Results for 'logical empiricism'

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  1. Neither Logical Empiricism nor Vitalism, but Organicism: What the Philosophy of Biology Was.Daniel J. Nicholson & Richard Gawne - 2015 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 37 (4):345-381.
    Philosophy of biology is often said to have emerged in the last third of the twentieth century. Prior to this time, it has been alleged that the only authors who engaged philosophically with the life sciences were either logical empiricists who sought to impose the explanatory ideals of the physical sciences onto biology, or vitalists who invoked mystical agencies in an attempt to ward off the threat of physicochemical reduction. These schools paid little attention to actual biological science, and (...)
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  2. Logical Empiricism, Politics, and Professionalism.Scott Edgar - 2009 - Science & Education 18 (2):177-189.
    This paper considers George A. Reisch’s account of the role of Cold War political forces in shaping the apolitical stance that came to dominate philosophy of science in the late 1940s and 1950s. It argues that at least as early as the 1930s, Logical Empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap already held that philosophy of science could not properly have political aims, and further suggests that political forces alone cannot explain this view’s rise to dominance during the Cold War, since (...)
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  3. Appropriating Kuhn’s Philosophical Legacy. Three Attempts: Logical Empiricism, Structuralism, and Neokantianism.Andoni Ibarra & Thomas Mormann - 2010 - Cadernos de Filosofia Das Ciencias 8:65 - 102.
    In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical logical empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc- turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. (...)
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  4. Realistic Claims in Logical Empiricism.Matthias Neuber - forthcoming - In Uskali Mäki, Stéphanie Ruphy, Gerhard Schurz & Ioannis Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer.
    Logical empiricism is commonly seen as a counter-position to scientific realism. In the present paper it is shown that there indeed existed a realist faction within the logical empiricist movement. In particular, I shall point out that at least four types of realistic arguments can be distinguished within this faction: Reichenbach’s ‘probabilistic argument,’ Feigl’s ‘pragmatic argument,’ Hempel’s ‘indispensability argument,’ and Kaila’s ‘invariantist argument.’ All these variations of arguments are intended to prevent the logical empiricist agenda from (...)
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  5. Philipp Frank’s Austro-American Logical Empiricism.Thomas Mormann - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1): 56 - 86.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss the “Austro-American” logical empiricism proposed by physicist and philosopher Philipp Frank, particularly his interpretation of Carnap’s Aufbau, which he considered the charter of logical empiricism as a scientific world conception. According to Frank, the Aufbau was to be read as an integration of the ideas of Mach and Poincaré, leading eventually to a pragmatism quite similar to that of the American pragmatist William James. Relying on this peculiar interpretation, (...)
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  6. The Structure of Scientific Theories in Logical Empiricism.Thomas Mormann - 2007 - In A. Richardson & T. Uebel (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism. Cambridge University Press.
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  7. The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism.Nikolay Milkov & V. Peckhaus (eds.) - 2013 - Berlin: Springer.
    The Berlin Group for scientific philosophy was active between 1928 and 1933 and was closely related to the Vienna Circle. In 1930, the leaders of the two Groups, Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap, launched the journal Erkenntnis. However, between the Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle, there was not only close relatedness but also significant difference. Above all, while the Berlin Group explored philosophical problems of the actual practice of science, the Vienna Circle, closely following Wittgenstein, was more interested in (...)
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  8. Modal Rationalism and Logical Empiricism: Some Similarities.Stephen Yablo - manuscript
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  9.  85
    From Cautious Enthusiasm to Profound Disenchantment - Ernest Nagel and Carnapian Logical Empiricism.Thomas Mormann - forthcoming - In Matthias Neuber & Adam Tamas Tuboly (eds.), Ernest Nagel: Philosophy of Science and the Fight for Clarity. Springer.
    The global relation between logical empiricism and American pragmatism is one of the more difficult problems in history of philosophy. In this paper I’d like to take a local perspective and concentrate on the details that concern the vicissitudes of a philosopher who played an important role in the encounter of logical empiricism and American pragmatism, namely, Ernest Nagel. In this paper, I want to explore some aspects of Nagel’s changing attitude towards the then „new“ (...)-empiricist philosophy. In the beginning Nagel welcomed logical empiricism whole-heartedly. This early enthusiasm did not last. At the end of his philosophical career Nagel’s early positive attitude towards logical empiricism shown in the 1930s had been replaced by a much more reserved one. Nagel’s growing dissatisfaction with the Carnapian version of logical empiricist philosophy was clearly expressed in Nagel’s criticism of Carnap’s inductive logic and more generally in his last book Teleology Revisited and Other Essays on History and Philosophy of Science. There he critized harshly Carnap’s philosophy of science in general as ahistoric and non-pragmatist. One of the distinctive features of Nagel’s philosophy of science is the emphasis that he put on the role of history of science for philosophy of science. A compelling evidence for this attitude are his works on the history and philosophy of geometry and algebra One may say that Carnap and Nagel represented opposed possibilities of how the profession of a philosopher of science could be understood: Carnap as a „conceptual engineer“ was engaged in the task of inventing the conceptual tools for a better theoretical understanding of science, while Nagel was to be considered more as a „public intellectual“ engaged in the project of realizing a more rational and enlightened society. (shrink)
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  10.  52
    Kurt Grelling and the Idiosyncrasy of the Berlin Logical Empiricism.Nikolay Milkov - 2021 - In Sebastian Lutz & Adam Tamas Tuboly (eds.), Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics. London: Routledge. pp. 64-83.
    The received view has it that Hans Reichenbach and his friends of the Berlin Group worked close together with the more prominent Vienna Circle. In the wake of this view, Reichenbach was often treated as a logical positivist – despite the fact that he decisively opposed it. In this chapter we follow another thread. We shall show the “third man”– besides Reichenbach and Walter Dubislav – of the Berlin Group, Kurt Grelling, as a man who could grasp the academic (...)
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  11. Review of Stefano Gattei, Thomas Kuhn's 'Linguistic Turn' and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism[REVIEW]Francis Remedios - 2010 - Philosophy in Review (3):189-191.
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  12. Empiricism.Jennifer Nagel - 2006 - In Sarkar Pfeifer (ed.), The Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
    Having assigned experience this exclusive role in justification, empiricists then have a range of views concerning the character of experience, the semantics of our claims about unobservable entities, the nature of empirical confirmation, and the possibility of non-empirical warrant for some further class of claims, such as those accepted on the basis of linguistic or logical rules. Given the definitive principle of their position, empiricists can allow that we have knowledge independent of experience only where what is known is (...)
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  13. From Locke to Materialism: Empiricism, the Brain and the Stirrings of Ontology.Charles Wolfe - 2018 - In What Does It Mean to Be an Empiricist? Springer Verlag.
    My topic is the materialist appropriation of empiricism – as conveyed in the ‘minimal credo’ nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu (which interestingly is not just a phrase repeated from Hobbes and Locke to Diderot, but is also a medical phrase, used by Harvey, Mandeville and others). That is, canonical empiricists like Locke go out of their way to state that their project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: “I (...)
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  14. Numbers, Empiricism and the A Priori.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2020 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (2):149-177.
    The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege ́s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path, that departin1g from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more (...)
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  15. Phenomenology, Empiricism, and Constructivism in Paolo Parrini's Positive Philosophy.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2020 - In Federica Buongiorno, Vincenzo Costa & Roberta Lanfredini (eds.), Phenomenology in Italy. Authors, Schools, Traditions. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 161-178.
    In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point out some lines of (...)
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  16.  35
    Marco Sgarbi, The Aristotelian Tradition and the Rise of British Empiricism: Logic and Epistemology in the British Isles, 1570–1689[REVIEW]John P. McCaskey - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):204-207.
    Sgarbi just shows that in the century before Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding many writers mentioned induction and many claimed that knowledge must rely somehow on sense experience. An attempt to revive Randall’s thesis needs more than that.
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  17. Mill on Logic.David Godden - 2017 - In Dale E. Miller & Christopher Macleod (eds.), A companion to Mill. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 175-191.
    Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, as set forth in his A System of Logic (1843–1872), this chapter provides an introduction to Mill’s logical theory by reviewing his position on the relationship between induction and deduction, and the role of general premises and principles in reasoning. Locating induction, understood as a kind of analogical reasoning from particulars to particulars, as the basic form of inference that (...)
