On social equality, individuals ought to relate on terms of equality. An important issue concerning this theory, which has not received much attention, is its scope: which individuals ought to relate on egalitarian terms? The answer depends on the theory’s grounds: the basis upon which demands of social equality arise when they do. In this chapter, I consider how we ought to construe the scope and the grounds of social equality. I argue that underlying the considerations social egalitarians advance for (...) taking demands of social equality to arise in the context of the state are relational facts that can obtain beyond state borders. So, my argument suggests an account of the grounds of social equality, and this account provides support for the scope of social equality potentially transcending the state. (shrink)

What bearing does living in an increasingly globalized world have upon the moral assessment of global inequality? This paper defends an account of global egalitarianism that differs from standard accounts with respect to both the content of and the justification for the imperative to reduce global inequality. According to standard accounts of global egalitarianism, the global order unjustly allows a person’s relative life prospects to track the morally arbitrary trait of where she happens to be born. After raising some worries (...) with these accounts, the author offers an alternative account of global egalitarianism, “social egalitarianism,” which locates the wrongfulness of global inequalities in their effects on social and political interaction rather than in the unfairness of their source. On this view, global inequalities wrongfully exclude the worse-off from partaking in the benefits of globalization. Consequently, social egalitarianism aims for the elimination of only those inequalities that impede such participation. (shrink)

An important debate in the current philosophy of wisdom is whether knowledge is necessary for wisdom. In this paper I argue that knowledge is necessary to explain wise actions. Towards this, firstly, I individuate two modal properties relevant for wise actions: (i) counterfactual robustness: an action performed in the actual world is wise only if it leads to or is constituted by the goals of living well in all nearby worlds; (ii) rational robustness: an action performed for the sake of (...) living well is wise only if, in all nearby worlds, when an agent has sufficient reasons to perform the action, she performs the action. Secondly, I argue that these two modal properties are best explained in terms of two central features of knowledge: (a) safety: if the agent knows that a certain action will help her successfully reach the relevant goal(s) of living well, or is constituted by those goal(s), then in all the nearby worlds, her belief that the action will help her successfully reach the goal is true; (b) stability: the agent's knowledge that the action will help her successfully reach the goal(s) of living well, or is constituted by those goals, entails that her belief that the action will help her successfully reach the goal(s), or is constituted by those goals, isn’t based on any reason that could easily have been defeated by misleading evidence. (shrink)

In cognitive science, there are many computational theories regarding the function of the mind; connectionism is one of them. Connectionist networks are intricate systems of simple units related to their environment. Some have thousands of units, but those with only a few units can also behave with surprising complexity and subtlety. This is because processing occurs in parallel as also interactively, in marked contrast with the serial processing to which this is accustomed. In the first section of this paper, I (...) intend to describe a simple network that illustrates several features of connectionist processing. Secondly, I would like to examine its relation with other areas in realm of cognitive science. Thirdly, I shall make an attempt to find out whether this theory contributes to the replacement of folk psychology. Lastly, I find that connectionist thus fails to account for the real nature of the mental states because of its not too clear attempt to reduce mental states to the machine states. The mechanistic theory of mind in all its hues faces the question as to how we can account for the qualitative content of our consciousness. It cannot ultimately tell us how the subjective experience is possible and how consciousness to be real feature of universe. (shrink)

Kok-Chor Tan has recently defended a novel theory of egalitarian distributive justice, institutional luck egalitarianism (ILE). On this theory, it is unjust for institutions to favor some individuals over others based on matters of luck. Tan takes his theory to preserve the intuitive appeal of luck egalitarianism while avoiding what he regards as absurd implications that face other versions of luck egalitarianism. Despite the centrality of the concept of institutional influence to his theory, Tan never spells out precisely what it (...) means for an inequality to be produced by an institution. In this paper, I consider different conceptions of institutional influence that ILE might employ. It appears that however this concept is construed, ILE has serious problems. On some conceptions, the luck egalitarian character of the theory is undermined. On others, the theory gives rise to precisely the sorts of absurd implications facing other versions of luck egalitarianism that Tan takes his theory to avoid. (shrink)

