Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness (...) remains very much open. In this paper, I contrast two disorders affecting the control of voluntary action: the anarchic hand syndrome and utilization behavior. Although in both conditions patients fail to inhibit actions that are elicited by objects in the environment but inappropriate with respect to the wider context, these actions are experienced in radically different ways by the two groups of patients. I discuss how top-down and bottom-up processes involved in the generation of agentive self-awareness would have to be related in order to account for these differences. (shrink)

It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...) integrates personal and sub-personal components, psychological and neural processes. I then proceed to show how this model can be applied to explain the action-related passivity experiences of persons suffering from schizophrenia. I argue that a distinctive phenomenological mark of these experiences is that they are vividly felt, unlike ordinary actions (those taken to belong to self), and I seek to explain these heightened sensory experiences from within the proposed framework. I also propose hypotheses concerning such phenomena as thought insertion and anarchic hand syndrome that are motivated by this framework. Finally, I argue that the proposed model and view of self-experiences is consistent with several aspects of and theories of consciousness, especially theories which indicate that consciousness is more likely to be engaged when we are dealing with novelty or error—e.g. when self seems to have gone missing. I conclude by recommending that if we wish to learn about self, we would be well advised to attend closely to those times when it seems absent. -/- . (shrink)

Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...) anomalous cases, especially instances of alien experience. These experiences are distinctive precisely because self-referencing is explicitly denied by the only person able to report them: those who experience them deny that certain actions, mental states, or body parts belong to self. The relevant actions, mental states, or body parts are sometimes attributed to someone or something other than self, and sometimes they are just described as not belonging to self. But all are referred away from self. -/- The cases under discussion here include somatoparaphrenia, schizophrenia, depersonalization, anarchic hand syndrome, and utilization behavior; the theories employed, Higher-Order Thought, Wide Intrinsicality, and Self-Representational. Below I argue that each of these attempts at explaining or explaining away the anomalies fails. Along the way, since each of these theories seeks at least compatibility with science, I sketch experimental approaches that could be used to adduce support for my position, or indeed for the positions of theorists with whom I disagree. -/- In a concluding section I first identify two presuppositions shared by all of the theorists considered here, and argue that both are either erroneous or misleading. Second, I call attention to divergent paths adopted when attempting to explain alienation experiences: some theorists choose to add a mental ingredient, while others prefer to subtract one. I argue that alienation from experience, action, or body parts could result from either addition or subtraction, and that the two can be incorporated within a comprehensive explanatory framework. Finally, I suggest that this comprehensive framework would require self-referencing of a sort, but self-referencing that occurs solely on the level of mechanism, or the subpersonal level. In adumbrating some features of this “subpersonal self,” I suggest that there might be one respect in which it is prior to conscious experience. (shrink)

Wayne Wu argues that attention is necessary for action: since action requires a solution to the ‘Many–Many Problem’, and since only attention can solve the Many–Many Problem, attention is necessary for action. We question the first of these two steps and argue that it is based on an oversimplified distinction between actions and reflexes. We argue for a more complex typology of behaviours where one important category is action that does not require a solution to the Many–Many Problem, and so (...) does not require attention. (shrink)

Social cognition researchers have become increasingly interested in the ways that behavioral, physiological, and neural coupling facilitate social interaction and interpersonal understanding. We distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the role of such coupling processes in social cognition: strong and moderate interactionism. According to strong interactionism (SI), low-level coupling processes are alternatives to higher-level individual cognitive processes; the former at least sometimes render the latter superfluous. Moderate interactionism (MI) on the other hand, is an integrative approach. Its guiding assumption is (...) that higher-level cognitive processes are likely to have been shaped by the need to coordinate, modulate, and extract information from low-level coupling processes. In this paper, we present a case study on Möbius Syndrome (MS) in order to contrast SI and MI. We show how MS—a form of congenital bilateral facial paralysis—can be a fruitful source of insight for research exploring the relation between high-level cognition and low-level coupling. Lacking a capacity for facial expression, individuals with MS are deprived of a primary channel for gestural coupling. According to SI, they lack an essential enabling feature for social interaction and interpersonal understanding more generally and thus ought to exhibit severe deficits in these areas. We challenge SI’s prediction and show how MS cases offer compelling reasons for instead adopting MI’s pluralistic model of social interaction and interpersonal understanding. We conclude that investigations of coupling processes within social interaction should inform rather than marginalize or eliminate investigation of higher-level individual cognition. (shrink)

