Order:
See also
Ru Ye
Wuhan University
  1. Permissivism, the Value of Rationality, and a Convergence‐Theoretic Epistemology.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  38
    A Doxastic-Causal Theory of Epistemic Basing.Ru Ye - 2020 - In J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York, NY, USA: pp. 15–33.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3. The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme:1-20.
    The debate between Uniqueness and Permissivism concerns whether a body of evidence sometimes allows multiple doxastic attitudes towards a proposition. An important motivation for Uniqueness is the so-called ‘arbitrariness argument,’ which says that Permissivism leads to some unacceptable arbitrariness with regard to one's beliefs. An influential response to the argument says that the arbitrariness in beliefs can be avoided by invoking epistemic standards. In this paper, I argue that such a response to the arbitrariness argument is unsuccessful. Then I defend (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  4.  12
    Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    Impurism says that practical factors encroach on knowledge. An important version of impurism is called ‘Threshold-Impurism,’ which says that practical factors encroach on the threshold that rational credence must pass in order for one to have knowledge. A prominent kind of argument for Threshold-Impurism is the so-called ‘principle-based argument,’ which relies on a principle of fallibilism and a knowledge-action principle. This paper offers a new challenge against Threshold-Impur- ism. I attempt to show that the two principles Threshold-Impurists are committed to—KJ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.
    It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. It has been (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark