Results for 'legal reasoning'

998 found
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  1. Fictions in legal reasoning.Manish Oza - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (3):451-463.
    A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works.
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  2. Arguments and Stories in Legal Reasoning: The Case of Evidence Law.Gianluca Andresani - 2020 - Archiv Fuer Rechts Und Sozialphilosphie 106 (1):75-90.
    We argue that legal argumentation, as the subject matter as well as a special subfield of Argumentation Studies (AS), has to be examined by making skilled use of the full panoply of tools such as argumentation and story schemes which are at the forefront of current work in AS. In reviewing the literature, we make explicit our own methodological choices (particularly regarding the place of normative deliberation in practical reasoning) and then illustrate the implications of such an approach (...)
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  3. How much of commonsense and legal reasoning is formalizable? A review of conceptual obstacles.James Franklin - 2012 - Law, Probability and Risk 11:225-245.
    Fifty years of effort in artificial intelligence (AI) and the formalization of legal reasoning have produced both successes and failures. Considerable success in organizing and displaying evidence and its interrelationships has been accompanied by failure to achieve the original ambition of AI as applied to law: fully automated legal decision-making. The obstacles to formalizing legal reasoning have proved to be the same ones that make the formalization of commonsense reasoning so difficult, and are most (...)
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  4. A Review of the LSAT Using Literature on Legal Reasoning.Gilbert E. Plumer - 2000 - Law School Admission Council Computerized Testing Report 97 (8):1-19.
    Research using current literature on legal reasoning was conducted with the goals of (a) determining what skills are most important in good legal reasoning according to such literature, (b) determining the extent to which existing Law School Admission Test item types and subtypes are designed to assess those skills, and (c) suggesting test specifications or new or refined item types and formats that could be developed in the future to assess any important skills that appear [by (...)
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  5. 20th-Century Bulgarian Philosophy of Law: From Critical Acceptance of Kant’s Ideas to the Logic of Legal Reasoning.Vihren Bouzov - 2016 - In Enrico Pattaro & C. Roversi (eds.), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. V.12 (1), Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law World. pp. 681-690.
    My analysis here is an attempt to bring out the main through-line in the development of Bulgarian philosophy of law today. A proper account of Bulgarian philosophy of law in the 20th century requires an attempt to find, on the one hand, a solution to epistemological and methodological problems in law and, on the other, a clear-cut influence of the Kantian critical tradition. Bulgarian philosophy of law follows a complicated path, ranging from acceptance and revision of Kantian philosophy to the (...)
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  6. On law and legal reasoning.Fernando Atria Lemaître - 2001 - Portland, Or.: Hart.
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  7. The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.
    According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a (...)
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  8. Legal Directives and Practical Reasons.Noam Gur - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements—e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations—make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. -/- At the outset, (...)
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  9. Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity.Noam Gur - 2019 - In Frederick Schauer, Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac (eds.), The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between is and Ought. Springer Verlag. pp. 151-170.
    This chapter considers whether legal requirements can constitute reasons for action independently of the merits of the requirement at hand. While jurisprudential opinion on this question is far from uniform, sceptical views are becoming increasingly dominant. Such views typically contend that, while the law can be indicative of pre-existing reasons, or can trigger pre-existing reasons into operation, it cannot constitute new reasons. This chapter offers support to a somewhat less sceptical position, according to which the fact that a (...) requirement has been issued can be a reason for action, yet one that is underpinned by bedrock values which law is apt to serve. Notions discussed here include a value-based conception of reasons as facts ; a distinction between complete and incomplete reasons ; and David Enoch’s idea of triggering reason-giving. Following a discussion of criticism against the view adopted here, the chapter concludes by considering some more ‘robust’ conceptions of law’s reason-giving capacity. (shrink)
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  10. Are There Cross-Cultural Legal Principles? Modal Reasoning Uncovers Procedural Constraints on Law.Ivar R. Hannikainen, Kevin P. Tobia, Guilherme da F. C. F. de Almeida, Raff Donelson, Vilius Dranseika, Markus Kneer, Niek Strohmaier, Piotr Bystranowski, Kristina Dolinina, Bartosz Janik, Sothie Keo, Eglė Lauraitytė, Alice Liefgreen, Maciej Próchnicki, Alejandro Rosas & Noel Struchiner - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (8):e13024.
    Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have argued that laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. In the present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different countries. Are there cross‐cultural principles of law? In a between‐subjects design, participants (N = 3,054) were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and (...)
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  11.  47
    Legal Pragmatism as a guide to new perspectives on the application of Law.Alvaro de Azevedo Gonzaga, Felipe Labruna & Cassiano Mazon - 2024 - Revista da Faculdade de Direito Do Sul de Minas 40 (1):129-144.
    This is an article about Legal Pragmatism, studied under the prism of the Philosophy of Law. The pragmatist philosophical current, born in the United States, was responsible for consolidating the line of legal reasoning aimed at obtaining the results that best meet social desires and human hopes. Legal Pragmatism is not presented as a Theory of Law, consubstantiating itself, in reality, in a method based on argumentation, capable of substantiating decision making. Finally, an attempt was made (...)
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  12. Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
    In order to perform certain actions – such as incarcerating a person or revoking parental rights – the state must establish certain facts to a particular standard of proof. These standards – such as preponderance of evidence and beyond reasonable doubt – are often interpreted as likelihoods or epistemic confidences. Many theorists construe them numerically; beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often construed as 90 to 95% confidence in the guilt of the defendant. -/- A family of influential cases suggests (...)
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  13. Legal Epistemology.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    An annotated bibliography of legal epistemology.
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  14. Pequeno comentário a 'Fundamental Legal Concepts (as Aplied in Judicial Reasoning) I' de Wesley Hohfeld.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - manuscript
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  15. Legal Subversion of the Criminal Justice Process? Judicial, Prosecutorial and Police Discretion in Edmondson, Kindrat and Brown.Lucinda Vandervort - 2012 - In Elizabeth Sheehy (ed.), Chapter 6, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN CANADA: LAW, LEGAL PRACTICE & WOMEN'S ACTIVISM, pp. 113-153. University of Ottawa Press. pp. 111-150.
    In 2001, three non-Aboriginal men in their twenties were charged with the sexual assault of a twelve year old Aboriginal girl in rural Saskatchewan. Legal proceedings lasted almost seven years and included two preliminary hearings, two jury trials, two retrials with juries, and appeals to the provincial appeal court and the Supreme Court of Canada. One accused was convicted. The case raises questions about the administration of justice in sexual assault cases in Saskatchewan. Based on observation and analysis of (...)
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  16. Reasons for Meaningful Human Control.Herman Veluwenkamp - 2022 - Ethics and Information Technology 24 (4):1-9.
    ”Meaningful human control” is a term invented in the political and legal debate on autonomous weapons system, but it is nowadays also used in many other contexts. It is supposed to specify conditions under which an artificial system is under the right kind of control to avoid responsibility gaps: that is, situations in which no moral agent is responsible. Santoni de Sio and Van den Hoven have recently suggested a framework that can be used by system designers to operationalize (...)
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  17. Legal Fictions and the Essence of Robots: Thoughts on Essentialism and Pragmatism in the Regulation of Robotics.Fabio Fossa - 2018 - In Mark Coeckelbergh, Janina Loh, Michael Funk, Joanna Seibt & Marco Nørskov (eds.), Envisioning Robots in Society – Power, Politics, and, Public Space. pp. 103-111.
    The purpose of this paper is to offer some critical remarks on the so-called pragmatist approach to the regulation of robotics. To this end, the article mainly reviews the work of Jack Balkin and Joanna Bryson, who have taken up such ap- proach with interestingly similar outcomes. Moreover, special attention will be paid to the discussion concerning the legal fiction of ‘electronic personality’. This will help shed light on the opposition between essentialist and pragmatist methodologies. After a brief introduction (...)
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  18. Legal Positivism and the Moral Origins of Legal Systems.Emad H. Atiq - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 36 (1):37-64.
    Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s (...)
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  19. How People Judge What Is Reasonable.Kevin P. Tobia - 2018 - Alabama Law Review 70 (2):293-359.