Decision-making has traditionally been viewed as detached from the neural systems of sensory perception and motor function. Consequently, motor areas have played a relatively minor role in discussions surrounding the control processes and neural origins of decision-making. Empiric evidence, catalysed by technological advances in the past two decades, has proven that motor areas have an integral role in decision-making. They are involved in the generation, modulation, maintenance and execution of decisions and actions. They also take part in a complex hierarchical (...) assessment of multi-modal inputs to ensure that the most appropriate action is generated given the context presented. Clinical conditions such as, alien hand syndrome and utilisation behaviour exemplify the importance of these regulatory controls. This review charts the trajectory of our understanding of the hidden role of motor areas in decision-making and reflects upon the implications of our deepened understanding. The convergence of evidence from multiple modalities underpinning our current knowledge is discussed and the potential applications thereof considered. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...) of the brain-injured war veteran Schneider, and a neurological disorder known as Gerstmann’s syndrome. Building on my analysis of Schneider’s sensorimotor compensatory performances in relation to his limitations in the domains of algebra, geometry, and language usage, I demonstrate a strong continuity between the sense of embodiment and enaction at all these levels. Based on Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations, I argue that “higher-order” cognition is impaired in Schneider insofar as his injury limits his sensorimotor capacity to dynamically produce comparatively more complex differentiations of any given phenomenal structure. I then show how Merleau-Ponty develops and specifies his interpretation of Schneider’s intellectual difficulties in relation to the ambiguous role of the body, and in particular the hand, in Gerstmann’s syndrome. I explain how Merleau-Ponty defends the idea that sensorimotor and quasi-representational cognition are mutually irreducible, while maintaining that symbol-based cognition is a fundamentally enactive and embodied process. (shrink)

Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...) the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self-reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito. (shrink)

Thema der Arbeit ist die Frage, ob eine naturalistische Revolutionierung unseres Selbstverständnisses sprachlich möglich ist. Nach der sprachlichen Möglichkeit wird gefragt, weil nach dem linguistic turn kein Naturalisierungsprogramm ohne den Anspruch auskommt, dass eine Reduktion, Elimination oder Uminterpretation bestimmter Diskurse über den Menschen möglich sei: Die Diskurse über den Menschen sollen an den naturalistischen Diskurs assimiliert werden. Wodurch dieser sich auszeichnet, ist nicht einfach zu bestimmen, doch ist die Intuition nicht von der Hand zu weisen, dass wir über Erfahrungen, (...) die unser Selbstverständnis als denkende und handelnde Subjekte betreffen, in einer ‚anderen Sprache‘, zumindest in anderen Begriffen reden als über Naturdinge. Bei dieser Dualisierung spielt unser intentionalistisches Idiom, also unsere Rede von Wünschen, Überzeugungen, Absichten etc. die entscheidende Rolle. Der naturalistische Diskurs über den Menschen lässt sich in erster Linie negativ bestimmen: durch die Abwesenheit intentionaler Begriffe. In der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Naturalismus werden drei Diskussionsstränge zusammengeführt, die bisher nicht systematisch aufeinander bezogen worden sind. Ausgebend von einer kritischen Darstellung einflussreicher naturalistischer Positionen der Gegenwart und ihrer begrifflichen Konflikte wird die sprachendualistische Gegenstrategie vorgestellt, die dem Naturalismus eine kategorienfehlerhafte Verletzung von Diskursgrenzen vorwirft. Diese Auseinandersetzung mündet in eine Diskussion über die kognitive Funktion von Metaphern, die die vom Sprachendualismus aufgestellten Diskursgrenzen überschreiten. Der sprachendualistischen Intuition steht bei näherer Betrachtung eine zweifache Komplizierung entgegen, die man das „anthropomorph-physiomorphe Paradox“ nennen kann, das Paradox von anthropomorphem Naturverständnis und physiomorphem (oder naturalistischem) Selbstverständnis des Menschen. Es ist vielfach aufgewiesen worden, dass wir einerseits oft in anthropomorpher Weise über Naturdinge reden, andererseits in physiomorpher Weise über uns selbst und unsere mentalen Prozesse. Dieses Wechselspiel von Projektionen ist in unser Selbst- und Naturverständnis zu tief eingelassen, als dass man einen der beiden Züge einfach sprach-, metaphysik- oder ideologiekritisch verbieten könnte. In der Arbeit wird die Überzeugung vertreten, dass sich dieses Syndrom von Anthropomorphismus und Physiomorphismus nur aufklären lässt, wenn man das Naturalismusthema mit dem Sprachendualismusthema und dem Metaphernthema systematisch zusammenführt und sie ineinander verschränkt. Das Hauptergebnis der Arbeit besteht in dem Nachweis, dass die verschiedenen Naturalisierungsprojekte, ob reduktiv oder eliminativ, jeweils in einem angebbaren Punkt ihre Grenze finden. Dieser Punkt ist das intentionale Idiom, in dem sich unser Verständnis menschlicher Handlungen ausdrückt. Dieses Idiom scheint so universal in die Diskurse der Humanwissenschaften auszustrahlen, dass Naturalisten immer wieder auf das Konzept der Handlungsintentionalität zurückgreifen, meist in metaphorischer Form. (shrink)

