The primary explanatory items of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology are the drives. Such drives, he holds, are arranged hierarchically in virtue of their entering dominance-obedience relations analogous to those obtaining in human societies. This view is puzzling for two reasons. First, Nietzsche’s idea of a hierarchical order among the drives is far from clear. Second, as it postulates relations among subpersonal items that mimic those among persons, Nietzsche’s view seems to trade on the homunculus fallacy. In this paper, I argue that (...) a Hume-inspired dispositional reading of the drives’ order successfully addresses these two problematic issues. Moreover, I argue that my reading is superior to the two main competing interpretations, which I call the vitalistic reading and the normative reading, for these ascribe to Nietzsche a view committed to the homunculus fallacy. (shrink)

The essay explores the intersection of the Theory of Mind (T.O.M.) and Artificial Intelligence (AI), emphasizing the potential for AI to emulate cognitive processes fundamental to human social interactions. T.O.M., a concept crucial for understanding and interpreting human behavior through attributed mental states, contrasts with AI's behaviorist approach, which is rooted in data-driven pattern analysis and predictions. By examining foundational insights from cognitive sciences and the operational models of AI, this analysis highlights the potential advancements and implications of integrating T.O.M.-like (...) capabilities into AI systems. The discussion pivots around three critical questions: whether AI should emulate T.O.M. to enhance human interactions if AI can maintain its data-driven model while integrating cognitive processes, and how AI can expand its capabilities in social contexts. The arguments suggest that incorporating T.O.M.-like processes could significantly improve AI's interaction quality without compromising its analytical strengths, pointing towards a future where AI not only predicts but also empathizes, offering more nuanced and culturally aware interactions. This synthesis of cognitive theories and computational strategies advocates for deeper integration of diverse datasets and advanced computing methodologies, aiming to transform AI into a more empathetic and effective participant in human social environments. -/- Keywords: Theory of Mind, Artificial Intelligence, Human-AI Interaction, Cognitive Processes, Data-Driven Analysis. (shrink)

To cause pain, it is not enough to deliver a dose of noxious stimulation. Pain requires the interaction of sensory processing, emotion, and cognition. In this paper, I focus on the role of cognition in the felt intensity of pain. I provide evidence for the cognitive modulation of pain. In particular, I show that attention and expectation can influence the experience of pain intensity. I also consider the mechanisms that underlie the cognitive effects on pain. I show that all the (...) proposed mechanisms of pain modulation affirm the view that cognition impacts the sensory and discriminative aspects of pain. I conclude that pain perception is a cognitively penetrated phenomenon. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the ontological status of actants. Actants are argued as being the basic constituting entities of networks in the framework of Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2007). I introduce two problems concerning actants that have been pointed out by Collin (2010). The first problem concerns the explanatory role of actants. According to Collin, actants cannot play the role of explanans of networks and products of the same newtork at the same time, at pain of circularity. The second (...) problem is that if actants are, as suggested by Latour, fundamentally propertyless, then it is unclear how they combine into networks. This makes the nature of actants inexplicable. -/- I suggest that both problems rest on the assumption of a form of object ontology, i.e. the assumption that the ontological basis of reality consists in discrete individual entities that have intrinsic properties. I argue that the solution to this problem consists in the assumption of an ontology of relations, as suggested within the framework of Ontic Structural Realism (Ladyman & Ross, 2007). Ontic Structural Realism is a theory concerning the ontology of science that claims that scientific theories represent a reality consisting on only relation, and no individual entities. -/- Furthermore I argue that the employment of OSR can, at the price of little modification for both theories, solve both of the two problems identified by Collin concerning ANT. -/- Throughout the text I seek support for my claims by referring to examples of application of ANT to the context of networked learning. As I argue, the complexity of the phenomenon of networked learning gives us a convenient vantage point from which we can clearly understand many important aspects of both ANT and OSR. -/- While my proposal can be considered as an attempt to solve Collin's problems, it is also an experiment of reconciliation between analytic and constructivist philosophy of science. -/- In fact I point out that on the one hand Actor Network Theory and Ontic Structural Realism show an interesting number of points of agreement, such as the naturalistic character and the focus on relationality. On the other hand, I argue that all the intuitive discrepancies that originates from the Science and Technology Studies’ criticism against analytic philosophy of science are at a closer look only apparent. (shrink)