    A classic debate concerns whether reasonableness should be understood statistically (e.g., reasonableness is what is common) or prescriptively (e.g., reasonableness is what is good). This Article elaborates and defends a third possibility. Reasonableness is a partly statistical and partly prescriptive “hybrid,” reflecting both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Experiments reveal that people apply reasonableness as a hybrid concept, and the Article argues that a hybrid account offers the best general theory of reasonableness. -/- First, the Article investigates how ordinary people judge (...)
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  20. Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law?Edmund Tweedy Flanigan - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2):159-197.
    Instead of the question, ‘do we have an obligation to obey the law?,’ we should first ask the more modest question, ‘do we have reasons to obey the law?’ This paper offers a new account of the notion of the content-independence of legal reasons in terms of the grounding relation. That account is then used to mount a defense of the claim that we do indeed have content-independent moral reasons to obey the law (because it is the law), and (...)
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  21. Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.
    A question, long discussed by legal scholars, has recently provoked a considerable amount of philosophical attention: ‘Is it ever appropriate to base a legal verdict on statistical evidence alone?’ Many philosophers who have considered this question reject legal reliance on bare statistics, even when the odds of error are extremely low. This paper develops a puzzle for the dominant theories concerning why we should eschew bare statistics. Namely, there seem to be compelling scenarios in which there are (...)
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  22. Law and philosophy: selected papers in legal theory.Csaba Varga (ed.) - 1994 - Budapest: ELTE “Comparative Legal Cultures” Project.
    Photomechanical reprint of papers from 1970 to 1992 mostly in English, some in German or French: Foreword 1–4; LAW AS PRACTICE ‘La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques’ 7–33, ‘Geltung des Rechts – Wirksamkeit des Rechts’ 35–42, ‘Macrosociological Theories of Law’ 43–76, ‘Law & its Inner Morality’ 77–89, ‘The Law & its Limits’ 91–96; LAW AS TECHNIQUE ‘Domaine »externe« & domaine »interne« en droit’ 99–117, ‘Die ministerielle Begründung’ 119–139, ‘The Preamble’ 141–167, ‘Presumption & Fiction’ 169–185, ‘Legal Technique’187–198; LAW AS (...)
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  23. Legal evidence and knowledge.Georgi Gardiner - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This essay is an accessible introduction to the proof paradox in legal epistemology. -/- In 1902 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine filed an influential legal verdict. The judge claimed that in order to find a defendant culpable, the plaintiff “must adduce evidence other than a majority of chances”. The judge thereby claimed that bare statistical evidence does not suffice for legal proof. -/- In this essay I first motivate the claim that bare statistical evidence does not (...)
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  24. Reason's freedom and the dialectic of ordered liberty.Edward C. Lyons - 2007 - Cleveland State Law Review 55 (2):157-232.
    The project of “public reason” claims to offer an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of incompatible options for the rational exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse community. The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of “public reason,” in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more reflective Supreme Court precedent. Although logical commonalities might be available (...)
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  25. Balancing Freedom and Restraint: The Role of Virtue in Legal Analysis.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2023 - Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 32:315-353.
    Even if one sees the law as “a self-contained system of legal reasoning” from which we deduce “neutral,” non-political conclusions from “general principles and analogies among cases and doctrines” (including formalist claims that judges simply call “balls and strikes” like umpires in a baseball game), one should still consider certain characteristics of the party making such deductions or calling such “balls and strikes.” [Relevant citations to quoted language are in the Article.] If such decision maker has questionable motivations, (...)
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  26. Voluntariness or legal obligation? An ethical analysis of two instruments for fairer global access to COVID-19 vaccines.Katja Voit, Cristian Timmermann, Marcin Orzechowski & Florian Steger - 2023 - Frontiers in Public Health 11:995683.
    Introduction: There is currently no binding, internationally accepted and successful approach to ensure global equitable access to healthcare during a pandemic. The aim of this ethical analysis is to bring into the discussion a legally regulated vaccine allocation as a possible strategy for equitable global access to vaccines. We focus our analysis on COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) and an existing EU regulation that, after adjustment, could promote global vaccine allocation. -/- Methods: The main documents discussing the two strategies are (...)