There is tension between commonly held views concerning phenomenal imagery on the one hand and our first-person epistemic access to it on the other. This tension is evident in many individual issues and experiments in philosophy and psychology (e.g. inattentional and change blindness, the speckled hen, dream coloration, visual periphery). To dissolve it, we can give up either (i) that we lack full introspective access to the phenomenal properties of our imagistic experiences, or (ii) that phenomenal imagery is fully (...) determined, or (iii) that phenomenal imagery does not exist. Which option is preferable? I explore the feasibility of option (ii) in more details by distinguishing between di erent kinds of indeterminacy. One of the most often proclaimed versions of indeterminacy is tied to Representationalism. However, I argue that in this context, Representationalism appears to be the least satisfying option, for which I give ten reasons. By abduction, we should reject Representationalism in favour of (i) or (iii)—the most parsimonious option being eliminativism, and the most conservative being the rejection of privileged access. The decision between these two, however, should be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on which is most adequate given the data. I illustrate this with the comparison between visual agnosia and Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Simon Baron-Cohen has argued that autism and related developmental disorders (sometimes called “autism spectrum conditions” or “autism spectrum disorders”) can be usefully thought of as the condition of possessing an “extreme male brain.” The impetus for regarding autism spectrum disorders (ASD) this way has been the accepted science regarding the etiology of autism, as developed over that past several decades. Three important features of this etiology ground the Extreme Male Brain theory. First, ASD is disproportionately male (approximately 10:1 in (...) the case of Asperger’s Syndrome or high-functioning autism (HFA) and approximately 4:1 in the case of autistic disorder). Second, ASD is not psychogenic but biological in origin, and hence is not the product of sexist conditioning or childrearing practices, although these may affect the development of the disorder. Third, ASD is regarded as a spectrum developmental disorder, unlike other disorders such as Down Syndrome that are diagnosed by a (nearly) binary criterion. Down Syndrome, for example, is diagnosed by the presence in all or most cells within a given individual of an extra copy of Chromosome 21. Autism, on the other hand, is diagnosed by the presence of a set of symptoms that vary in their intensity and in their milder forms seem to conform to purported sex differences in cognitive, emotional, and social functioning. -/- In this paper, I do not challenge accepted science regarding the etiology of autism, and I do not challenge the idea of ASD as a disorder. Nor do I wish to offer an alternative account of what autism is. Instead, I focus on the usefulness of thinking of a disorder as an extreme version of ordinary sex differences. Does it follow from the fact that a disorder is more often found in men that we should think of it as an extreme form of maleness? If not, what other conditions must be met in order to warrant this way of thinking about ASD? What does it mean to say that ASD is a form of “extreme male brain”? Feminists are rightly skeptical of theories that make claims about male and female brains, so how should we respond to the clear evidence that the differences between typical and ASD individuals are not caused by childrearing practices? I explain what I take to be Baron-Cohen’s central argument that autism should be seen as the extreme male brain, and critique that argument. I conclude that there is no good argument that autistic symptoms should be regarded as an extreme form of male mental traits, and that Baron-Cohen’s claim does not help us to understand autism, women, or men. His claim is a speculative thesis that is readily mobilized for sexist practices. As such it requires a higher threshold for evidentiary support and rigorous argumentation—support and argumentation that does not exist. -/- KEYWORDS: autism, brain, gender, neuroscience, feminism, male . (shrink)

