McTaggart’s paradox and his A-theory and B-theory are basic notions in the contemporary philosophy of time. It is well known that the paradox was introduced by McTaggart’s paper called “The Unreality of Time” published in 1908, so that it has a one-hundred-year history. As for A-theory and B-theory, in contrast, McTaggart himself didn’t consider both of them at all. The notions of A-theory and B-theory came much later, 60 years after the paradox. Moreover, they had not been as popularized as (...) they are today until quite recently, at least after the 1990s. This paper aims to trace the origin of the notions of A-theory and B-theory and show how the debates behind them, especially objections to “spatialising time,” form the notions. (shrink)

Modal realism is an ontological position made familiar by David Lewis, according to which there exist possible worlds other than the actual world that we inhabit. It is hard to uphold modal realism, and indeed modal realism has only a few advocates. However, as most contemporary metaphysicians agree, this does not mean that it is easy to refute modal realism. In this paper, I argue against modal realism from a metaontological point of view. First, I provide a precise formulation of (...) modal realism based on Lewis’ discussion of modal realism. Second, I argue that modal realism is undermined unless it incorporates a view of metaontology known as ontological realism. Third, I point out that if modal realism incorporates ontological realism, it comes into conflict with its own formulation. (shrink)

Modal realism is an ontological claim according to which there exist many possible worlds just like our actual world. Since it is so hard to believe, modal realism has only a few advocates. However, it is well known that alternative theories have serious problems. It is one of the central issues of metaphysics to find a persuasive way to reject modal realism. In this paper, I will suggest that it could be accomplished with help of metaontology-one of the topics of (...) metaphysics which has recently discussed intensely. I will show how we could argue against modal realism from the metaontological point of view. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to defend Presentism. First of all, I explore how Presentism diverges to its versions and show that none of them, which include the currently standard Presentism that invokes tense logic, are tenable. Next, I point out that some philosophers argue that by replacing the Quinean criterion of existence with the Truthmaker Principle, another version of Presentism, which invokes tensed properties, can emerges. However, this version has a highly implausible conclusion. Finally, I argue that it can (...) be avoided by taking the evidences of the past or future truths to be typical truthmakers of them. (shrink)

What is the exact relationship between analytic philosophy and philosophy of science? In this paper, I will address this question from the perspective of research traditions, with the help of recent histor- ical studies on analytic philosophy. The two groups are particularly focused: the Polish philosophers and the logical empiricists in Berlin. Neither of them is unknown to us. However, by taking seriously their connection to the development of analytic philosophy and philosophy of science as research traditions, I believe, the (...) understanding of our own tradition may be improved. (shrink)

Monism is a metaphysical view according to which there is only one fundamental object. This paper will explore monism within the context of truthmaker theory, or Truthmaker Monism, a view rarely discussed in literature. Although few truthmaker theorists defend monism, at least explicitly, some theories seem to share the spirit of monism to some extent. Interestingly, they are proposed as solutions for the same problem, called the problem of negative truth. A close examination will show that while each of these (...) solutions can account for the problem, they are unsatisfactory for different reasons. This paper will suggest a novel solution to the problem of negative truth which preserves the advantages of existing solutions while avoiding the difficulties with which they are faced. (shrink)

Background: Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) is one of the major viruses that cause respiratory infections in all generations, not only in neonates and infants. There is a limited number of reports on serological epidemiology of RSV subgroups A and B. Neutralizing test (NT) antibody reflects protective immunity but bothersome. Sero-epidemiological study should be performed using practical NT method. Methods: Two wild-type viruses subgroups A and B, isolated in 2013, and the Long strain was used as the challenge viruses. NT antibody (...) with 100% inhibition of cytopathic effect (CPE) was examined. A total of 91 serum samples obtained from 0 to 12 years subjects without RSV infection who visited our hospital with some health problems and 121 sera obtained from healthy subjects in different age groups were used. Serological epidemiology of subgroups A and B was investigated in this study using new NT methods. Results: 1) A simple and practical NT method was developed. 2) The NT antibody titer was lowest in <1 year of age (5 × 21.70 ± 2.03 against subgroup A and 5 × 20.85 ± 1.31 against subgroup B) and increased in 3 years of age or older, and high antibody titers were maintained during school age. 3) A slight difference was observed in the NT antibody titers against subgroups A and Bin young children <3 years, but not after 3 years of age, reflecting the repeated infections. 4) Specific IgG antibody against RSV was measured. The IgG EIA values decreased with age. No association was observed between IgG EIA and NT titers. Conclusions: A simple NT assay method was developed in the present study. By the age of 3 years, high NT antibody titers were observed and maintained until 12 years. The IgG (EIA) values decreased with age. No association was observed between IgG (EIA) and NT titers. (shrink)