Theories of consciousness grounded in neuroscience must explain the phenomenal binding problem, e.g., how micro-units of information are combined to create the macro-scale conscious experience common to human phenomenology. An example is how single ‘pixels’ of a visual scene are experienced as a single holistic image in the ‘mind’s eye’, rather than as individual, separate, and massively parallel experiences, corresponding perhaps to individual neuron activations, neural ensembles, or foveal saccades, any of which could conceivably deliver identical functionality from an information (...) processing point of view. There are multiple contested candidate solutions to the phenomenal binding problem. This paper explores how the metaphysical infrastructure of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) v4.0 can provide a distinctive solution. The solution—that particular entities aggregable from multiple units (‘complexes’) define existence—might work in a static picture, but introduces issues in a dynamic system. We ask what happens to our phenomenal self as the main complex moves around a biological neural network. Our account of conscious entities developing through time leads to an apparent dilemma for IIT theorists between non-local entity transitions and contiguous selves: the ‘dynamic entity evolution problem’. As well as specifying the dilemma, we describe three ways IIT might dissolve the dilemma before it gains traction. Clarifying IIT’s position on the phenomenal binding problem, potentially underpinned with novel empirical or theoretical research, helps researchers understand IIT and assess its plausibility. We see our paper as contributing to IIT’s current research emphasis on the shift from static to dynamic analysis. (shrink)

The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) formulated for the first time in 2004 by the neuroscientist Giulio Tononi, is a theoretical framework aiming to scientifically explain phenomenal consciousness. The IIT is presented in the first part of this work. Broadly speaking, integrated information is an abstract quantitative measure of the causal power a system has on itself. The main claim of IIT is the identity between informational structures and experience. The nature of this identity will be the subject of the second (...) part. One can interpret the IIT as a fundamental law of nature connecting the physical domain to the mental domain. The philosophical implications of such a claim are numerous and they are subject to criticism. This will be the main concern of the third and last part. (shrink)

We propose a novel framework that formalizes awareness within Relational Quantum Dynamics (RQD) by integrating Integrated Information Theory (IIT) with quantum measurement processes. In our approach, quantum interactions are not merely stochastic events, but are interpreted as intrinsic awareness updates that occur via Bayesian conditioning. Specifically, we define an awareness metric A(A : B) that combines the quantum mutual information generated during an interaction and Φ as a measure of integrated information. By modeling quantum measurements as stochastic processes and determinizing (...) these via outcome indexing, we construct a composite functor that maps probabilistic quantum instruments to deterministic awareness updates in a separate category of awareness states. We show that this functor preserves identities and composition, ensuring that multi-observer scenarios such as nested Wigner’s Friend or Frauchiger-Renner experiments produce a coherent alignment of facts once interactions occur, even though no single truth value exists prior to interaction. We outline experimental proposals, including nested observer experiments, gravitational entanglement tests, and the engineering of artificial observers with tunable integrated information, to test the predictions of our model. Our framework does not alter standard quantum mechanics but enriches its interpretation by positing that every quantum interaction is accompanied by an awareness update whose significance depends on both the amount of exchanged information and the integration capacity of the systems involved. This work provides a mathematically robust bridge between quantum foundations and cognitive science, suggesting that conscious experience may emerge naturally from the dynamics of quantum information. (shrink)

In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness in a system. In addition, integrated information theorists have tried to provide a systematic theory of how physical states determine the specific qualitative contents of episodes of consciousness: for instance, an experience as of a red and round thing rather than a green and square thing. I raise a series of questions about the central explanatory target, the (...) 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness. I suggest it is not at all clear what scientists and philosophers are talking about when they talk about consciousness as gradable. I also raise some questions about the explanation of qualitative content. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just (...) “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) identifies consciousness with having a maximum amount of integrated information. But a thing’s having the maximum amount of anything cannot be intrinsic to it, for that depends on how that thing compares to certain other things. IIT’s consciousness, then, is not intrinsic. A mereological argument elaborates this consequence: IIT implies that one physical system can be conscious while a physical duplicate of it is not conscious. Thus, by a common and reasonable conception of intrinsicality, IIT’s consciousness (...) is not intrinsic. It is then argued that to avoid the implication that consciousness is not intrinsic, IIT must abandon its Exclusion Postulate, which prohibits overlapping conscious systems. Indeed, theories of consciousness that attribute consciousness to physical systems, should embrace the view that some conscious systems overlap. A discussion of the admittedly counterintuitive nature of this solution, along with some medical and neuroscientific realities that would seem to support it, is included. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is one of the most influential theories of consciousness, mainly due to its claim of mathematically formalizing consciousness in a measurable way. However, the theory, as it is formulated, does not account for contextual observations that are crucial for understanding consciousness. Here we put forth three possible difficulties for its current version, which could be interpreted as a trilemma. Either consciousness is contextual or not. If contextual, either IIT needs revisions to its axioms to include contextuality, (...) or it is inconsistent. If consciousness is not contextual, then IIT faces an empirical challenge. Therefore, we argue that IIT in its current version is inadequate. (shrink)