An examination of the debates over the so-called 'false' memory syndrome. In this paper, I concur that memory is malleable, but interrogate notions of truth and falsity underlying standards used to evaluate the accuracy of memories of abuse. Such standards divert us, I suggest, from recognizing the truth behind widespread recollections of abuse at the hands of patriarchy.

In recent years, a debate has emerged on whether bodily sensations are typically accompanied by a sense of body ownership, namely a distinctive experience of one's body or body part as one's own. Realists about the sense of body ownership heavily rely on evidence from experimentally-induced bodily illusions (e.g., the rubber hand illusion) and pathological disownership syndromes (e.g. somatoparaphrenia). In this chapter, I will introduce novel evidence regarding body disownership syndromes induced by psychoactive drugs rather than pathological conditions, and (...) discuss its relevance to the debate on the sense of body ownership. (shrink)

Monsters as a category seem omnipresent in early modern natural philosophy, in what one might call a “long” early modern period stretching from the Renaissance to the late eighteenth century, when the science of teratology emerges. We no longer use this term to refer to developmental anomalies (whether a two-headed calf, an individual suffering from microcephaly or Proteus syndrome) or to “freak occurrences” like Mary Toft’s supposedly giving birth to a litter of rabbits, in Surrey in the early eighteenth-century (...) (Todd 1995). But the term itself has a rich semantic history, coming from the Latin verb monstrare (itself deriving from monere, to remind, warn, advise), “to show,” from which we also get words like “monitor,” “admonish,” “monument” and “premonition”; hence there are proverbs like, in French, le monstre est ce qui montre, difficult to render in English: “the monsters is that which shows.” Scholars have discussed how this “monstrative” dimension of the monster is in fact twofold: on the one hand, and most awkwardly, the monster is an individual who is “pointed at,” who is shown; on the other hand, the monster is a sign, a portent, an omen, and in that sense “shows us” something (on the complex semantic history of the term across Indo-European languages see Ochsner 2005). The latter dimension persists in naturalized form in the early modern period when authors like Bacon, Fontenelle or William Hunter insist that monsters (or anomalies) can show us something of the workings of Nature. (shrink)