Health care providers are expected both to relieve pain and to provide anticipatory guidance regarding how much a procedure is going to hurt. Fulfilling those expectations is complicated by the cognitive modulation of pain perception. Warning people to expect pain or setting expectations for pain relief not only influences their subjective experience, but it also alters how nociceptive stimuli are processed throughout the sensory and discriminative pathways in the brain. In light of this, I reconsider the characterization of placebo analgesia (...) as pharmacologically inert and the use of it as deceptive. I show that placebo analgesia exploits the same physical mechanisms as proven analgesics and argue that it should be utilized to relieve pain. Additionally, I describe factors to help identify situations in which clinicians have the obligation to disclose the potential for pain coupled with ways of mitigating the risk of high-intensity pain by setting positive expectations. (shrink)

There are currently two legally established criteria for death: the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration and the irreversible cessation of neurologic function. Recently, there have been technological developments that could undermine the irreversibility requirement. In this paper, I focus both on whether death should be identified as an irreversible state and on the proper scope of irreversibility in the biological definition of death. In this paper, I tackle the distinction between the commonsense definition of death and the biological definition (...) of death to show that even the commonsense concept of death is specified by biological facts. Resting on this argument, I argue that any definition of death is a posteriori. Thus, irreversibility is part of any definition of death because the actual phenomenon of death is irreversible. In addition, I show that the proper domain of irreversibility in a definition of death is circumscribed by physical possibilities and that irreversibility in the definition of death refers to current possibilities for the reversal of relevant biological processes. I conclude that, despite recent technological advancements, death is still irreversible. (shrink)

In 1959 two French neurologists, Pierre Mollaret and Maurice Goullon, coined the term coma dépassé to designate a state beyond coma. In this state, patients are not only permanently unconscious; they lack the endogenous drive to breathe, as well as brainstem reflexes, indicating that most of their brain has ceased to function. Although legally recognized in many countries as a criterion for death, brain death has not been universally accepted by bioethicists, by the medical community, or by the public. I (...) this paper, I defend brain death as a biological concept. I challenge two assumptions in the brain death literature that have shaped the debate and have stood in the way of an argument for brain death as biological. First, I challenge the dualism established in the debate between the body and the brain. Second, I contest the emphasis on consciousness, which prevents the inclusion of psychological phenomena into a biological criterion of death. I propose that the term organism should apply both to the functioning of the body and the brain. I argue that the cessation of the organism as a whole should take into account three elements of integrated function. Those three elements are: 1) the loss of integrated bodily function; 2) the loss of psychophysical integration required for processing of external stimuli and those required for behavior; and, 3) the loss of integrated psychological function, such as memory, learning, attention, and so forth. The loss of those three elements of integrated function is death. (shrink)

The use of brain technology that contributes to psychological changes has spurred a debate about personal identity. Some argue that neurotechnology does not undermine personal continuity (Levy, 2011) while others argue that it does (Kreitmair, 2019; Schechtman, 2010). To make these assessments, commentators fail to identify psychological changes that cause personal discontinuity. In this paper, I present a view that identifies personal continuity with the maintenance of a self-concept. I argue that a concept of self requires the ability to self-ascribe (...) physical and psychological features and that the diachronic self emerges with self-ascriptions of features that require endurance over time. I maintain that an adequate concept of self does not depend on the maintenance of any particular combination of self-ascriptions and that it can be maintained despite even significant changes in psychological or physical traits. Finally, I apply the self-concept view to identify changes that can result in discontinuity of self. (shrink)

This chapter will address the axiological objection to cognitive enhancement, which is that the use of cognitive enhancers reduces the value of cognitive achievement. In a recent defense of cognitive enhancement, Carter and Pritchard (2019) utilize the extended mind hypothesis to argue that cognitive enhancers do not compromise knowledge acquisition. In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that the reliance on the extended mind hypothesis leaves some cognitive enhancers vulnerable to the axiological objection. To expand the scope of the argument, (...) it will be shown that criteria for cognitive integration are applicable even to enhancers that cause changes to cognition internal to the human organism. This chapter will begin with a description of several cognitive enhancers and with the identification of the type of cognitive process they purportedly improve. It will then be demonstrated that even when those improvements are internal, they need not affect cognitive character and do not compromise cognitive agency. (shrink)

