This article advances a critical analysis of John Rawls’s justification of liberal democratic nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War era as found in The Law of Peoples. Rawls’s justification overlooked how nuclear-armed liberal democracies are ensnared in two intransigent ethical dilemmas: one in which the mandate to secure liberal constitutionalism requires both the preservation and violation of important constitutional provisions in domestic affairs, and the other in which this same mandate requires both the preservation and violation of (...) the liberal commitment to international legal arrangements and to the rule of law generally. On this view, the choice to violate constitutional provisions and international legal arrangements is evidence of nuclear despotism. Moreover, this choice does not imply that the ethical foreign policy dilemmas were resolved. Instead, it implies that the dilemmas force liberal democratic governments into implementing ethically paradoxical policy outcomes. (shrink)

Like asteroids, hundred-year floods and pandemic disease, thermonuclear war is a low-frequency, high-impact threat. In the long run, catastrophe is inevitable if nothing is done − yet each successive government and generation may fail to address it. Drawing on risk perception research, this paper argues that psychological biases cause the threat of nuclear war to receive less attention than it deserves. Nuclear deterrence is, moreover, a ‘front-loaded good’: its benefits accrue disproportionately to proximate generations, whereas much of (...) the expected cost will be borne in the distant future. Recent surveys indicate that the US and Russian publics assign a surprisingly high likelihood to nuclear war. Nevertheless, earlier research suggests that it is probably not believed to be just around the corner. This, along with the absence of easy solutions, encourages governments and publics to give priority to more pressing concerns. The danger is that the pattern will continue clear up to the point that nuclear war arrives. (shrink)

This paper explores how the Leviathan that projects power through nuclear arms exercises a unique nuclearized sovereignty. In the case of nuclear superpowers, this sovereignty extends to wielding the power to destroy human civilization as we know it across the globe. Nuclearized sovereignty depends on a hybrid form of power encompassing human decision-makers in a hierarchical chain of command, and all of the technical and computerized functions necessary to maintain command and control at every moment of the sovereign's (...) existence: this sovereign power cannot sleep. This article analyzes how the form of rationality that informs this hybrid exercise of power historically developed to be computable. By definition, computable rationality must be able to function without any intelligible grasp of the context or the comprehensive significance of decision-making outcomes. Thus, maintaining nuclearized sovereignty necessarily must be able to execute momentous life and death decisions without the type of sentience we usually associate with ethical individual and collective decisions. (shrink)

This article assesses how autonomy and machine learning impact the existential risk of nuclear war. It situates the problem of cyber security, which proceeds by stealth, within the larger context of nuclear deterrence, which is effective when it functions with transparency and credibility. Cyber vulnerabilities poses new weaknesses to the strategic stability provided by nuclear deterrence. This article offers best practices for the use of computer and information technologies integrated into nuclear weapons systems. Focusing (...) on nuclear command and control, avoiding autonomy and machine learning is recommended as one means to reduce the existential risk of unintended nuclear conflict. (shrink)

This book review of Lieber and Press's “The myth of the nuclear revolution: Power politics in the atomic age" challenges the authors' position that nuclear weapons essentially have the same properties of conventional weapons. We argue that nuclear weapons alter warfare because they can end human civilization, and they pose a shared risk of mutual destruction.

The goal of this essay is to explore "the highly contested nature of [decision-making through adopting] a historically comparative and interdisciplinary approach." Internalist history of game theory treats decision theory as a science of making choices to maximize expected gain. Game theory is applied to nuclear deterrence and military strategy, building markets and designing institutions, analyzing collective action, developing jurisprudence, and addressing crime and punishment. This essay draws on recent historiography of Cold War decision-making to draw into focus (...) the constructive aspects of decision theory to argue that the perceived need to avoid worst-case scenarios has instead contributed to a world in which the worst outcome is probabilistically assured to occur over the long duree timeframe. (shrink)

私たちが最初に留意しなければならないのは、中国がこれを言うか、中国がそうしていると言うとき、我々は中国の人々について話すのではなく、CCPを支配する社会主義者、すなわちCCPの常任委員会の7人の老人社 会病連続殺人犯(SSSSK)または政治局の25人のメンバーについて話しているということです。 CCPの第一次世界大戦と完全支配の計画は、中国政府の出版物や演説で非常に明確にレイアウトされており、これは習近平の「チャイナドリーム」です。中国を支配する小さな少数派(おそらく数十人から数百人)と他の 誰にとっても悪夢(14億人の中国人を含む)にとっては夢です。年間100億ドルは、彼らまたは彼らの人形が毎日どこでもほとんどの主要メディアにフェイクニュースを置き、新聞、雑誌、テレビ、ラジオチャンネルを 所有または制御し、置くことを可能にします。 さらに、彼らはより多くのプロパガンダを置き、正当な解説(50セントの軍隊)をかき消すすべてのメディアを荒らす軍隊(おそらく何百万人もの人々)を持っています。 第3の資源を取り除くことに加えて、数兆ドルの一帯一路イニシアチブの大きな推力は、世界中に軍事基地を建設しています。彼らは自由な世界をソ連との冷戦をピクニックのように見せる大規模なハイテク軍拡競争に追い 込んでいます。 SSSSKと世界の軍隊の残りの部分は、高度なハードウェアに巨額を費やしていますが、WW3(またはそれに至るまでの小規模なエンゲージメント)がソフトウェア支配になる可能性が高いです。SSSSKは、おそら くより多くのハッカー(コーダー)が彼らのために働き、世界の他のすべての部分を組み合わせることで、ネットを介して敵を麻痺させることによって、最小限の物理的な紛争で将来の戦争に勝つことは問題外ではありませ ん。衛星、電話、通信、金融取引、電力網、インターネット、高度な武器、車両、電車、船、飛行機はありません。 CCPを削除し、14億人の中国人囚人を解放し、第三次世界大戦への狂気の行進を終わらせるための2つの主要な道しかありません。 平和的なものは、軍がうんざりしてCCPを打ち切るまで、中国経済を荒廃させるために全面的な貿易戦争を開始することです。 中国経済を閉鎖する代わりに、CCPの第20回議会で50機の熱圧ドローンが1か所に位置する場合、標的型ストライキなど、限られた戦争であるが、2022年まで行われないので、年次本会議に当たる可能性がある。 中国人は、攻撃が起こったように、彼らは腕を下ろし、民主的な選挙を行うか、石器時代にヌックされる準備をしなければならないと知らされるだろう。もう一つの選択肢は、全面的な核攻撃です。 軍事的対立は、CCPの現在のコースを考えると避けられない。 南シナ海や台湾の島々で数十年以内に起こる可能性が高いが、世界中に軍事基地を設置するにつれて、どこでも起こり得る(クラウチング・タイガーなど参照)。 将来の紛争は、すべての軍事および産業通信、機器、発電所、衛星、インターネット、銀行、およびネットに接続されたデバイスまたは車両の制御システムをハッキングし、麻痺させることによってサイバー戦争を強調する ために、CCPの述べられた目的とハードキルとソフトキルの側面を持つことになります。 SSは、中国からの信号を待っているか、あるいは米国の船や飛行機の署名を探している場合でも、休眠状態にある可能性のある通常兵器や核兵器を打ち上げることができる有人および自律的な表面および水中潜水艦または ドローンの世界的な配列をゆっくりとフィールド化しています。 私たちの衛星を破壊し、したがって、世界中のアメリカと我々の軍隊との間の通信を排除しながら、彼らは私たちの現在優れた海軍を標的にし、破壊するためにドローンと一緒に、彼ら自身を使用します。 もちろん、このすべてがAIによってますます自動的に行われます。 CCPの最大の同盟国はアメリカの民主党です。 選択は、今CCPを停止するか、彼らは全世界に中国の刑務所を拡張として見てです。 .

