This study of Greek time before Aristotle’s philosophy starts with a commentary on his first text, the Protrepticus. We shall see two distinct forms of time emerge: one initiatory, circular and Platonic in inspiration, the other its diametrical opposite, advanced by Aristotle. We shall explore this dichotomy through a return to poetic conceptions. The Tragedians will give us an initial outline of the notion of time in the Greek world (Fate); we shall then turn to Homer in order to better (...) grasp the complex relations between time and the religious sphere (the Hero); the work of the great theologian Hesiod will confirm this initiatory vision, later set out in remarkable fashion by Nietzsche (Myths); we shall then dive deep into Pythagoreanism to complete our account (Mysteries). Having understood this current of thought, powerfully influenced by the Iranian theogony, we shall be able to discern its clear differences from the so-called “Ionian” current, and thus to move away from Plato (Ideology). Lastly, we shall return to the early Ionian thinkers Thales and Anaximander to analyse whether this really was the vision of the world that Aristotle adopted in developing the first model of time (Science). In the second volume we shall see the return of the thought of the theologoi within the Aristotelian corpus itself, and will question our distinction between the being and existence of time. Régis Laurent is a philosopher and member of the association Kairos Kai logos (Centre for the study of ancient philosophy). This book is the first part of his doctoral thesis in philosophy, undertaken under the aegis of three French universities (Grenoble, Clermont-Ferrand and Rennes). In addition to his philosophical training, the author is also qualified to Masters level in linguistics and in general psychology, and studied theology at the Thomist University in Paris (ULSH) and at the CEJ of the EHESS. (shrink)

Notre étude sur le temps grec précédant la pensée d Aristote commencera d'abord par un commentaire de son premier texte, le Protreptique. Nous verrons se dégager deux temps distincts : l'un initiatique, circulaire et d'inspiration platonicienne, et l'autre diamétralement opposé dont Aristote serait le défenseur. Afin d'interroger cette dichotomie, nous retournerons aux conceptions poétiques. Les Tragiques nous permettront d'offrir une première esquisse de cette notion dans l'univers grec (Du destin...). Ensuite, l'oeuvre épique d'Homère sera l'occasion de mieux saisir le nouage (...) existant entre le temps et la sphère religieuse (Des héros...). Le travail du grand théologue Hésiode viendra confirmer cette vision initiatique, comme l'avait déjà remarquablement exposée F. Nietzsche (Des mythes...). C'est alors que nous plongerons au sein du pythagorisme afin de parachever cette vision (Des mystères...). Notre compréhension de ce courant, traversé par la théogonie iranienne, nous permettra, ensuite, de bien le distinguer de celui dit «ionien» et ainsi de s'éloigner de la parole platonicienne (De l'idéologie...). Enfin, en revenant aux premiers penseurs ioniens que furent Thalès et Anaximandre, nous analyserons si c'est effectivement cette vision du monde qui a été retenue par le Stagirite afin de fonder la première modélisation du concept de temps (De la science...). -/- Dans le deuxième volume, nous verrons revenir la pensée des théologoï au sein même du corpus aristotélicien et c'est alors que nous interrogerons notre division entre être et existence du temps. -/- Régis LAURENT est philosophe, membre de l'association Kairos kai logos (Centre d'études sur la pensée antique).Ce livre est le premier volet de son travail de thèse de doctorat en philosophie effectué au sein de trois Universités françaises (Grenoble, Clermont-Ferrand et Rennes).Outre cette formation philosophique,l'auteur est également diplômé en sciences humaines (Maîtrise des sciences du langage et maîtrise de psychologie). Par ailleurs, sa formation en théologie a été effectuée à l'Université thomiste de Paris (U.L.S.H = CEPHI) et au C.E.J de l'E.H.E.S.S. (shrink)

Puisque nous n'avons pu trouver un fondement logique à la dialectique, nous avons alors compris que la dialectique était historique. Il ne restait plus alors qu'à trouver la culture d'origine que nous avons localisée en Perse. -/- Since we could not find a logical foundation for the dialectic, we then understood that the dialectic was historical. All that remained was to find the culture of origin, which we located in Persia.

On abordera ici l'échec du pseudo-théologien Heidegger à venir se saisir de l'irrationnel augustinien et soulignerons la différence entre l'irrationnel dorien (au bout du langage) et l'irrationnel ionien (au bout du monde) autour de la mesure.