Loss of personal identity in dementia can raise a number of ethical considerations, including the applicability of advance directives and the validity of patient preferences that seem incongruous with a previous history of values. In this chapter, we first endorse the self-concept view as the most appropriate approach to personal continuity in healthcare. We briefly describe two different types of dementia, Alzheimer’s dementia (AD) and behavioral-variant frontotemporal dementia (bv-FTD). We identify elements considered important for the continuation of a self-concept, including (...) continuation of memories, consistency in personality traits and personal preferences, and continued endorsement of certain moral tenets. We show that, depending on which element is considered most important for personal identity, continuity of a self-concept for individuals with distinct types of dementia will be affected and assessed differently. Utilizing a variety of empirical evidence, we argue that persistence of memory, personality traits, and preferences are not the most important for the maintenance of personal identity. Instead, as studies aimed to capture the folk-psychological view of personal continuity demonstrate, judgements about continuity depend primarily on the persistent commitment to widely shared moral beliefs. Because of that, we argue that individuals with bv-FTD are more likely to lose their sense of self than individuals whose dementia primarily affects memory, such as Alzheimer’s disease. We end the chapter by showing how the importance of moral beliefs for continuity of self can be used to provide guidance to health-care professionals when considering changes in preference by individuals with dementia. (shrink)

It is one of the premises of eliminative materialism that commonsense psychology constitutes a theory. There is agreement that mental states can be construed as posited entities for the explanation and prediction of behavior. Disputes arise when it comes to the range of the commonsense theory of mental states. In chapter one, I review major arguments concerning the span and nature of folk psychology. In chapter two, relying on arguments by Quine and Sellars, I argue that the precise scope of (...) commonsense psychology cannot be determined because there are no resources to distinguish claims that are commonsense from all others. I use this conclusion to evaluate Churchland’s proposal that folk psychology should be eliminated in favor of a scientific theory. I argue that, although such an elimination is possible, it is unnecessary because commonsense psychology is in part informed by scientific theories. The properties that are usually attributed to mental states, on my view, are not common sense and would re-emerge even if we replaced our current theory with a scientific one. In chapter three, I examine how this affects eliminativist arguments, such as Churchland’s proposals for how to solve the emergence of the phenomenal character of sensations. I argue that it might be the case that some phenomenal properties are the result of endorsing a particular theory, but phenomenal character as such is a permanent feature of any theory about internal states. Addressing the problem of the incorrigibility of mental states, in chapter four, I challenge Rorty’s idea that such a property is the mark of the mental and can be attributed to our mental states based on our everyday usage of mental terms. The position asserted in the dissertation is compatible with the view that any theory can be revised, but doubts are expressed concerning the likelihood for a complete replacement of the current folk-psychological theory. Taking inspiration form Sellars, in chapter five, I argue that the establishment of a conceptual framework entails a wholistic jump from no concepts to a rudimentary framework. With this leap some properties are solidified and stand in the way of elimination. (shrink)

The established two tracks of neuroenhancement, moral and cognitive enhancements, rest on the characterization of commonsense morality as a set of static psychological dispositions. In this paper, I challenge this way of describing commonsense morality. I draw a parallel between commonsense psychology and commonsense morality, and I propose that the right way to characterize commonsense morality is as an empirically evaluable theory, with a structure similar to a scientific theory. I argue further that psychological dispositions to react in certain ways (...) require the tacit endorsement of a commonsense moral theory. By adopting this view, I argue that the way to change our psychological dispositions is by changing the background theory that produces them. I conclude that when commonsense morality is construed as an empirically evaluable theory, the cleft between the abilities that support scientific progress and the abilities that promote moral progress closes and it becomes evident that the way to promote both types of advancements is through cognitive enhancement. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the definition and application of the sliding scale of capacity. We show that the current interpretations of the sliding scale confound distinct features of the medical decision, such as its urgency, its severity, or its complexity, that do not always covary.We propose that the threshold for assessing capacity should be adjusted based solely on the cognitive complexity of the decision at hand. We further suggest that the complexity of a decision should be identified based (...) on a patient’s particular cognitive deficits. We utilize the current research on the types of deficits that characterize amnestic dementias and examine which types of medical decisions might be most complex for patients with that type of dementia. We conclude that applying the sliding scale based on individualized judgments of cognitive complexity will improve accuracy of assessment of capacity and enable capable patients to participate in medical decision making. (shrink)

If we feel confident in criticizing art for being sentimental, we ought to be able to precisely state how and why sentimentality is an aesthetic fault. This entails demonstrating that sentimental art fails to perform some function that is essential to art. In this paper I will argue that any critique of sentimental art that does not satisfy such a condition is not a legitimate aesthetic critique. Additionally I will put forth a genuinely aesthetic critique of sentimental art, establishing why (...) sentimentality is an aesthetic fault and why art will be aesthetically flawed to the extent that it is sentimental. (shrink)

