acquaintance (Pearson, 2013; Ninan, 2014). But different forms of these reports differ in their perceptual requirements. For example, the copy raising (CR) report, ‘Tom seems like he’s cooking’ requires the speaker to have seen Tom, while its expletive subject (ES) variant, ‘It seems like Tom is cooking’, does not (Rogers, 1972; Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012). (...) This contrast has led some theorists to hold that the matrix subject in CR constructions is uniformly interpreted as the perceptual source (p-source) (Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012; Rett and Hyams, 2014). Others, based on examples of CR reports that seem not to require perception of the referent of the matrix subject, have taken the p-source interpretation instead to be non-uniform across CR reports (Landau, 2011; Doran, 2015). We reconsider these theoretical approaches to copy raising in light of new experimental work probing the sensitivity of these requirements to the matrix verb, the embedded ‘like’-clause, and the context. While we find some motivation for a non-uniform p-source analysis, it comes from importantly different cases than those others have relied on. Furthermore, our findings cast doubt on the prevalent assumption that the perceptual requirements of CR reports are to be captured solely by the presence or absence of the p-source interpretation. We suggest that the data motivating a non-uniform p-source view are better captured by an alternative approach, which makes use of a more minimal evidential source role, in place of the perceptual source role. We close by considering the relationship between English copy raising and evidential constructions cross-linguistically. (shrink)

The article outlines the Multiple-Field-Approach ("Mehr-Felder-Ansatz") in Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy and in psychotherapy in general. This Gestalt theory based approach deals 1) with the conditions under which a secondary phenomenal field (containing a secondary phenomenal ego and a secondary phenomenal environment) segregates within the primary phenomenal field, 2) with the dynamic field interaction between primary and secondary field and their role in psychotherapy, 3) with psychotherapeutic techniques favouring the segregation and favouring the dissolution of a secondary field . Some of (...) these phenomena have been discussed as mind-wandering, daydreaming, or - in a pathological context - as dissociation. But it seems that the Gestalt psychological approach presented in this paper has to offer a more promising framework for these phenomena and their dynamics. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the history of dzogchen within the heart essence tradition.

This paper focuses on the contributions of phenomenology to Dzogchen.

This paper focuses on Dzogchen and self liberation.

The paper presents basic Gestalt psychological concepts of ego and self. They differ from other concepts in the way that they do not comprehend ego and self as fixed entities or as central controlling instances of the psyche, but as one specific organized unit in a psychological field in dynamic interrelation with the other organized units—the environment units—of this field. On this theme, well-known representatives of Gestalt theory have presented some general and special theories since the early days of this (...) approach that could partly be substantiated experimentally. They illuminate the relationship between ego and world in everyday life as well as in the case of mental disorders. Not only the spatial extension of the phenomenal ego is subject to situational changes, but also its place in the world, its functional fitting in this world, its internal differentiation, its permeability to the environment, and much more. The German Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Metzger emphasizes the significant functional role that this dynamic plasticity of the phenomenal world and its continuously changing segregation of ego and environment have for human life by designating the phenomenal world as a “Central Steering Mechanism.” In this article, ego and self as part of this field in their interrelation with the total psychological field will be illuminated from the perspective of the thinking of the Gestalt psychologists Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, Kurt Lewin, Wolfgang Metzger, Mary Henle, Edwin Rausch, and Giuseppe Galli. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the essence of dzogchen as Presence.

This paper explores the nature of awakened awareness and awakened phenomena in the dzogchen tradition from a phenomenological viewpoint.

This paper focuses on Heidegger's presentation of becoming self liberated.

This paper focuses on Winnicott and Lacan and the lack within subjectivity in light of dzogchen.

This paper focuses on Prajna and the discernment of knowningness.

This paper focuses on the appearance of emptiness through time.

This paper describes the phenomenology of gazing within dzogchen practice.

This paper focuses on Merleau Ponty understanding that the body is the medium of the field of awareness.

This paper focuses on the hermeneutic of reading text and hearing text.

This paper focuses on empty mind, transitional space and the dissolving of the self object function.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of healing within the awareness field.

This paper describes the contemporary phenomenological understanding of subjectivity as non dual awareness.

This paper focuses on liberation as the experience of pervasive radiance.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of essence and appearance in Merleau Ponty.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of timeless awareness.

This paper focuses on the base of awareness as space and light.