Premier ouvrage de l’histoire de la philosophie à être totalement consacré au concept d’entéléchie, il ne s’agira pas de proposer un essai historique allant de la mise en place de cette notion chez Aristote jusqu’à la conception biologique développée par Hans Driesch. Inscrit dans un projet plus global de compréhension du temps aristotélicien, c’est à une véritable refondation métaphysique du concept que ce travail nous convie. Si Kant, à l’ultime fin de sa première critique, avait admis qu’il n’existait que deux (...) voies possibles de fondation de l’a priori - la voie historique (platonicienne) empruntée par Hegel et la voie physiologique (aristotélicienne) qui sera la nôtre - la première partie de ce second volume prendra pour acquis qu’il n’existe pas de théorie qui puisse unifier ces deux pôles du savoir. Cela impliquera une scission entre deux mouvements irrationnels que sont le mouvement entéléchique aristotélicien et le mouvement dialectique platonicien. A partir du corps a priori du surhomme, le premier mouvement sera à la racine de la théorie de la connaissance (De la science) alors que le second sera au fondement de la théorie des valeurs (De l’Idéologie). En circonscrivant le mouvement dialectique dorien autour du noûs perse (iranien), ce travail offrira une première définition totalement négative du mouvement entéléchique appuyé, lui, sur le noûs ionien (« phénicien ») dont la seconde partie sera l’objet. De l’analyse de la substance première en passant par l’étude phénoménologique des schèmes de la camusité et du membre moteur, cette étude reviendra sur l’élasticité du tendon afin d’approcher non-phénoménalement le concept lui-même et tenter ainsi une première symphyse avec les rythmes circadiens de la biologie contemporaine. (shrink)

In this essay we will consider another basic topic: the problem of the nature of the distinctions between Sitte, Brauch, Wert, Mode, and Recht, on which Weber's discussion relies. These discussions typically involved the untranslatable concept of Sitte, which marks a contrast between practices or customs with normative force and “mere practice.” There is a close parallel to this distinction in American social thought in W. G. Sumner's latinate distinction between the mores and folkways of a society. In what follows (...) we shall simply use the German term as a reminder of its long history in German philosophy. Weber was obviously aware of this history, as was Jhering. Our aim will be to examine Weber's modifications of the received version of these distinctions and to consider the Implications of these modifications. As we shall see, what Weber represents as an innocuous classificatory problem contains a much more significant conceptual transformation, which bears on the general image of modernity as rationalization constructed by Weber. (shrink)

La division entre "Intellect Agent" (intellectus agens) et "intellect Patient" (noûs pathêtikos) est-elle historique et donc culturelle ? Si oui , y a-t-il un intellect Uni-versel entre les deux ?

Rejet de la dialectique comme objet pouvant rentrer au sein de la logique. Refoulement de la dialectique dans l'histoire. Or si la dialectique est historique alors nous pouvons la situer spatialement dans l'histoire.

Le structuralisme, en le rapprochant du langage, a détruit le concept freudien de "Verdichtung" (condensation). Il s'agissait chez Freud d'un mouvement irrationnel dont la rationalité ne venait que de la cause finale qu'était le désir (inconscient). Avec sa notion de "Volonté de Puissance" (Der Wille zur Macht), Nietzsche tente de la même manière de déterminer l'intention et l’extension de ce mouvement de sens sans introduire la cause finale comme le fit Freud. Il s'approche alors de la dialectique platonicienne et de (...) son fondement, avant de plonger dans l'abyme de la source iranienne (perse). L'échec de la métabiologie de Nietzsche sera le départ de notre approche métabiologique appuyée sur la métaphysique d'Aristote et Kant. (shrink)

Comment l'Etre s'ouvre-t-il ? Réponse définitive au sophiste Heidegger.

ARISTOTE contre LEIBNITZ : En quoi le concept d'Entéléchie aristotélicien est-il totalement opposé au concept d'Harmonie platonicien et leibnitzien ?

In this paper, we apply the perspective of intra-organismal ecology by investigating a family of ecological models suitable to describe a gene therapy to a particular metabolic disorder, the adenosine deaminase deficiency (ADA-SCID). The gene therapy is modeled as the prospective ecological invasion of an organ (here, bone marrow) by genetically modified stem cells, which then operate niche construction in the cellular environment by releasing an enzyme they synthesize. We show that depending on the chosen order (a choice that cannot (...) be made on \textit{a priori} assumptions), different kinds of dynamics are expected, possibly leading to different therapeutic strategies. This drives us to discuss several features of the extension of ecology to intra-organismal ecology. (shrink)

Unlike many of Descartes’s other followers, Pierre-Sylvain Re´gis resists the temptations of occasionalism. By marrying the ontology of mechanism with the causal structure of concurrentism, Re´gis arrives at a novel view that both acknowledges God’s role in natural events and preserves the causal powers of bodies. I set out Re´gis’s position, focusing on his arguments against occasionalism and his responses to Malebranche’s ‘no necessary connection’ and divine concursus arguments.