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  18. Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of all knowledge, empirical (...)
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  19.  27
    Establish Knowledge System in the Most Rigorous Order— From Purely Logical Belief to Methodology and Universal Truths.Kai Jiang - manuscript
    Knowledge is correct and reliable when its foundation is correct, but humans never have the correct beliefs and methodology. Thus, knowledge is unreliable and the foundation of knowledge needs to be reconstructed. A pure rationalist only believes in logic. Thus, all matter and experience must be propositions derived from logic. The logically necessary consequence of this belief is truth; logically possible consequences are phenomena, and logically impossible consequence are fallacies and evils. This paper introduces belief and its logical consequences, (...)
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  20. Language, Truth, and Logic and the Anglophone Reception of the Vienna Circle.Andreas Vrahimis - 2020 - In Adam Tamas Tuboly (ed.), The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. Hampshire: Palgrave. pp. 41-68.
    A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic had been responsible for introducing the Vienna Circle’s ideas, developed within a Germanophone framework, to an Anglophone readership. Inevitably, this migration from one context to another resulted in the alteration of some of the concepts being transmitted. Such alterations have served to facilitate a number of false impressions of Logical Empiricism from which recent scholarship still tries to recover. In this paper, I will attempt to point to the ways in which (...)
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  21. Clarifying Ostensible Definition by the Logical Possibility of Inverted Spectrum.C. Lu - 1989 - Modern Philosophy 2.
    How "red", "green" were defined? Through analyzing how two children with congenitally inverted color sensations corresponding to red flags and green grass accept their grand mothers’ teaching about colors, the paper get opposite conclusions against logical empiricism. The “red” and “green” and other names of properties of objects were defined by objective physical properties (or together with behavior, such as in defining “beauty”), instead our sensations. So language directly points to things in themselves passing through sensations and presentative (...)
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  22. An Empirical Route to Logical 'Conventionalism'.Eugene Chua - 2017 - In Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10455. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 631-636.
    The laws of classical logic are taken to be logical truths, which in turn are taken to hold objectively. However, we might question our faith in these truths: why are they true? One general approach, proposed by Putnam [8] and more recently Dickson [3] or Maddy [5], is to adopt empiricism about logic. On this view, logical truths are true because they are true of the world alone – this gives logical truths an air of objectivity. (...)
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  23. Philosophy of Logic. Hilary Putnam.John Corcoran - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (1):131-133.
    Putnam, Hilary FPhilosophy of logic. Harper Essays in Philosophy. Harper Torchbooks, No. TB 1544. Harper & Row, Publishers, New York-London, 1971. v+76 pp. The author of this book has made highly regarded contributions to mathematics, to philosophy of logic and to philosophy of science, and in this book he brings his ideas in these three areas to bear on the traditional philosophic problem of materialism versus (objective) idealism. The book assumes that contemporary science (mathematical and physical) is largely correct as (...)
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  24.  58
    Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part II: Hans Reichenbach.Sander Verhaegh - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (11).
    In the late 1930s, a few years before the start of the Second World War, a small number of European philosophers of science emigrated to the United States, escaping the increasingly perilous situation on the continent. Among the first expatriates were Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, arguably the most influential logical empiricists of their time. In this two-part paper, I reconstruct Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain (...)
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  25. An Introduction to Logical Positivism: The Viennese Formulation of the Verifiability Principle.Alberto Oya - manuscript
    The verifiability principle was the characteristic claim of a group of thinkers who called themselves the Vienna Circle and who formed the philosophical movement now known as logical positivism. The verifiability principle is an empiricist criterion of meaning which declares that only statements that are verifiable by —i.e., logically deducible from— observational statements are cognitively meaningful. -/- This essay is a short introduction to the philosophical movement of logical positivism and its formulation of the verifiability principle. Its primary (...)
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  26. A Promethean Philosophy of External Technologies, Empiricism, & the Concept: Second-Order Cybernetics, Deep Learning, and Predictive Processing.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Media Theory 4 (1):87-146.