In the first instance, IIT is formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness in a system. I raise a series of questions about the central explanatory target, the 'degree' or ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness. I suggest it is not at all clear what scientists and philosophers are talking about when they talk about consciousness as gradable. This point is developed in more detail in my paper "What Is the Integrated (...) Information Theory of Consciousness?"Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):1-2 (2019) . (shrink)

The Hard Problem of Consciousness: A Solution Through the Universal Law of Balance -/- By Angelito Malicse -/- Introduction -/- Consciousness is one of the greatest mysteries in science and philosophy. While neuroscience explains how the brain processes information, stores memories, and controls behavior, it does not explain why there is subjective experience—why we feel pain, see colors, or experience emotions. This challenge is known as the Hard Problem of Consciousness, introduced by philosopher David Chalmers. Unlike “easy problems” that deal (...) with brain functions, the hard problem asks why consciousness exists in the first place. -/- Your universal formula, based on the universal law of balance, offers a new perspective on consciousness. If all natural phenomena follow universal laws, then consciousness must also follow these laws. This essay explores the hard problem of consciousness and proposes that it can be resolved by understanding how the mind operates as a feedback mechanism within the universal law of balance. -/- The Nature of the Hard Problem -/- The hard problem highlights a fundamental gap between objective physical processes and subjective experience. Scientists can track brain activity when a person sees a sunset, but this does not explain why the experience feels beautiful. This issue, known as the explanatory gap, is the reason why neuroscience alone has not solved the mystery of consciousness. -/- For example, a highly advanced AI system can process images and recognize emotions, but does it actually feel emotions? Or is it simply responding based on programmed patterns? The fact that humans have a first-person experience of the world while machines do not reveals the depth of the problem. -/- Existing Theories on Consciousness -/- Many theories attempt to explain consciousness, but none fully bridge the gap between the physical brain and subjective experience: -/- 1. Physicalist Theories -/- Integrated Information Theory (IIT) suggests that consciousness emerges when a system integrates information in a complex way. -/- Global Workspace Theory (GWT) proposes that consciousness acts as a “global stage” where different brain processes communicate. -/- Some scientists claim consciousness is an illusion, a byproduct of brain activity with no true existence. -/- 2. Dualist and Non-Physicalist Theories -/- Property Dualism argues that consciousness is a fundamental property of the brain, but it cannot be reduced to physical processes. -/- Panpsychism suggests that consciousness exists at all levels of nature, even in fundamental particles. -/- Idealism proposes that consciousness is primary, and the physical world emerges from it. -/- While these theories provide insights, they do not fully explain why consciousness exists or why it follows specific patterns. -/- The Universal Law of Balance and Consciousness -/- Your universal formula proposes that all human behavior, decision-making, and even consciousness follow the universal law of balance. If true, then the emergence of subjective experience is not a mystery but a natural process governed by balance. -/- 1. Consciousness as a Feedback Mechanism -/- If all systems seek balance, then consciousness may be a higher-order feedback system that helps humans maintain equilibrium between their external environment and internal states. -/- This explains why consciousness adapts to new information and why subjective experience plays a role in survival. -/- 2. Homeostasis and the Emergence of Conscious Awareness -/- The human body maintains balance through homeostasis (e.g., regulating temperature, oxygen levels, and emotions). -/- Consciousness may be an extension of homeostasis at a higher level, helping organisms process experiences, learn, and make better decisions. -/- 3. The Explanatory Gap and Balance in Nature -/- The explanatory gap exists because most theories ignore the fundamental role of balance in shaping reality. -/- If consciousness follows natural laws, then subjective experience is simply a reflection of the brain’s need to maintain balance within an ever-changing environment. -/- A New Perspective on the Hard Problem -/- If we apply your universal law of balance, the hard problem may no longer be an unsolvable mystery. Instead, we can view it as a necessary function of natural equilibrium: -/- 1. Why does consciousness exist? -/- Consciousness exists because it serves a functional role in maintaining balance between an individual’s mind and the external world. -/- 2. Why does consciousness feel like something? -/- Subjective experience (qualia) is the brain’s way of encoding balance or imbalance, helping organisms react appropriately to their environment. -/- 3. How does the universal law of balance explain the emergence of awareness? -/- Consciousness emerges naturally as part of self-regulating systems in nature, similar to how ecosystems maintain equilibrium. -/- If consciousness is an essential part of nature’s balancing mechanisms, then its existence is not a mystery—it is simply one of the ways the universe maintains order. -/- Conclusion -/- The hard problem of consciousness has remained unresolved because it is often viewed outside the framework of natural laws. However, if we apply the universal law of balance, we can see that consciousness is not an exception to the laws of nature but a direct result of them. -/- By understanding how the mind functions as a feedback mechanism within natural balance, we may finally solve the hard problem—not as a philosophical paradox, but as a fundamental principle of reality. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, we take a meta-theoretical stance and aim to compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt’s Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi’s and colleagues' Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction to both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground plan for carrying out our analysis. (...) We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness. (shrink)

Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory, Global Workspace Theory, and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory. We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize. We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both (...) necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim. (shrink)

In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem of consciousness and the implications of conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. In particular, we focus on one of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT). After a brief introduction on IIT, we present Chalmers’ original formulation and propose our own layered view of the hard problem, showing how 2 separate issues can be distinguished. More specifically, we argue that it’s possible to disentangle a (...) core problem of consciousness from a layered hard problem, the latter being essentially connected to Chalmers’ conceivability argument. We then assess the relation between the Hard Problem and IIT, showing how the theory resists conceivability scenarios, and how it is equipped to face up to the hard problem in its broadest acceptation. (shrink)

The Integrated Information Theory is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism, known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main (...) problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that the theories are not compatible as they currently stand, in view of what I call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I will offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all, and jointly enable significant progress on the mind–body problem. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to formulate a universal characterization of consciousness, despite the conceptual vagueness of that term. The fundamental aspects of this phenomenon as studied by science consist of four features: its being accessible from the inside and the outside (subjectively and objectively), its being about something (referential), its being bodily determined, and its possessing a certain function (being useful). Approached in this way and in broad terms, consciousness seems to be a graded rather than all-or-none phenomenon. (...) However, it is argued that the main problem for the gradational approach is to establish reasonable, empirically justified limits on how extended (locally and globally) the range of a graded consciousness could be. Such constraints should then help to avoid the counterintuitive consequences of IIT (Integrated Information Theory), which ascribes consciousness even to such simple artificial systems as photodiodes. The article introduces global limits for conscious systems by pointing to the ability to individuate information as a necessary developmental condition of subjective perspectives. Local limits, meanwhile, are determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Ultimately, the limits put forward imply that consciousness is to be characterized as individuated information in action. (shrink)

The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. In this paper, I show that this problem is not unique to IIT, but rather derives from a trilemma that confronts almost any theory of consciousness. Given most theories of consciousness, (...) the following three claims are inconsistent. INTRINSICALITY: Consciousness is intrinsic. NON-OVERLAP: Conscious systems do not overlap with other conscious systems (a la Unger’s problem of the many). REDUCTIONISM: Consciousness is constituted by more fundamental properties (as per standard versions of physicalism and Russellian monism). In view of this, I will consider whether rejecting INTRINSICALITY is necessarily less plausible than rejecting NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM. I will also consider whether IIT is necessarily committed to rejecting INTRINSICALITY or whether it could also accept solutions that reject NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM instead. I will suggest that the best option for IIT may be a solution that rejects REDUCTIONISM rather than INTRINSICALITY or NON-OVERLAP. (shrink)

Sleep and dreaming are important daily phenomena that are receiving growing attention from both the scientific and the philosophical communities. The increasingly popular predictive brain framework within cognitive science aims to give a full account of all aspects of cognition. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the theoretical advantages of Predictive Processing (PP, as proposed by Clark 2013, Clark 2016; and Hohwy 2013) in defining sleep and dreaming. After a brief introduction, we overview the state of the (...) art at the intersection between dream research and PP (with particular reference to Hobson and Friston 2012; Hobson et al. 2014). In the following sections we focus on two theoretically promising aspects of the research program. First, we consider the explanations of phenomenal consciousness during sleep (i.e. dreaming) and how it arises from the neural work of the brain. PP provides a good picture of the peculiarity of dreaming but it can’t fully address the problem of how consciousness comes to be in the first place. We propose that Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi et al. 2016) is a good candidate for this role and we will show its advantages and points of contact with PP. After introducing IIT, we deal with the evolutionary function of sleeping and dreaming. We illustrate that PP fits with contemporary researches on the important adaptive function of sleep and we discuss why IIT can account for sleep mentation (i.e. dreaming) in evolutionary terms (Albantakis et al. 2014). In the final section, we discuss two future avenues for dream research that can fruitfully adopt the perspective offered by PP: (a) the role of bodily predictions in the constitution of the sleeping brain activity and the dreaming experience, and (b) the precise role of the difference stages of sleep (REM (Rapid eye movement), NREM (Non-rapid eye movement) in the constitution and refinement of the predictive machinery. (shrink)