L’usage de la raison et de la foy ou l’accord de la foy et de la raison (1704) by Pierre-Sylvain Régis can be considered his last attempt to defend the ‘new philosophy’ of René Descartes by vindicating its agreement with faith and protecting it from censorship. This contribution offers an analysis of the theories expounded by Régis in this treatise, showing how these evolved from those of his earlier Système de philosophie (1690), and arguing that both are characterized by a (...) reinterpretation of the Cartesian metaphysics on an empirical basis. In particular, Régis offered an empirical interpretation of the relations between substances, attributes and modes, by which he criticized Spinoza’s metaphysics and attempted to solve the riddle of Descartes’ dualism. (shrink)

One of the most mature achievements of the Cartesian philosophy is the aim to diffuse Descartes’ thought among a wider audience by presenting his philosophy in an encyclopedic way. A relevant contribution in this field is Pierre Sylvain Régis’s Système. Régis’s contribution consists both in reconciling the new scientific discoveries with les principes de Monsieur Descartes by combining them into a scholarly manual whose aim is to stimulate the ars inveniendi and in recognizing the relevance of Arnauld’s and Nicole’s L’art (...) de penser as manual of Cartesian logic. In an article published on the «Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa», pp. 517-55: L’«Art de penser» nella logica del «Système» di Régis) I analysed Régis’s logic in order to point out that, even if L’art de penser represents its only source, La logique of the Système has not to be considered as a mere compendium of the Port-Royal Logique, but as a revision of the latter according to a specific philosophical system, characterized by the empirical interpretation of Descartes’s philosophy. In this paper I provide a synopsis of the comparison between the logic of the Système and the Logique of Port-Royal, in order to resume in a schematic way the results of my research. (shrink)

This work takes into account three Cartesian manuals diffused in 17th century France ; Jacques Rohault, Traité de physique ; Pierre-Sylvain Régis, Cours entier de philosophie, ou système general selon les principes de M. Descartes contenant la logique, la metaphysique, la physique et la morale ) in order to question if the development of an empirical attitude in the scientific research influenced their approaches to the study of motion. The article intends to deepen the role that these authors give to (...) God in the physical structure of the universe with the purpose of investigating whether their analysis of motion is untainted by the metaphysical component or on what terms it remains linked to it. (shrink)

Pierre-Sylvain Régis’s Cartesianism is quite singular in seventeenth-century French philosophy. Though, can we speak of a form of experimental science in Régis’s work? After exploring his notions of ‘system’ and ‘hypothesis’, I will define his position in relation to Claude Perrault, Jacques Rohault, and the Royal Society. I argue, first, that the contrasts which traverse French science are not so much about the use of experiments but about whether or not observational data can be traced back to hypotheses and to (...) a coherent system. Secondly, that we can detect a significant similarity between Boyle’s positions and the views expressed by Perrault and also by Régis. Lastly, that French science, even in its Cartesian version, is much more probabilistic than English experimental philosophy. (shrink)

The Système de philosophie by Pierre Sylvain Régis can be considered as the achievement both of the scientific liveliness of the Académie des Sciences in the 17th century and of its fruitful relationship with the Royal Society. Since it aims to shape the new conception of the universe in terms of a system, the Système represents one of the most mature achievements of Cartesian philosophy and it is characterized by an empirical interpretation of Descartes’ thought. The Système therefore reflects two (...) important phenomena occurring in the Europe of the 17th century: the scientific revolution and the proliferation of Academies. In fact, this ambitious work could be undertaken with the support of the Académie des Sciences and the Journal des Sçavants. My paper will analyse the French context by focusing to outline the role which the Académie de France had both in France, as the medium of dissemination of the new philosophy despite censorship, and abroad, in particular through the relationship with the Royal Society in England. I aim to analyse the role of the Journal des Sçavants as a means to share ideas other than by correspondence and as a trait d’union between “rationalist France” and “empiricist England”. I intend to question whether it is possible to establish a connection between the empirical interpretation of French Cartesianism, the consolidation of the Académie de France and the employment of new means of academic communication. The paper will show that the second half of 17th century France represents a remarkable exception to the conventional picture, which states that in 17th century Europe, following the success of a mechanistic interpretation of reality, two philosophical school clashed: rationalism, predominating on the continent, and empiricism, in England. (shrink)

Henri Lelevel’s La philosophie moderne par demandes et réponses is a very interesting as well as pretty neglected attempt to disseminate the new philosophy among a larger audience, including the non specialists. Either the style of presentation or the oversimplification of the topics discussed is clearly intended to reach people interested to a smattering of philosophy. More than the comparisons between the traditional and the new philosophy and the compendia, this work vouches for the great interest toward the new philosophy. (...) In this particular case the model is the philosophy of Malebranche, whose interpretation of Descartes thought is preferred by Lelevel, worried by the excessive twist given toward empiricism in P.-S. Régis rendering of Cartesian philosophical system. Lelevel’s logic is directed to eliminate the confusion between sense data and knowledge, echoing also Malebranche’s notion of éténdue idéale, one of the major contribution to the reconsideration of Descartes’ thought. This paper aims to sketch the mains topics discussed in the four sections of Lelevel’s work, with some cross-references to Malebranche’s writings. (shrink)

