Results for 'QUINE'

369 found
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  1. ‘‘Quine’s Evolution From ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of “Two Dogmas.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.
    Recent scholarship indicates that Quine’s “Truth by Convention” does not present the radical critiques of analytic truth found fifteen years later in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” This prompts a historical question: what caused Quine’s radicalization? I argue that two crucial components of Quine’s development can be traced to the academic year 1940–1941, when he, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Hempel, and Goodman were all at Harvard together. First, during those meetings, Quine recognizes that Carnap has abandoned the extensional, (...)
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  2. W.V. Quine, Immanuel Kant Lectures, translated and introduced by H.G. Callaway.H. G. Callaway & W. V. Quine (eds.) - 2003 - Frommann-Holzboog.
    This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is (...)
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  3. Quine's Monism and Modal Eliminativism in the Realm of Supervenience.Atilla Akalın - 2019 - International Journal of Social Humanities Sciences Research (JSHRS) 6 (34):795-800.
    This study asserts that W.V.O. Quine’s eliminative philosophical gaze into mereological composition affects inevitably his interpretations of composition theories of ontology. To investigate Quine’s property monism from the account of modal eliminativism, I applied to his solution for the paradoxes of de re modalities’ . Because of its vital role to figure out how dispositions are encountered by Quine, it was significantly noted that the realm of de re modalities doesn’t include contingent and impossible inferences about things. (...)
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  4. Quine on the Nature of Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):96-115.
    Quine's metaphilosophical naturalism is often dismissed as overly “scientistic.” Many contemporary naturalists reject Quine's idea that epistemology should become a “chapter of psychology” and urge for a more “liberal,” “pluralistic,” and/or “open-minded” naturalism instead. Still, whenever Quine explicitly reflects on the nature of his naturalism, he always insists that his position is modest and that he does not “think of philosophy as part of natural science”. Analyzing this tension, Susan Haack has argued that Quine's naturalism contains (...)
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  5. Quine, Putnam, and the ‘Quine–Putnam’ Indispensability Argument.David Liggins - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
    Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine's argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. (...)
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  6. Quine's Argument From Despair.Sander Verhaegh - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):150-173.
    Quine's argument for a naturalized epistemology is routinely perceived as an argument from despair: traditional epistemology must be abandoned because all attempts to deduce our scientific theories from sense experience have failed. In this paper, I will show that this picture is historically inaccurate and that Quine's argument against first philosophy is considerably stronger and subtler than the standard conception suggests. For Quine, the first philosopher's quest for foundations is inherently incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient (...)
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  7. Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.Qilin Li -
    In this paper, it is argued that there are (at least) two different kinds of ‘epistemic normativity’ in epistemology, which can be scrutinized and revealed by some comparison with some naturalistic studies of ethics. The first kind of epistemic normativity can be naturalized, but the other not. The doctrines of Quine’s naturalized epistemology is firstly introduced; then Kim’s critique of Quine’s proposal is examined. It is argued that Quine’s naturalized epistemology is able to save some room for (...)
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  8. Duhem–Quine Virtue Epistemology.Abrol Fairweather - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):673-692.
    The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves (...)
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  9. Quine's ‘Needlessly Strong’ Holism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 61:11-20.
    Quine is routinely perceived as having changed his mind about the scope of the Duhem-Quine thesis, shifting from what has been called an 'extreme holism' to a more moderate view. Where the Quine of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' argues that “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science” (1951, 42), the later Quine seems to back away from this “needlessly strong statement of holism” (1991, 393). In this paper, I show that the received view (...)
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  10. Theories and Things.W. V. O. Quine (ed.) - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
    Things and Their Place in Theories Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and ...
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  11.  43
    Quine’s Argument From Despair.Sander Verhaegh - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):150-173.
    Quine’s argument for a naturalized epistemology is routinely perceived as an argument from despair: traditional epistemology must be abandoned because all attempts to deduce our scientific theories from sense experience have failed. In this paper, I will show that this picture is historically inaccurate and that Quine’s argument against first philosophy is considerably stronger and subtler than the standard conception suggests. For Quine, the first philosopher’s quest for foundations is inherently incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient (...)
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  12. Quine's Interpretation Problem and the Early Development of Possible Worlds Semantics.Sten Lindström - 2001 - In Ondrey Majer (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2000. Filosofia.