    Beginning with a survey of the shortcoming of theories of organology/media-as-externalization of mind/body—a philosophical-anthropological tradition that stretches from Plato through Ernst Kapp and finds its contemporary proponent in Bernard Stiegler—I propose that the phenomenological treatment of media as an outpouching and extension of mind qua intentionality is not sufficient to counter the ̳black-box‘ mystification of today‘s deep learning‘s algorithms. Focusing on a close study of Simondon‘s On the Existence of Technical Objectsand Individuation, I argue that the process-philosophical work of Gilbert (...)
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  27. Rethinking Woodger’s Legacy in the Philosophy of Biology.Daniel J. Nicholson & Richard Gawne - 2014 - Journal of the History of Biology 47 (2):243-292.
    The writings of Joseph Henry Woodger (1894–1981) are often taken to exemplify everything that was wrongheaded, misguided, and just plain wrong with early twentieth-century philosophy of biology. Over the years, commentators have said of Woodger: (a) that he was a fervent logical empiricist who tried to impose the explanatory gold standards of physics onto biology, (b) that his philosophical work was completely disconnected from biological science, (c) that he possessed no scientific or philosophical credentials, and (d) that his work (...)
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  28. A Critical Relation Between Mind and Logic in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein: An Analytical Study.Mudasir A. Tantray - 2017 - Lokayata Journal of Positive Philosophy 7 (2):45-57.
    This paper deals with the study of the nature of mind, its processes and its relations with the other filed known as logic, especially the contribution of most notable contemporary analytical philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein showed a critical relation between the mind and logic. He assumed that every mental process is logical. Mental field is field of space and time and logical field is a field of reasoning (inductive and deductive). It is only with the advancement in logic, (...)
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  29.  85
    CORCORAN's THUMBNAIL REVIEWS OF OPPOSING PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC BOOKS.John Corcoran - 1978-9 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 56:98-9.
    PUTNAM has made highly regarded contributions to mathematics, to philosophy of logic and to philosophy of science, and in this book he brings his ideas in these three areas to bear on the traditional philosophic problem of materialism versus (objective) idealism. The book assumes that contemporary science (mathematical and physical) is largely correct as far as it goes, or at least that it is rational to believe in it. The main thesis of the book is that consistent acceptance of contemporary (...)
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  30. On Walter Dubislav.Nikolay Milkov - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (2):147-161.
    This paper outlines the intellectual biography of Walter Dubislav. Besides being a leading member of the Berlin Group headed by Hans Reichenbach, Dubislav played a defining role as well in the Society for Empirical/Scientific Philosophy in Berlin. A student of David Hilbert, Dubislav applied the method of axiomatic to produce original work in logic and formalist philosophy of mathematics. He also introduced the elements of a formalist philosophy of science and addressed more general problems concerning the substantiation of human knowledge. (...)
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  31.  65
    The Berlin Group and the Society for Scientific Philosophy.Nikolay Milkov - forthcoming - In Thomas Uebel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism. London: Routledge.
    In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the philosopher Hans Reichenbach led a group of like-minded colleagues in Berlin that must count as an independent point of origin of the movement of logical empiricism. Like the Vienna Circle with whom they cooperated on numerous occasions, their concern was to develop a philosophy of science adequate to the latest advances in science itself. Differences of philosophical background and interests, however, resulted in putting different accents by justifying scientific knowledge.
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  32. Revisiting Galison’s ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus’ in Light of Neurath’s Philosophical Projects.Angela Potochnik & Audrey Yap - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):469-488.
    Historically, the Vienna Circle and the Dessau Bauhaus were related, with members of each group familiar with the ideas of the other. Peter Galison argues that their projects are related as well, through shared political views and methodological approach. The two main figures that connect the Vienna Circle to the Bauhaus—and the figures upon which Galison focuses—are Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath. Yet the connections that Galison develops do not properly capture the common themes between the Bauhaus and Neurath’s philosophical (...)
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  33. Una modernizzazione incompiuta: il programma di unificazione della scienza.Gereon Wolters - 1992 - Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 10 (3/4):90-98.
    The paper shows how logical empiricism aims at a modernization of philosophy.