In a few texts, Thomas Aquinas says that the first operation of the intellect pertains to (respicit) “the quiddity of a thing” whereas the second operation pertains to “the to be itself of a thing” (esse). But Aquinas also says that quiddities are to the intellect as color is to the power of sight. Statements such as these seem to have led Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson to see esse as the proper object of the intellect’s second operation. Against this (...) conclusion, Fr Régis and Ralph McInerny have argued—using Aquinas’s In I Peryermenias, lecture 5—that since ‘is’ is a verb and ‘is’ signifies existence, but all verbs signify the first operation of the intellect, we must be able to form a concept of existence in the first operation of the intellect. This paper does three things. First, it analyzes the nature of the claim made by Maritain and Gilson. Second, it shows from internal textual evidence that “respicit ipsum esse rei” cannot mean what Maritain and Gilson take it to mean. The second operation of the intellect cannot have a proper object distinct from the object of the first operation, which is quiddities. Finally, this paper provides an alternative interpretation of In I Peryermenias, lecture 5, to the one given by McInerny. In that text, Aquinas does not speak about a particular concept of existence in the first operation of the intellect and signified by the verbs ‘is’ or ‘exists.’ Rather, he uses the word ‘esse’ in indirect speech to include generally any form or act joined to a subject by the copula, ‘is.’ Aquinas’s focus is not on what ‘esse’ or ‘est’ signifies, but on the mode in which it signifies (per modum actualitas) absent additional qualifying terms. The conclusion of this paper is that, although the esse contrasted with essence in Aquinas’s metaphysics corresponds to a concept in the intellect’s first operation, nevertheless, like the notions of blindness and of genus, this esse cannot fall properly within the intellect’s object. (shrink)

This volume takes cue from the idea that the thought of no philosopher can be understood without considering it as the result of a constant, lively dialogue with other thinkers, both in its internal evolution as well as in its reception, re-use, and assumption as a starting point in addressing past and present philosophical problems. In doing so, it focuses on a feature that is crucially emerging in the historiography of early modern philosophy and science, namely the complexity in the (...) production of knowledge. The book explores the applicability of this approach to a long-considered armchair philosopher, namely René Descartes, who is now more and more understood as a full-blown scientist, networker, and intellectual éminence grise rather than as the mere philosopher of the cogito, as well as the originator of different ‘Cartesianisms’ which encompassed many ideas and approaches for long captured by dichotomic historiographical categories as rationalism and empiricism, or speculative and experimental philosophy. The essays gathered in the volume aim to address the ways in which Descartes’s philosophy evolved and was progressively understood by scientists, philosophers, and intellectuals from different contexts and eras, either by considering direct interlocutors of Descartes such as Isaac Beeckman and Elisabeth of Bohemia, early modern thinkers who developed upon his ideas and on particular topics as Nicolas Malebranche or Thomas Willis, those who adapted his overall methodology in developing new systems of knowledge as Johannes Clauberg and Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and contemporary thinkers from continental and analytic traditions like Emanuele Severino and Peter Strawson. (shrink)

