An important way in which philosophy can contribute to public discourse is by clarifying concepts that are central to it. This paper is a philosophical contribution in that spirit. It offers an account of fake news—a notion that has entered public debate following the 2016 US presidential election. On the view I defend, fake news is Frankfurtian bullshit that is asserted in the form of a news publication. According to Frankfurt’s famous account, bullshit has two characteristics. There is, firstly, an (...) “indifference to how things really are” on the part of the bullshitter. This does not mean that what a bullshitter says is always false. It might well be true. What it does mean, however, is that, unlike a liar, who tries to convince us that a given statement he believes to be false is true, a bullshitter simply does not care whether what he says is true. The same, I believe, is true of the publisher of fake news. Secondly, the bullshitter misrepresents “in a certain way … what he is up to”. Likewise, the publisher of fake news seems to misrepresent what he is up to. It appears that he wants to hide his actual motives. At any rate, so I will argue. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a conceptual analysis of fake news. In essence, I suggest analysing this notion as a species of Frankfurtian bullshit. This construal, I argue, allows us to distinguish it from similar phenomena like bad or biased journalism and satire. First, I introduce four test cases. The first three are, intuitively, not cases of fake news, while the fourth one is. A correct conceptual analysis should, hence, exclude the first three while including the fourth. Next, I go (...) through some factors that could explain the difference between the first three cases and the fourth one before I offer my explanation. After that, I propose an analysis of fake news and show that it matches our intuitions about the four test cases. Finally, I consider a possible objection to my proposal. (shrink)

This chapter offers a concise discussion of classic utilitarianism which is the prototypical moral doctrine of the utilitarian family. It starts with an analysis of the classic utilitarian criterion of rightness, gives an overview over its virtues and vices, and suggests an overall assessment of its adequacy as a theory of morality. Furthermore, it briefly discusses whether classic utilitarianism holds promise as a philosophy for doing business.

Over the years, consequentialism has been subjected to numerous serious objections. Its adherents, however, have been remarkably successful in fending them off. As I argue in this paper, the reason why the case against consequentialism has not been more successful lies, at least partly, in the methodological approach that critics have commonly used. Their arguments have usually proceeded in two steps. First, a definition of consequentialism is given. Then, objections are put forward based on that definition. This procedure runs into (...) one of two problems. Substantive criticisms of consequentialism can only be formulated, if the posited definition is sufficiently concrete and narrow. In that case, however, consequentialists can defend themselves using a strategy that I call “interpretive divergence”. They can simply point out that the critic's definition does not accord with their understanding of consequentialism to which criticisms do not apply. If, on the other hand, an all-encompassing definition is used, it is so abstract that it is doubtful whether any substantive criticisms can be formulated. To escape this dilemma, I sketch a methodological approach which drops the assumption that consequentialism should be defined. It assumes, rather, that the term “consequentialism” should be interpreted as a Wittgensteinian family resemblance term. (shrink)

Minimum wages are usually assumed to be inefficient as they prevent the full exploitation of mutual gains from trade. Yet advocates of wage regulation policies have repeatedly claimed that this loss in market efficiency can be justified by the pursuit of ethical goals. Policy makers, it is argued, should not focus on efficiency alone. Rather, they should try to find an adequate balance between efficiency and equity targets. This idea is based on a two-worlds-paradigm that sees ethics and economics as (...) two inherently conflicting ways of thinking. We, however, believe that this view of the relationship between ethics and economics is fundamentally flawed and blurs our understanding of how an ethically responsible regulation of the labour market should be conducted. In drawing on an economic-ethical approach that resolves the antinomy between efficiency and equity, we show that ethics and economics are, in fact, two sides of the same coin and that minimum wage legislation can only be ethically responsible, if it is at the same time economically efficient. In other words, we can have our cake and eat it too. On the basis of our approach, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an economic-ethical viewpoint. We suggest that under the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets a tax-funded wage subsidy is preferable over minimum wages, as it makes everyone better off. If, however, employers have monopsony power in the wage setting process, the minimum wage is justifiable under certain conditions. (shrink)