Por definição, quando se fala de existência se fala da existência de algo. O nada não é coisa alguma, logo não existe. O nada é um signo, uma representação linguística do que se pensa ser a ausência de tudo. O que existe são representações mentais do nada. Como uma definição ou um conceito é uma afirmação sobre o que uma coisa é, o nada não é positivamente definido, mas apenas representado, fazendo-se a relação entre seu símbolo (...) (a palavra "nada") e a ideia que se tem da não-existência de coisa alguma. O "nada" não existe, mas é concebido por operações de mente. Esta é a concepção de Bergson, oposta à de Hegel, modernamente reabilitada, de que o nada seria uma entidade de existência real, em oposição ao ser. -/- . (shrink)

Tendo em vista que a lei de ser em relação ao sujeito cognoscente consiste em ser-consciente, a consciência, segundo Jean-Paul Sartre, sobrepõe-se ao status de modo particular de conhecimento enquanto sentido interno ou conhecimento como conhecimento de si, constituindo a dimensão de ser transfenomenal. Dessa forma, baseado no princípio fenomenológico-ontológico-existencial, o Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano Da Rosa se detém na relação entre o fenômeno de ser e o ser do fenômeno e na irredutibilidade do ser do fenômeno ao fenômeno do (...) ser, assinalando o processo que sobrepõe o ser do fenômeno à condição fenomênica e converge para a consciência enquanto ser cognoscente enquanto é em um movimento que escapa ao enquanto é conhecido, transpondo as fronteiras da preeminência do conhecimento. Se a consciência emerge como consciência de alguma coisa em um processo cujo ser implica um ser que encerra a si como não consciente e transfenomenal, o que se impõe, segundo Sartre, não é senão a consciência como um ser que encerra a questão do seu ser enquanto ser que implica outro ser que não si mesmo. Assim, detendo-se no acontecimento da aparição do existente humano em relação ao ser enquanto descoberta de um mundo e a negação como momento essencial e primordial, o artigo assinala o motivo pelo qual o existente humano em seu ser implica a possibilidade de aparição do nada em um processo que encerra a liberdade como condição para a nadificação do nada. (shrink)

This paper investigates how the female political movement occurred between 1945 and 1955 in Argentina, specifically within the Feminist Peronist Party. In this paper, the specific objectives are: first, to provide a brief overview of the history of Latin America, placing a focus on the geopolitical context of the region; and second, to briefly present the situation from the perspective of Peronism, including its theoretical, political, economic, and social characteristics. Next, the research focuses on the female movements led by Eva (...) Perón, analyzed using sources from Díaz (2005) and Olguin (2013). The last part points out some criticisms of the Argentine scenario of the time and the social justice movements undertaken by the Peronist Party. Moreover, the theoretical framework includes texts from Barros (2016) and Perrig (2015). For the construction of the idea of Conservative-Progres sivism, the theoretical guiding thread that guides our research is the texts of Barry (2007, 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Focus is given especially to those centred on the develop ment of female political movements that consolidated the participation of women in the Ar gentine democratic process and the creation and expansion of the Feminist Peronist Party, ensuring certain political advances for women through what was known as Social Justice. (shrink)

This paper discusses the possibility of an absolute vacuum - a space without any substance. The motivation of this study is the contrast between most philosophers, up to Descartes, who stated that a vacuum was impossible, and the 17th century change of outlook, when the possibility and effective existence of the vacuum was accepted after the experiments of Torricelli and Pascal. This article attempts to show that, contrary to the received opinion, the acceptance of an ether is preferable to the (...) acceptance of a vacuum for several reasons. First: it is impossible to provide an empirical proof of the non-existence of the ether; second, an absolute vacuum is unthinkable; third, the ether concept is useful for the understanding of physical phaenomena; and fourth, the hypothesis of an ether in apparently void spaces is useful for the future development of science. The paper also endeavours to show that no recent advance of science changed those conclusions and that no future development can change them. (shrink)

En el presente art´ıculo exploramos la carencia de valor que tiene la muerte, el cese de la vida de una persona, para la filosof ´ıa estoica, que con-sidera a aquella como uno de los factores indiferentes o adi´aphora (“no prefe-ribles”) para la felicidad humana. La idea del “temor hacia la muerte”, comoun sentimiento incorrecto, repercuti´o en la pol´ıtica cotidiana de la Roma im-perial; seg´un concluimos, esta circunstancia demuestra el car´acter pragm´aticoy terap´eutico de la Stoa, escuela que siempre busc´o eliminar tal (...) temor. (shrink)

For philosophy to criticize the concept of reality requires self-criticism. Throughout history many thinkers that have systematized a critique of both reality and philosophy. In this article we will analyze the Kantian and Hegelian systems by showing the failure in their respective critique to exercise sufficient self-criticism, resulting in unfinished critiques. Going a step further, Tanabe’s proposal was to plunge philosophy into a kind of «absolute disruption» that would drive thought beyond itself by means of an absolute critique in which (...) being and nothingness are seen to interpenetrate each other, thus opening up the possibility of positing absolute nothingness as «a foundation that is not a foundation.». (shrink)

nevrosity for the dense social relations in urban context.