Mit den Fortschritten in Generativer Künstlicher Intelligenz, Large Language Models, Brain-Computer Interfaces und genetischen Eingriffen gewinnt auch der Transhumanismus an Relevanz. Der Transhumanismus ist ein beliebtes Thema der Medien und wird in Tages- und Wochenzeitungen sowie im Fernsehen gerne aufgegriffen. Außerdem gibt es inzwischen viele Filme, die den Transhumanismus thematisieren, z. B. die Dokumentation „Endlich unendlich“ (2021, Regie: Stephan Bergmann). Der Transhumanismus wurde in Österreich auch Gegenstand einer Verschwörungserzählung, über die der Bayrische Rundfunk aufgeklärt hat. Auf den Wahlplakaten der „Partei (...) für Gesundheitsforschung“ ist der Transhumanist Aubrey de Grey abgebildet, der ein in Cambridge lebender Brite ist, aber auf Plakaten in Deutschland dargestellt wird. Diese und weitere Entwicklungen machen es notwendig, sich mit dem Transhumanismus aus wissenschaftlicher Perspektive auseinanderzusetzen. Was ist der Transhumanismus? Alle sprechen von Transhumanismus, aber was der Transhumanismus letztlich ist, bleibt häufig unklar. Der Transhumanismus (TH) ist eine philosophisch-technologische Bewegung des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts, die es sich zum Ziel setzt, mittels neuer Technologien den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren. Wichtig ist dabei, dass sich der TH nicht mit den Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft oder technologischem Fortschritt gleichsetzen lässt. Vielmehr verstehe ich unter TH die Gruppe, die sich um die Organisation Humanity+ in Kalifornien versammelt und die Personen, die sich explizit alsVertreter*innen des TH verstehen. Der TH hat eine ganz eigene Agenda, eigene Institutionen, Organisationen und Publikationsorgane.4 Zu den Themen und Visionen gehören die Lebensverlängerung von mehreren Hundert Jahren bis zur Unsterblichkeit, Kryonik (das Einfrieren des Körpers, der wieder aufgetaut werden soll, wenn nach transhumanistischer Vorstellung Unsterblichkeit ermöglicht werden kann), umfassendes Enhancement und die Verschmelzung von Körper und Technik sowie Beseitigung allen Leids, aller Krankheiten und Aufhebung des Alterns. Der TH strebt danach, mittels Technik neue Sinnesfähigkeiten zu erlangen und neue (virtuelle) Erfahrungswelten zu erschließen. Außerdem wird von vielen Transhumanist*innen auch die hochspekulative Vision des Mind Uploading vertreten, die streng genommen dem Posthumanismus zugeordnet werden muss Gemäß dieser Vision soll durch das maschinelle Lesen des Gehirns der ganze Mensch auf ein externes Medium hochgeladen werden können. Die Vision des Mind Uploadings ist aus naturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive hochumstritten, ist aber ein sehr beliebtes Motiv, das auch außerhalb des TH Wirkung zeigt und in viele Science-Fiction- Filme Eingang gefunden hat (z.B. die Amazon Serie „Upload“, 2020, Regie: Greg Daniels). Das Bestreben des TH, den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren, wirft zunächst die Frage auf, wie der TH den Menschen überhaupt versteht. Dieser Frage nach dem Menschenverständnis des TH habe ich mich in meinem Buch „Über-Menschen. Philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit der Anthropologie des Transhumanismus“ gewidmet. Philosophische Anthropologie bezeichnet die wissenschaftlichen, philosophischen Reflexionen auf den Menschen. Welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der TH und lässt sich unsere Anthropologie auf dieser Grundlage weiterentwickeln? Das Buch gliedert sich in drei Teile: Teil 1 führt zuerst in die Bewegung des TH ein, worauf Teil II aufbaut, der sich mit dem Menschenverständnis des TH beschäftigt. Teil III betrachtet schließlich heutige Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft sowie neue Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie (z. B. Kritischer Posthumanismus und Neuer Materialismus). Die nachfolgenden Kapitel dieses Aufsatzes sind ein Ausschnitt aus Teil II, der Untersuchung des transhumanistischen Menschenverständnisses. Dieser Aufsatz widmet sich dem „genetisch codierten Menschen“ im TH, also der transhumanistischen Sicht auf den Menschen als jemanden, die*der vollständig von ihren*seinen Genen bestimmt ist. Der genetische Diskurs ist nur einer von fünf im TH dominanten Diskursen, die das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis ausmachen. Zu den anderen Diskursen bzw. transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen gehören: der Diskurs um die „Natur des Menschen“, der Maschinendiskurs – die Bestimmung des Menschen als Maschine –, der neurowissenschaftliche Diskurs – die Gleichsetzung des Menschen mit dem Gehirn bzw. Neuronalem und zuletzt die metaphysischen Verhältnisbestimmungen von Geist und Körper (PUZIO, Über-Menschen, Kap. 4). Diese transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen werden am Ende ausgewertet. Ohne die Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels im Detail vorwegnehmen zu wollen, kann für die Gesamtuntersuchung des TH gesagt werden, dass das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis sich als hochproblematisch erweist. Die transhumanistischen Argumentationsstrukturen sind nicht tragfähig und der TH behauptet sich auf die Naturwissenschaften zu berufen, widerspricht allerdings den aktuellen Ergebnissen der Naturwissenschaften. Dies wird in den nachfolgenden Kapiteln gut deutlich werden. Der TH hat ein reduktionistisches Menschenverständnis und reduziert den Menschen beispielsweise auf „Information“. Viele Ausführungen sind diskriminierend z. B. gegenüber Kranken, Alternden und Menschen mit Behinderungen und letztendlich wird sogar jeder Mensch, auch der gesunde junge Mensch, gegenüber der Maschine abgewertet, die aus transhumanistischer Sicht den Menschen weit übertrifft. Im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit werden sogar „ideologische Elemente“ im TH identifiziert. Daher wird in der Arbeit abgelehnt, den TH als Grundlage für die Weiterentwicklung der Anthropologie zu verwenden und stattdessen werden im letzten Teil der Arbeit alternative Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie präsentiert. Wie bereits erwähnt, richtet sich die Kritik am TH jedoch nicht gegen die heutige Optimierung in der Gesellschaft, die ebenfalls im letzten Teil der Arbeit diskutiert wird. Optimierungsbestrebungen hat es schon immer gegeben und sie werden nun durch neue Technologien weiter verändert, sie sind aber nicht mit der Bewegung des TH gleichzusetzen. Das Kapitel ist eingebettet zwischen dem Maschinendiskurs (Mensch als Maschine) mit seinen Ausführungen zu Information und Kybernetik und dem neurowissenschaftlichen Diskurs („Der Mensch ist ihr*sein Gehirn“). Es wird im Folgenden der genetische Diskurs im TH untersucht, also wie der TH den Menschen vollständig auf Gene zurückführt, und dies schließlich kritisch geprüft. Sind „gute Gene“ alles? Kann der Mensch vollständig über ihre*seine Gene bestimmt werden? Und was hat es mit der trügerischen „genetischen Information“ auf sich? Zunächst wird der genetische Diskurs im TH dargestellt, also die genetischen Ausführungen des TH präsentiert (Kap. 2), danach wird der Blick auf den Gebrauch der genetischen Metaphern im TH gerichtet (Kap. 3) und zuletzt werden die genetischen Vorstellungen des TH kritisiert (Kap. 4). Der Aufsatz schließt in Kap. 5mit einer (vorläufigen) Zusammenführung der Ergebnisse und einem Ausblick. (shrink)