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  27. Kant's Legal Metaphor and the Nature of a Deduction.Ian Proops - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2):209-229.
    This essay partly builds on and partly criticizes a striking idea of Dieter Henrich. Henrich argues that Kant's distinction in the first Critique between the question of fact (quid facti) and the question of law (quid juris) provides clues to the argumentative structure of a philosophical "Deduction". Henrich suggests that the unity of apperception plays a role analogous to a legal factum. By contrast, I argue, first, that the question of fact in the first Critique is settled by the (...)
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  28.  62
    Legal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses the idea that legal proof should use variable standards rather than a single fixed threshold.
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  29. Hobbes’s third jurisprudence: legal pragmatism and the dualist menace.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 33 (1).
    This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘third way’ in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential ‘third theories’ of law -- legal pragmatism and legal dualism -- and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s (...)
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  30. Reasonable Moral Doubt.Emad Atiq - 2022 - New York University Law Review 97:1373-1425.
    Sentencing outcomes turn on moral and evaluative determinations. For example, a finding of “irreparable corruption” is generally a precondition for juvenile life without parole. A finding that the “aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors” determines whether a defendant receives the death penalty. Should such moral determinations that expose defendants to extraordinary penalties be subject to a standard of proof? A broad range of federal and state courts have purported to decide this issue “in the abstract and without reference to our (...)
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  31. Reasoning about Criminal Evidence: Revealing Probabilistic Reasoning Behind Logical Conclusions.Michelle B. Cowley-Cunningham - 2007 - SSRN E-Library Maurer School of Law Law and Society eJournals.
    There are two competing theoretical frameworks with which cognitive sciences examines how people reason. These frameworks are broadly categorized into logic and probability. This paper reports two applied experiments to test which framework explains better how people reason about evidence in criminal cases. Logical frameworks predict that people derive conclusions from the presented evidence to endorse an absolute value of certainty such as ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1999). But probabilistic frameworks predict that people derive conclusions from the presented (...)
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  32. Reasonableness on the Clapham Omnibus: Exploring the outcome-sensitive folk concept of reasonable.Markus Kneer - 2022 - In P. Bystranowski, Bartosz Janik & M. Prochnicki (eds.), Judicial Decision-Making: Integrating Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives. Springer Nature. pp. 25-48.
    This paper presents a series of studies (total N=579) which demonstrate that folk judgments concerning the reasonableness of decisions and actions depend strongly on whether they engender positive or negative consequences. A particular decision is deemed more reasonable in retrospect when it produces beneficial consequences than when it produces harmful consequences, even if the situation in which the decision was taken and the epistemic circumstances of the agent are held fixed across conditions. This finding is worrisome for the law, where (...)
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  33. Uncertain reasoning about agents' beliefs and reasoning.John A. Barnden - 2001 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 9 (2-3):115-152.
    Reasoning about mental states and processes is important in various subareas of the legal domain. A trial lawyer might need to reason and the beliefs, reasoning and other mental states and processes of members of a jury; a police officer might need to reason about the conjectured beliefs and reasoning of perpetrators; a judge may need to consider a defendant's mental states and processes for the purposes of sentencing and so on. Further, the mental states in (...)
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  34. Default Reasoning and the Law: A Dialogue.Penco Carlo & Canale Damiano - 2022 - Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 47.
    Reasoning by default is a relevant aspect of everyday life that has traditionally attracted the attention of many fields of research, from psychology to the philosophy of logic, from economics to artificial intelligence. Also in the field of law, default reasoning is widely used by lawyers, judges and other legal decision-makers. In this paper, a philosopher of language (Carlo Penco) and a philosopher of law (Damiano Canale) attempt to explore some uses of default reasoning that are (...)
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  35. Comparative legal cultures: on traditions classified, their rapprochement & transfer, and the anarchy of hyper-rationalism with appendix on legal ethnography.Csaba Varga - 2012 - Budapest: Szent István Társulat.
    Disciplinary issues -- Field studies -- Appendix: Theory of law : legal ethnography, or, the theoretical fruits of the inquiries into folkways. /// Reedition of papers in English spanning from 1995 to 2008 /// DISCIPLINARY ISSUES -- LAW AS CULTURE? [2002] 9–14 // TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES [2002] 15–17 // COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES: ATTEMPTS AT CONCEPTUALISATION [1997] 19–28: 1. Legal Culture in a Cultural-anthropological Approach 19 / 2. Legal Culture in a Sociological Approach 21 (...)
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  36. What is Legal Moralism?Thomas S.øøbirk Petersen - 2011 - SATS 12 (1):80-88.
    The aim of this critical commentary is to distinguish and analytically discuss some important variations in which legal moralism is defined in the literature. As such, the aim is not to evaluate the most plausible version of legal moralism, but to find the most plausible definition of legal moralism. As a theory of criminalization, i.e. a theory that aims to justify the criminal law we should retain, legal moralism can be, and has been, defined as follows: (...)
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  37. Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution.Richard Posner - 1986 - Case Western Reserve Law Review 37 (2):179–217.
    A current focus of legal debate is the proper role of the courts in the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution. Are judges to look solely to the naked language of an enactment, then logically deduce its application in simple syllogistic fashion, as legal formalists had purported to do? Or may the inquiry into meaning be informed by perhaps unbridled and unaccountable judicial notions of public policy, using legal realism to best promote the general welfare? Judge Posner (...)
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  38.  57
    Legal misinterpretation.Timothy Endicott - 2022 - Jurisprudence 13 (1):99-106.
    In his book, _Interpretation without Truth_, Pierluigi Chiassoni articulates the sceptical view that the province of legal interpretation is ‘a province without truth’. A misinterpretation is a false interpretation, and I argue that the widespread phenomenon of legal misinterpretation gives us reason to resist the sceptical conclusion. The potential for a legal interpretation to be a false interpretation –a misinterpretation– implies that a legal interpretation can be true. And legal misinterpretations can be understood as interpretations (...)
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  39.  25
    What's in a Name? Legal Fictions and Philosophical Fictionalism.Luft Constantin - 2024 - Law and Literature 2:1-22.
    This paper uses analytic philosophy to prevent merely verbal disputes about the concept of fiction within discussions on fictiones iuris. It provides a survey of potentially fruitful connections between legal fictions and fictionalism. More specifically, I will argue that by enriching current accounts of legal fictions in legal theory with insights from (1) the philosophy of language on fictional speech and from (2) contemporary metaphysics on philosophical fictionalism, it seems natural to explore the position that talk involving (...)
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  40. Asymmetries in prior conviction reasoning: Truth suppression effects in child protection contexts.Michelle B. Cowley-Cunningham - 2010 - Psychology, Crime and Law 3 (16):211-231.
    In three empirical studies we examined how people reason about prior convictions in child abuse cases. We tested whether the disclosure of similar prior convictions prompts a mental representation or an additive probative value (Criminal Justice Act, 2003). Asymmetrical use of similar priors were observed in three studies. A pilot study showed that disclosure of a second prior did not contribute a weight equivalent to that of the first disclosure. Study 1 showed jurors did not see left-handed evidence (i.e. matching (...)
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  41.  74
    Should Legal Proof Be Binary?Lewis Ross - 2024 - In The Philosophy of Legal Proof. Cambridge University Press.
    Discusses the question of whether trials should just use two verdicts (e.g. guilty or not guilty) or whether they use multiple verdicts.
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  42. Law’s Artifactual Nature: How Legal Institutions Generate Normativity.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 247-266.
    I argue that law is best understood as an institutionalized abstract artifact. Using the ideas of John Searle on institutions and Amie Thomasson on artifacts, I show how the law is capable of generating new reasons for action, arguing against recent work by David Enoch who holds that legal reason-giving is ultimately a form of triggering conditional reasons.
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  43.  89
    The Possibility of a Uniform Legal Language at the Interplay of Legal Discourse, Semiotics and Blockchain Networks.Pierangelo Blandino - 2024 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 1:1-29.
    This paper explores the possibility of a standard legal language (e.g. English) for a principled evolution of law in line with technological development. In doing so, reference is made to blockchain networks and smart contracts to emphasise the discontinuity with the liberal legal tradition when it comes to decentralisation and binary code language. Methodologically, the argument is built on the underlying relation between law, semiotics and new forms of media adding to natural language; namely: code and symbols. In (...)
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  44. Does Legal Interpretation Need Paul Grice?Matczak Marcin - 2016 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):67-87.
    By significantly diminishing the role intentions play in communication, in Imagination and Convention Lepore and Stone attempt to overthrow the Gricean paradigm which prevails in the philosophy of language. The approach they propose is attractive to theorists of legal interpretations for many reasons. Primary among these is that the more general dispute in the philosophy of language between Griceans and non-Griceans mirrors the dispute between intentionalists and non-intentionalists in legal interpretation. The ideas proposed in Imagination and Convention naturally (...)
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  45. Practical Reasoning Arguments: A Modular Approach.Fabrizio Macagno & Douglas Walton - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (4):519-547.
    This paper compares current ways of modeling the inferential structure of practical reasoning arguments, and proposes a new approach in which it is regarded in a modular way. Practical reasoning is not simply seen as reasoning from a goal and a means to an action using the basic argumentation scheme. Instead, it is conceived as a complex structure of classificatory, evaluative, and practical inferences, which is formalized as a cluster of three types of distinct and interlocked argumentation (...)
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  46. Practical Reasons and interpretation of Customary International Law.Kostiantyn Gorobets - forthcoming - In Panos Merkouris, Jörg Kammerhofer & Noora Arjärvi (eds.), The Theory and Philosophy of Customary International Law and its Interpretation.
    When we say that we interpret customary international law, what is this thing that we actually interpret? Depending on how we answer this question, our view on interpretative methodology will change. It seems that the most promising approach is to say that interpretation of customary international law is an interpretation of certain legal practices. However, here we also encounter some problems. The dominant doctrine of customary international law requiring state practice and opinio juris assumes that only by adding a (...)
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  47. Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense.Andrew Ingram - 2012 - American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (3):101-120.
    Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court’s finding and a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between a person's (...)
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  48. Reasonable illegal force: Justice and legitimacy in a pluralistic, liberal society.Alec Walen - 2001 - Ethics 111 (2):344-373.
    Ideally, should liberals in a pluralistic society be able to agree to abide by a common legal system such that all their disputes are resolved without resort to illegal force? Rawls believes the answer is “yes.” I explain and defend his answer, but I also conclude, focusing on the example of abortion, that the truth is “not necessarily, not always.” Rawls’s conceptions of reasonable citizens and public reason help explain why there is a strong prima facie duty to forswear (...)
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  49. The Great Alliance: History, Reason, and Will in Modern Law.Paulo Barrozo - 2015 - Law and Contemporary Problems 78 (1):235-270.
    This article offers an interpretation of the intellectual and political origins of modern law in the nineteenth century and its consequences for contemporary legal thought. Social theoretical analyses of law and legal thought tend to emphasize rupture and change. Histories of legal thought tend to draw a picture of strife between different schools of jurisprudence. Such analyses and histories fail to account for the extent to which present legal thought is the continuation of a jurisprudential settlement (...)
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  50. Reasons for endorsing or rejecting ‘self-binding directives’ in bipolar disorder: a qualitative study of survey responses from UK service users.Tania Gergel, Preety Das, Lucy Stephenson, Gareth Owen, Larry Rifkin, John Dawson, Alex Ruck Keene & Guy Hindley - 2021 - The Lancet Psychiatry 8.
    Summary Background Self-binding directives instruct clinicians to overrule treatment refusal during future severe episodes of illness. These directives are promoted as having potential to increase autonomy for individuals with severe episodic mental illness. Although lived experience is central to their creation, service users’ views on self-binding directives have not been investigated substantially. This study aimed to explore whether reasons for endorsement, ambivalence, or rejection given by service users with bipolar disorder can address concerns regarding self-binding directives, decision-making capacity, and human (...)
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