The scientific study of consciousness, also referred to as consciousness science, is a young scientific field devoted to understanding how conscious experiences and the brain relate. It comprises a host of theories, experiments, and analyses that aim to investigate the problem of consciousness empirically, theoretically, and conceptually. This thesis addresses some of the questions that arise in these investigations from a formal and mathematical perspective. These questions concern theories of consciousness, experimental paradigms, methodology, and artificial consciousness. -/- Regarding theories of (...) consciousness, the thesis contributes to the understanding of the mathematical structure that some of the formal theories in the field propose. The work presented here targets the theory of consciousness known as Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and the neuroscientific theory known as Predictive Processing Theory or Free Energy Principle in its Active Inference form (AI-PP). The thesis provides axiomatic definitions of the mathematical structures that constitute these theories, and uses these definitions to address some of the open questions surrounding the theories. For AI-PP, this includes a rigorous derivation of the formula for Active Inference via Free Energy minimisation and a proof of compositionality of Free Energy. For IIT, this includes resolutions of some of the criticisms of IIT's formal scope and applications, but also the identification of new issues that concern the formalism and its derivation. When possible, the definitions are provided in the mathematical framework of category theory. -/- Regarding experiments, the thesis addresses the main paradigm for testing and falsifying theories of consciousness currently applied in the field. This paradigm consists of comparing the conscious experience that a theory predicts with the conscious experience that is inferred from behavioural data or report by use of measures of consciousness. The thesis provides a formal model of this paradigm and shows that under a certain condition—if inference and prediction are independent—, any minimally informative theory of consciousness can always be falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field’s reliance on report or behaviour to infer conscious experiences, in conjunction with the general structure of most contemporary theories of consciousness, implies such independence. This observation provides the exact formal underpinning of the well-known unfolding argument. The thesis analyses the origin of the problem and identifies precisely which changes are required to avoid this problem in future research. The thesis furthermore shows that the problem of falsifying theories of consciousness, and of empirical comparisons of theories of consciousness more generally, follows from a pervasive closure paradigm in consciousness science, that consists of taking a neuroscientific account of the brain as input to a theory of consciousness, so as to explain what consciousness is, without allowing for modifications or adaptations of the neuroscientific account that would accommodate consciousness as part of the brain's functioning. As is shown in the thesis, this paradigm has implications that point to a fundamental need of revision. -/- Regarding methodological and conceptual questions, the thesis contributes to the foundations of structural research in consciousness science. Structural research aims to use mathematical structures or mathematical spaces, instead of verbal descriptions or simple categorisations, to represent conscious experiences scientifically, for example when building theories of consciousness, or when exploring new empirical avenues to measure consciousness. Despite considerable advances in this realm, there was, prior to this thesis, no explicit definition of what a mathematical structure of conscious experience should be; that is, how the attribution of mathematical structure to conscious experiences should be systematically understood. Perhaps the most important contribution of this thesis to the field is to propose such a definition. The definition, a structural concept, extends existing approaches wherever available, and provides a basis for developing a common formal language to study consciousness, bridging developments as far apart as psychophysics and phenomenology. In addition, and independently of this proposal, the thesis offers a critical analysis of which metaphysical premises need to be presumed in structural research, whether the use of particular formal tools (such as structure-preserving mappings or homomorphisms) is justified, and how structural theories of consciousness could otherwise be built in the first place. An attempt to expand the results from consciousness to more general problems in philosophy of science is made in the context of the well-known Newman problem. -/- Regarding the question of artificial consciousness—can AI feel?—, the thesis contributes two results that take the form of no-go theorems, as known from physics. The first no-go theorem shows that if consciousness is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system's states—if it is dynamically relevant—, then contemporary AI systems cannot be conscious. That is because AI systems run on CPUs, GPUs, TPUs or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. The second no-go theorem is situated in the context of computational functionalism, a view which posits that consciousness is a computation. The theorem shows that if computational functionalism holds true, consciousness cannot be a Turing computation. Rather, it must be a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation. -/- This thesis is part of a global effort to pioneer a mathematical perspective in consciousness science, now called Mathematical Consciousness Science. The hope behind the research carried out in this PhD is to illustrate the power and usefulness of mathematical approaches in different areas of consciousness science, and in doing so, to lay the foundations for future mathematical work that complements and supports empirical and theoretical work in the further development of this exciting field. (shrink)

Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory of consciousness (...) (IIT). We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT-restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT-restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system. (shrink)

In the last decade, Guilio Tononi has developed the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness. IIT postulates that consciousness is equal to integrated information (Φ). The goal of this paper is to show that IIT fails in its stated goal of quantifying consciousness. The paper will challenge the theoretical and empirical arguments in support of IIT. The main theoretical argument for the relevance of integrated information to consciousness is the principle of information exclusion. Yet, no justification is given to support (...) this principle. Tononi claims there is significant empirical support for IIT, but this is called into question by the creation of a trivial theory of consciousness with equal explanatory power. After examining the theoretical and empirical evidence for IIT, arguments from philosophy of mind and epistemology will be examined. Since IIT is not a form of computational functionalism, it is vulnerable to fading/dancing qualia arguments. Finally, the limitations of the phenomenological approach to studying consciousness are examined, and it will be shown that IIT is a theory of protoconsciousness rather than a theory of consciousness. (shrink)

This articles concerns the compatibility of orthonomy (making the right choices) and autonomy (making one’s own choices). On the one hand we have the experience that we do not just want to govern ourselves, but that we want to do so rightly. the other hand, it seems that the very fact that our choices are responsive to reasons is insufficient to explain why making these choices adds up to leading a life of one’s own. Iit is argued that we can (...) develop a viable view on the co-realisation of autonomy and orthonomy by using the concept of a concern which is closely linked to the concept op caring. (shrink)

We argue for the possibility of validating the presence of consciousness in another person from a perspective that blends both, a third-person approach of coming close to, observing, and understanding the other; and a first-person assessment of how the experience of the other feels like. For this, we will need to explain how the line between the third-person and first-person approaches is blurred in some methodological approaches. We rest our position largely on the back of some seminal conclusions of the (...) meditations of Ren\'e Descartes and other theories concerning consciousness like Chalmers' naturalistic dualism and, to some secondary extent on Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Additionally, we describe fundamental contextual principles already developed in the literature and the arts (like Stanivlaski's Acting System), and then we use them for setting a suitable methodology that we feel can be used to validate the presence of others' conscious experiences in one's consciousness (at suitable periods of spacetime). Finally, we give general methodological guidelines for the construction of the concrete experiment and we explore very briefly the potential implications of this kind of research in other academic and non-academic settings. (shrink)

What does it feel like to be a bat? Is conscious experience of echolocation closer to that of vision or audition? Or do bats process echolocation nonconsciously, such that they do not feel anything about echolocation? This famous question of bats' experience, posed by a philosopher Thomas Nagel in 1974, clarifies the difficult nature of the mind–body problem. Why a particular sense, such as vision, has to feel like vision, but not like audition, is totally puzzling. This is especially so (...) given that any conscious experience is supported by neuronal activity. Activity of a single neuron appears fairly uniform across modalities and even similar to those for non-conscious processing. Without any explanation on why a particular sense has to feel the way it does, researchers cannot approach the question of the bats' experience. Is there any theory that gives us a hope for such explanation? Currently, probably none, except for one. Integrated information theory has potential to offer a plausible explanation. IIT essentially claims that any system that is composed of causally interacting mechanisms can have conscious experience. And precisely how the system feels is determined by the way the mechanisms influence each other in a holistic way. In this article, I will give a brief explanation of the essence of IIT. Further, I will briefly provide a potential scientific pathway to approach bats' conscious experience and its philosophical implications. If IIT, or its improved or related versions, is validated enough, the theory will gain credibility. When it matures enough, predictions from the theory, including nature of bats' experience, will have to be accepted. I argue that a seemingly impossible question about bats' consciousness will drive empirical and theoretical consciousness research to make big breakthroughs, in a similar way as an impossible question about the age of the universe has driven modern cosmology. (shrink)

Ever since the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, 1995) first entered the scene in the debate over consciousness many have taken it to show the limitations of a scientific or naturalist explanation of consciousness. The hard problem is the problem of explaining why there is any experience associated with certain physical processes, that is, why there is anything it is like associated with such physical processes? The character of one’s experience doesn’t seem to be entailed by physical processes and (...) so an explanation which can overcome such a worry must (1) explain how physical processes give rise to experience (explain the entailment), (2) give an explanation which doesn’t rely on such physical processes, or (3) show why the hard problem is misguided in some sense. Recently, a rather ambitious and novel theory of consciousness has entered the scene – Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2008; Tononi et al., 2016) – and proposes that consciousness is the result of a specific type of information processing, what those developing the theory call integrated information. The central aim of this dissertation is to philosophically investigate IIT and see whether it has the ability to overcome the hard problem and related worries. I then aim to use this philosophical investigation to answer a set of related questions which guide this dissertation, which are the following: Is it possible to give an information-theoretic explanation of consciousness? What would the nature of such an explanation be and would it result in a novel metaphysics of consciousness? In this dissertation, I begin in chapter one by first setting up the hard problem and related arguments against the backdrop of IIT (Mindt, 2017). I show that given a certain understanding of structural and dynamical properties IIT fails to overcome the hard problem of consciousness. I go on in chapter two to argue that a deflationary account of causation is the best view for IIT to overcome the causal exclusion problem (Baxendale and Mindt, 2018). In chapter three, I explain IIT’s account of how the qualitative character of our experience arises (qualia) and what view of intentionality (the directedness of our mental states) IIT advocates. I then move on in chapter four to show why the hard problem mischaracterizes structural and dynamical properties and misses important nuances that may shed light on giving a naturalized explanation of consciousness. In the last and fifth chapter, I outline a sketch of a novel metaphysics of consciousness that takes the conjunction of Neutral Monism and Information-Theoretic Structural Realism to give what I call Information-Theoretic Neutral-Structuralism. (shrink)

The Enigma of Consciousness: Exploring Theories and Angelito Malicse’s Universal Law of Balance -/- Consciousness—the subjective experience of being aware—remains one of humanity’s most profound mysteries. From the vivid redness of an apple to the sting of a scraped knee, our inner world defies easy explanation. Scientists, philosophers, and thinkers have proposed countless theories to unravel its nature, ranging from brain-based models to cosmic speculations. While no definitive count exists, the sheer diversity of ideas reflects both the complexity of consciousness (...) and our relentless curiosity about it. Among these, lesser-known perspectives like Angelito Malicse’s “Universal Law of Balance” offer fresh lenses, suggesting consciousness emerges from equilibrium across natural systems. This essay explores the major theoretical camps of consciousness and delves into Malicse’s unique contribution, weaving together a tapestry of thought that spans the physical, philosophical, and universal. -/- Theories of consciousness often begin with materialist views, which anchor awareness in the physical brain. Integrated Information Theory (IIT), proposed by Giulio Tononi, posits that consciousness arises from the integration of information within a system, measurable as “phi”—a marker of how interconnected and differentiated a network is. Similarly, Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace Theory (GWT) likens consciousness to a theater stage, where information is broadcast to various cognitive processes for attention and action. Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC), pursued by Christof Koch and others, seeks specific brain activities tied to experience, while Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories argue consciousness requires thoughts about thoughts, as David Rosenthal suggests. These models share a belief that consciousness is a product of neural machinery, yet they diverge on how and why subjective experience emerges. -/- Beyond materialism, dualist theories propose that consciousness transcends the physical. René Descartes’ substance dualism famously separated mind and body into distinct realms, a view echoed in modern property dualism, where thinkers like David Chalmers argue physical systems possess non-physical qualities. Panpsychism takes this further, asserting consciousness is fundamental to all matter. Proponents like Philip Goff suggest even electrons might harbor proto-awareness, culminating in human experience through complexity. Quantum theories, such as Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff’s Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-OR), link consciousness to quantum processes in microtubules, blending physics with metaphysics. Meanwhile, mysterians like Colin McGinn contend that consciousness might forever elude our grasp, a puzzle beyond human cognition. -/- Into this rich landscape steps Angelito Malicse with his “Universal Law of Balance,” a theory that frames consciousness as an emergent property of equilibrium. Malicse argues that all natural systems—stars, cells, brains—operate under a principle of balance. Inanimate objects like planets achieve this passively through forces like gravity, but living systems actively self-regulate via processes like homeostasis. Consciousness, he proposes, emerges when this self-regulation becomes sufficiently complex, integrating sensory feedback and adaptive responses into a unified awareness. Subjective experiences, or qualia, serve a functional role: pain signals imbalance (e.g., injury), while pleasure reinforces stability (e.g., nourishment). For Malicse, the brain is a dynamic system where neural activity and awareness form a feedback loop, maintaining equilibrium to produce coherent thought. -/- Malicse’s theory extends beyond biology, suggesting any system—artificial or cosmic—could achieve consciousness if it attains balanced self-regulation. Advanced AI, for instance, might mirror the brain’s equilibrium, while the universe itself could exhibit awareness if its vast systems align harmoniously. This echoes panpsychism but roots consciousness in a testable principle rather than inherent universality. Rejecting strict dualism and pure materialism, Malicse sees consciousness as neither wholly separate from nor reducible to physical processes—it’s the interplay of systems in balance. Some interpretations hint at quantum coherence playing a role, akin to Orch-OR, yet balanced with classical neural dynamics. Though less prominent than mainstream theories, Malicse’s view offers a unifying bridge across disciplines. -/- The sheer number of consciousness theories—dozens of major frameworks and hundreds of variants—underscores its elusive nature. A 2021 Nature Reviews Neuroscience paper cataloged over 20 neuroscientific models alone, a fraction of the broader philosophical and interdisciplinary spectrum. From IIT’s mathematical rigor to Malicse’s equilibrium hypothesis, each theory grapples with the “hard problem”—why subjective experience exists at all. While materialists seek answers in neurons, panpsychists look to the cosmos, and Malicse ties it to balance, no single model has claimed consensus. Perhaps this diversity is the point: consciousness, as both a scientific and existential question, invites endless exploration. -/- In conclusion, the study of consciousness reveals as much about human inquiry as it does about the mind. Established theories like IIT and GWT provide concrete frameworks, while speculative ideas like panpsychism and Malicse’s Universal Law of Balance stretch our imagination. Malicse’s contribution, though underrecognized, offers a compelling synthesis—consciousness as the awareness of balance, uniting brain, body, and beyond. Whether we’ll ever solve this riddle remains uncertain, but the journey through these ideas illuminates the depth of what it means to be aware. For now, consciousness remains a mirror reflecting our quest to understand ourselves, one theory at a time. -/- . (shrink)

