With this paper I intend to rehabilitate the status of orality as medium of the public use of reason in the normative Kantian sense. As a first step, I reconstruct the reasons why Kant rejects the spoken word and designates the written word as the sole medium of public reasoning. As a second step, I argue for the possibility of employing the spoken word as medium of public reasoning while remaining within the normative framework of Kant’s concept of the public (...) use of reason. (shrink)

According to recent scholarship, Kant’s "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" and the introductory section to "The Conflict of the Faculties" are masterpieces of philosophical rhetoric. The philosophical significance of these texts lies in establishing the free public use of reason as a tool to discipline political power through pure practical reason, and the rhetorical mastery consists in presenting the free public use of reason as a means to satisfy the ruler’s pragmatic practical reason. Elaborating on this interpretation, (...) I flesh out three further aspects of the writings in question. First, I examine the four types of arguments that Kant crafts in defence of the public use of reason and show how their pragmatic practical character is fully in keeping with the foundation of politics on pure practical ideas. Second, contrasting Kant’s notion of the public use of reason with the classical liberal conception of free speech, I argue that the distinctive character of Kant’s notion of the public use of reason consists in adding to the liberal demand for freedom from state censorship the requirement of the self-discipline of the participants in the public use of reason. Third, I contend that Kant’s notion of the public use of reason goes beyond a mere non-coercive discursive procedure and conclude that, to qualify as public in the distinctive Kantian sense, publicly presented positions must uphold theoretical and moral criteria informed by critical philosophy. (shrink)

In seinem 2020 erschienen Buch "Moralischer Fortschritt in dunklen Zeiten. Universale Werte für das 21. Jahrhundert" präsentiert Markus Gabriel einen ethischen Ansatz, den er als Neuen Moralischen Realismus bezeichnet. Das zweite Kapitel trägt den Titel _Warum es moralische Tatsachen, aber keine ethischen Dilemmata gibt_ und bildet den Gegenstand des vorliegenden Beitrags. Es wird im Folgenden versucht, die Positionen des Neuen Moralischen Realismus in Bezug auf ethische Dilemmata zu beleuchten. Zu diesem Zweck gilt es deutlich zu machen, wie der Neue Moralische (...) Realismus die Fragen beantwortet, was ethische Dilemmata sind, ob ethische Dilemmata überhaupt vorkommen und wie die entsprechenden Handlungsoptionen moralisch zu beurteilen sind. Von der Absicht geleitet, durch diesen Beitrag einen philosophischen Dialog zu reproduzieren, werden die hier gemachten Deutungsversuche als Fragen präsentiert. (shrink)

This article was originally published in January 2007 on the online version of the journal “Rivista della scuola superiore dell'economia e delle finanze”. Since the journal’s webpage does not exist anymore, I have uploaded a PDF of the article as it was published in January 2007. In questo articolo esamino l'idea humboldtiana di progresso. Più precisamente, ricostruisco come Wilhelm von Humboldt teorizzi il progresso del singolo individuo, del cittadino e del genere umano. Secondo la mia ricostruzione, l’idea humboldtiana di progresso (...) presenta un intreccio di motivi illuministi, storicisti e antirazionalisti, ed esige una riforma dello stato in senso liberale. La mia tesi è che, tuttavia, il pensiero politico di Humboldt sfoci in un conservatorismo non liberale che in quanto tale spalanca uno iato tra il sistema istituzionale auspicato e la possibilità di progresso. (shrink)

With this paper I analyze Kant’s account of the human vocation to cosmopolitanism discussed in the last section of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (7:321-333) and show how Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism requires the cooperation of pure reason and pragmatic anthropology. My main thesis is that pure reason provides regulative ideas, thereby maintaining a foundational role, and pragmatic anthropology provides empirical evidence, thereby reinforcing the theoretical and practical status of reason’s ideas. In developing my analysis, I argue (...) that Kant reframes the question ‘What is the human being?’ in a non-essential way, foregrounds a moral practical concern, and assigns freedom an unprecedented role. Finally, I relate my analysis to two questions frequently discussed in Kant scholarship, namely the problem of whether the Anthropology has only a pragmatic or also a moral scope and the problem of the relation between the Anthropology and Kant’s critical system. (shrink)