In his rich and provocative paper, Peter Carruthers announces two related theses: (a) a positive thesis that “central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts” (Carruthers 2013) and (b) a negative thesis that the “central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active” (Carruthers 2013). These are striking claims suggesting that a natural view about cognition, namely that explicit theoretical reasoning involves direct (...) operations over beliefs, is wrong. Our beliefs, on this natural view, interact with each other to yield new beliefs. If Carruthers is right, beliefs have only an indirect or mediated influence in cognition with sensory states playing the direct role. I think it an important feature of Carruthers’ discussion that he draws support from work on the neural circuits and mechanisms that subserve these processes. In what follows, I want to regis. (shrink)

The famous Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) espoused the occasionalist doctrine that ‘there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes’ (LO, 448, original italics). One of Malebranche’s well-known arguments for occasionalism, known as, the ‘no necessary connection’ argument (or, NNC ) stems from the principle that ‘a true cause… is (...) one such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect’ (LO, 450). The outline of this paper is as follows. I explicitly layout NNC and articulate some of its prima facie strengths (§1). I then critically discuss, what I take to be, the two main arguments against NNC of the Lee-Pyle interpretation (§2). The main conclusion from (§2) is that Malebranche did not abandon NNC in his later works given textual evidence from the Dialogues, contrary to the Lee-Pyle interpretation. In (§3) I discuss in what ways Suárez, Leibniz, Régis and Spinoza all accepted the main premise of NNC. Then, I rebut Steven Nadler’s influential and unchallenged criticism that Malebranche conflated causal and logical necessity, and provide a more accurate interpretation of Malebranche that only commits him to a partial reduction of causal to logical necessity (§4). (shrink)

Today’s debates present ”occasionalism’ as the position that any satisfying account of divine action must avoid. In this paper I discuss how a leading Cartesian author of the end of the seventeenth century, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, attempted to avoid occasionalism. Régis’s case is illuminating because it stresses both the difficulties connected with the traditional alternatives to occasionalism and also those aspects embedded in the occasionalist position that should be taken into due account. The paper focuses on Régis’s own account of secondary (...) causation in order to show how the challenge of avoiding occasionalism can lead to the development of new accounts of divine action. (shrink)

Nous comparons les notions d’usage et de signification chez Ludwig Wittgenstein et Martin Heidegger. Contrairement à Jocelyn Benoist, nous pensons que l’analogie entre Wittgenstein et Heidegger n’est pas superficielle. La métaphysique de Heidegger explicite certaines présuppositions implicites de la seconde philosophie de Wittgenstein. Le pragmatisme naturaliste de Wittgenstein peut être théorisé. Notamment la notion wittgensteinienne d’usage, ou de jeu de langage, peut être comprise comme une pratique à la fois naturelle et normative régie par des règles. -/- Wittgenstein’s notions of (...) use and meaning are compared with the corresponding Heidegger’s ones. Unlike Jocelyn Benoist, we suggest that the analogy between Wittgenstein and Heidegger is not superficial. Heidegger’s metaphysics makes explicit some of the implicit presuppositions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s naturalistic pragmatism can be theorized. In particular, Wittgenstein’s notion of use, or language game, can be understood as both natural and normative rule- governing practice. (shrink)