Is capitalism inherently predatory? Must there be winners and losers? Is public interest outdated and free-riding rational? Is consumer choice the same as self-determination? Must bargainers abandon the no-harm principle? Prisoners of Reason recalls that classical liberal capitalism exalted the no-harm principle. Although imperfect and exclusionary, modern liberalism recognized individual human dignity alongside individuals' responsibility to respect others. Neoliberalism, by contrast, views life as ceaseless struggle. Agents vie for scarce resources in antagonistic competition in which every individual seeks dominance. This (...) political theory is codified in non-cooperative game theory; the neoliberal citizen and consumer is the strategic rational actor. Rational choice justifies ends irrespective of means. Money becomes the medium of all value. Solidarity and good will are invalidated. Relationships are conducted on a quid pro quo basis. However, agents can freely opt out of this cynical race to the bottom by embracing a more expansive range of coherent action. (shrink)

アメリカと世界は、過去1世紀の人口過剰な人口増加から崩壊し、現在は第3世界の人々のために崩壊しています。資源の消費と40億ca.2100の追加は、産業文明を崩壊させ、驚異的な規模で飢餓、病気、暴力と戦 争をもたらすでしょう。地球は毎年表土の少なくとも1%を失うので、2100に近づくにつれて、その食糧栽培能力のほとんどはなくなりました。何十億人もの人が死んで、核戦争は確実です。アメリカでは、これは大規 模な移民と移民の生殖によって、民主主義によって可能になった虐待と相まって、非常に加速されています。堕落した人間性は、民主主義と多様性の夢を犯罪と貧困の悪夢に変えます。中国は、利己主義を制限する独裁政権 を維持する限り、アメリカと世界を圧倒し続けるだろう。崩壊の根本的な原因は、私たちの生来の心理学が現代世界に適応できないことであり、人々は無関係な人を共通の利益を持っているかのように扱う。人権の考え方は 、左翼が第三世界の母性によって地球の無慈悲な破壊から注意を引くために促進する邪悪なファンタジーです。これは、基本的な生物学と心理学の無知に加えて、民主的な社会を支配する部分的に教育を受けた人々のソーシ ャルエンジニアリングの妄想につながります。一人の人を助けた場合、誰かに危害を加える人はいませんが、無料のランチはなく、誰もが消費するアイテムが修復を超えて地球を破壊することを理解している人はほとんどい ません。その結果、至る所の社会政策は持続不可能であり、利己主義に対する厳格な統制なしに、すべての社会が一つ一つ無政府状態または独裁に崩壊する。最も基本的な事実は、ほとんど言及されていないが、貧困層のか なりの割合を貧困から引き上げ、そこに留めるのに十分な資源がアメリカや世界に存在しないことである。これを行う試みは、アメリカを破産させ、世界を破壊することです。私たちの遺伝的品質と同様に、食料を生産する 地球の能力は毎日低下します。そして今、いつものように、貧しい人々の最大の敵は他の貧しい人々であり、金持ちではありません。劇的かつ即時の変化がなければ、アメリカの崩壊や民主主義システムに続く国を防ぐ望み はありません。.