In this paper I shall explore Wittgenstein’s view on the existence of mind. The main concern is in this paper to give a positive theory of mind which can provide a method for understanding mind as a metaphysical reality. In this context the self is presupposed by which what we call the mental phenomena including consciousness, because without the self the mind will be meaningless in this physical world. That is, this phenomenon of world itself needs a self in which (...) mind is the part of this phenomenal world. As Wittgenstein takes mind in continuation with language and world because, for him, mind is not an independent entity in this world, rather it is part of this world. Thus the existence of the mind itself in this physical world proves that mind is metaphysical. (shrink)

Virginia Held argues that terrorism can be justified in some instances. But unlike standard, consequentialist justifications, hers is deontological. This paper critically examines her argument. It explores how the values of fairness, responsibility, and desert can serve to justify acts of terrorism. In doing so, two interpretations of her account are considered: a responsibility-insensitive and a responsibility-sensitive interpretation. On the first, her argument collapses into a consequentialist justification. On the second, it relies on an implausible conception of responsibility. Either way, (...) her argument fails as a distinctly deontological defense of terrorism. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall review the reasons that let Putnam to propose functionalism and the reasons that subsequently led him to abandon it. I would like to discuss Putnam's views belonging to early Putnam and later Putnam. First, let us focus on early Putnam. Early Putnam tries to show the possibility of robot consciousness. As a functionalist, Putnam shows that the human being is an autonomous: that is, human mind is a computing machine. Later, he changes his position to (...) demonstrate not just his intellectual confidence, but also the virtue of seeing the bigger picture. Later Putnam realized this because this sort of utopianism is an illustration of what is called ‘scientism’. It is based on speculations regarding scientific possibilities. The problem is that it is completely unclear just what possibility has been envisaged when one speaks of robotic consciousness. While arguing against Turing machine, the later Putnam said that pessimism about the success of artificial intelligence (AI) in simulating human intelligence amounts to pessimism about possibility of describing the functioning of the brain. He raised the question: what connection is there between simulating intelligence and describing the brain? Even if the computer model of the brain is correct, it does not follow that AI will succeed. Simulation is just simulation, it does not mean exact replications of human mind. (shrink)

Some consequentialists argue that ordinary individuals are obligated to act in specific, concrete ways to address large-scale harms. For example, they argue that we should each refrain from meat-eating and avoid buying sweatshop-made clothing. The case they advance for such prescriptions can seem intuitive and compelling: by acting in those ways, a person might help prevent serious harms from being produced at little or no personal cost, and so one should act in those ways. But I argue that such reasoning (...) often relies on an overly simplistic assessment of the costs and benefits of those prescriptions, one that misconstrues or neglects important issues. Indeed, a closer look at those costs and benefits reveals just how little we often know about a number of real-world matters that bear on the expected consequences of the prescribed individual actions. Our predicament is one of radical uncertainty: we currently lack a sound basis for concluding that the relevant actions are more likely to do good than to backfire. I distinguish this empirically grounded objection from others, which are not convincing—including one based on the mere conceivability of the actions in question backfiring and another based on the supposition that such actions cannot make a difference in addressing the massive problems at issue. The upshot is that, at least for now, consequentialist arguments for many specific individual actions aimed at addressing large-scale harms are inconclusive. (shrink)

This paper deals with the philosophical problems concerned with research in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), in particular with problems arising out of claims that AI exhibits ‘consciousness’, ‘thinking’ and other ‘inner’ processes and that they simulate human intelligence and cognitive processes in general. The argument is to show how Cartesian mind is non-mechanical. Descartes’ concept of ‘I think’ presupposes subjective experience, because it is ‘I’ who experiences the world. Likewise, Descartes’ notion of ‘I’ negates the notion of computationality (...) of the mind. The essence of mind is thought and the acts of thoughts are identified with the acts of consciousness. Therefore, it follows that cognitive acts are conscious acts, but not computational acts. Thus, for Descartes, one of the most important aspects of cognitive states and processes is their phenomenality, because our judgments, understanding, etc. can be defined and explained only in relation to consciousness and not in relation to computationality. We can only find computationality in machines and not in the mind, which wills, understands and judges. (shrink)