My aim here is to answer the question about why is there something rather than nothing by arguing for the existence of some necessary beings (that, as such, couldn’t not exist) – the space, the time, and the natural basic laws – and by showing that the existence of nothingness is logically impossible. I also try to account for the fact that contingent beings arise from necessary beings by distinguishing between necessary existence and necessary arising, as to answer the question (...) about why is there anything contingent at all and to propose a solution to the Dilemma of Contingency. (shrink)

This paper aims at an analytical explanation of the distinctive nature of music, as it has been formulated in perhaps one of the world's very first works on the subject, namely the ‘Sangeet Ratnakar’ of Pandit Sarangadeva, a 13th century musicologist of India. He, in the first chapter of the work defines music ('sangeet' in Sanskrit and Hindi) as a composite of singing or 'Gita', instrumental music or 'vadan' and dancing or ‘nrittam’. In addition, he also holds singing to be (...) the most important component of music. These two ideas are not only unquestionably acceptable , as the analysis in the paper will show, but give to Indian music , in its difference from western music, its distinctively spiritual character, making it a path to liberation or Moksha (Muktidayakam na tu ranjakam). Sarangadeva's reason, here, is not rational but empirico-inductive. It is that mainly by virtue of its 'gitam’ (singing component), which, like the Yoga system of exercise, needing only one's body as its instrument, music too needing only one’s voice is as self-sufficient and autonomous as the ultimate Reality itself (Swayamev Rajate). In the hierarchy (a distinctively ancient Indian insistence) of arts, singing is the highest and unique because in spite of being heard by the auditory sense, it affects our 'reflective sensibility' and transports us to the virtual world of melodic and rhythmic forms. Forms, as against their particular illustrations, are abstract universals. Ultimate Reality is also a Form-all comprehensive and internally harmonious. However, pure Form, whether melodic or religious or even rational like that of triangularity, is almost impossible to concentrate on. Realizing this practical difficulty, Indian scriptures and the world's first Grammarian-linguist, Acharya Panini, framed a composite sound as the manifestation of the ultimate musical Form. This purely formal-because devoid of all meaning, sound is that of 'om', spelt, in Sanskrit as a conjunction (sandhi) of 'a'+'u'+'m'. For Indian musicologists and musicians, ‘om’ is the perfect manifestation of the Sound-God or ‘Nada-Brahman’ because, 1. Its composite nature resembles God, as a harmony of 'sat', 'chit', and 'ananda'; and 2. The composite sound is self-existent as its all three components-two vowels, i.e. ‘a’, ‘u’, and one consonant i.e. ‘m’, can be and are pronounced just as they originally are, -un-elongated and un-vitiated and therefore pure. This is the reason why every recital of Indian classical vocal music is begun with an elaborate rendering of 'om' as an invocation to Sound-God or ‘Nada-Brahman’. Scholarly and authentic, this ancient Indian approach to music, is undoubtedly the earliest and original. My observation is that its main contentions like Sharang Dev’s insistence that of the three components of music, ‘gitam’ or singing is the highest, have only been translated and never argued for. In this presentation my good intention is to provide much needed rational support for making these key statements in this unparalleled Indian text, indubitable and unquestionable. (shrink)

The starting point of this paper are two views: on the one hand, two general claims about street art – a broad art category encompassing works of spray painting as well as of yarn bombing, paste ups as well as sculptural interventions, tags as well as stickers, and so on – and, on the other hand, a much more specific view about certain contemporary tags produced, roughly, over the past twenty years. The two general claims are, first, that all works (...) of street art are subversive (see, e.g., Bacharach 2015; 2018; Chackal 2016; Baldini 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; Willard 2016), second, that works of street art are the result of acts of self-expression (Riggle 2016). The specific view about certain contemporary tags is that they are artworks, although they are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of aesthetic properties grounded in their perceptual properties, because they are works of conceptual street art (see Lewisohn 2010; JAK 2012). The key question of the paper concerns, however, not contemporary tags, but “very early tags” (VETs) – a term that I shall use to designate the extremely simple, unadorned tags that first appeared in the late 1960s and that some scholars consider as the historical predecessors of the various practices that today we group under the category “street art” (see, e.g., Young 2014; Gastman et al. 2015): should we regard VETs as artworks? On the one hand, VETs writers tend to answer this question in the negative, since they stress that they didn’t cast themselves as artists and often identify the first tags that are artworks with the graphically elaborated tags that begun to be seen around New York City and Philadelphia just a few years after the appearance of the first tags. On the other hand, already in the early 1970s, artists and intellectuals such as Norman Mailer and Gordon Matta-Clark seemed to hold the view that it was appropriate to regard both VETs and later tags as art, although they didn’t defend this thesis with argument. The view that some contemporary tags that are not presented, mainly, for appreciation of their aesthetic properties might be candidates for appreciation as works of conceptual art suggests a strategy for assessing the issue whether VETs are candidates for art appreciation: can we defend the claim that the extremely simple, unadorned VETs were presented for appreciation as works of conceptual street art? I argue that we have good reasons to hold this view. (shrink)

