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Ru Ye
Wuhan University
  1. The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme:1-20.
    The debate between Uniqueness and Permissivism concerns whether a body of evidence sometimes allows multiple doxastic attitudes towards a proposition. An important motivation for Uniqueness is the so-called ‘arbitrariness argument,’ which says that Permissivism leads to some unacceptable arbitrariness with regard to one's beliefs. An influential response to the argument says that the arbitrariness in beliefs can be avoided by invoking epistemic standards. In this paper, I argue that such a response to the arbitrariness argument is unsuccessful. Then I defend (...)
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  2. Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Impurism says that practical factors encroach on knowledge. An important version of impurism is called ‘Threshold-Impurism,’ which says that practical factors encroach on the threshold that rational credence must pass in order for one to have knowledge. A prominent kind of argument for Threshold-Impurism is the so-called ‘principle-based argument,’ which relies on a principle of fallibilism and a knowledge-action principle. This paper offers a new challenge against Threshold-Impur- ism. I attempt to show that the two principles Threshold-Impurists are committed to—KJ (...)
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  3. Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  4. A Doxastic-Causal Theory of Epistemic Basing.Ru Ye - 2020 - In J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York, NY, USA: pp. 15–33.
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  5. Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.
    ABSTRACTAccording to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the credential of (...)
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  6.  80
    It Can Be Rational to Change Priors.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Analysis.
    According to a widely held norm of rationality, one should not change prior credences without new evidence. An important argument for this norm appeals to accuracy considerations, which says that changing priors doesn’t maximize expected accuracy. This is because accuracy measures are strictly proper, and thus any probabilistically coherent person regards her own priors as uniquely maximizing expected accuracy compared with other priors. -/- This paper attempts to resist the accuracy argument against changing priors. We argue that even if rational (...)
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  7. Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.
    It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. It has been (...)
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  8. Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality.Ru Ye - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):93-108.
    Richard Foley has presented a puzzle purporting to show that all attempts in trying to find a sufficient condition of rationality are doomed. The puzzle rests on two plausible assumptions. The first is a level-connecting principle: if one rationally believes that one's belief that p is irrational, then one's belief that p is irrational. The second is a claim about a structural feature shared by all promising sufficient conditions of rationality: for any such condition, it is possible that one's belief (...)
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