Expression is the central concept in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, and our experiences are reflected in our bodily expressions or gestures, facial expressions, behaviors and linguistic expressions. It seems true that we have no access of other people’s experiences but we can know or talk about them in so far as they are the common experiences of all. This inaccessibility of other’s experiences may create a genuine thinking that one’s experiences are private and the first person present tense psychological utterances (...) are not descriptive at all. They are understood solely as expressive and expression is the outer concept of a mental phenomenon. In this paper, an attempt will be made on the basis of Wittgenstein’s critique of the relationship between the concepts of experience and expression we shall argue that certain uses of the dichotomy between the inner and the outer are mistakes. According to Wittgenstein, the inner is not a set of experiences which are or are not expressed by our immediate (primitive) expressions or linguistic expressions rather it is the capacity of the subject to express himself genuinely. (shrink)

In this article, I have argued that persons are individual human beings capable of mental activities. In this sense, persons have not only physical properties, but also various forms of consciousness. I have mentioned that the relation between a person and his/her physical properties are contingent; not logical, but factual. I have also mentioned Descartes' view that a person is a combination of two separate entities- a body and a mind. Only mind is conscious; the physical properties that the person (...) possesses are properties of his or her body. It is conceivable that either should exist without the other. That is to say that the mind can exist without the aid of the body. I have provided a detailed summery of Strawson's theory because it goes against William's concept of person and give an account of person , which in turn, removes many of the difficulties of the mind-body relation. Strawson concludes that a person is not identical with his/her body. Like Descartes, he gives primary to the mental attributes of a person. Thus, the concept of a person is fundamental and metaphysical. This is the main theme of this article. (shrink)

I have argued that emergentism is a non-computational theory of mind, because this theory says that mind or consciousness emerges from material objects, but it will not be reduced to that matter. That is to say that the higher level of quality emerge from a lower level of existence. It emerges therefrom, and does not belong to that level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existence with its social laws of behaviour. Thus, emergentism is an anti-reductionists' theory of (...) the mind and has established the hardness of the problem of consciousness. The physicalistic theory of mind in all its hues faces the question as to how we can account for the qualitative content of our consciousness. It cannot ultimately tell us how the subjective content of our consciousness. (shrink)

Gillian Brock's "Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account" and Darrel Moellendorf's "Global Inequality Matters" present carefully crafted accounts of the obligations we have to non-compatriots and offer practical proposals for how we might get closer to meeting these obligations.

In Foucault, thought is spatial, and unfolds within the density of becoming, in the void that separates the subject and the object. It is ontologically independent from the authority of the contemplating self, the ‘I’. Thought is a being of its own, and comes from the outside – the world of relationships. The present study poses to itself the following question: if thinking indeed comes from the outside, then under what condition thinking can encounter itself – its colour, texture and (...) topography? That is, under what condition can man encounter himself and the world? Since this problem does not have its origin in Foucault’s work, this work does not arrive at any conclusion merely by analysing and evaluating his work alone. Rather, it aims to explore how Foucault has incorporated Kant and Nietzsche into his thinking, on the one hand, and contextualises him within the Western tradition in general and his responses to contemporaries Deleuze and Derrida, in particular, on the other. Consequently, this study is limited by the sheer weight of its own problematisation. However, the problem of ‘under what condition thought encounters itself?’ is here posed not for the sake of constituting a form of knowledge on it, but rather, it is asked from the point of view of ethics. This, in fact, demands a reordering of the forms of ontology that Foucault has developed at different stages of his career. There are three forms of ontology in Foucault’s work: the first analyses man as the subject of truth; the second takes up man as the subject of power; and the third analyses man as an ethical being. The present study reverses the order and examines his work in its totality from the standpoint of his later writings that deal with the problem of truth and ethics. It tries to connect two problems that pop up at different stages of Foucault’s career. The Order of Things asks the question, “what is man?” and in his later writings Foucault labours on the question, “how should I live my life?” This study tries to relate these two questions, as it unfolds itself. (shrink)

The marriage ceremony of the Hindu Bangalees of Barak Valley is observed through long ceremonial rituals. Songs are one of the important parts of this ceremony. These songs are mainly sung by women. The main feature of the songs is that the important rituals are depicted through these songs. Mythological stories and characters constitute another important feature of these songs. This paper aims to discuss the elements and importance of these folk songs in the marriage ceremony of the Hindu Bangalees (...) of Barak Valley. (shrink)

The identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. The main thesis of this theory is – states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. This theory leaves many things unexplained with regard to the relation between mind and body, which have been questioned by different thinkers in different periods. (...) Hence, in this article I am going to find out only the problem of identity in the ‘Identity theory of mind’. (shrink)

Novel is a time-art. Gunamoy Manna writes novel, express truth with the help of time. Gunamoy Manna is an anti-establish writer. He enlightens those people, whom live for truth and life. 'Mute` is one of the most extra-ordinary novel in history of Bengali novel, because most popular religious and cultural festival 'Gaajan` and its philosophy is the main theme in this novel. The main character Sudhir overcomes all the problems through his faith on lord Shiva.

Privation of exposure, women cluster of our society were ignored, their potentiality and credentials never note-of for productive utilization, thus, their qualities remains unveiled. The SHG movement of microfinance (mF),bring an exception and has able to reach all over the world for her easy factors of financing , where women occupied the major share, as such, the entrepreneurial and other potentialities of this neglected cluster, become a case of concern. Same instance is in the Gobardhana Block, where woman’s shows their (...) potentialities of excellence in various economic activities , especially in weaving and farming. But, to have desired result, women clients of mF are in need of due care and attention like training, management etc. as demand by the time. (shrink)

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence. Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, (...) we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead. (shrink)

Post colonialism is often understood to be a period of time after colonialism and post-colonial literature is usually characterized by its opposition to the colonial discourse. However, any literature that expresses an opposition to colonialism, even if it is written during a colonial period, may be defined as postcolonial literature, primarily due to its oppositional nature. From this point of view, novels like ‘Kankabati’, ‘Nildarpan’, ‘Bolmik’, ‘Tabubihanga’, ‘Aranyer Adhikar’, ‘Droupadi’, ‘Akasher Niche Manus’, and Mohakaler Rather Ghora’ have been discussed in (...) this paper. The paper also highlights that the so-called renaissance and modernity in Bengali Literature took place under the imposed structure of an English modernity. Perceived in this light, a new dimension of Bengali novels could be found, where the plights of marginalized sections are being highlighted. The paper is analytical in nature construed with the help of Primary and Secondary data. (shrink)

'ā no bhadrāḥ kratavo yantu viśvato ' Let good thoughts come from all around; inspired by this timeless epic of Rigveda. India has presented an excellent model of Multiculturalism to the world. The multiculturalist model of the West, as established by contemporary thinkers like Wilkymalika, is based on the separate political existence of different cultural classes. been made for thousands of years. India has maintained Multiculturalism not only at the socio-cultural level but also at the political level. Through federal structure, (...) universal suffrage, constitutionally guaranteed civil rights, with other constitutional institutions and provisions, multiculturalism is being addressed at the political level for a population of 13 million people .Thus in India , multiculturalism is not only is not only a political tool for diversity but also a socio-political concept. Therefore, Indian multiculturalism presents a comprehensive, effective, and more sustainable model which have to be discussed. (shrink)