    In this paper, I shall consider the challenge that Quine posed in 1947 to the advocates of quantified modal logic to provide an explanation, or interpretation, of modal notions that is intuitively clear, allows “quantifying in”, and does not presuppose, mysterious, intensional entities. The modal concepts that Quine and his contemporaries, e.g. Carnap and Ruth Barcan Marcus, were primarily concerned with in the 1940’s were the notions of (broadly) logical, or analytical, necessity and possibility, rather than the metaphysical (...)
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  13. The Behaviorisms of Skinner and Quine: Genesis, Development, and Mutual Influence.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (4):707-730.
    in april 1933, two bright young Ph.D.s were elected to the Harvard Society of Fellows: the psychologist B. F. Skinner and the philosopher/logician W. V. Quine. Both men would become among the most influential scholars of their time; Skinner leads the "Top 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century," whereas philosophers have selected Quine as the most important Anglophone philosopher after the Second World War.1 At the height of their fame, Skinner and Quine became "Edgar Pierce (...)
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  14. Willard Van Orman Quine's Philosophical Development in the 1930s and 1940s.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2018 - In Walter Carnielli, Frederique Janssen-Lauret & William Pickering (eds.), The Significance of the New Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    As analytic philosophy is becoming increasingly aware of and interested in its own history, the study of that field is broadening to include, not just its earliest beginnings, but also the mid-twentieth century. One of the towering figures of this epoch is W.V. Quine (1908-2000), champion of naturalism in philosophy of science, pioneer of mathematical logic, trying to unite an austerely physicalist theory of the world with the truths of mathematics, psychology, and linguistics. Quine's posthumous papers, notes, and (...)
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  15.  91
    Why “is At”? —On Quine’s Objection to Carnap’s Aufbau in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.Ka Ho Lam - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (4).
    In “Two Dogmas”, Quine indicates that Carnap’s Aufbau fails “in principle” to reduce our knowledge of the external world to sense data. This is because in projecting the sensory material to reconstruct the physical world, Carnap gives up the use of operating rules and switches to a procedure informed by general principles. This procedure falls short of providing an eliminative translation for the connective “is at”, which is necessary for the reduction. In dissecting Quine’s objection, I argue that (...)
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  16. Is Quine a Verificationist?Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):399-409.
    For example, Cheryl Misak in her book-length examination of verificationism writes that ‘the holist [such as Quine] need not reject verificationism, if it is suitably formulated. Indeed, Quine often describes himself as a verificationist’.[iii] Misak concludes that Quine ‘can be described as a verificationist who thinks that the unit of meaning is large’;[iv] and when comparing Dummett and Quine, Misak states that ‘both can be, and in fact are, verificationists’.[v].
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  17. Quine and Quantified Modal Logic – Against the Received View.Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):518-545.
    The textbook-like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, re-ceived views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of ana-lytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against (...)
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  18. The Esoteric Quine? Belief Attribution and the Significance of the Indeterminacy Thesis in Quine’s Kant Lectures.H. G. Callaway - 2003 - In W.V. Quine, Wissenschaft und Empfindung. Frommann-Holzboog.
    This is the Introduction to my translation of Quine's Kant Lectures. Part of my interpretation is that an "esoteric doctrine" in involved in Quine's distinctive semantic claims: his skepticism of the credulity of non-expert evaluation of discourse and theory.
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  19. Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):873-890.
    Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that (...)
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  20. Quine and the Incoherence of the Indispensability Argument.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (2):207-213.
    It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, when coupled with some other plausible and related views, implies that there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure mathematical theories within the Quinean framework. This is a serious problem because there seems to be a principled difference between the two disciplines that cannot apparently be captured in the orthodox Quienan framework. For the purpose of simplicity let us call this Quine's problem of demarcation. (...)
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  21.  34
    Quine on Explication.Jonas Raab - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-30.
    The main goal of this paper is to work out Quine's account of explication. Quine does not provide a general account, but considers a paradigmatic example which does not fit other examples he claims to be explications. Besides working out Quine's account of explication and explaining this tension, I show how it connects to other notions such as paraphrase and ontological commitment. Furthermore, I relate Quinean explication to Carnap's conception and argue that Quinean explication is much narrower (...)
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  22. Quine, Ontology, and Physicalism.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2019 - In Robert Sinclair (ed.), Science and Sensibilia by W.V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 181-204.
    Quine's views on ontology and naturalism are well-known but rarely considered in tandem. According to my interpretation the connection between them is vital. I read Quine as a global epistemic structuralist. Quine thought we only ever know objects qua solutions to puzzles about significant intersections in observations. Objects are always accessed descriptively, via their roles in our best theory. Quine's Kant lectures contain an early version of epistemic structuralism with uncharacteristic remarks about the mental. Here (...) embraces mitigated anomalous monism, allowing introspection and the availability in principle of full physical descriptions of the perceptual states which get science off the ground. Later versions abandon these ideas. My epistemic-structural interpretation explains why. I argue first-personal introspective access to mental states is incompatible with global epistemic structuralism. (shrink)
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  23. Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Russell Gillian - 2014 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W.V.O. Quine. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 181-202.