In this paper I shall discuss the relationship between the two known Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Burhān. I shall argue that Avicenna relies on both (1) Abū Bishr Mattā’s translation and (2) the anonymous translation used by Averroes in the Long Commentary as well as in the Middle Commentary (and also indirectly preserved by Gerard of Cremona’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s work). Although, generally speaking, the problem is relevant to the history of the transmission of (...) the Posterior Analytics from Greek through Syriac into Arabic, I do not intend to give a systematic presentation of the historical setting in which Aristotle’s work became readily available to the Arabo-Islamic culture. My aim here is rather to isolate and discuss some pieces of evidence concerning the texts that seem to have been available to Avicenna. In addition to that, I shall also provide evidence concerning the relationship with the Greek commentary tradition (in particular Philoponus and Themistius) that is likely to have influenced Avicenna in his discussion of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration and scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Una deseada organización social por la cual se erige una teoría filosófica en materia política aparece en Platón como una cuestión de orden moral que tiene en la aprehensión de virtudes su naturaleza. La razón regenta sobre el alma cuya condición desiderativa puede tender a un extravío de la virtud, y por ello nada más contrario al orden de sí mismo que el estar dominado por placeres. No obstante, el placer, pese a su caracterización abyecta como sensación natural del (...) hombre, puntualiza sobre la virtud bajo una adecuada formación en su uso. Por tal razón, y por las muchas funciones que ejerce el placer (ἡδονή) en el corpus platonicum, es necesario atender al sentido que este posee en el proyecto educativo-político de Platón. (shrink)

El presente trabajo, se avoca a determinar cuál es el status ontológico del principio de no-contradicción -(P -P). Rechazo que la exigencia que dicho principio implica, sea de naturaleza entitativa, es decir, que sea una dimensión constitutiva de los entes exteriores a la función racional de la mente humana. Afirmo que la exigencia que impone dicho principio, se reduce a ser nada más que una exigencia emanada de la humana mente racional, siempre que ésta participe como uno de los (...) miembros de la relación mente-objeto. (shrink)

La obra es un estudio de una de las nociones fundamentales en la filosofía de Gadamer, el concepto de aplicación. Se intenta dar cuenta de la manera en que dicho concepto viene a solucionar, o tal vez sería mejor decir, a disolver, en la reflexión del siglo XX, el problema que enfrentaban las ciencias históricas en el siglo XIX para convertirse en conocimiento objetivo. Dicho problema consistía en dos importantes dificultades vinculadas entre sí: la imposibilidad de disponer de un objeto (...) independiente, el pasado “tal cual ocurrió” para confrontar la adecuación de las visiones del mismo constituidas desde el presente, por un lado, y la imposibilidad de erradicar la perspectiva del presente (intereses, ideologías, etc.)en los relatos históricos. Para abordar este problema, Gadamer acomete nada menos que una revisión de las categorías fundamentales en las cuales se inserta esta dificultad, esto es, las nociones de conocimiento, realidad y verdad modeladas, a través de Kant, de acuerdo a la perspectiva de la moderna ciencia de la naturaleza. Un paso fundamental será entonces examinar el problema del valor cognitivo del arte, esto es, elucidar las nociones de realidad y experiencia a partir de la experiencia artística, para extender luego estas conclusiones a la historia y el lenguaje. En el marco de esta revisión se perfila el concepto de aplicación, el cual destaca que nuestra condición de agentes históricos, insertos en una tradición y en una comunidad lingüística, no es un obstáculo, sino justamente la condición que hace posible que podamos comprender lo diferente a lo propio, ya sea en la forma de la alteridad histórica, lingüística o meramente personal. La tesis de la obra que presentamos es que la estructura de la aplicación, con la consecuente historicidad que acarrea, se presenta de manera semejante tanto en las macro-estructuras de la comprensión (comprensión de textos, de la tradición, del arte) como en las estructuras de un nivel inferior o más básico, como la realización de juicios y la comprensión de conceptos, punto que se elabora, en esta obra, a través de una comparación con las ideas del segundo Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Guru Nanak was not content to remain a mystic. He undertook four long travels, called udasis, to spread his message far and wide, and to share his spiritual experiences with others. Bhai Mardana always accompanied the Guru during the missionary tours. During his four travels, Guru Nanak visited different religious places. He went to Kurukshetra, Haridwar, Joshi Math, Ratha Sahib, Gorakh Matta (Nanak Matta), Audhya, Prayag, Varanasi, Gaya, Patna, Dhubri and Gauhati in Assam, Dacca, Puri, Cuttock, Rameshwaram, Ceylon, (...) Bidar, Baroach, Somnath, Dwarka, Janagarh, Ujjain, Ajmer, Mathura, Pakpattan, Talwandi, Lahore, Sultanpur, Bilaspur, Rawalsar, Jawalaji, Spiti Vally, Tibet, Ladakh, Kargil, Amarnath, Srinagar, and Baramula. Guru Nanak also paid visits to Muslim holy places. He went to Mecca, Medina, Baghdad via Multan, Peshawar Sakhar, Son Miani, Hinglaj etc. Some accounts say that Guru Sahib reached Mecca by sea route. He also visited Syria, Turkey, and Tehran (Iran). From Tehran he set out on the caravan route and covered Kabul, Kandhar, and Jalalabad. The aim of his tours was to awaken the people, to realize the truth about God and his creation. He established a network of preaching centers of his philosophy, which were called “Manjis”. He appointed able and committed followers as their in-charges. The basic tenets of Guru Nanak's philosophy were wilfully conceived by people from all walks of life. Thus the seeds of Sikhism were sown all over India and abroad in a well-planned manner. (shrink)