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  34.  84
    Two Kindred Neo-Kantian Philosophies of Science: Pap's "The A Priori in Physical Theory" and Cassirer's "Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics".Thomas Mormann - 2021 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 1.
    The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori of Physical Theory (Pap 1946, henceforth FAP) and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (Cassirer 1937, henceforth DI) may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. (...)
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  35.  41
    Positivism in Action: The Case of Louis Rougier.Fons Dewulf & Massimiliano Simons - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 11 (2).
    In this paper, we investigate how the life and work of Louis Rougier relate to the broader political dimension of logical empiricist philosophy. We focus on three practical projects of Rougier in the 1930s and 1940s. First, his attempts to integrate French-speaking philosophers into an international network of scientific philosophers by organizing two Unity of Science conferences in Paris. Second, his role in the renewal of liberalism through the organization of the Walter Lippmann Colloquium. Third, Rougier’s attempts at political (...)
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  36. Instrumentalism Revisited.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Critica 31 (91):3-39.
    The logical empiricists said some good things about epistemology and scientific method. However, they associated those epistemological ideas with some rather less good ideas about philosophy of language. There is something epistemologically suspect about statements that cannot be tested. But to say that those statements are meaningless is to go too far. And there is something impossible about trying to figure out which of two empirically equivalent theories is true. But to say that those theories are synonymous is also (...)
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  37. Morris’ Pariser Programm einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie.Thomas Mormann - 2016 - In Christian Bonnet & Elisabeth Nemeth (eds.), Wissenschaft und Praxis. Zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie in Österreich und Frankreich in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Springer. pp. 73 - 88.
    Abstract: One of the institutional highlights of the encounter between Austrian “wissen¬schaftliche Philosophie” and French “philosophie scientifique” in the first half of the 20th century was the “First International Congress for Unity of Science” that took place 1935 in Paris. In my contribution I deal with an episode of the philosophical mega-event whose protagonist was the American philosopher and semiotician Charles William Morris. At the Paris congress he presented his programme of a comprehensive, practice-oriented scientific philosophy and, in a more (...)
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  38.  73
    Nagel’s Philosophical Development.Sander Verhaegh - forthcoming - In Ernest Nagel: Between Naturalist Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism.
    Ernest Nagel played a key role in bridging the gap between American philosophy and logical empiricism. He introduced the European analytic approach to the American philosophical community but also remained faithful to the naturalism of his teachers. This paper aims to shed new light on Nagel’s intermediating endeavors by reconstructing his philosophical development in the late 1920s and 1930s. This is a decisive period in Nagel’s career because it is the phase in which he first formulated the principles (...)
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  39.  68
    Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part I: Rudolf Carnap.Sander Verhaegh - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (11).
    In the years before the Second World War, Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach emigrated to the United States, escaping the quickly deteriorating political situation on the continent. Once in the U. S., the two significantly changed the American philosophical climate. This two-part paper reconstructs Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain the impact of their arrival in the late 1930s. Building on archival material of several key players and (...)
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  40. Kaila's Reception of Hume.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 89:147-162.
    In this paper, I discuss Eino Kaila's (1890-1958) understanding of David Hume. Kaila was one of the leading Finnish philosophers of the 20th century and a correspondent of the Vienna Circle. He introduced logical empiricism into Finland and taught Georg Henrik von Wright. Final draft.
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  41.  28
    The Institutional Stabilization of Philosophy of Science and its Withdrawal From Social Concerns After the Second World War.Fons Dewulf - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-19.
    In this paper, I criticize the thesis that value-laden approaches in American philosophy of science were marginalized in the 1960s through the editorial policy at Philosophy of Science and funding practices at the National Science Foundation. I argue that there is no available evidence of any normative restriction on philosophy of science as a domain of inquiry which excluded research on the relation between science and society. Instead, I claim that the absence of any exemplary, professional philosopher who discussed the (...)
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  42. Katz’s Revisability Paradox Dissolved.Allard Tamminga & Sander Verhaegh - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):771-784.
    Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally (...)
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  43. Relevance and Verification.Ben Blumson - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (3):457-480.