Der Kerngedanke der politischen Theorie des Wilhelm von Humboldt ist äußerst schlicht und übersichtlich: In seinen "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen" heißt es, dass die Funktion des Staats auf die Erhaltung der inneren und auswärtigen Sicherheit beschränkt werden soll. Diese Staatsauffassung findet ihre Begründung in einer Anthropologie, die dem Menschen das Recht und zugleich die Aufgabe zuweist, durch das spontane Zusammenwirken mit den anderen seine Potenzialitäten zur Entfaltung zu bringen. Schlicht und übersichtlich wie (...) diese Staats- und Menschenlehre auch scheinen mag, ist es an ihr außerordentlich interessant, einerseits welche Leitgedanken ihr zugrunde liegen, und andererseits welche theoretischen Neuigkeiten sie erzielt. Hier möchte ich insbesondere vier Aspekte hervorheben: 1- Individualismus: Der Angelpunkt der gesamten Philosophie Humboldts ist das Individuum, aus dem allerdings nie ein selbstgenügsames Subjekt wird; 2- Liberalismus: Humboldt formuliert als erster den Katalog der Motive des Liberalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts; 3- Gesetzmäßigkeitsprinzip: im Sinne seiner Ausformulierung des Rechts- und Freiheitsbegriffs erarbeitet Humboldt ein Gesetzmäßigkeitsprinzip anthropologischen Charakters; 4- Legitimationsprinzip: in Anlehnung an die Prämissen, aus denen sich das neue Gesetzmäßigkeitsprinzip ergibt, setzt Humboldt ein neues Legitimationsprinzip, das unserem Begriffspaar „materielle Verfassung-formelle Verfassung“ sehr ähnelt. (shrink)

Vortragstext für die VI. Tagung für Praktische Philosophie Universität Salzburg 27. & 28. September 2018.

According to a common misconception, Kant rejects rhetoric as worthy of no respect and neglects popularity as a dispensable accessory. Two recent publications on the communicative dimension of Kant’s conception and practice of philosophy represent a very solid rebuttal of such criticism. The books in question are Kant’s Philosophy of Communication by G. L. Ercolini and A linguagem em Kant. A linguagem de Kant edited by Monique Hulshof and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, especially in light of the long chapter (...) “Kant e a Questão da Popularidade e da Linguagem da Filosofia” by Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (pp. 17- 69). What Ercolini’s monograph and Santos’ chapter have in common, is that they both argue that Kant does indeed value and practice both rhetoric and popularity. However, they differ from each other in that Ercolini lets Kant’s reflection on popularity derive from occasional factors, while Santos locates its origin at the heart of Kant’s critical project. In order fully to appreciate their novelty, these two contributions call for an overview of the state of research on the subject of Kant’s conception of rhetoric. Thus, before closely examining them, I will briefly outline the relevant scholarship by dividing it into the three classes of those who interpret Kant (a) as a skillful rhetorician, (b) as dismissive of rhetoric, and finally (c) as according rhetoric a moral function. (shrink)

With An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (1784) and What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? (1786), Kant presents the concept of public use of reason and defines its requirements, scope, and function. In outline, the public use of reason consists in sharing one’s thoughts with “the entire public of the world of readers” (8:37). As for its requirements, to the extent that someone communicates in their own person, i.e. not in the exercise of their function (...) as a public official, and bases their reasoning on universalizable grounds, their use of reason qualifies as public and shall be free from state censorship. Therefore, Kant’s concept of public use reason aims to establish a public debate that is free and includes in its scope, both as subjects and recipients, potentially all adult men. The ultimate function of the public use of reason is to foster moral progress and, with it, the reform of the political community according to the republican ideal. However, it is commonly held that Kant, with his 1798 essay The Conflict of the Faculties, deprives his notion of public use of reason of its progressive core and adjusts it to the absolutist conception of speech and civil service. Characterizations of state officials as “not free to make public use of their learning” (7:18) and “bound to uphold whatever […] the crown sanctions for them to expound publicly” (7:8), as well as the depiction of laypeople as “incompetent” (7:18) and “resigned to understanding nothing about [the sciences]” (7:34), have led influential interpreters to read Kant as redefining his notion of public use of reason by restricting its subjects to university professors and its recipients to government members (e.g. John Christian Laursen 1986, rpt. 1992 and 1996; Kevin Davis 1992; Steven Lestition 1993; Jay Franzel 2013). On my reading, with The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant does indeed redefine the concept of public use of reason making concessions to the absolutist notion of speech and civil service. However, a close reading of the text reveals that the public use of reason ends up being reaffirmed in its progressive core and extended in its scope. To substantiate my interpretation, I will systematically analyse and classify each of the 68 occurrences of the adjective ‘public’ in The Conflict of the Faculties and show how Kant employs the absolutist vocabulary to convey the progressive project of his previous writings. Accordingly, I argue that Kant holds on to the free public use of reason as a means to reform politics according to the republican ideal and that the employment of the absolutist vocabulary is motivated by a pragmatic attitude and a provocative stance. (shrink)