Первое, что мы должны иметь в виду, что, говоря, что Китай говорит это или Китай делает это, мы говорим не о китайском народе, но социопатов, которые контролируют КПК - Коммунистическая партия Китая, т.е. семь senile sociopathic серийных убийц (SSSSK) Из Постоянного комитета КПК или 25 членов Политбюро и т.д. Планы CCP для WW3 и полного доминирования lay out довольно ясно в китайских изданиях и речи правительства и это «мечта Кита» Си Цзиньпина. Это мечта только для крошечного меньшинства (возможно, от нескольких (...) десятков до нескольких сотен), которые правят Китаем и кошмар для всех остальных (в том числе 1,4 миллиарда китайцев). 10 миллиардов долларов ежегодно позволяет им или их марионеткам владеть или контролировать газеты, журналы, телевизионные и радиоканалы и размещать поддельные новости в большинстве крупных средств массовой информации во всем мире каждый день. Кроме того, у них есть армия (может быть, миллионы людей), которые троллят все средства массовой информации размещения больше пропаганды и заглушая законные комментарии (50 центов армии). В дополнение к зачистке3-й мир ресурсов, основной направленноймноготриллионной инициативы «Пояс и путь» является строительство военных баз по всему миру. Они вынуждают свободный мир врезаться в массовую гонку вооружений для высоких технологий, которая делает холодную войну с Советским Союзом похожей на пикник. Хотя SSSSK, и остальные военные мира, тратят огромные суммы на передовое оборудование, весьма вероятно, что WW3 (или меньше обязательств, ведущих к нему) будет доминировать программного обеспечения. Это не может быть и речи, что SSSSK, с, вероятно, больше хакеров (кодеров), работающих на них, то весь остальной мир вместе взятые, победит будущих войн с минимальным физическим конфликтом, просто парализовав своих врагов через сеть. Ни спутников, ни телефонов, ни связи, ни финансовых операций, ни электросети, ни интернета, ни современного оружия, ни транспортных средств, ни поездов, кораблей, ни самолетов. Есть только два основных пути к удалению КПК, освобождение 1,4 миллиарда китайских заключенных, и окончание сумасшедшего марша к WW3. Мирный одно начать тотаку торговую войну для того чтобы опустошить китайскую экономию до тех пор пока воискаа получает надоеденными вверх и загружает вне CCP. Альтернативой закрытию экономики Китая является ограниченная война, такая как целенаправленный удар, скажем, 50 термобарических дронов на 20-мth конгрессе КПК, когда все высшие члены находятся в одном месте, но это не состоится до 2022 года, чтобы можно было попасть на ежегодное пленарное заседание. Китайцы будут проинформированы, как нападение произошло, что они должны сложить оружие и подготовиться к проведению демократических выборов или быть nuked в каменном вене. Другой альтернативой является тотавлёневая ядерная атака. Военная конфронтация неизбежна, учитывая нынешний курс КПК. Это, скорее всего, произойдет над островами в южно-китайском море или Тайваня в течение нескольких десятилетий, но, как они создают военные базы по всему миру это может произойти в любом месте (см. Крадущийся тигр и т.д.). Будущие конфликты будут иметь hardkill и softkill аспекты с заявленными целями CcP, чтобы подчеркнуть кибервойны путем взлома и парализующих систем управления всех военных и промышленных коммуникаций, оборудования, электростанций, спутников, Интернет, банки, и любое устройство или транспортное средство, подключенное к сети. СС медленно высаживают во всем мире множество пилотируемых и автономных надводных и подводных подводных подводных подводных и подводных подводных подводных аппаратов или беспилотных летательных аппаратов, способных запускать обычное или ядерное оружие, которое может находиться в состоянии покоя в ожидании сигнала из Китая или даже искать подпись американских кораблей или самолетов. Уничтожая наши спутники, тем самым устраняя связь между США и нашими силами по всему миру, они будут использовать их, совместно с беспилотниками, чтобы нацелить и уничтожить наши в настоящее время превосходящие военно-морские силы. Конечно, все это все чаще делается автоматически ИИ. На сегодняшний день крупнейшим союзником КПК является Демократическая партия США. Выбор остановить CCP теперь или наблюдать по мере того как они расширяют китайскую тюрьму над всем миром. Те, кто заинтересован в более подробной информации о сумасшедшем пути современного общества могут проконсультироваться с другими моими работами, такими как Самоубийство демократии-некролог для Америки и мира 3-е издание 2019 и суицидальных утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке: Философия, человеческая природа и крах цивилизации 4-й ред (2019). (shrink)

Discerning the decisionmaking of Kim Jong-Un and the North Korean regime on issues of peaceful engagement and warlike actions endures as a mighty challenge for U.S. intelligence analysts and policymakers. In this report, we seek to inform analysis of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leadership decisionmaking. To do so, we use three discussion papers that were written to facilitate discussion of an interagency working group. The three papers are assembled here in a single report. The first discussion paper describes (...) decisionmaking among different authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, and the opening up of those economies to outside engagement. The second paper outlines two different scenarios that might occur when conventional deterrence on the Korean Peninsula breaks down and the resulting decisions that North Korea’s leadership could face. The third paper assesses DPRK decisionmaking about nuclear weapon use. The report concludes with some observations, drawn from the issues covered in these three discussion papers, about DPRK decisionmaking and stability on the Korean Peninsula. (shrink)

Joseph Newhard (2017) argues that a libertarian anarchist society would be at a serious military disadvantage if it extended the nonaggression principle to include potential foreign invaders. He goes so far as to recommend cultivating the ability to launch a nuclear attack on foreign cities. In contrast, I argue that the free society would derive its strength from a total commitment to property rights and the protection of innocent life. Both theory and history suggest that a free society would (...) be capable of defending itself, and indeed that it would probably use other means to avoid military conflict altogether. (shrink)

Upon Brexit & Trade War, the research took a supply-side analysis in macroeconomic paradigm for the purpose and cause of the actions. In the geopolitical competitions on crude oil resources between the allied powers & the Russian hegemony, the latter of which has effective control over P. R. China’s multilateral behaviors, the external research induced that trade war, either by complete information in intelligence or an unintended result, was a supply chain attack in prohibiting the antisatellite weapon supplies in the (...) Northern regions of mainland China in relation to Russia. Although no substantive change to international relations, the Trade War’s prohibitive effect on the high frequency trading in the monetary domain of CNY was observed, which had been the source of economic bubbles in the import-export control regime with centralized banking. The paper argues that by realism in economy & military strategy, trade war was ineffective in deterring the covert operations of the People’s Liberation Army by their territorial strategies and raises questions in humanitarianism in conflict situations. Moreover, with gross privacy breaches by mass surveillance in domain politics, totalitarianism with coercions, and counterfeit of drone strikes, traditional methods of threat elimination are rendered less pragmatic apart from the adversaries’ cyber security breaches. With the scientific approach, I offer an ecological paradigm with historic analysis of the Chinese military’s conducts in terms economics. The territorial methods of the PLA are contextualized into the ecological paradigm in regionalism & public administration. Electronic combats of the Chinese regime with the Great Firewall and Denial-of-Service attacks not only contribute to the diminishing natural freedoms of the population, but also transgress the fundamental right to health along with non-traditional nuclear threats to P.R.C. itself. (shrink)

A deterrence theory of punishment holds that the institution of criminal punishment is morally justified because it serves to deter crime. Because the fear of external sanction is an important incentive in crime deterrence, the deterrence theory is often associated with the idea of severe, disproportionate punishment. An objection to this theory holds that hope of escape renders even the severest punishment inapt and irrelevant. -/- This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defend a more (...) plausible deterrence theory of punishment—the wide-scope deterrence theory. The wide-scope theory holds that we must make the best use of all the deterrence tools available, including both external and internal sanctions. Drawing on insights from the early Confucian tradition, the article develops a deep deterrence theory, which holds that the most important deterrence tool involves internal, not external, sanction. It describes how internal sanctions deter potential offenses and why relevant policies need not conflict with liberalism’s respect for neutrality. (shrink)

Since the end of the Cold War, international ethicists have focused largely on issues outside the traditional scope of security studies. The nuclear ethics literature needs to be revived and reoriented to address the new and evolving 21st century nuclear threats and policy responses.

This is a presentation of the utilitarian approach to punishment. It is meant for students. A note added in July, 2022 advises the reader about the author's current views on some topics in the paper. The first section discusses Bentham's psychological hedonism. The second briefly criticizes it. The third section explains abstractly how utilitarianism would determine of the right amount of punishment. The fourth section applies the theory to some cases, and brings out how utilitarianism could favor punishments more or (...) less severe than the lex talionis. (shrink)

Recent existential-risk thinkers have noted that the analysis of the fine-tuning argument for God’s existence, and the analysis of certain forms of existential risk, employ similar types of reasoning. This paper argues that insofar as the “many worlds objection” undermines the inference to God’s existence from universal fine-tuning, then a similar many worlds objection undermines the inference that the historic risk of global nuclear catastrophe has been low from the lack of such a catastrophe has occurred in our world. (...) A version of the fine-tuning argument applied to nuclear risk, The Nuclear Fine-Tuning Argument, utilizes the set of nuclear close calls to show that 1) conventional explanations fail to adequately explain how we have survived thus far and 2) the existence of many worlds provides an adequate explanation. This is because, if there are many worlds, observers are disproportionately more likely to reflect upon a world that hasn’t had a global nuclear catastrophe than upon one that has had a global nuclear catastrophe. This selection bias results from the catastrophic nature of such an event. This argument extends generally to all global catastrophic risks that both A) have been historic threats and B) would result in a significantly lower global population. (shrink)

This article explores the transformative impact of artificial intelligence on deterrence theory, introducing 10 groundbreaking concepts that are reshaping global security dynamics. As traditional deterrence strategies face challenges in an increasingly complex and interconnected world, these innovative approaches leverage AI, complex systems theory, and emerging technologies to create more sophisticated and adaptive deterrence mechanisms. From Chaos Deterrence, which harnesses unpredictability, to Möbius Deterrence, which blurs the lines between offense and defense, these concepts represent a paradigm (...) shift in conflict prevention and strategic stability. The article examines each concept in detail, discussing their potential applications, historical precedents, and contemporary relevance. It also addresses the ethical implications, challenges, and potential risks associated with implementing these AI-driven deterrence strategies. By analyzing these cutting-edge concepts, the article provides valuable insights into the future of global security in the age of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Communities of nuclear workers have evolved in distinctive contexts. During the Manhattan Project the UK, USA and Canada collectively developed the first reactors, isotope separation plants and atomic bombs and, in the process, nurtured distinct cadres of specialist workers. Their later workplaces were often inherited from wartime facilities, or built anew at isolated locations. For a decade, nuclear specialists were segregated and cossetted to gestate practical expertise. At Oak Ridge Tennessee, for example, the informal ‘Clinch College of (...) class='Hi'>Nuclear Knowledge’ aimed to industrialise the use of radioactive materials. ‘We were like children in a toy factory’, said its Director: ‘everyone could play the game of designing new nuclear power piles’. His counterpart at Chalk River, Ontario headed a project ‘completely Canadian in every respect’, while the head of the British project chose the remote Dounreay site in northern Scotland because of design uncertainties in the experimental breeder reactor. With the decline of secrecy during the mid-1950s, the hidden specialists lauded as ‘atomic scientists’ gradually became visible as new breeds of engineers, technologists and technicians responsible for nuclear reactors and power plants. Mutated by their different political contexts, occupational categories, labour affiliations, professional representations and popular depictions, their activities were disputed by distinct audiences. This chapter examines the changing identities of nuclear specialists and the significance of their secure sites. Shaped successively by Cold War secrecy, commercial competition and terrorist threats, nuclear energy remained out of site for wider publics and most nuclear specialists alike. The distinctive episodes reveal the changing working experiences of technical workers in late-twentieth and early twenty-first century environments. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the degree to which the most plausible versions of a Kantian approach to punishment differ from plausible versions of a consequentialist approach with regard to the permissibility of deterrence. I begin by examining the Formula of Humanity. Perhaps surprisingly, I show that the most plausible statement of this principle does not even mention the idea of treating people merely as a means. The other crucial claim in that principle—that we must treat people as ends—is (...) in fact the operative idea. The best interpretation of the Formula of Humanity makes Kantianism a basically ‘objective’ moral theory, in a sense to be explained, as is consequentialism. After defending my interpretation of the formula I go on to consider a recent theory of punishment developed by Victor Tadros that appeals to a principle paralleling the Formula of Humanity, the Means Principle. I argue that the Means Principle is not a plausible moral principle by using arguments that derive from my interpretation of the Formula of Humanity. The Means Principle is therefore unsuited to be the way to frame a discussion of whether deterrent punishments are permissible. In Section IV I discuss a version Kantian moral theory that can be seen as based on a proper interpretation of the Formula of Humanity. This version, drawing on the work of John Rawls, permits the pursuit of deterrence. This suggests that Kantianism and consequentialism are not divided on the issue of the permissibility of deterrence. In the final section I note one reason for thinking that further features of the consequentialist approach to deterrence make it superior to the Kantian-Rawlsian. (shrink)