A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY: Abstract of the Ph.D. Dissertation By Ramesh N. Patel June, 1970 -/- Philosophy pursues a rational explication of our understanding, experiences, and values in terms of objective truth and reality. Conspicuously, its view of rationality has been rigid and preconceived. Application of the preconceived reason in the explication of the essential features of our world fails and issues in a network of dialectical tangles. These artificially created tangles pose a unique intellectual challenge, (...) but the perennial failure to resolve them limits the intellectual response of philosophers to remaining caught in the tangles, or to taking intuitively favorable sides, or to simply denouncing the tangles as meaningless. Each is understandable. -/- Superficially, traditional philosophical reason looks like a correct tool for the explication of our world of common sense, but its applications to the world result in logical tangles showing its inadequacy. The philosopher’s faith in such reason ends up in one of two positions: abandoning our world in the interests of such reason, or embodying itself in the world through a special form of reason. Plato took the first and Aristotle took the second position. My analysis shows that Plato failed to explicate the relation between his world of Forms and our world of particulars, and, more importantly, between the Forms and the intuitive reason which grasps them. Aristotle, in my analysis, cannot conceal that the law of noncontradiction is a mere exhortation and has no descriptive necessity with respect to thought, things, or meaning. We also find such dialectical difficulties in Augustine, Hume and Strawson. -/- “Microphilosophical feasibilism” is our proposal for the best treatment, if not the definitive solution, of these problems. Instead of separating philosophical method into logic, epistemology, axiology, and metaphysics on the one side, and partitioning the projected results of philosophizing into validity, truth, valuation, and reality on the other, we need to start philosophizing with a general distinction between “method employed” and “intended result.” This distinction is not pre-colored by claims to ultimate verities. It is a direct aid to understanding. I consider the basic inevitable paradox that a philosopher should explain not only our understanding of experience but also his philosophizing itself. The circularity between “method employed” and “intended result” needs to be admitted as an initial fact about reason rather than circumvented by an implausibly claimed capacity of philosophical reason to formally transcend everything including this circularity. -/- Presuppositions are reduced to a minimum inevitable number. Being our primary microphilosophical criteria, they are reason, experience, and value in their minimal sense. They cannot be plausibly substituted or further reduced. They cannot be preferred one or more to others arbitrarily. We show how, in microphilosophy they coincide or synchronize. Jointly and basically, they form the minimum method employed. The initial, basic, intended result is called minimum feasibility. The fundamental circularity between method and result leaves no way out but to ground self-reference in such a manner that method and result “logico-genetically” coincide. Two extreme situations are avoided: “the logical zero-situation” where nothing is true or real, and “the credulous open situation” where everything is true or real. Finding a mean manifests a basic value. If the meaning of truth and reality is to be preserved, the basic value must have a clear impact and express descriptive rather than revisionary reason. -/- Several other stringent demands are raised as conditions which microphilosophy should fulfil to achieve feasibility. The final, joint, outcome of both “method” and “result,” in the thesis of microphilosophical feasibilism, is formulated thus: Self refers freely and symbolically to itself, own person, own body, material bodies, other persons’ bodies, other persons, and other selves. -/- Ramesh N. Patel Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy conferred in June, 1970 University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M. (shrink)

Ayurveda is considered one of the ancient systems of knowledge in India. Various compendiums of Ayurveda i.e., Charaka, Sushruta, or Vagbhatta have enumerated an education system based on Gurukuls i.e., An Educator and their pupils. It is evident from them that a very systematized and organized form of medical education starting from selection to induction and then to effective teaching and training were given during that ancient era. The triad of education viz. Adhyayan (studying), Adhyapan (teaching) and Sambhasha (an argument (...) based on logic) is key to knowledge and the learning process as per Charaka. The selection of students and teachers was based on some set of fixed criteria necessary to be fulfilled. Induction was done prior to admission and proper disciplinary, and ethical rules were practiced. For the development of knowledge and skills in branches of Ayurveda, problems-based case discussion, identification, causes, and treatment of diseases, their principles were taught. Yogya (a set of dummy objects) was used to practice prior to the final surgery. (shrink)

The present book attempts to look out for management lessons in Holy Mother’s life. The author is a disciple of Sri Akshaya Chaitanya who was himself a disciple and biographer of Holy Mother. This book is thus a product of inspired effort. Various facets of the Holy Mother’s personality have been traced through incidents from her life and these have been classified into different sections such as planning, organisation, motivation, leadership, decision-making, communication, and inspiration.