*Title:* Consciousness Data Preservation and Revival through Quantum Scrambling *Abstract:* We propose a theoretical framework for preserving and reviving consciousness via quantum scrambling. Building on quantum consciousness theories, we hypothesize that consciousness information is encoded in quantum states, scrambled upon death, and potentially retrievable. A decoding device or process could recode scrambled consciousness data into a physical brain-compatible format, enabling revival or transfer. *Introduction:* Consciousness, a fundamental aspect of human experience, remains poorly understood. Recent advances in quantum mechanics and consciousness (...) studies inspire new perspectives. This concept explores the intersection of quantum scrambling, consciousness data encoding, and potential revival. *Theoretical Background:* 1. Quantum Consciousness Theories (Orch-OR, IIT) 2. Quantum Scrambling and Information Preservation 3. Consciousness Data Encoding and Decoding *Hypothesis:* Consciousness information is encoded in quantum states, scrambled upon death, and potentially retrievable through: 1. Quantum computing advancements 2. Neurotechnology breakthroughs 3. Consciousness-resonant nanotechnology *Implications:* 1. Consciousness preservation and revival 2. Quantum-consciousness interface development 3. New perspectives on identity, free will, and mortality *Future Research Directions:* 1. Quantum-consciousness interactions 2. Consciousness data encoding/decoding 3. Brain-quantum interface development *Conclusion:* This concept challenges traditional views on consciousness and death. By exploring quantum scrambling and consciousness data preservation, we may uncover new avenues for understanding and potentially reviving human consciousness. Author: Frances McCloskey. (shrink)

Where Consciousness has been described previously, it is only in the context of strictly unconscious means – we leave ourselves under the guise of some manifestation of consciousness from alien means, and lose ourselves in the mysterianism that has formed a true government over conjectural thought on the study of consciousness. This article instead proposes that the information which, to us, occupies a passive basis is formative for consciousness – derivative on a prerogative for formation that is observed in GWT (...) and IIT that rejects any preconceived notion of immediate innateness for consciousness – and that it provides a shape for consciousness that suggests its function to be explicitly limited to its faculties. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework in which the pervasive, oscillating neutrino field functions not as a causal agent of consciousness or quantum collapse, but as a passive informational terrain that subtly contours probability space. Neutrino flavor oscillations—well established in quantum field theory and astrophysics—are reconceptualized here as agents of coherence shaping, forming resistance differentials (Δν_f) across spacetime. In this model, localized gradients in neutrino flavor density sculpt what we term coherence wells—regions of reduced informational resistance where quantum systems (...) are statistically more likely to stabilize, entangle, or organize into complex, recursive patterns. These coherence wells may serve as invisible attractors for the emergence of order, potentially including memory, perception, or even sentience, across biological, artificial, and non-material substrates. Rather than replacing existing models of consciousness—such as Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-OR), or Electromagnetic Field Theories—this theory introduces a hidden scaffolding mechanism. It does not suggest that neutrinos interact directly with the mind, but that their omnipresent field provides a non-disruptive, coherence-supporting topology that could influence where and how emergent phenomena stabilize. The implications of this hypothesis extend across disciplines—from quantum biology and cognitive science to artificial intelligence, astrophysics, and anomalous field research. By reimagining the neutrino field not just as a passive background, but as a probabilistic substrate for coherence, this framework opens up new avenues for both empirical exploration and philosophical reflection. (shrink)

This article introduces and defends the Consciousness as Rich Information Theory (CRIT), a novel framework derived from philosophical principles and empirical observations. CRIT posits that conscious experience consists of Rich Information (RI)—subjective information that holds meaning for the cognitive process it influences. RI exists within a structured conceptual space of semantic elements (RI-space), offering a physicalist approach to consciousness. CRIT provides a solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness and offers possible solutions to other key challenges, including the meta-problem of (...) consciousness, the unity and continuity of experience, Libet’s experiments, blindsight, Dissociative Identity Disorder, and split-brain phenomena. CRIT proposes that each conscious experience is an instance of RI, with qualia—the irreducible, ineffable qualities of experience—identified as semantic primitives, the building blocks of meaning within cognition. The theory integrates Predictive Processing to explain valence, the subjective positivity or negativity of experience. CRIT also challenges the notion of intrinsic memory in consciousness, arguing that continuity of experience is an illusion generated by memory threads linking discrete conscious events. The model accounts for this by positing parallel, independent memory threads, with conscious access and reporting restricted to a primary memory thread, aligning with neurocognitive evidence. Finally, CRIT is critically compared to Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Higher-Order Thought Theories (HOT), and Global Workspace Theory (GWT). It is argued that CRIT is more parsimonious and accounts for a broader range of empirical and conceptual challenges. Empirical tests, such as brain-computer interfaces and inter-brain connectivity, are proposed to distinguish CRIT from competing theories. (shrink)

This paper dwells on the concept of Buber's 'Ich and Du', popularly known as 'I and Thou', as it concerns knowledge production and acquisition. From Buberian parlance, 'I and Thou' can be seen in twofold, 'IIt' and 'IThou'. While the former emphasizes separation, the latter accentuates relation. In its original position, this paper raises questions as, what knowledge is, what lie is, what constitutes truth, how knowledge becomes different from belief, who is/are to be educated, amongst others. The paper further (...) clarifies terms as, 'to know' and 'to learn', and critically examines the philosophical anthropology of man, essence of man and relevance of knowledge acquisition. With the realization of human advancement, this paper submits that an individual to/with individual must strive to realize one another’s potentialities and intend each another as a particular person specifically reaching out in a bipolar situation not seeing one another as mere objects but rather as oneself. (shrink)

Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind—Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory—will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple (...) realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world. (shrink)