Objective: Laparoscopic ovarian drilling normalizes ovulation by reducing cortical thickening, lowering androgen production, and regulating luteinizing hormone pulse frequency. On the other hand, the effect of laparoscopic ovarian drilling on the endometrium is unknown. This study was planned to investigate the changes in the functional markers of choline, creatine, lactate, and lipid metabolites of the endometrium before and after laparoscopic ovarian drilling in women with polycystic ovary syndrome. -/- Methods: Twenty women diagnosed with clomiphene-resistant polycystic ovary syndrome (...) who did not ovulate successfully despite the administration of clomiphene citrate or aromatase inhibitor were included in the study. Patients were offered Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) or laparoscopic ovarian drilling options. Patients who accepted laparoscopic ovarian drilling formed the study group. Endometrial MR spectroscopy was applied to the participants in the mid-luteal phase before laparoscopic ovarian drilling. Choline, creatine, lactate, and lipid metabolites of all patients were measured and denominated parts per million. The second MR spectroscopy was performed 2 months after the first MR spectroscopy, and the changes in endometrial metabolites after laparoscopic ovarian drilling were recorded. Twenty patients who did not have clinical and laboratory findings of polycystic ovary syndrome and were matched for age and body mass index were accepted as the control group. The patients in this group were selected from fertile women with at least 2 children. MR spectroscopy was performed in the mid-luteal phase in fertile women. The obtained results were compared within and between groups and the possible effects of laparoscopic ovarian drilling on metabolite synthesis were tried to be determined. -/- Results: During MR spectroscopy examination main endometrial metabolites choline, creatine, lactate, and lipid were detected in the polycystic ovary syndrome group. The most prominent metabolite peak before and after laparoscopic ovarian drilling was recorded as choline and creatine. There was a significant increase in choline and creatine peaks after laparoscopic ovarian drilling compared to the values before laparoscopic ovarian drilling. There was no significant increase in lactate and lipid signals before and after laparoscopic ovarian drilling. The choline and creatine metabolite levels of the women with polycystic ovary syndrome before laparoscopic ovarian drilling were significantly lower than those of the fertile women. The choline and creatine metabolite levels of the women with polycystic ovary syndrome after m laparoscopic ovarian drilling were similar to those of the fertile women. There was no significant difference between lactate and lipid signals before and after laparoscopic ovarian drilling. -/- Conclusion: Laparoscopic ovarian drilling improves polycystic ovary syndrome-related subfertility by increasing endometrial choline and creatine metabolite levels to those of fertile women. (shrink)

This paper examines the connection between happiness and the meaning of life, where life is meant in terms of both its potentiality and its fragility, as incorporating both health and disease. Fundamentally, the problem at hand is an ethical or axiological one since it concerns the value of life and people’s judgments about the value of their own lives and existence—people who more or less share a world with others and who, consequently, must respect certain universal values. These values (...) can come into conflict with individual values or with individual value preferences. At times, respecting universal values and universal goods seems to demand the sacrifices of one’s own feelings, above all with what one considers one’s own happiness and individual good. The issue of happiness and the meaning of life or existence has received various treatments in the history of philosophy. In the current literature, the prevailing interpretations of this question are largely deontological, eudaimonic or hedonic in character. This paper deals with this problem from a phenomenological perspective, and in particular from a Schelerian one. Within this framework, “good in itself” does not necessarily conflict with “good for someone”. I will argue that happiness and the meaning of life (in the case of the deepest happiness or bliss) are co-originally grounded in an act of love; when an individual achieves it, she reveals herself in her personal unitariness and unicity. Recognizing that life (including the life of the mind) can involve suffering, this essay considers this problem from a psychopathological point of view as well, making use (and revealing the value of) the dialogue between Scheler and the Dutch psychiatrist Henricus Cornelius Rümke. In the first part of this essay, I consider the specific context of interaction between philosophy and psychiatry. I then describe the general traits of the Schelerian vocational ethic, focusing above all on Scheler’s theory of the stratification of emotional life—particularly on his interpretation of bliss—and on his concept of motivational efficay. In this context, I discuss the connection between happiness and the meaning of existence. In the second part of this essay, assuming as a leitmotiv the both Schelerian and psychological concept of a motiv, I concentrate on Rümkean phenomenology, his clinical psychiatric analysis of the feeling of happiness, and his clinical observations on the happiness syndrome within a pathological framework. Rümke’s clinical work presupposes (and at the same time empirically confirms) Scheler’s theory of the stratification of emotional life. Both in normal cases of happiness and in the pathological states observed by Rümke, the deepest feeling of happiness appears in itself as a genuine, non-pathological sentiment. Within this context, I also point out the limits within which it is possible to speak of the meaning of an existence. (shrink)