J. N. (Jitendra Nath) Mohanty (1928–2023). -/- Professor J. N. Mohanty has characterized his life and philosophy as being both “inside” and “outside” East and West, i.e., inside and outside traditions of India and those of the West, living in both India and United States: geographically, culturally, and philosophically; while also traveling the world: Melbourne to Moscow. Most of his academic time was spent teaching at the University of Oklahoma, The New School Graduate Faculty, and finally Temple University. Yet (...) his preeminent work in Husserlian phenomenology developed alongside his eminent work in Indian philosophy: describing his interests as “a fusion of disparate horizons.” -/- J. N. Mohanty was born September 26, 1928, in Cuttack (Odisha, East India). After graduating from high school, he went on to study both Indian and Western philosophy in Calcutta, earning bachelor’s and master’s degrees. There he read Whitehead and Kant’s First Critique; although he wanted to include mathematics in his curriculum, he was led instead to include Indian philosophy and Sanskrit. On the shelves of his teacher, Ras Vihar Das, he came upon a copy of the English translation (Ideas I, 1931) of Edmund Husserl’s classic Ideen I (1913), which presented Husserl’s ground-breaking conception of phenomenology. In 1952–1954 he left India for the first time, reaching Göttingen to study mathematics and philosophy, which earned him a doctorate in mathematics and “philosophy of mathematical sciences” (in his own words). In Göttingen, Mohanty found the powerful mathematical world that Husserl himself had earlier interacted with, where several Husserl students had formed the Göttingen school of phenomenology. During these years Mohanty studied primarily mathematics, alongside Kant and also Vedic Sanskrit. From his friend Günter Patzig, interpreter of Aristotle and Frege, Mohanty was drawn to Frege in relation to mathematical logic. He attended lectures of Heidegger, intrigued by his ontological thinking. Yet, despite the Husserlian legacy, Mohanty was completely self-taught in his studies of Husserl (as he has reported). With a doctorate in mathematics, and ideas from Kant and Frege in his philosophical background, Mohanty set about crafting his own conception of philosophy grounded in phenomenology, drawing on Husserl’s extensive work, critically sifting through Husserl’s texts and their emerging concepts of intentionality, meaning, subject, intersubjectivity, and world. In between he wrote his first book-length study: on phenomenological insights in Nicolai Hartmann and A. N. Whitehead (1958). -/- Over many decades Mohanty formulated and argued, in analytical detail, for a conception of phenomenology and its place in philosophy, later presented in a clear and concise book titled Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account (1989). Over these very decades the same scholar explored classical and recent Indian philosophy, thinking through kindred ideas of consciousness, self, and knowledge drawn from the Indian philosophical contexts. While writing on Nyāya theory of truth, he also pondered whether the world and finite individual are illusory or real, and whether Marx, Arendt, Gandhi (whom he heard speak in Calcutta), or Vinoba Bhave (with whom he marched across India for the land-grant movement) could best navigate post-Independent India’s social and svarāj or self-rule reforms. The two Mohantys, thinking through a vision of self and world, turned out to be “non-different” or “non-dual” as they each practiced critical phenomenology from both inside and outside the respective philosophical and cultural traditions. Numerous students, fellows, and colleagues or collaborators have benefited immensely from this infusion and unified approach to diversity in philosophical thought. In the 2000s, moving into retirement, Mohanty wrote two long books devoted to his understanding of Husserl and phenomenology and the calling of philosophy itself. This two-volume study shows Mohanty himself thinking through Husserl, critically, in The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Introduction (2008), and Edmund Husserl’s Freiburg Years: 1916–1938. As Mohanty worked on Husserl, he carefully indicated where he agreed and where he rejected or changed ideas, all part of his practice in phenomenology of “description and interpretation.” It was the same pattern he used in addressing the thought of Husserl vis-à-vis Kant or Frege or even Quine. -/- As Mohanty developed his understanding of phenomenology over the years, he wrote books on theory of meaning and the concept of intentionality, developing a model of ideal meaning and its foundation in intentionality, drawing on Husserl’s results. He followed these with the book Husserl and Frege (1982), linking the thought of those foundational figures for the “continental” and “analytic” traditions, respectively, in twentieth-century Western philosophy. Over his long career Mohanty addressed both traditions in his clear and accessible writing style. While developing his views on phenomenology, Mohanty regularly looked to “Husserl and his others,” evaluating views in Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and then Derrida and others in the wake of Husserl. With his background in Kant, Mohanty also looked toward Heidegger and Hegel in relation to Husserl’s later work in the Crisis (1935–38). Similarly, he looked to contemporary analytic philosophers, adjudicating his own, oft-wise Husserlian views in relation to Frege, Nagel, and others. Amid his active scholarly career, Mohanty co-founded the journal Husserl Studies, and was editorial advisor to Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, Philosophy East & West, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Sophia, among others. -/- Yet all this while Mohanty was also thinking and writing about Indian philosophy and its relation to phenomenology. In his own retrospective, Indian philosophy is “the permanent background” of his Husserlian thinking, while Kant is the recurrent Western background of his Husserlian phenomenology. Mohanty’s form of “transcendental phenomenology” evolved, in his own perspective, against the background of his studies of Navya-Nyāya on logic and Vedānta on consciousness, in Indian philosophy, and against the background of Kant’s First Critique on the transcendental, in Western philosophy. Accordingly, Mohanty’s study of logical form and of the intentionality of consciousness seeks a fusion of East and West in the conception of transcendental phenomenology. (Cf. Mohanty’s apt response to critics in The Empirical and the Transcendental (2000).) Even in the context of North American Husserl scholarship, Mohanty has exercised an earnest fusion of East and West. For the so-called East Coast and West Coast interpretations of Husserl’s crucial notion of noema both find a sympathetic spirit in J. N. Mohanty’s careful and nuanced interpretation of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. With Mohanty the two faces of the noema are the logical (Fregean) and the phenomenal (Kantian), and these views of intentional structure join in consciousness—in a way resonant with Indian thought. -/- - David Woodruff Smith (UC Irvine) and Purushottama Bilimoria (SFSU, San Francisco; University of Melbourne) -/- For photo of Prof Mohanty visit APA online memorial_minutes2023 Courtesy of APA Memorial Minutes (& Proceedings) 2023 . (shrink)

In der Literatur zur Wirkungsgeschichte der Farbenlehre Goethes aus dem Jahr 1810 grassieren zwei Vorurteile: (1) Nur ein einziger Physiker von Rang (Seebeck) habe sich auf Goethes Projekt wissenschaftlich eingelassen. (2) Schon zu Goethes Lebzeiten habe sich die Fachwissenschaft mit überwältigender Mehrheit gegen den Dichter ausgesprochen. Beide Behauptungen sind falsch. ad (1): Der bedeutende Physiker und Chemiker Johann Ritter hat zwischen 1800 und 1801 eng mit Goethe kooperiert, dieselbe Forschungsmethode eingesetzt wie Goethe und aufgrund dieser Kooperation das UV-Licht entdeckt. Bis (...) zu seinem Lebensende war er der Ansicht, dass die newtonische Theorie durch Fortführung der Experimente Goethes unterminiert werden könne. ad (2): Wie sich bei einer Kampfabstimmung unter den MINT-Forschern der Goethe-Zeit ergibt (bei der sämtliche veröffentlichte Voten von 1810 bis 1832 gezählt werden), stimmten gegen Goethe die Hälfte der Naturwissenschaftler, für ihn ein Drittel, bei 15 Prozent Stimmenthaltungen. Goethe hat die Abstimmung in der Tat verloren, doch eine verheerende Niederlage sähe anders aus. (shrink)

Contemporary Indian Philosophy is related to contemporary Indian thinkers and contains the proceedings of First Session of Society for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (SPPIS) Haryana. It is neither easy nor impossible to translate into action all noble goals set forth by the eminent thinkers and scholars, but we might try to discuss and propagate their ideas. In this session all papers submitted electronically and selected abstracts have been published on a website especially develop for this session. In this volume (...) we included some papers from this session and also from open sources and contributors include teachers, research scholars and students etc. This volume is divided into two parts. First part contains papers on Swami Vivekananda and second part contains papers of B. G. Tilak, Sri Aurobindo, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Saheed Bhagat Singh and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar etc. It is the general intention of the Centre to produce informative as well as positive literature to inspire and motivate the students and the general readers. (shrink)

In der Korrespondenz mit Clarke ist Leibniz' Standardargument gegen die Annahme, daß Raum und Zeit absolut seien, daß Gott sich bei der Wahl des zu erschaffenden Universums gezwungen sähe, gegen das Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes zu verstoßen, wenn diese Annahme richtig wäre: Bloße Unterschiede in räumlicher und zeitlicher Hinsicht ergeben keinen Vorteilsunterschied, und da Gott nur aus Vorteilsgründen handelt, sind solche Unterschiede nicht möglich. Leibniz stellt dieses Argument als ausschließlich abhängig vom Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes dar, eine gängige Interpretation ist (...) aber, daß dies Prinzip determinierte Objekte göttlicher Wahl nur dann ergibt, wenn ein ergänzendes Prinzip von Kontingenz hinzutritt. Diese Auslegung muß falsch sein, wenn Leibniz hier authentisch bleibt, und insofern wäre doch das Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes eher als irgendein Prinzip des Besten Leibniz' Prinzip der Kontingenz. (shrink)

In der Literatur zur Wirkungsgeschichte der Farbenlehre Goethes aus dem Jahr 1810 grassieren zwei Vorurteile: (1) Nur ein einziger Physiker von Rang (Seebeck) habe sich auf Goethes Projekt wissenschaftlich eingelassen. (2) Schon zu Goethes Lebzeiten habe sich die Fachwissenschaft mit überwältigender Mehrheit gegen den Dichter ausgesprochen. Beide Behauptungen sind falsch. ad (1): Der bedeutende Physiker und Chemiker Johann Ritter hat zwischen 1800 und 1801 eng mit Goethe kooperiert, dieselbe Forschungsmethode eingesetzt wie Goethe und aufgrund dieser Kooperation das UV-Licht entdeckt. Bis (...) zu seinem Lebensende war er der Ansicht, dass die newtonische Theorie durch Fortführung der Experimente Goethes unterminiert werden könne. ad (2): Wie sich bei einer Kampfabstimmung unter den MINT-Forschern der Goethe-Zeit ergibt (bei der sämtliche veröffentlichte Voten von 1810 bis 1832 gezählt werden), stimmten gegen Goethe die Hälfte der Naturwissenschaftler, für ihn ein Drittel, bei 15 Prozent Stimmenthaltungen. Goethe hat die Abstimmung in der Tat verloren, doch eine verheerende Niederlage sähe anders aus. (shrink)

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) won the largest number of seats in the Constituent Assembly election held on 10 April 2008, and formed a coalition government which included most of the parties in the CA. Although acts of violence occurred during the pre-electoral period, election observers noted that the elections themselves were markedly peaceful and "well-carried out". The newly elected Assembly met in Kathmandu on 28 May 2008, and, after a polling of 564 constituent Assembly members, 560 voted to (...) form a new government, with the monarchist Rastriya Prajatantra Party, which had four members in the assembly, registering a dissenting note. At that point, it was declared that Nepal had become a secular and inclusive democratic republic,with the government announcing a three-day public holiday from 28 to 30 May.[citation needed] The King was thereafter given 15 days to vacate the Narayanhiti Royal Palace, to re-open it as a public museum. Nonetheless, political tensions and consequent power-sharing battles have continued in Nepal. In May 2009, the Maoist-led government was toppled and another coalition government with all major political parties barring the Maoists was formed.Madhav Kumar Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) was made the Prime Minister of the coalition government. In February 2011 the Madhav Kumar Nepal Government was toppled and Jhala Nath Khanal of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) was made the Prime Minister.[citation needed][43] In August 2011 the Jhala Nath Khanal Government was toppled and Baburam Bhattarai of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was made the Prime Minister. (shrink)

Research is increasing becoming AI dependent and is being done for fulfilment of various academic requirements. Researchers are spending a lot of time 'reinventing the wheel' and use word-padding to trick themselves and their examiners/peers happy. Often bibligraphies are longer than the research papers just to impress others. Often researchers do not know how to cita and rely solely on machine-created bibliographies which are insufficient bibligraphies. They tend to follow the letter of the law, discarding the spirit of the law. (...) While discussing research, the author comments on the Kathleen O'Connor; Graham Greene, Dracula, Hamlet, Blake, Plato and Augistine of Hippo. And Hannah Arendt. Some of his observations in this essay are unique; like he asks Levinas scholars to interrogate certain lines of thoughts which have hitherto not considered. In short, he teaches how to connect the dots. Here and in the Herald he has pointed out the contributions of Fr. Adrian Van Kaam, these need to be worked on by others in the field. An entire section is on Hindu religious research in terms of the Anuttara Trika. Another section is on Gerard Manley Hokins and sprung rhytm. A very interesting observation which he touches on is Samkhya and Plato. Through these and many more examples this essay tries to cleanse the research process of blah and abracadabra. (shrink)