Ordinary people shudder at the thought that people in positions of power might do whatever they think they can get away with. But that is often the way it is in the real world, and the risks go even higher when opportunity is compounded with impatience. The ways of negotiation and diplomacy are not considered entirely outmoded. But more and more we are being duped by a dream of some ultimate technological fix: that one more fancy gadget is all it (...) will take to solve the vexing problems that less well-tooled folks have been stumbling over for centuries. Our success rate, this reasoning goes, has been limited so far only by the limits on our equipment. With the new super-missile, or the new super-plane, or the new superlaunching system in space, we will be able to leap tall buildings in a single bound-or, what is more to the point, just blow them away and walk across the crater. "Bombs can be clean." "Nuclearwar is winnable." The illusion of omnipotence that accompanies this megalomania is well nurtured by manufacturers who stand in line for contracts to help build some super-weapon. This should not be surprising. What at first glance is surprising is the almost total failure of our commercial media to call this myth into question. This criticism is meant to be sweeping, but I will here focus my remarks on film. (shrink)

Recent revelations of Iran’s hitherto undisclosed uranium enrichment programs have once again incited western fears that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons’ capability. Their fears seem motivated by more than the concern for compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Rather, they seem strongly connected to the western moral assumptions about what kind of government or people can be trusted with a nuclear arsenal. In this paper, I critically examine the western assumptions of the immorality of contemporary nuclear (...) proliferation from an international ethical stance that otherwise might be expected to give it unequivocal support – the stance of Kantian nonideal theory. In contrast to the uses of Kant that were prominent during the Cold War, I advance and apply a sketch of a Kantian nonideal theory that specifies the conditions (although strict conditions) under which nuclear proliferation for states like Iran is morally permissible even though the NPT forbids it. (shrink)

A remarkable event occurred at the December 3, 2004, meeting of the U. S. President’s Council on Bioethics. Council member William Hurlbut, a physician and Consulting Professor in the Program in Human Biology at Stanford University, formally unveiled a proposal that he claimed would solve the ethical problems surrounding the extraction of stem cells from human embryos. The proposal would involve the creation of genetically defective embryos that “never rise to the level of integrated organismal existence essential to be designated (...) human life with potential,” and therefore could be used as morally acceptable sources of stem cells for research and therapy. The aim of this essay is to show that Hurlbut’s proposal does not solve the ethical problems associated with human embryonic stem cell research. Two major reasons are presented. First, the proposal, which involves modification of a somatic cell nucleus, suffers from an ethical problem that is common to all types of human genetic engineering: since the procedure is not foolproof, there will be failures. In the case of the procedure Hurlbut proposes, some normal (albeit cloned) embryos will be produced. Second, the embryo engineered in the manner described is, at least in the early stages of its development, fully human despite its genetic defect. This essay also will show how a reasonable person might mistakenly view the proposal as legitimate if he or she makes the error of conflating genetic determinism with Aristotelian teleology. Finally, it will argue that ethical clarity can be achieved by seeing the embryo as a holistic entity possessing emergent properties that cannot simply be spelled out by genes. (shrink)

The nuclear engineer emerged as a new form of recognised technical professional between 1940 and the early 1960s as nuclear fission, the chain reaction and their applications were explored. The institutionalization of nuclear engineering—channelled into new national laboratories and corporate design offices during the decade after the war, and hurried into academic venues thereafter—proved unusually dependent on government definition and support. This paper contrasts the distinct histories of the new discipline in the USA and UK (and, more (...) briefly, Canada). In the segregated and influential environments of institutional laboratories and factories, historical actors such as physicist Walter Zinn in the USA and industrial chemist Christopher Hinton in the UK proved influential in shaping the roles and perceptions of nuclear specialists. More broadly, I argue that the State-managed implantation of the new subject within further and higher education curricula was shaped strongly by distinct political and economic contexts in which secrecy, postwar prestige and differing industrial cultures were decisive factors. (shrink)

Objective: In the treatment of coronary artery disease, stent implantation has become the standard treatment, but development of in-stent restenosis (ISR) limits the benefit of this treatment modality. -/- Methods: Based on the connection between oxidative stress and thiol/disulphate and NRF2, it was intended to measure NRF2 and thiol/disulphate levels. -/- Results: Coronary angiography images of 76 stable angina pectoris patients were evaluated. Of the 51 patients with a history drug eluting stent implantation, we determined 25 patients with ISR (Group (...) 1) and 26 patients without ISR (Group 2). Twenty-five patients with normal coronary arteries were included in the study as control group (Group 3). NRF2 level was found to be significantly higher in patients who did not develop ISR (p=0.01). Total thiol was significantly higher in group 3 (738.76 micromole/L) compared to group 1 (626.11 micromole/L) and group 2 (630.27 micromole/L) (p=0.014). Native thiol was also significantly higher in group 3 (570.53 micromole/L) compared to group 1 (483.91 micromole/L) and group 2 (501 micromole/L) (p=0.006). -/- Conclusion: We think that total and native thiol levels might be useful as an indicator of oxidative stress in early diagnosis of coronary artery disease, and the NRF2 level can be used in predicting patients who might develop coronary ISR. (shrink)

Between 1942 and the late 1950s, atomic piles (nuclear chain-reactors) were industrialized, initially to generate plutonium for the first atomic weapons and later to serve as copious sources of neutrons, radioisotopes and electrical power. These facilities entrained a new breed of engineering specialist adept at designing, operating and maintaining them. From the beginning, large companies supplied the engineering labor for this new technology, and played an important role in defining the nature of their nuclear expertise. In the USA, (...) the most influential company of the period was DuPont, which assumed responsibility for the first plutonium production reactors at Oak Ridge TN and Hanford WA between 1942-6, and of the postwar production facilities at Savannah River SC 1950-87. This paper explores the transition of authority from so-called “atomic scientists” to nuclear engineers at these sites, and the role played by DuPont in consolidating this new technical profession. (shrink)

