12 found
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Lauritz Munch [7]Lauritz Aastrup Munch [5]
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Lauritz Munch
Aarhus University
  1. The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making.Lauritz Munch, Jakob Mainz & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 25 (1):1-11.
    Many seem to think that AI-induced responsibility gaps are morally bad and therefore ought to be avoided. We argue, by contrast, that there is at least a pro tanto reason to welcome responsibility gaps. The central reason is that it can be bad for people to be responsible for wrongdoing. This, we argue, gives us one reason to prefer automated decision-making over human decision-making, especially in contexts where the risks of wrongdoing are high. While we are not the first to (...)
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  2. To Believe or not to Believe - That is not the (Only) Question: the Hybrid View of Privacy.Lauritz Munch & Jakob Mainz - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (3):245-261.
    In this paper, we defend what we call the ‘Hybrid View’ of privacy. According to this view, an individual has privacy if, and only if, no one else forms an epistemically warranted belief about the individual’s personal matters, nor perceives them. We contrast the Hybrid View with what seems to be the most common view of what it means to access someone’s personal matters, namely the Belief-Based View. We offer a range of examples that demonstrate why the Hybrid View is (...)
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  3. Why algorithmic speed can be more important than algorithmic accuracy.Jakob Mainz, Lauritz Munch, Jens Christian Bjerring & Sissel Godtfredsen - 2023 - Clinical Ethics 18 (2):161-164.
    Artificial Intelligence (AI) often outperforms human doctors in terms of decisional speed. For some diseases, the expected benefit of a fast but less accurate decision exceeds the benefit of a slow but more accurate one. In such cases, we argue, it is often justified to rely on a medical AI to maximise decision speed – even if the AI is less accurate than human doctors.
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  4. Algorithmic decision-making: the right to explanation and the significance of stakes.Lauritz Munch, Jens Christian Bjerring & Jakob Mainz - forthcoming - Big Data and Society.
    The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes” decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or “non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a detailed investigation of what we will call (...)
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  5. What relational egalitarians should (not) believe.Andreas Bengtson & Lauritz Munch - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals; and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up (1).
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  6. Proper Address and Epistemic Conditions for Acting on Sexual Consent.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2023 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 52 (1):69-100.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 69-100, Winter 2024.
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  7.  74
    Consensual Discrimination.Andreas Bengtson & Lauritz Munch - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account.
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  8. Doxastic Affirmative Action.Andreas Bengtson & Lauritz Aastrup Munch - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.
    According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of the regard-requirement for relating as equals.
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  9. The Privacy Dependency Thesis and Self-Defense.Lauritz Aastrup Munch & Jakob Thrane Mainz - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.
    If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act can undermine other people’s ability to effectively conceal information about themselves. One case in point involves genetic information: if I share ‘my’ genetic information with others, I thereby also reveal genetic information about my biological relatives. Such dependencies are well-known in the privacy literature and are often referred to as ‘privacy dependencies’. Some take the existence of privacy dependencies to generate a moral duty to sometimes avoid sharing information about oneself. (...)
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  10. The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies.Lauritz Aastrup Munch & Jakob Thrane Mainz - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (4):1-19.
    Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that inferring information about others can violate their right to privacy. (...)
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  11. Two Reasons for Subjecting Medical AI Systems to Lower Standards than Humans.Jakob Mainz, Jens Christian Bjerring & Lauritz Munch - 2023 - Acm Proceedings of Fairness, Accountability, and Transaparency (Facct) 2023 1 (1):44-49.
    This paper concerns the double standard debate in the ethics of AI literature. This debate essentially revolves around the question of whether we should subject AI systems to different normative standards than humans. So far, the debate has centered around the desideratum of transparency. That is, the debate has focused on whether AI systems must be more transparent than humans in their decision-making processes in order for it to be morally permissible to use such systems. Some have argued that the (...)
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  12. What We Owe Past Selves.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (5):936-950.
    Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves.
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