    A. J. Ayer’s empiricist criterion of meaning was supposed to have sorted all statements into nonsense on the one hand, and tautologies or genuinely factual statements on the other. Unfortunately for Ayer, it follows from classical logic that his criterion is trivial—it classifies all statements as either tautologies or genuinely factual, but none as nonsense. However, in this paper, I argue that Ayer’s criterion of meaning can be defended from classical proofs of its triviality by the adoption of a relevant (...)
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  44. Collapse of the New Wave.Ronald P. Endicott - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):53-72.
    I critically evaluate the influential new wave account of theory reduction in science developed by Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker. First, I cast doubt on claims that the new wave account enjoys a number of theoretical virtues over its competitors, such as the ability to represent how false theories are reduced by true theories. Second, I argue that the genuinely novel claim that a corrected theory must be specified entirely by terms from the basic reducing theory is in fact too (...)
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  45. A Place for Pragmatism in the Dynamics of Reason?Thomas Mormann - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):27-37.
    Abstract. In Dynamics of Reason Michael Friedman proposes a kind of synthesis between the neokantianism of Ernst Cassirer, the logical empiricism of Rudolf Carnap, and the historicism of Thomas Kuhn. Cassirer and Carnap are to take care of the Kantian legacy of modern philosophy of science, encapsulated in the concept of a relativized a priori and the globally rational or continuous evolution of scientific knowledge,while Kuhn´s role is to ensure that the historicist character of scientific knowledge is taken (...)
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  46. Carnap and Kuhn on linguistic frameworks and scientific revolutions.Gilson Olegario - 2013 - Manuscrito 36 (1):190.
    Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors (e.g., Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grünberg) maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of (...)
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  47. Referential Consistency as a a Criterion of Meaning.Steven James Bartlett - 1982 - Synthese 52 (2):267 - 282.
    NOTE TO THE READER - October, 2020¶¶ After a long period of time devoted to research in other areas, the author has returned to the subject of this paper in a book-length study, CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning, which has been published as an open access eBook by Studies in Theory and Behavior in August, 2020. In this book (Chapter 11, “The Metalogic of Meaning”), the position developed in the 1982 paper that follows is substantively revised (...)
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  48. Ethik und Moral im Wiener Kreis. Zur Geschichte eines engagierten Humanismus.Anne Siegetsleitner - 2014 - Böhlau.
    Die vorliegende Schrift unternimmt eine Revision des vorherrschenden Bildes der Rolle und der Konzeptionen von Moral und Ethik im Wiener Kreis. Dieses Bild wird als zu einseitig und undifferenziert zurückgewiesen. Die Ansicht, die Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises hätten kein Interesse an Moral und Ethik gezeigt, wird widerlegt. Viele Mitglieder waren nicht nur moralisch und politisch interessiert, sondern auch engagiert. Des Weiteren vertraten nicht alle die Standardauffassung logisch-empiristischer Ethik, die neben der Anerkennung deskriptiv-empirischer Untersuchungen durch die Ablehnung jeglicher normativer und inhaltlicher (...)
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  49. Metafore, modelli, linguaggio scientifico: il dibattito postempirista.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1988 - In Melchiorre Virgilio (ed.), Simbolo e conoscenza. Milan, Italy: VIta e Pensiero. pp. 31-102.
    I discuss Mary Hess’s interaction-view of scientific metaphor, outline an alternative view and show how it may prove fruitful when applied to chapters of the history of science. I start with a reconstruction of the discussion on the nature of scientific models and on their relationship to metaphors that has taken place in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of Science starting from the Fifties; the discovery started with Stephen Pepper and Kenneth Burke, reaching Thomas Kuhn, Marx Wartofsky, and George Lakoff via Max (...)
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  50. Enlightenment and Formal Romanticism - Carnap’s Account of Philosophy as Explication.Thomas Mormann - 2010 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 14:263 - 329.
    Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as En lighten ment is the first book in the English language that seeks to place Carnap's philosophy in a broad cultural, political and intellectual context. According to the author, Carnap synthesized many different cur rents of thought and thereby arrived at a novel philosophical perspective that remains strik ing ly relevant today. Whether the reader agrees with Carus's bold theses on Carnap's place in the landscape of twentieth-century philosophy, and his even bolder claims concerning (...)
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