Community detection is a major issue in network analysis. This paper combines a socio-historical approach with an experimental reconstruction of programs to investigate the early automation of clique detection algorithms, which remains one of the unsolved NP-complete problems today. The research led by the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin from the 1950s on non-numerical information and graph analysis is retraced to demonstrate the early contributions of social sciences and humanities. The limited recognition and reception of Gardin's innovative computer application to the humanities (...) are addressed through two factors, in addition to the effects of historiography and bibliographies on the recording, discoverability, and reuse of scientific productions: (1) funding policies, evidenced by the transfer of research effort on graph applications from temporary interdisciplinary spaces to disciplinary organizations related to the then-emerging field of computer science; and (2) the erratic careers of algorithms, in which efficiency, flaws, corrections, and authors’ status, were determining factors. (shrink)

The historic material culture produced by American Cold War nuclear weapons testing includes objects of scientific inquiry that can be generally categorized as being either ephemeral or enduring. Objects deemed to be ephemeral were of a less substantial nature, being impermanent and expendable in a nuclear test, while enduring objects were by nature more durable and long-lasting. Although all of these objects were ultimately subject to disappearance, the processes by which they were transformed, degraded, or destroyed prior to (...) their disappearing differ. Drawing principally upon archaeological theory, this paper proposes a functional dichotomy for categorizing and studying the historical trajectories of nuclear weapons testing technoscience artifacts. In examining the transformation patterns of steel towers and concrete blockhouses in particular, it explores an associated loss of scientific method that accompanies a science object's disappearance. (shrink)

This study aims to determine driving factors significantly influencing the purchase intention and to identify impediments creating the intention –behavior gap regarding organic food consumption in Vietnam. The chosen driving factors affecting the organic food purchase intention in this study are health benefits, environmental awareness, and social norms, whereas trust, price, and convenience as well as availability are investigated as deterrent factors of the link between intention and behavior. A structured online questionnaire with snow-balling sampling method was distributed to collect (...) a representative sample of 466 Vietnamese consumers nationwide. A five-point likert scale was used for the level of approval for 36 statements. Statistical tools of SPSS 22.0 including descriptive analysis, principal component analysis, and multiple regression analysis models were used for data analysis. The results showed that health benefits, environmental awareness, and social norms were facilitators of organic food purchase intention. Although high intention to purchase organic foods was identified in Vietnam, it was not translated into actual purchase behavior. The main barriers for the inconsistency were premium price and low availability of organic products or inconvenience to buy in the market. Lack of trust insignificantly impacted on organic food choices among Vietnamese consumers in this study. These empirical findings and suggestions are beneficial for all players across supply chains. (shrink)

Owing to the escalating regional rivalries and the conventional arms race, Iran’s post-revolutionary hostilities towards the West, in addition to the crucial geopolitical and economic significance of the region, the complex Iranian nuclear crisis has made the global leaders to brood over the multilateral Iranian negotiations with the P5+1 and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which led to finalization and adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. The United Kingdom as a permanent member of the United (...) Nations Security Council, a nuclear state, the bridge to the Cross-Atlantic relations, in addition to its noted ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and having over two centuries of political ties with Iran has constantly played a crucial role in all stages of the negotiations and tightening the imposed embargoes. Indeed, ever since the 1979 Revolution the Anglo-Iranian relations have been volatile and have suffered from tension, instability, and upheavals; despite reconciliation in 1998 and some prominent diplomatic accomplishments in nuclear negotiations the sour relations had strained by several incidents in the past two decades. This study addresses the Anglo-Iranian relations and attempts to provide theoretical scrutiny of the UK foreign policy on the Iranian nuclear program and clarify the British approach through the lens of game theories with respect to neorealism, classical realism, neoclassical realism, and liberalism perspectives. (shrink)

In this article, I present a view on the future of nuclear war which takes into account the expected technological progress as well as global political changes. There are three main directions in which technological progress in nuclear weapons may happen: a) Many gigaton scale weapons. b) Cheaper nuclear bombs which are based on the use of the reactor-grade plutonium, laser isotope separation or are hypothetical pure fusion weapons. Also, advanced nanotechnology will provide the ability to quickly (...) build large nuclear arsenals and AI could be used in designing, manufacturing and nuclear strategy planning. c) Specialized nukes like nuclear-powered space lasers, hafnium bombs and nuclear-powered space ships as kinetic weapons. Meanwhile, the nuclear war strategy also has changed as the bipolar world has ended and as new types of weapons are becoming available. The first strategy change is that Doomsday weapons for blackmail will become attractive for weaker countries which can’t use ICBM to penetrate the anti-missile defense of the enemies. Secondly, the cheaper nukes will become available to smaller actors, who may be involved in “worldwide guerilla”. Cheaper nukes and a larger number of actors also encourage nuclear terrorism and anonymous or false-flag warfare. This will result in the normalization of the use of nuclear weapons in war and growing nuclear arsenals, now distributed between many countries. The third change of the strategy is the use of nukes not against primary military targets but on other objects, which could increase their effects: nuclear power plants, supervolcanos, EMP, tsunamis, taiga fires for global cooling, and even more hypothetical things like asteroid deflection to Earth. All these unconventional means and strategies of nuclear war could become available somewhere in the 21st century and may cause or contribute to the civilizational collapse and even human extinction. (shrink)

This essay aims to tell the story of the “altered nuclear transfer-oocyte assisted reprogramming,” or ANT-OAR, proposal—from its conception by Professor William Hurlbut of the President’s Council on Bioethics—to its adoption and promotion by a group of conservative, mostly Catholic philosophers, theologians and scientists—to its eventual demise in Congress. It also will give some reflections on how ANT-OAR promotes a genetically deterministic view of the human organism and can lead down a slippery slope into a future in which human (...) cloning and human genetic engineering are more acceptable. For these reasons, it will be argued, ANT-OAR should be opposed by all who are against human genetic modification regardless of their political orientation. (shrink)