Una importante amenaza para la comunicación intercultu-ral es el relativismo: la idea de que cada cultura es tan diferente a las demás que resulta imposible entender nada de una de ellas desde cualquier otra. Se trata, de hecho, de una noción que cobró cierto éxito en diversas áreas del saber durante el siglo XX. Para oponerse a ella, los filósofos a menudo han intentado encontrar qué es lo que sí tienen todas las culturas en común, con el propósito de (...) que sirva de punto de apoyo para la comprensión mutua. En este artículo, empero, intentamos mostrar cómo cabe refutar las ideas del relativismo sin tener a la vez que comprometerse con una u otra idea de lo que presunta-mente puedan tener todas las culturas en común. El pensamiento de Richard Rorty será el que nos sirva de guía para ello. Veremos por qué, según este autor, el relativismo puede considerarse en realidad una idea incomprensible y, por tanto, que puede ser abandonada; y por qué, aunque nos confesemos etnocéntricos (como él se confesaba), ello no nos cierra a la comunicación con otras culturas, sino que, bien al con-trario, nos invita a entenderlas y a ampliar con ello nuestra propia comprensión de nosotros mismos. El uso de argumentos filosóficos tomados tanto de la epistemología elaborada por Donald Davidson, como de la historia del liberalismo político, nos resultarán fecundos en ambos empeños. (shrink)

Para diagnosticar y curar una enfermedad del pensamiento y de la cultura tan devastadora en nuestros días como es la del relativismo, parece oportuno reparar antes en las diversas tipologías que este mal adopta, pues es razonable sospechar que seguramente las terapias oportunas podrán resultar más efectivas si lo sometemos a un tratamiento particularizado. Así pues, en mi comunicación, y una vez establecido el criterio según el cual se van a clasificar los diferentes modos de planteamiento epistemológico posible (criterio que (...) residirá en el número de instancias que se reconocen como autoridades normativas para nuestro pensamiento), describo tres tipos de relativismo posible: el relativismo cultural, el relativismo protagórico y el relativismo escéptico. Para el primer tipo de relativismo, las instancias normativas pertinentes son tantas como culturas o “paradigmas” existan en el mundo: se trata, pues, de un pensamiento que apuesta por una pluralidad de instancias normativas, y por el hecho de que estas dependan del contexto desde el cual el agente epistémico aborda la tarea de conocer o pensar. Para el segundo y tercer tipos de relativismo, empero, no existe instancia normativa válida alguna, y la diferencia entre ellos reside en el “talante” con el cual se toman tal creencia en la ausencia de autoridades (el relativismo protagórico tenderá al cinismo del “todo vale”, mientras que el relativismo escéptico se refugiará más bien en la tragedia del “nada vale nada”). Por su parte, y como alternativa a estos relativismos, también apuntamos en nuestra comunicación brevemente a los tres tipos de pensamiento (monista, pluralista y postmetafísico) que acaso podrían plantarle cara a la tríada antes descrita, con diversas posibilidades de éxito. (shrink)