Istoria unui stat poate fi plină de evenimente care nu sunt preconizate. Pentru a cunoaște viitorul trebuie să te raportezi la trecut. Istoria evenimențială este o istorie accidentală plină de necunoscute și de interogări. Autoritatea centrală în istoria omenirii a avut caracter diferit de la stat la stat. Faraoni, împărați, regi sau moguli, toți acești conducători au avut în jurul lor un grup de oameni care i-a ajutat în actul de administrare al țării. În calitatea lor de guvernatori, intendenți, legați (...) sau sub diverse alte denumiri, acești funcționari se aflau în slujba puterii centrale administrative. Rolul acestor funcționari a variat de-a lungul istoriei. Reprezentarea lor nu a fost doar pur formală. Delegarea de autoritate s-a făcut în baza unei rațiuni și a unui calcul pragmatic și anume o reprezentare exactă a voinței liderului în comunități care nu gravitau în jurul centrului său de putere. În istorie, reprezentanții autorității centrale au avut un rol fundamental în promovarea puterii centrale la nivel local, în provincii. Guvernatorii de provincii au fost emisarii puterii centrale, numirea și demiterea lor depinzând de voința unilaterală a conducătorului. Evoluția statală a mărit importanța rolului acestui reprezentant de la simplu emisar sau de la persoana care pune în practică voința conducătorului la un adevărat administrator al problemelor unei comunități. În statele democratice reprezentatul administrației centrale are un rol de gestionar al problemelor curente, dar și de control al diferitelor instituții la nivel local. Am putea spune că este un factor de echilibru și control asumat de autoritatea centrală. Reprezentarea în teritoriu a administrației centrale este o realitate în zilele noastre și o certitudine istorică. Comunitățile au avut nevoie să fie conduse de către lideri, iar liderii care au condus națiuni formate din mai multe comunități au avut nevoie de ajutoare în gestionarea mecanismelor interne ale administrării acelor popoare care au evoluat spre națiuni. Prin urmare, reprezentarea în teritoriu a fost benefică de-a lungul istoriei, iar delegarea de autoritate către persoane atent alese poate chiar întări autoritatea centrală. În epoca postmodernă a statelor democratice, reprezentanții autorității centrale sunt ghidați în luarea deciziilor de către puterea executivă la nivel central, în spiritul legii. Toate deciziile se iau cu respectarea legii, a normelor și a reglementărilor în vigoare. De asemenea, deciziile se iau și cu conștientizarea unei etici a funcției pe care o îndeplinesc. (shrink)

On peut identifier deux principales caractéristiques de Wikipédia pour expliquer son succès et sa spécificité. La première est sa liberté de modification et d’accès. La deuxième réside dans le système organisationnel ascendant (bottom-up) et égalitaire où les articles ne proviennent plus d’experts sélectionnés pour être ensuite distribués à la foule mais sont, au contraire, produits par une base composée d’amateurs inconnus. Ces deux caractéristiques, associées au succès populaire et qualitatif de l’encyclopédie, laissent peu de place à l’expertise individuelle (en particulier (...) à l’expertise académique et scientifique). De plus, le constat de l’auto-correction dynamique de l’encyclopédie a effacé l’idée d’une vérification a posteriori des articles par un ou plusieurs experts du domaine. La force de Wikipedia semble alors résider dans une harmonie systématique inhérente à sa forme. -/- Dans cet article, je tente de montrer qu’il faut dépasser l’antagonisme entre amateurs et experts (crowds versus experts) et que c’est justement le caractère libre et égalitaire de Wikipedia qui rend nécessaire une réflexion épistémologique sur l’expertise au sein de cette encyclopédie. Je prends l’exemple du problème du novice et des deux experts théorisé par Alvin Goldman (2001). Appliqué à Wikipédia, ce problème pose la question des options épistémiques disponibles pour les wikipédiens confronté à une guerre d’édition. Outre les solutions classiques (recours à des meta-experts, décision majoritaire, discussion), Goldman avance l’idée d’une prise en compte, par le novice, des (in)succès épistémiques précédents des différents experts en désaccord. Un expert s’étant majoritairement trompé par le passé en devient ainsi moins crédible et inversement. Même si cette solution pose un certain nombre de problèmes, elle semble particulièrement propice à étudier l’expertise au sein de Wikipédia. Elle permet de comprendre (1.) qu’il existe déjà une expertise wikipedienne régie par certaines règles et (2.) qu’il est possible d’aménager une place aux experts (en particulier scientifiques) dans cette encyclopédie libre. Au final, pour comprendre et améliorer la place de l’expertise dans Wikipedia, il semble qu’il faille adopter une certaine conception de l’expertise, centrée sur l’agent plus que sur le contenu épistémique. Cette conclusion soulève un paradoxe, Wikipedia s’étant construite sur l’anonymat des auteurs et la primauté du contenu. (shrink)