In this article I examine the compatibility of a leading trope bundle theory of substance, so-called Nuclear Theory, with trope theory more generally. Peter Simons (1994) originally proposed Nuclear Theory (NT), and continues to develop (1998, 2000) and maintain (2002/03) the view. Recently, building on Simons’s theory, Markku Keinänen (2011) has proposed what he calls the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT). Although the latter is supposed to shore up some of NT’s weaknesses, it continues to maintain NT’s central (...) tenet, the premise that tropes are variously existentially interdependent. I argue that the central tenet of NT frustrates several important aims of trope theory. If my arguments go through, they also implicate SNT. Because of this, I largely set aside other aspects of NT and SNT and focus on their shared central tenet. (shrink)

Atomic energy developed from 1940 as a subject shrouded in secrecy. Identified successively as a crucial element in military strategy, national status and export aspirations, the research and development of atomic piles (nuclear chain-reactors) were nurtured at isolated installations. Like monastic orders, new national laboratories managed their specialist workers in occupational environments that were simultaneously cosseted and constrained, defining regional variants of a new state-managed discipline: reactor technology. This paper discusses the significance of security in defining the new subject (...) in the USA, UK and Canada – wartime allies with similar political traditions but distinct trajectories in this field during the Cold War. The intellectual borders and content of the subject developed differently in each country, shaped under the umbrella of secrecy by disparate clusters of expertise, industrial traditions, and national goals. The nascent cadre was contained until the mid 1950s by classified publications and state-sponsored specialist courses. The early context of high security filtered its members and capped enduringly both their professional aspirations and public engagement. (shrink)

The development of nuclear energy technologies in the second half of the 20th century came with great hopes of rebuilding nations recovering from the devasta-tion of the Second World War or recently released from colonial rule. In coun-tries like France, India, the USA, Canada, Russia, and the United Kingdom, nuclear energy became the symbol of development towards a modern and technologically advanced future. However, after more than six decades of experi-ence with nuclear energy production, and in the (...) aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, it is safe to say that nuclear energy production is not without its problems.Some of these problems have their origins in the very materiality of the technolo-gies involved. For example, not only does the use of highly radioactive materials give rise to risks for the current generation (e.g., in the potential for disaster when reactors melt down) but high-level radioactive waste from nuclear energy production presents a serious intergenerational problem for which an acceptable final solution or its implementation remains elusive. Moreover, nuclear energy technologies have specific social and political consequences. For example, they have been said to be authoritarian technologies (Winner, 1980), requiring cen-tralized authority, secrecy, and technocratic decision-making. While some of these problems could have been foreseen before nuclear energy technologies were introduced, others only arose after these technologies were already integrated into the social and infrastructural fabric of our lives. Addition-ally, new technologies (e.g., Generation III, III+ and IV reactors) are still being developed, bringing with them new and uncertain hazards and risks. Ignorance and uncertainty about the possible deleterious effects of introducing a new technology are inevitable, especially if the technology is complex, large time-scales are involved, or risks depend on social or political factors unforeseen in the design stage. However, this should not deter us from developing and intro-ducing new technologies. Rather, it should motivate us to organize these ‘exper-iments’ with new technologies in society in such a way that we can learn about their possible hazards and risks as effectively and responsibly as possible (van de Poel, 2011, 2015). In this way, it is possible to minimize risks and avoid unwant-ed moral, social or political developments. However, organizing such experi-ments responsibly also means that one could come to the conclusion that continuing an experiment is no longer responsible or desirable. Should we be prepared for such a scenario, and if so, how could we do that? One possible strategy to tackle this issue is that the technology and its introduction should be reversible. The aim of this thesis is to further explore this strategy by answering the following main research question (RQ) and accompanying subquestions (SQ):RQ: What are the implications of reversibility for the responsible develop-ment and implementation of nuclear energy technologies?SQ1: Under what conditions can nuclear energy technologies be considered reversible?SQ2: Why should nuclear energy technologies be reversible?SQ3: If so, how could the reversibility of nuclear energy technologies be achieved?After the introductory chapter 1, the chapters that form the main body of this dissertation each provide a distinct contribution to answering the three subques-tions and, by extension, the main research question. Guided by three historical case studies of nuclear energy technology development (i.e., India, France and the USA), chapter 2 answers the first subquestion by formulating the two condi-tions under which it can be considered reversible, i.e., 1) the ability to stop the further development and deployment of a that technology in society, and 2) the ability to undo the undesirable outcomes (material, institutional or symbolic) of the development and deployment of the technology. Chapter 3 subsequently tackles the second subquestion by establishing the general desirability of technological reversibility by virtue of its relation to responsibility in Emmanuel Levinas’ ethical phenomenology. It argues that technology development is a legitimate response to responsibility but inevitably falls short of the responsibility that inspires it, incessantly calling for technological and political change in the process. Having thus argued that nuclear energy technologies should ideally be reversible, chap-ters 4 and 5 work towards specific strategies to achieve technological reversibil-ity. Chapter 4 first investigates the processes that make it difficult to stop the further development and implementation of a nuclear energy technology in society, thus provid-ing input on how to fulfill the first condition for the reversibility of nuclear energy technologies. To do so, it presents a phenomenological perspective on technology and its adoption based on the work of Alfred Schutz. It also explores different ways in which technology adoption drives the processes of path depend-ence towards technological lock-in. Chapter 5 examines the history of geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste in the USA. It identifies a number of concrete policy pitfalls that could lead to lock-in and that should consequently be avoided. It also presents a number of general design strategies that could facilitate the undoing of undesirable consequences of a technology, thus providing input on how to fulfill the second condition for the reversibility of nuclear energy technol-ogies.Chapter 6 summarizes the central findings of the thesis and explains how these help to answer the research questions. On top of this, it reflects on a number of complications connected to reversibility considerations. Based on this, it is concluded that the question of irreversibility and reversibility is context- and technology-specific and a matter of degree. The chapter concludes with a reflec-tion on generalizations and limitations of the results. Finally, chapter 7 discusses the implications of this dissertation’s results for responsibly experimenting with nuclear energy technologies in society. (shrink)