The gap between teaching and learning occurs likewise and exclusively in the human condition, though—as we have pointed out earlier—not in all instances because human sensitivity to the fundamental character of the nature-to-culture trajectory will prevent the chasm. To be more specific on this issue, it is in the formalization of the teaching-learning event in the hands of human initiators that the gap gets in as a resultant disorder—even a syndrome. In this sense, formalized teaching doesn´t always result to (...) learning. In certain cases, formalized teaching (as in a school classroom) simply gets so far as the level of a mental assent—a theoretical approximation of a subject matter whose empirico-pragmatic location in real life is nowhere found. Learning—if we could call it as such—in this case is hence short of realization. (shrink)

The paper traces the sequence of events which brought Popperian philosophy (including Lakatos) to its position on the issues of excess content, novelty and scientific progress. The general approach is to analyze Popper's and Lakatos's positions on these issues as an appropriate response to a particular philosophical problem situation in which they found themselves. The paper closes with a discussion of how these issues relate to economics and economic methodology.

The relationship between economics and the philosophy of natural science has changed substantially during the last few years. What was once exclusively a one-way relationship from philosophy to economics now seems to be much closer to bilateral exchange. The purpose of this paper is to examine this new relationship. First, I document the change. Second, I examine the situation within contemporary philosophy of science in order to explain why economics might have its current appeal. Third, I consider some of the (...) issues that might jeopardize the success of this philosophical project. (shrink)

This paper challenges Mäki's argument about commonsensibles by offering a case study from contemporary microeconomics – contemporary revealed preference theory (hereafter CRPT) – where terms like "preference," "utility," and to some extent "choice," are radical departures from the common sense meanings of these terms. Although the argument challenges the claim that economics is inhabited solely by commonsensibles, it is not inconsistent with such folk notions being common in economic theory.

“John Hands has attempted a remarkable thing: nothing less than an exhaustive account of the current state of scientific knowledge about the origins and evolution of the cosmos, life and humanity. His driving questions are those that have inspired all of science, religion and philosophy: What are we? Where do we come from? What is the source of consciousness, value and meaning? Hands painstakingly summarises the current state of knowledge in a huge variety of fields, from cosmology to evolutionary psychology, (...) in enviably lucid prose. His conclusions are measured and sceptical, and his conception of the limits of science is well-argued: he gives an extremely clear view of what science has established, what it has not established, and what it never will. This is a truly exceptional piece of work.” —TIM CRANE, Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy, University of Cambridge . (shrink)

Review Article on Mirowski's More Heat Than Light (1989).

Abstract: This paper examines Mark Blaug's position on the normative character of Paretian welfare economics: in general, and specifically with respect to his debate with Pieter Hennipman over this question during the 1990s. The paper also clarifies some of the confusions that emerged within the context of this debate, and closes by providing some additional arguments supporting Blaug's position that he himself did not provide.

Abstract: The paper argues that mainstream economics and mainstream philosophy of natural science had much in common during the period 1945-1965. It examines seven common features of the two fields and suggests a number of historical developments that might help explain these similarities. The historical developments include: the Vienna Circle connection, the Samuelson-Harvard-Foundations connection, and the Cold War operations research connection.

Abstract: Don Ross’ Economic Theory and Cognitive Science (2005) provides an elaborate philosophical defense of neoclassical economics. He argues that the central features of neoclassical theory are associated with what he calls the Robbins-Samuelson argument pattern and that it can be reconciled with recent developments in experimental and behavioral economics, as well as contemporary cognitive science. This paper argues that Ross’ Robbins-Samuelson argument pattern is not in the work of either Robbins or Samuelson and in many ways is in conflict (...) with their own versions, and defenses, of neoclassical theory. (shrink)

This article examines Bolzano’s aesthetic cognitivism. It argues that, while reminiscent of German rationalist aesthetics and hence potentially appearing rigid and outdated, Bolzano’s version of cognitivism is, in fact, highly innovative and more flexible than the cognitivism championed by the rationalists. He imports from the rationalists the idea that aesthetic appreciation and creation are rule-governed, yet does not construe rule-following and engaging in free aesthetic activities as mutually exclusive. Furthermore, thanks to his nuanced treatment of the interaction between aesthetic values (...) and other types of values, Bolzano’s aesthetic cognitivism presents a fresh alternative to contemporary versions of aesthetic cognitivism. (shrink)

Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...) HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion. There is also Cotard syndrome which is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in which people hold the delusional belief that they are dead, do not exist, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In this paper, I argue that HOT theory has nothing to fear from it either and can consistently account for what happens in such unusual cases. I analyze Cotard syndrome in light of my previous discussion of somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, and argue that HOT theory can provide a somewhat analogous account without the worry of inconsistency. It is crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” and levels of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced explanation. With regard to the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, it is proposed that Cotard patients are indeed capable of having some “I-thoughts” about their bodies and mental states. (shrink)

Many intelligent, capable, and successful individuals believe that their success is due to luck and fear that they will someday be exposed as imposters. A puzzling feature of this phenomenon, commonly referred to as imposter syndrome, is that these same individuals treat evidence in ways that maintain their false beliefs and debilitating fears: they ignore and misattribute evidence of their own abilities, while readily accepting evidence in favour of their inadequacy. I propose a novel account of imposter syndrome (...) as an instance of self-deception, whereby biased evidence treatment is driven by the motivational benefit of negative self-appraisal. This account illuminates a number of interconnected philosophical and scientific puzzles related to the explanation, definition, and value of imposter syndrome. (shrink)

While some of mental disorders due to emotional distress occur cross-culturally, others seem to be much more bound to particular cultures. In this paper, I propose that many of these “cultural syndromes” are culturally sanctioned responses to overwhelming negative emotions. I show how tools from cultural evolution theory can be employed for understanding how the syndromes are relatively confined to and retained within particular cultures. Finally, I argue that such an account allows for some cultural syndromes to be or become (...) mental disorders and also steers clear of some of the anti-realist trappings associated with a social constructivism of cultural syndromes. (shrink)

Ordinary cases of object seeing involve the visual perception of space and spatial location. But does seeing an object require such spatial perception? An empirical challenge to the idea that it does comes from reflection upon Bálint's syndrome, for some suppose that in Bálint's syndrome subjects can see objects without seeing space or spatial location. In this article, I question whether the empirical evidence available to us adequately supports this understanding of Bálint's syndrome, and explain how the (...) aforementioned empirical challenge can be resisted. (shrink)

The patient with Capgras’ syndrome claims that people very familiar to him have been replaced by impostors. I argue that this disorder is due to the destruction of a representation that the patient has of the mind of the familiar person. This creates the appearance of a familiar body and face, but without the familiar personality, beliefs, and thoughts. The posterior site of damage in Capgras’ is often reported to be the temporoparietal junction, an area that has a role (...) in the mindreading system, a connected system of cortical areas that allow us to attribute mental states to others. Just as the Capgras’ patient claims that that man is not his father, the patient with asomatognosia claims that his arm is not really his. A similar account applies here, in that a nearby brain area, the supramarginal gyrus, is damaged. This area works in concert with the temporoparietal junction and other areas to produce a large representation of a mind inside a body situated in an environment. Damage to the mind-representing part of this system (coupled with damage to executive processes in the prefrontal lobes) causes Capgras’ syndrome, whereas damage to the body-representing part of this system (also coupled with executive damage) causes asomatognosia. (shrink)

In books 8 and 9 of Plato’s Republic, Socrates provides a detailed account of the nature and origins of four main kinds of vice found in political constitutions and in the kinds of people that correspond to them. The third of the four corrupt kinds of person he describes is the ‘democratic man’. In this paper, I ask what ‘rules’ in the democratic man’s soul. It is commonly thought that his soul is ruled in some way by its appetitive part, (...) or by a particular class of appetitive desires. I reject this view, and argue instead that his soul is ruled by a succession of desires of a full range of different kinds. I show how this view helps us better understand Plato’s depiction of corrupt souls in the Republic more generally, and with it his views on the rule of the soul, appetitive desire, and the nature of vice. (shrink)