Die im Reader versammelten Beiträge verstehen sich als Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Visuellen. Sie untersuchen am Beispiel des Mediums Stadtfilm, welche Rolle die dorterzeugten Bilder großer Städte bei der Produktion urbanistischer Repräsentanten spielen. Aus diesem Grund werden insbesondere Übergänge analysiert, die Spielfilme einerseits und urbanistische Diskurse andererseits miteinander verknüpfen. Gemeinsamer Ausgangspunkt ist die These, daß es vor allem Bilder sind, die solche Verknüpfungen gewährleisten. Es wird unterstellt, daß es das Medium Film erlaubt, gerade über den Einsatz von Bildern "näher" (...) an soziale Wirklichkeiten heranzukommen, als dies textzentrierter Praxis empirischer Sozialforschung möglich ist. Stadtfilme erzeugen wirkmächtige Bilder, auf die dann unter bestimmten Bedingungen in urbanistischen Kontexten zurückgegriffen wird. Die Autoren präsentieren konzeptionelle Überlegungen und Filminterpretationen zu Moebius (1991, Regie: Matti Geschonneck), Der Himmel über Berlin (1987, Regie: Wim Wenders), In weiter Ferne, so nah! (1993, Regie: Wim Wenders), Der Bauch des Architekten (1987, Regie: Peter Greenaway) und Hass (1995, Regie: Mathieu Kassovitz). Sie bedienen sich dabei sehr unterschiedlicher Verfahren. Gemeinsam sind ihnen allerdings die Anliegen, die größere Nähe der Filme zu sozialen Welten hervorzuheben und die Übergänge zwischen Stadtfilmen und Urbanistik herauszuarbeiten. -/- City and Film. Attempts at a 'Visual Sociology' Summary The contributions collected in this reader present attempts at a Visual sociology'. Based on a study on the medium 'city film' the author s determine which role the images of big cities evoked in such films can play for urbanistic representations. Therefore the analysis is, in particular, focussed on points of transition marking a connection of movies, on the one hand, and urbanistic discourse, on the othe r. The common point of departure is the hypothesis that images, more than anything else, do guarantee such connections. The authors assume that the medium film may lead 'closer' to social realities than the text- centered practices of empirical social research. City films produce powerful images which, under certain cond itions, can be utilized in urbanistic contexts. The authors present conceptual considerations and interpretations of the following films: Moebius (1991, director: Matti Geschonneck); Der Himmel über Berlin (1987, director: Wim Wenders); In weiter Ferne, so nah! (1993, director: Wim Wenders); The Belly of the Architect (1987, director: Peter Greenaway); and quite different methods they aim at the same goals: emphasizing the greater closeness of films to social worlds and bringing out the points of transition between city films and urbanistics. (shrink)

UNLEARNING THE BASICS -/- ༄༅ REVIEWS ༄༅ -/- « An exhilarating and lucid introduction to Buddhist thought. Sativihari begins with a sophisticated reading of the Four Noble Truths as a sacred poem and ends with a plea for more compassionate culture and politics. In between there is wisdom spiked on every page. »【Mark Kingwell, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto】 -/- « I am deeply grateful for Rishi Sativihari's achievement in ‘Unlearning The Basics.’ Often, attempts to help Westerners understand Buddhism (...) rely too heavily on idealist philosophies, leading to a kind of mystification of the four noble truths. Because Dr. Sativihari appeals consistently to experience and is sophisticated in his understanding of Western philosophy and theology, he can present the four noble truths with profound spiritual realism. The work is very reader-friendly, showing the fruits of extensive reflection on pedagogical practice. There is genuine spiritual maturity at work in this text. »【Gilles Mongeau S.J., Regis College, University of Toronto】 -/- « ‘Unlearning The Basics’ might be understood as a sequel to the classic ‘Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind’ : gently nudging us back to what we thought we knew and helping us to discover something fresh and real — something suddenly self-evident. A rare and precious achievement. »【Kurt Spellmeyer, Department of English, Rutgers University】 -/- ༄༅༅༅༅ FROM THE FOREWORD BY MU SEONG ༄༅༅༅༅༅ « It is axiomatic that the teachings of the Buddha have found their integrity and authenticity in each generation in the lives as well as interpretative efforts of a handful of practitioners and thinkers. Rishi Sativihari’s is one of these new voices and it’s a pleasure to sit back and listen to it. Sativihari’s argument that — “the four truths were given in a certain order, not only for the sake of creating a logical system of thought, but because experientially they emerged in that way in the Buddha’s life, building progressively on one another” — never rang more true. » « If there is any “system” at all in the Buddha’s teachings, the Four Noble Truths are that system. These truths (or reflections, if you will) are secular, etiological, and universally human. They are free of the ontological promiscuities and speculative metaphysics in which so many religious systems get bogged down. Unlearning the Basics remains impeccably faithful to these orientations of the Four Noble Truths and this orientation is what makes his book an exciting read. » « This book is in many ways a model for how the teachings of the Buddha could and should be talked about in a psychologically mature and sophisticated manner, in a way congruent with recent findings in brain research and cognitive science. Sativihari touches upon these researches and findings to supplement his own innovative insights into what the Buddha was trying to convey to his audience in his explication of the Four Noble Truths. Sativihari’s commitment to using Pali and Sanskrit words as his primary frame of reference, rather than their often garbled and confusing English translations, lends a much-appreciated gravitas to his presentation. » « This is an important book… It adds much to the current discourses and also brings us much closer to a more nuanced understanding of the Buddha’s own thought processes. »【Mu Soeng, Scholar in Residence, Barre Center for Buddhist Studies】 . (shrink)