In this short piece, I explore why we, as moral philosophers, should watch sci-fi movies. Though I do not believe that sci-fi material is ne- cessary for doing good moral philosophy, I give three broad reasons why good sci-fi movies should nevertheless be worth our time. These reasons lie in the fact that they can illustrate moral-philosophical pro- blems, probe into possible solutions and, perhaps most importantly, an- ticipate new issues that may go along with the use of new technologies. (...) For the sake of illustration, I focus, for the most part, on aspects of robo-ethics in the movie I, Robot. (shrink)

In this essay, I will examine how technological progress affects the responsibilities of human agents. To this end, I will distinguish between two interpretations of the concept of responsibility, viz. responsibility as attributability and substantive responsibility. On the former interpretation, responsibility has to do with the idea of authorship. When we say that a person is responsible for her actions we mean that she is to be seen as the author of these actions. They can be attributed to her, such (...) that she can be normatively appraised – i.e. blamed, praised, etc. – on that basis. In discussing this kind of responsibility I will show that the responsibility of human agents tends to increase as their technologies progress. This claim is often taken for granted, but seldom clarified and argued for. I will give it a clear interpretation and provide a semi-formal reasoning that supports it. The second interpretation of responsibility that I will discuss is substantive responsibility. It has to do with the normative demands that confront us with what we are required to do. I will argue that technological change can affect, firstly, what our substantive responsibilities are on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, I will try to show that it can affect the way we think about our substantive responsibilities at the level of theoretical normative ethics. (shrink)

The theme of this issue of the St. Gallen Business Review is "Harmony". For this reason, we would like to discuss whether two aspects of our life- world are in harmony, namely economic optimization and morality. What is the relation between them? According to a widely shared view, which is one aspect of the doctrine of "mainstream economics", the functioning of an economic system does not require moral behaviour on the part of the individual economic agent. In what follows, we (...) will try to convince you that this is false. If all economic agents – managers, employees, bankers, consumers and so on – were purely self-interested, as mainstream economics assumes, our economic practice would fail. There are various reasons for this. Here we will focus on one of them, namely the pivotal role of interpersonal communication. (shrink)

Was tun Philosophen eigentlich, wenn sie Philosophie treiben? Oder besser: Was sollten Philosophen tun, wenn sie Philosophie treiben? Diese Frage ist selbst eine philosophische. Und sie wird seit einigen Jahren wieder mit zunehmender Intensität diskutiert. Dafür ist vor allem eine neue philosophische Bewegung verantwortlich, die man als „experimentelle Philosophie“ oder kurz „ x-phi “ bezeichnet. Anhänger dieser Bewegung glauben, die Philosophie solle sich in Vorgehensweise und Methodik den empirischen Wissenschaften annähern und philosophischen Fragestellungen mithilfe empirischer Tests zu Leibe rücken. Diese (...) Ansicht steht im krassen Widerspruch zur konventionellen Sichtweise, nach der die Philosophie eine empirieferne Disziplin ist, die von Philosophen im sprichwörtlichen Lehnstuhl betrieben werden kann. Entsprechend stießen die Thesen experimenteller Philosophen bei Vertretern der klassischen Sichtweise zunächst auf Stirnrunzeln und Unverständnis. Mittlerweile hat sich die experimentelle Philosophie jedoch zu einer reputierlichen Position entwickelt, der ganze Aufsatzbände gewidmet werden. Im Folgenden werden wir einen ihrer Teilbereiche betrachten, nämlich die „experimentelle Ethik“. Dazu werden wir zunächst die klassische Sichtweise von Ethik einführen, die das Bild einer autonomen, von empirischer Wissenschaft weitestgehend unabhängigen Ethik zeichnet. Danach werden wir die experimentell-ethische Sichtweise einführen, die mit dem traditionellen Bild bricht. Es soll uns lediglich darum gehen, die zentrale These der experimentellen Ethik, nach der empirisch-wissenschaftliche Fragen für ethische Grundsatzfragen relevant sind, zu verstehen und zu plausibilisieren. Wir werden zu diesem Zweck zwei Argumentationslinien betrachten, die deutlich machen, dass grundsätzliche ethische Fragen von empirisch-wissenschaftlichen Fragen abhängen können. Schließlich werden wir klären, welche Rolle der klassischen Lehnstuhl-Philosophie im Rahmen des experimentell-ethischen Paradigmas zukommt bzw. zukommen sollte. (shrink)