El problema de la autenticidad del filosofar latinoamericano es una de las temáticas más constantes y trascendentales de la historia del pensamiento subcontinental, asociada a la preocupación esencial por la autenticidad misma del latinoamericano, de su ser, de su cultura, preocupación que ha matizado toda la historia de nuestra América, desde que ésta fue conquistada por Europa. Este problema llegó a convertirse en una especie de obsesión o fiebre que se extendió prácticamente a todos los filósofos del continente. Esto no (...) fue nada casual, implicaba una nueva conciencia de sí, un deseo de enfrentarse a Occidente, una asunción de la necesidad de libertad e independencia también en el plano teórico y espiritual, una lucha contra el intento de universalización exclusiva de los valores originados en Occidente... (shrink)

Uno de los incuestionables aportes teóricos de Marx fue la clara delimitación del papel fundamental que desempeña la vida humana en la sociedad y en su historia. La aparente acumulación caótica de acontecimientos que hacen parte de la historia sólo adquiere un sentido y se aproxima a una determinada lógica (plural, diversa, si se quiere, pero lógica al fin) si se vincula al proceso real de la vida de los seres humanos. Si Darwin había encontrado en la vida (en particular, (...) en la lucha por la existencia) la clave para explicar la evolución de las especies, Marx también adjudicaría a la vida la llave explicativa de la historia. No había nada casual en ello. La vida es un atributo compartido por las plantas, los animales y los humanos. Todos son seres vivos y, como tales, portadores de un impulso vital hacia la autoconservación. Dicho impulso responde a una ley universal de la vida, sin la cual ésta no podría existir. De ese impulso se derivan las necesidades y la acción dirigida a su satisfacción, garantes de la imprescindible relación metabólica con el medio exterior... (shrink)

A filosofia da linguagem dedica-se ao estudo da linguagem natural. Não se dedica ao estudo de línguas particulares, tal como o português, o castelhano ou o inglês, mas sim ao estudo filosófico de características gerais da linguagem e da nossa capacidade e proficiência linguística enquanto seres humanos. A investigação do desenvolvimento da linguagem é uma tarefa a ser desenvolvida pela ciência – a paleontologia, a neurologia, etc. Mas a ciência ocupa-se de algo de que temos um conhecimento intuitivo prévio – (...) a linguagem natural. Ora, a filosofia da linguagem dedica-se em parte a tornar explícito o nosso conhecimento implícito da linguagem. Como tal, a filosofia da linguagem é uma disciplina central na filosofia. Este capítulo é uma introdução selectiva à filosofia da linguagem. A alternativa que se nos deparava era fazer uma breve apresentação de teorias do significado, da referência e da verdade, e ainda de alguns tópicos de pragmática, ou escolher um tópico em particular que é, tradicionalmente, o elegido nos cursos introdutórios à filosofia da linguagem. Este capítulo oferece assim uma introdução a alguns dos temas centrais e clássicos da filosofia da linguagem contemporânea. A maior parte do capítulo dedicar-se-á a teorias da referência, a de Frege e de Russell, e à sua crítica subsequente por filósofos como Saul Kripke. Isto poderia levar-nos a pensar que a filosofia da linguagem contemporânea continua, como era tradicional, focada simplificada da relação entre linguagem, mente e mundo. Nada podia estar mais longe da verdade, como se tornará claro. A grande alteração na perspectiva sobre o estudo da linguagem, que se deve a pessoas como Frege ou Russell, é que graças ao seu trabalho os filósofos passaram a reflectir sobre a contribuição semântica sistematicamente feita por diferentes categorias sintácticas nas diferentes construções frásicas em que possam ocorrer, por exemplo a de termos referenciais como os nomes próprios. A relação linguagem-mente-mundo continua a ser uma preocupação dos filósofos contemporâneos, mas de uma forma muito mais sofisticada, rigorosa e sistemática. Os filósofos preocupam-se agora, por exemplo, com as condições de verdade correctas de usos particulares de frases, com os estados de coisas reais ou possíveis que confeririam verdade ou falsidade às frases usadas, e com o valor cognitivo de distintos tipos de frases. Como indicaremos na última secção do capítulo, outros desenvolvimentos da filosofia da linguagem contemporânea dizem respeito àquilo que nós, enquanto seres humanos, conseguimos fazer por meio da linguagem, aos diferentes actos de fala possíveis, e aos diferentes níveis de significado que podemos comunicar por meio do uso de frases com um significado convencionalmente estabelecido. (shrink)