It is commonly held that Kant, with his 1798 essay The Conflict of the Faculties, relinquishes some progressive stances and retreats to conservative positions. According to several interpreters, this is especially evident from Kant’s discussion of moral progress and public use of reason. Kant avers that moral progress can only occur through state-sanctioned education “from top to bottom” and entrusts the emergence of a state endowed with the relevant resolution and ability to “a wisdom from above” (7:92-93). According to numerous (...) interpreters, this call for state intervention and the accompanying surrender to a superhuman wisdom manifest Kant’s retreat from initially republican to later conservative positions. In Kant’s previous writings, the notion of public use of reason indicates the unrestricted freedom to communicate one’s thoughts, provided that the communication does not take place in the exercise of one’s function as a state official, and potentially encompasses all adult men. Instead, in The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant contrasts university professors’ freedom to make public use of their reason with the other public officials’ obligation “to uphold whatever […] the crown sanctions for them to expound publicly” (07:08). Thus, according to several scholars, Kant ends up disenfranchising the vast majority of people from the public use of reason and adjusting an emancipatory notion to the absolutist conception of speech and civil service. On my reading, with The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant neither retreats to conservative positions nor softens any progressive tenets of critical philosophy. On the contrary, I intend to show that a) the project of a state-sanctioned education constitutes Kant’s republican rebuttal of conservative positions on their ground, and is fully in keeping with critical philosophy; b) Kant sets forth a new notion of public use of reason that reverses the order of moral progress presented in his previous writings, but retains all its emancipatory character. I intend to support my interpretation by a) conducting a rhetorical analysis showing how Kant’s rhetoric aims to persuade the ruler that his interests are best served by fostering the regulative ideas of pure practical reason as discovered by critical philosophy; b) analysing Kant’s use of the term ‘public’ (both as the adjective ‘öffentlich’ and the noun ‘Publikum’) and showing how it retains its wide scope and emancipatory function and even expands them to areas previously subjected to legitimate censorship. (shrink)

Conference paper Convegno della Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani "Leggi e regole. Universi ordinati nella filosofia di Kant" Università di Pavia 19-20 Dicembre 2019 -/- .

L’indipendenza politica dei giudici è un principio e una prassi ormai consolidata nella Germania federale. A costituire una questione ancora dibattuta è invece la critica di politicità mossa al Tribunale Costituzionale Federale. La tesi presentata in quest’articolo è che tale critica non sia comprovabile né plausibile. Non è comprovabile nel senso che non è stato possibile provare inconfutabilmente che i giudici costituzionali interpretino la Costituzione sulla base di orientamenti politici personali. Non è plausibile in quanto la nomina dei giudici avviene (...) in conformità con la proporzionale politica. La critica di politicità del Tribunale Costituzionale Federale è da attribuire piuttosto al disappunto delle parti in causa, di volta in volta deluse dalla bocciatura di una legge o dal rifiuto di un ricorso. (shrink)