Gauthier claims: (1) a non-maximizing action is rational if it maximized to intend it. If one intended to retaliate in order to deter an attack, (2) retaliation is rational, for it maximized to intend it. I argue that even on sympathetic theories of intentions, actions and choices, (1) is incoherent. But I defend (2) by arguing that an action is rational if it maximizes on preferences it maximized to adopt given one's antecedent preferences. (2) is true because it maximized to (...) adopt preferences on which it maximizes to retaliate. I thus save the theory that rational actions must maximize, and extend it into the rational criticism of preferences. (shrink)

First put forth in June 2005, the altered nuclear transfer-oocyte assisted reprogramming (ANT-OAR) proposal has been promoted as an ethically-acceptable alternative to the embryo-destructive methods now used to obtain embryonic stem cells. According to its proponents, the goal of ANT-OAR is to use the cloning process to create a pluripotent stem cell. This would be achieved through overexpression of the transcription factor Nanog (or a hypothetical substitute) both in the enucleated egg cell and in the somatic cell prior to (...) transfer of its nucleus. Although the ethical acceptability of ANT-OAR has been publicly debated, its scientific feasibility has not. This paper aims to help rectify this situation. It argues that ANT-OAR, as currently conceived, cannot realistically work. It presents evidence from the scientific literature showing that Nanog cannot single-handedly establish pluripotency in cells, but rather works together with a network of other transcription factors to maintain pluripotency. It argues that ANT-OAR is based on a flawed understanding of stem cell biology, and emphasizes that, in this debate about embryonic stem cells, scientists must strive to accurately and realistically assess the feasibility of the embryo research strategies they propose. (shrink)

Canada, as one of the three Allied nations collaborating on atomic energy development during the Second World War, had an early start in applying its new knowledge and defining a new profession. Owing to postwar secrecy and distinct national aims for the field, nuclear engineering was shaped uniquely by the Canadian context. Alone among the postwar powers, Canadian exploration of atomic energy eschewed military applications; the occupation emerged within a governmental monopoly; the intellectual content of the discipline was influenced (...) by its early practitioners, administrators, scarce resources, and university niches; and a self-recognized profession coalesced later than did its American and British counterparts. This paper argues that the history of the emergence of Canadian nuclear engineers exemplifies unusually strong shaping of technical expertise by political and cultural context. (shrink)

I will relate some social and epistemic aspects involved in the conceptual development of the genetic model in the early Molecular Biology. I will use the link between Biology and Physics as a framework, which supports such assumptions, providing new methodologies, but mainly as a framework that provides a model of objectivity developed within Modern Tradition. Finally, I will interpret this relationship from the pragmatist perspective to embrace Rorty’s thesis on «the ontological priority of the social» which implies understanding biology (...) as a part of a general cultural politics. (shrink)

This article discusses twelve reasons that we must teach about the 1945 American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As with Holocaust studies, we must teach this material even though it is both emotionally and intellectually difficult—in spite of our feelings of repugnance and/or grief, and our concerns regarding students’ potential distress (“tertiary trauma”). To handle such material effectively, we should keep in mind ten objectives: 1) to expand students' knowledge about the subject along with the victims’ experience of it; (...) 2) to develop teachers’ awareness of and comfort with it; 3) to help students cope with this knowledge so they are not traumatized themselves; 4) to make sure students don't take refuge in callousness, inappropriate humor, blaming the victim, or despair; 5) to enable students to teach others about the event(s); 6) to enable students to use their increased knowledge and self-reflection individually and as part of the national dialogue; 7) to deepen and “complexify” the conversation on the bombings; 8) to develop supports for teachers and students throughout this process;” 9) to reintegrate the objective with the subjective, recognizing that emotion may be appropriate to some learning; 10) to instigate a dialogue allowing teachers and students to continue to investigate this and related topics. (shrink)

According to deterrence justifications of legal punishment, legal punishment is justified at least in part because it deters offenses. These justifications rely on important empirical assumptions, e.g., that non-punitive enforcement can't deter or that it can't deter enough. I’ll challenge these assumptions and argue that extant deterrence justifications of legal punishment fail. In the process, I examine contemporary deterrence research and argue that it provides no support for these justifications.

Suppose that state A attacks state D without warrant. The ensuing military conflict threatens international peace and security. State D (I assume) has a justification for defending itself by means of military force. Do third parties have a justification for intervening in that conflict by such means? To international public lawyers, the well-rehearsed and obvious answer is “yes.” Threats to international peace and security provide one of two exceptions to the legal and moral prohibition (as set out in Article 2[4] (...) of the UN Charter) on using force as a means for resolving interstate disputes. Just war theorists are not as verdictive. Compared to the ethics of humanitarian intervention and the ethics of national self-defense, the ethics of third-party military involvement in interstate conflicts remains underdeveloped in contemporary just war theory. This essay begins to fill that gap. I argue that to defend such interventions is tantamount to defending preventive military force, deterrent military force, and the resort to force in more cases than standardly thought. I then provide an account and limited defense of the deterrence argument. I show that deterrence is morally justified in relatively few cases and examine two problems with the argument: deterrence failures and the level of uncertainty under which leaders who use deterrent force operate. I conclude that we should take seriously the possibility that nonintervention, construed as the rejection of the direct use of military force, is the morally correct response to the most serious threats to international peace and security. (shrink)

This contribution aims to give an overview of the historical context of neutrino physics. I will present the strong social trends that shaped physics and the way physicists worked, along the 20th century. First, we will see the background of the birth of nuclear physics in the interwar period. Then, we will examine the deep implications the Second World War had, to conclude with the specificities of post-war years for nuclear and particle physics.

In this chapter, I consider contemporary consequentialist theories of punishment. Consequentialist theories of punishment look to the consequences of punishment to justify the institution of punishment. Two types of theories fall into this category—teleology and aggregationism. I argue that teleology is implausible as it is based on a problematic assumption about the fundamental value of criminal punishment, and that aggregationism provides a more reasonable alternative. Aggregationism holds that punishment is morally justified because it is an institution that helps society to (...) aggregate important moral values. Several theories fall into this category, including general deterrence theories, specific deterrence theories, and preventionism. I critically evaluate these theories and argue that only one specific deterrence theory, namely, my rights-protection theory, provides the most reasonable consequentialist account of punishment. (shrink)