Universities are knowledge institutions. Compared to several other knowledge institutions (e.g. schools, government research organisations, think tanks), research universities have unusual, anarchic organisational features. We argue that such anarchic features are not a weakness. Rather, they reflect the special standing of research universities among knowledge institutions. We contend that the distributed, self-organising mode of knowledge production maintains a diversity of approaches, topics and solutions needed in frontier research, which involves generating relevant knowledge under uncertainty. Organisational disunity and inconsistencies (...) should sometimes be protected by institutional structures and procedures in order for research universities to best serve their purpose as knowledge institutions. The quality control for the knowledge produced stems from knowledge fields, clusters of knowledge and research that exist beyond the confines of individual organisations. The diversity of epistemic contributions is therefore kept in check by the order imposed by the internal logic of science as a social practice. Our argument provides a new defence for the autonomy of research conducted at universities. (shrink)

The study examines the argumentative competencies of people with Asperger syndrome (AS) and compares this with those of normal – or what are called neurotypical (NT) – subjects. To investigate how people with AS recognise, evaluate and engage in argumentation, we have adapted and applied the empirical instrument developed by van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels to study the conventional validity of the pragma-dialectical freedom rule (van Eemeren, Gars- sen & Meuffels 2003a; 2003b; 2005a; 2005b; van Eemeren & Meuffels, 2002). (...) Our paper begins with some background information on Asperger syndrome and how it impacts upon communication and argumentation; then it addresses the research questions and methods used; thirdly, it presents some initial findings; finally, it will conclude with some im- plications for those people with AS, for those they come into contact with and for the pragma-dialectic model in general. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don't know it, and people who echolocate, but don't know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton's syndrome, human echolocation, and ‘facial vision’ suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.

Eyal et al have recently argued that researchers should consider conducting severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) human challenge studies to hasten vaccine development. We have conducted (J. L.) and overseen (L. D.) human challenge studies and agree that they can be useful in developing anti-infective agents. We also agree that adults can autonomously choose to undergo risks with no prospect of direct benefit to themselves. However, we disagree that SARS-CoV-2 challenge studies are ethically appropriate at this time, (...) for 3 reasons: (1) current scientific knowledge of SARS-CoV-2 infection is insufficient to manage risks; (2) autonomous decision making, while necessary, does not override concerns about risk; and (3) undertaking challenge studies now would imperil confidence in the research enterprise, potentially undermining the global response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. (shrink)

Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even (...) though they are not delusional, depersonalised patients seem to have experiences that are quite similar to those of Cotard patients. I argue that these experiences are essentially characterised by a lack of subjective character and of two other structural features of experience, which I call ‘the present character’ and ‘the actual character’. Cotard's nihilistic delusions simply consist in taking these anomalous experiences at face value. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the Ganser syndrome and gives a brief account on its clinical features. A significant number of clinicians in Europe continued accepting Ganser's basic postulates that the patients showed significant memory disorder and 'answers towards the question' within the framework of traumatic or reactive hysteria. In elderly patients, Ganser type symptoms may be indicative of the onset of dementia. Ganser syndrome raises the question of the interaction between concepts, ideology and clinical observation. The clinician must be (...) aware that a misdiagnosed case of Ganser-type hysteria may result in lawsuits, unnecessary surgical interventions, inappropriate use of minor and major tranquillizers, and social consequences that may be destabilizing for the patient and family. Positive results in the organic investigation should lead to a firm diagnosis and disconfirmation of Ganser syndrome. Persistent negative results and dramatic improvement should tend to confirm the diagnosis. (shrink)

Impostor syndrome or Impostor phenomenon is a belief that a person thinks their success is due to luck or external factors, not their abilities. This psychological trait is present in certain groups like women. In this paper, we propose a neutrosophic trait measure to represent the psychological concept of the trait-anti trait using refined neutrosophic sets. This study analysed a group of 200 undergraduate students for impostor syndrome, perfectionism, introversion and self-esteem: after the COVID pandemic break in 2021. (...) Data labelling was carried out using these neutrosophic trait measures. Machine learning models like Support Vector Machine(SVM), K-nearest neighbour (K-NN), and random forest were used to model the data; SVM provided the best accuracy of 92.15%. (shrink)