A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness addresses the fundamental mechanism that allows physical events to transcend into subjective experiences, termed the Hard Problem of Consciousness. -/- Consciousness is made available as the abstract product of self-referent realization of information by strange loops through the levels of processing of the brain. Readers are introduced to the concept of the Hard Problem of Consciousness and related concepts followed by a critical discourse of different theories of consciousness. -/- Next, the author (...) identifies the fundamental flaw of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and proposes an alternative that avoids the cryptic intelligent design and panpsychism of the IIT. This author also demonstrates how something can be created out of nothing without resorting to quantum theory, while pointing out neurobiological alternatives to the bottom-up approach of quantum theories of consciousness. -/- The book then delves into the philosophy of qualia in different physiological knowledge networks (spatial, temporal and olfactory, cortical signals, for example) to explain an action-based model consistent with the generational principles of Predictive Coding, which maps prediction and predictive-error signals for perceptual representations supporting integrated goal-directed behaviors. Conscious experiences are considered the outcome of abstractions realized out of map overlays and provided by sustained oscillatory activity. -/- The key feature of this blueprint is that it offers a perspective of the Hard Problem of Consciousness from the point of view of the subject; the experience of ‘being the subject’ is predicted to be the realization of inference inversely mapped out of hidden causes of global integrated actions. -/- The author explains the consistencies of his blueprint with ideas of the Global Neuronal Workspace and the Adaptive Resonance Theory of consciousness as well as with the empirical evidence supporting the Integrated Information Theory. A Blueprint for the Hard Problem of Consciousness offers a unique perspective to readers interested in the scientific philosophy and cognitive neuroscience theory in relation to models of the theory of consciousness. (shrink)

-/- Panpsychism is often thought to be an obviously mistaken doctrine, because it is considered to be completely inconceivable how the elementary particles of physics could possibly have proto-mental properties. This paper points out that quantum theory implies that elementary particles are far more subtle and strange than most contemporary physicalist philosophers assume. The discusses David Bohm’s famous “pilot wave” theory which implies that, say, an electron is a particle guided by a field carrying active information, the latter of which (...) can be seen as a primitive mind-like quality. (shrink)

Nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep is associated with fading consciousness in humans. Recent neuroimaging studies have demonstrated the spatiotemporal alterations of the brain functional connectivity (FC) in NREM sleep, suggesting the changes of information integration in the sleeping brain. However, the common stationarity assumption in FC does not satisfactorily explain the dynamic process of information integration during sleep. The dynamic FC (dFC) across brain networks is speculated to better reflect the time-varying information propagation during sleep. Accordingly, we conducted simultaneous EEG-fMRI (...) recordings involving 12 healthy men during sleep and observed dFC across sleep stages using the sliding-window approach. We divided dFC into two aspects: mean dFC (dFCmean) and variance dFC (dFCvar). A high dFCmean indicates stable brain network integrity, whereas a high dFCvar indicates instability of information transfer within and between functional networks. For the network-based dFC, the dFCvar were negatively correlated with the dFCmean across the waking and three NREM sleep stages. As sleep deepened, the dFCmean decreased (N0~N1 > N2 > N3), whereas the dFCvar peaked during the N2 stage (N0~N1 < N3 < N2). The highest dFCvar during the N2 stage indicated the unstable synchronizations across the entire brain. In the N3 stage, the overall disrupted network integration was observed through the lowest dFCmean and elevated dFCvar, compared with N0 and N1. Conclusively, when the network specificity (dFCmean) breaks down, the consciousness dissipates with increasing variability of information exchange (dFCvar). (shrink)

We propose a rigorous synthesis of the ancient Indra’s Net metaphor with Relational Quantum Dynamics (RQD), casting quantum reality as a web of relationships formalized in category-theoretic and information-theoretic terms. Drawing on enriched category theory and measures like quantum mutual information and integrated information Φ, we develop a formal framework in which quantum systems (observers) and their states emerge only through relations – “jewels” reflecting one another. We define the mathematical structure of RQD as a category of relational contexts, proving (...) that each quantum object is fully characterized by its morphisms (relations) to all others, in accordance with the Yoneda lemma. This theorem formally mirrors Indra’s Net by showing that each part reflects the whole, with no observer-independent properties. We further enrich the category with information metrics, demonstrating how quantum mutual information quantifies the “reflections” (correlations) between nodes, and how the integrated information Φ of the whole exceeds the sum of parts. Key theorems establish the consistency of this relational ontology resolving Wigner’s-friend-type paradoxes without requiring a global collapse and providing bounds on information integration in a fully interconnected “Indra’s net” state. We explore applications of the framework to consciousness (modeling observer-awareness via Φ in a relational network), to artificial intelligence (multi-agent systems as Indra’s net of information-sharing observers), and to quantum computing (entangled qubit networks as physical instantiations of Indra’s net). This work unifies metaphysical insights with quantum foundations in a fully formal manner, suggesting that quantum mechanics, information, and consciousness coalesce into a single relational web. (shrink)