The significance of and the role played by Knowledge Management (KM) is ever increasing in today's business and organizational decision-making environment. This paper attempts to underline the importance of organizing knowledge not for its own sake, but for its efficient use in organizational decision making. The tremendous explosion of knowledge resources, both electronic and conventional, within the last few decades calls for an understanding of how knowledge is organized for management of data and information. This is so for the reason (...) that they can be proficiently employed to create value and utility. This also calls for a search for 'relevance' in KM with regard to its situated nature in different contexts within which knowledge is situated, and that which nevertheless indirectly refers to its ontological scaffolding. We have devised two simple mathematical models of reference with regard to the design of the systems mostly intended for organizing knowledge in knowledge organizations for its most efficient utilization. The model specifies several unique scenarios aided by discovery of arguments related to its ontological framework within which knowledge is situated. Several contexts were drawn to draw inferences from the research study. The results bear relevance to knowledge managers who make important decisions for realization of organizational goals and objectives. (shrink)

Karl Homann ist vor allem als Wirtschaftsethiker bekannt. Er war der erste Inhaber eines wirtschaftsethischen Lehrstuhls und gilt als einer derjenigen Autoren, die das Fach Wirtschaftsethik im deutschen Sprachraum maßgeblich geprägt haben. Dabei hat Homann seinen wirtschaftsethischen Theorieentwurf nie als eine schlichte Anwendung ethischer Grundsätze auf Fragen des Wirtschaftens verstanden. Vielmehr begriff er ihn als allgemeinen ethischen Ansatz mit ökonomischer Methode. Im Rahmen dieses Ansatzes sollte die abendländische Moral ökonomisch rekonstruiert werden, um sie so unter den Bedingungen moderner Gesellschaften mit (...) institutionalisiertem marktwirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb überlebensfähig zu machen. Mit seiner neuen Monographie Sollen und Können stellt Karl Homann dieses Grundmodell einem weiteren Leserkreis vor. Er will sein Buch also nicht als einen neuen Beitrag zur Wirtschaftsethik-Debatte verstanden wissen, sondern als allgemeinen philosophischen Ethikentwurf. Die Argumentation, die Homann in Sollen und Können vorstellt, soll im Folgenden selektiv zusammengefasst und kritisch gewürdigt werden. (shrink)

Public Libraries (PLs) continue to contribute a great deal to user education in local communities. This paper analyzes the importance of PLs in driving community literacy through promotion of user education for the progressive improvement of the society. The paper stresses the relevance and value of PLs by reassessing the benefits they accrue by analyzing the impact of PLs on community and social education. As indigenous knowledge repositories, PLs play a significant role as community information service providers by driving community (...) literacy. The goal of this paper is to analyze the role played by PLs in driving community education and promoting information literacy in the society. PLs, being storehouses of knowledge, support user education by undertaking active part in community information services. The model helps in explaining and analyzing the efficiency of information search and retrieval process in PLs and how it affects user education and community literacy. The paper also discusses the relevance and value of PLs in this age of digital technology. The findings reinforce the claim that PLs are relevant even in this digital age, and they indeed support user education for the progressive improvement of the society. (shrink)

It would be unkind but not inaccurate to say that most experimental philosophy is just psychology with worse methods and better theories. In Experimental Ethics: Towards an Empirical Moral Philosophy, Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch, and Matthias Uhl set out to make this comparison less invidious and more flattering. Their book has 16 chapters, organized into five sections and bookended by the editors’ own introduction and prospectus. Contributors hail from four countries (Germany, USA, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and five disciplines (...) (philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, economics, and sociology). While the chapters are of mixed quality and originality, there are several fine contributions to the field. These especially include Stephan Wolf and Alexander Lenger’s sophisticated attempt to operationalize the Rawlsian notion of a veil of ignorance, Nina Strohminger et al.’s survey of the methods available to experimental ethicists for studying implicit morality, Fernando Aguiar et al.’s exploration of the possibility of operationalizing reflective equilibrium in the lab, and Nikil Mukerji’s careful defusing of three debunking arguments about the reliability of philosophical intuitions. (shrink)