    A critical survey of Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  24. Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms.Tony Cheng - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):548-567.
    This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly (...)
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  25. Quine and His Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality.Charles Sayward - 2007 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he (...)
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  26. What Quine (and Carnap) Might Say About Contemporary Metaphysics of Time.Natalja Deng - forthcoming - In Frederique Janssen-Lauret (ed.), Quine, Structure, and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter examines some (...)
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  27.  30
    Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse.Necip Fikri Alican - 2021 - Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse is the first comprehensive treatment of Quine’s brief yet memorable foray into ethics. It defends him against his most formidable critics, corrects misconceptions in the reception of his outlook on morality as a social institution and ethics as a philosophical enterprise, and restores emphasis on observationality as the impetus behind his momentous intervention in ethical theory. The central focus is on Quine’s infamous challenge to ethical theory: his thesis of (...)
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  28. Quine y el pragmatismo clásico.Andrés Páez - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11:59-79.
    A menudo se asocia a Quine con los filósofos pragmatistas o al menos se le atribuye una posición consonante con el pragmatismo. En el presente ensayo examino la relación entre la obra de Quine y la de los pragmatistas clásicos: Peirce, James y Dewey. El recorrido por los escritos de Quine mostrará varias similitudes con la doctrina de los límites de la experiencia propuesta por James, y al mismo tiempo diferencias significativas con el naturalismo de Dewey y (...)
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  29. Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".
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  30. Sign and Object : Quine’s Forgotten Book Project.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5039-5060.
    W. V. Quine’s first philosophical monograph, Word and Object, is widely recognized as one of the most influential books of twentieth century philosophy. Notes, letters, and draft manuscripts at the Quine Archives, however, reveal that Quine was already working on a philosophical book in the early 1940s; a project entitled Sign and Object. In this paper, I examine these and other unpublished documents and show that Sign and Object sheds new light on the evolution of Quine’s (...)
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  31. Quine’s Meaning Nihilism: Revisiting Naturalism and Confirmation Method,’.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2017 - Philosophical Readings (3):222-229.
    The paper concentrates on an appreciation of W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and ‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indeterminacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is (...)
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  32. Understanding Quine in Terms of the Aufbau: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology.Stefanie Rocknak - 2010 - In Marcin Milkowski Konrad Talmud-Kaminski (ed.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
    I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt (...)
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  33. Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine Revisited.Sean Crawford - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):75 - 96.
    Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’ (or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system is also supposed (...)
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  34. Working From Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    During the past few decades, a radical shift has occurred in how philosophers conceive of the relation between science and philosophy. A great number of analytic philosophers have adopted what is commonly called a ‘naturalistic’ approach, arguing that their inquiries ought to be in some sense continuous with science. Where early analytic philosophers often relied on a sharp distinction between science and philosophy—the former an empirical discipline concerned with fact, the latter an a priori discipline concerned with meaning—philosophers today largely (...)
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  35. Professor Quine on Japanese Classifiers.Takashi Iida - 1998 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 9 (3):111-118.
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  36. Quine's Relativism.Lars Bergström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):286-298.
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  37. Quine's Physicalism.H. G. Callaway & Paul Gochet - 2007 - In Filosofia, Scienza e Bioetica nel dibattito contemperano, Studi internazionali in onore di Evandro Agazzi, pp. 1105-1115.
    In this paper we briefly examine and evaluate Quine’s physicalism. On the supposition, in accordance with Quine’s views, that there can be no change of any sort without a physical change, we argue that this point leaves plenty of room to understand and accept a limited autonomy of the special sciences and of other domains of disciplinary and common-sense inquiry and discourse. The argument depends on distinguishing specific, detailed programs of reduction from the general Quinean strategy of reduction (...)
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  38.  72
    Quine l’extensionaliste. Entre naturalisme et esthétisme.Fabien Schang - 2005 - Philosophia Scientiae 9 (2):279-293.
    La position résolument extensionaliste de Quine a été appuyée par des arguments de nature différente, dans ses multiples articles destinés à rejeter le projet de logique modale. On peut classer ces arguments en trois catégories : un argument naturaliste, où l’auteur tente de baser le langage scientifique sur une notation tâchée de décrire la “structure ultime de la réalité” ; un argument esthétique, où Quine fait allusion à des raisons de clarté et d’efficacité démonstrative pour privilégier la théorie (...)