Mit diesem Beitrag untersuch ich systematisch (1) wie der Tyrannis-Begriff in der Moderne umgedeutet wird (2) und wie die moderne Auffassung der Tyrannis mit der Aufwertung des Antagonismus zusammenhängt. Von der Antike bis zum Spätmittelalter, so meine Rekonstruktion, gilt eine Regierung als tyrannisch, wenn sie die in der Antike als normativ gesetzte und im Mittelalter als gottgegeben aufgefasste Harmonie des Gemeinwesens zerstört. Dagegen gilt in der Moderne eine Regierung als tyrannisch, wenn sie das Individuum bei oder in der Entfaltung seiner (...) Talente und Eigenschaften hindert. Diese neue Begriffsbestimmung ergibt sich aus der Aufwertung der politischen und sozialen Antagonismen als Bestandteile der menschlichen Natur und zugleich als Triebfeder des staatsrechtlichen Fortschritts. Die neuzeitliche Aufwertung des Antagonismus und das mit diesem zusammenhängende Primat der individuellen Freiheit haben zur Folge, dass vom Staat die Fähigkeit gefordert wird, die aus der Entfaltung der individuellen Freiheit entstehenden Antagonismen anzuerkennen. Erst in der Moderne wird nämlich der Anspruch zur Geltung gebracht, den staatsrechtlichen Raum so zu gestalten, dass er politische und soziale Antagonismen ohne Schmälerung der individuellen Freiheit zu regeln vermag. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the increasing success of the FPÖ, the Austrian Freedom Party commonly classified as a right-wing populist party. Analyzing the possible causes of this incremental success, I especially focus on the party’s communication strategy. My thesis is that the discursive strategy of the FPÖ revolves around the unwarranted identification of persons and practices depicted as a benevolent and salvific “we” artificially set against a malevolent and dangerous “they”. This identification is unwarranted because it lacks any (...) modulation of level and logical articulation. Once thus constructed, the discursive strategy of the FPÖ includes, on one hand, the irremediable conflict of “we” and “they” and, on the other, the equalisation of “they”, so as to construct networks of guilty complicity among all subjects extraneous to the “we” represented through the leader’s will. (shrink)

Il tema dell'articolo è il massiccio incremento di elettori del Partito Liberale Austriaco FPÖ, comunemente classificato come partito populista di destra. La prospettiva scelta per analizzare tale successo elettorale consiste nell'esaminare la comunicazione pubblica della FPÖ. La tesi presentata è che la strategia discorsiva della FPÖ comprende da un lato la contrapposizione insanabile di un indistinto "noi" ad un altrettanto indistinto "loro" e dall’altro il livellamento del "loro" fino a costruire delle reti di colpevole complicità tra tutti i soggetti che (...) non siano il "noi" rappresentato nella volontà del capo. (shrink)

All'inizio degli anni '90 nella pubblicistica tedesca emerge la tendenza a decretare la fine politica dell’istituzione partito. Tipicamente, il partito viene presentato come un dinosauro della democrazia ormai incapace di assolvere alle sue funzioni tipiche o come piovra infiltratasi illegittimamente in ogni ambito della vita civile. La tesi di quest’articolo è che, al contrario, i partiti tedeschi abbiano dimostrato una forte reattività alle mutate circostanze nazionali e internazionali e che siano riusciti a mantenere il loro tipico ruolo funzionale di mediatore, (...) rappresentante ed amministratore degli interessi degli elettori. (shrink)

Im politischen Denken des Wilhelm von Humboldt findet eine konservative Wende statt: Von den radikalen Freiheitsansprüchen der Frühschriften bleibt in den Denkschriften des späten Staatsmannes kaum noch etwas erhalten. In diesem Band wird Humboldts konservative Wende textimmanent freigelegt, historisch situiert und systematisch ergründet. Insbesondere wird Humboldts Konservatismus auf seine zunehmende Angst vor der Demokratie zurückgeführt, was nach seinem Verständnis das schädliche Ergebnis der neuzeitlichen Vernunftrechts- und Vertragslehre darstellt. Aus diesem Grund wird Humboldts konservative Wende letzthin durch seine bereits in der (...) Frühproduktion anzutreffende zweifache Kritik an Rationalismus und Kontraktualismus beleuchtet. (shrink)

With this monograph on Kant and the problem of language, Raphaël Ehrsam develops a well-argued reconstruction of the architectonic place of language in Kant’s philosophy. The author terms his argument “genetic thesis”. On Ehrsam’s genetic thesis, in Kant’s philosophy the mastery of linguistic competences is indispensable to the acquisition of a priori theoretical and practical cognitions. The material of the book can be divided into three parts. In the first part (Introduction and Chapter One), Ehrsam frames the subject by outlining (...) his thesis and foregrounding Kant’s notions of acquisition and epigenesis. In the second part (Chapters Two - Five), he then articulates his thesis by reconstructing the functions played by specific linguistic instances in Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy. The third part (Chapter Six) is devoted to sketching Kant’s thoughts on how the human being, both as an individual and a species, acquires linguistic competences. (shrink)