This paper focuses in detail on the practice of meditation as becoming aware of awareness as a field vast and multidimensional.

This paper focuses on the views and formulations of eastern philosophy the negate humanism and personalism.

This paper focuses on awareness and movement in dzogchen.

This paper focuses on symbolization as purity and translucidity of phenomena.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of awareness as natural liberation.

This paper focuses on the realm of omnipotence from a Lacanian viewpoint.

This paper focuses on the path of appearance and awareness.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of desire and fixation.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of symbolic transmissions.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of the manifestation of awareness.

This paper focuses on mystical humanism as magical realism.

This paper relates Merleau Ponty's understanding of primordial subjectivity and the field of Being within beings.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of awareness and the second reduction.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of the experiential awareness field.

This paper beginning with a Lacanian view point describes fragmentation and the unfolding of awareness in the process of embodiment within the understanding of dzogchen.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of whoness.

This paper focuses on the phenomenology of idealism and realism in light of dzogchen.

This paper focuses on meditation as natural luminousity.

This paper describes the non dual relationship between the visible and the invisible.

This paper focuses on deathlessness awareness.

This paper focuses on the radiance of awareness.

This paper describes subjectivity as the manifestation of the primordial awareness field.

This paper focuses on the unfolding of awareness as embodiment of luminous spaceousness.

Conceptual engineering involves revising our concepts. It can be pursued as a specific philosophical methodology, but is also common in ordinary, non-philosophical, contexts. How does our capacity for conceptual engineering fit into human cognitive life more broadly? I hold that conceptual engineering is best understood alongside practices of conceptual exploration, examples of which include conceptual supposition (i.e., suppositional reasoning about alternative concepts), and conceptual comparison (i.e., comparisons between possible concept choices). Whereas in conceptual engineering we aim to change the concepts (...) we use, in conceptual exploration, we reason about conceptual possibilities. I approach conceptual exploration via the linguistic tools we use to communicate about concepts, using metalinguistic negotiation, convention-shifting conditionals, and metalinguistic comparatives as my key examples. I present a linguistic framework incorporating conventions that can account for this communication in a unified way. Furthermore, I argue that conceptual exploration helps undermine skepticism about conceptual engineering itself. (shrink)

Assertions about appearances license inferences about the speaker's perceptual experience. For instance, if I assert, 'Tom looks like he's cooking', you will infer both that I am visually acquainted with Tom (what I call the "individual acquaintance inference"), and that I am visually acquainted with evidence that Tom is cooking (what I call the "evidential acquaintance inference"). By contrast, if I assert, 'It looks like Tom is cooking', only the latter inference is licensed. I develop an account of the acquaintance (...) inferences of appearance assertions building on two main previous lines of research: first, the copy raising literature, which has aimed to account for individual acquaintance inferences through the "perceptual source" semantic role; second, the subjectivity literature, which has focused on the status of acquaintance inferences with predicates of personal taste, but hasn't given much attention to the added complexities introduced by appearance language. I begin by developing what I take to be the most empirically-sound version of a perceptual source analysis. I then show how its insights can be maintained, while however taking anything about perception out of the truth conditions of appearance sentences. This, together with the assumption that appearance assertions express experiential attitudes, allows us to capture the acquaintance inferences of bare appearance assertions without making incorrect predictions about the behavior of appearance verbs in embedded environments. (shrink)

In theoretical work about the language of personal taste, the canonical example is the simple predicate of personal taste, 'tasty'. We can also express the same positive gustatory evaluation with the complex expression, 'taste good'. But there is a challenge for an analysis of 'taste good': While it can be used equivalently with 'tasty', it need not be (for instance, imagine it used by someone who can identify good wines by taste but doesn't enjoy them). This kind of two-faced behavior (...) systematically arises with complex sensory-evaluative predicates, including those with other appearance verbs, such as 'look splendid' and 'sound nice'. I examine two strategies for capturing these different uses: one that posits an ambiguity in appearance verbs, and one that does not. The former is in line with an approach to 'look'-statements prominent in work in philosophy of perception, and I consider how the motivation given in that tradition carries over to the present context. I then show how the data used to support the verbal ambiguity approach can equally be captured on the second strategy, which appeals only to independently-motivated flexibility in adjective meaning. I close by discussing some considerations that are relevant for choosing between the two options. (shrink)