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  39. Are Quine’s Two Indeterminacy Theses Compatible?Gábor Forrai - 1999 - Acta Analytica 14 (23.):89-99..
    The paper seeks to show that Quine’s theses concerning the underdetermination of scientific theories by experience and the indeterminacy of reference cannot be reconciled if some of Quine’s central assumptions are accepted. The argument is this. Quine holds that the thesis about reference is not just a special case of the other thesis. In order to make sense of this comment we must distinguish between factual and epistemic indeterminacy. Something is factual indeterminate if it is not determined (...)
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  40. Quine and His Place in History. [REVIEW]Sander Verhaegh - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):433-435.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] the very end of his extraordinary philosophical career, Quine used a 1927 Remington typewriter—a machine that was perfectly adapted to his scholarly needs because he had replaced many of its keys with logical symbols. Famously, one of the keys Quine removed was the question mark. Asked about his curious (...)
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  41.  40
    Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action.Sean Crawford - forthcoming - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy.
    In Making it Explicit Robert Brandom claims that perspectivally hybrid de re attitude ascriptions explain what an agent actually did, from the point of view of the ascriber, whether or not that was what the agent intended to do. There is a well-known problem, however, first brought to attention by Quine, but curiously ignored by Brandom, that threatens to undermine the role of de re ascriptions in the explanation of action, a problem that stems directly from the fact that, (...)
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  42. Quine and the A Priori.Lars Bergström - 2014 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 38–53.
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  43.  31
    Quine, Willard Van Orman, From a Logic al Point of View.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2000 - In Franco Volpi (ed.), Dizionario delle opere filosofiche. Milano, Italy: Bruno Mondadori. pp. 885-886.
    A short reconstruction of the essays included in Quine's 'From a Logical Point of View'.
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  44. Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):317-342.
    W. V. Quine is arguably the intellectual father of contemporary naturalism, the idea that there is no distinctively philosophical perspective on reality. Yet, even though Quine has always been a science-minded philosopher, he did not adopt a fully naturalistic perspective until the early 1950s. In this paper, I reconstruct the genesis of Quine’s ideas on the relation between science and philosophy. Scrutinizing his unpublished papers and notebooks, I examine Quine’s development in the first decades of his (...)
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  45. Quine’s Indeterminacy: A Paradox Resolved and a Problem Revealed.Alexander George - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 21:41-55.
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  46. Four Quine’s Inconsistencies.Gustavo Picazo - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (2):163-177.
    In this paper I argue that the idiosyncrasy of linguistic competence fosters semantic conceptions in which meanings are taken for granted, such as the one that Quine calls ‘uncritical semantics’ or ‘the myth of the museum’. This is due to the degree of automaticity in the use of language which is needed for fluent conversation. Indeed, fluent conversation requires that we speakers instinctively associate each word or sentence with its meaning (or linguistic use), and instinctively resort to the conceptual (...)
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  47.  39
    Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry, de G. Ebbs. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 278 pp. [REVIEW]Carlota G. Llorente - 2020 - Thémata. Revista de Filosofía 62:205-210.
    Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry (2017) es el último libro publicado por Gary Ebbs, profesor titular de filosofía en la Universidad de Indiana. Ebbs ha dedicado su carrera al estudio de la metodología de la investigación racional, tratando temas como la verdad, la verdad lógica, el seguimiento de reglas o el anti-individualismo semántico. Como el propio título indica, el libro aquí reseñado se centra en los métodos de investigación de tres autores: Carnap, Quine y Putnam.
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  48. Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry. [REVIEW]Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1-9.
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  49. On Quine's Ontology: Quantification, Extensionality and Naturalism (or From Commitment to Indifference).Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2019 - Proceedings of Ther 3rd Filomena Workshop.
    Much of the ontology made in the analytic tradition of philosophy nowadays is founded on some of Quine’s proposals. His naturalism and the binding between existence and quantification are respectively two of his very influential metaphilosophical and methodological theses. Nevertheless, many of his specific claims are quite controversial and contemporaneously have few followers. Some of them are: (a) his rejection of higher-order logic; (b) his resistance in accepting the intensionality of ontological commitments; (c) his rejection of first-order modal logic; (...)
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  50.  15
    The Cambridge Companion to Quine (Review). [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 2004 - Philosophy in Review 24 (5):325-328.
    Review of Roger Gibson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Quine.
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