Philosophical counselling is typically conceptualised as a praxis going beyond academic and theoretical philosophy. However, two problems soon follow, namely the lack of agreed-upon methods and a substantial neglect of different philosophical traditions informing its practice. In this article, I propose reconceptualising philosophical counselling as a distinct method through which academic philosophy can be practised. This allows me to introduce an understanding of African philosophy, inspired by African philosophers Chimakonam and Serequeberhan, that might encourage the (...) philosophical counsellor to render academic philosophy more applicable to the counselee. Moreover, it allows for embodied voices talking from an embedded African lifeworld to create new and more relevant concepts that emerge from that lifeworld. (shrink)

At the heart of philosophical counselling, an emerging field of practical philosophy, is a modest claim, that the lay public can benefit from all that philosophy has to offer. If accepted, this claim suggests that different philosophical traditions should be incorporated into the philosophical counselling discourse. Even though various philosophical traditions have slowly been incorporated, there are sparse mentions of African philosophy in the philosophical counselling literature. However, Ubuntu philosophy has recently garnered (...) some attention. Nonetheless, in this talk I address this dearth of African philosophical input through the introduction of two alternative notions of African philosophy, namely, African hermeneutics and conversational philosophy. These two schools of thought provide valuable and enriching insights to the philosophical counselling discourse. Through this introduction, I aim to transform two key mechanisms as found in the philosophical counselling literature. These mechanisms, that of a hermeneutical happening and collaborative philosophising, invaluable as they are to our understanding of philosophical counselling, lack a certain contextual nuance and situated sensitivity. Consequently, a problematic value-neutrality is continually reproduced; the philosophical counsellor then emerges as an “unprejudiced and value neutral educator”. With the help of African hermeneutics and conversational philosophy, I aim to positively transform these mechanisms. This transformation involves taking seriously the situated and contextual response, emerging from and responding to, in this case, an African lifeworld. Resultant is an interpretive actualisation through a collaborative undertaking rooted in the very conditions of the philosophical conversation. (shrink)

In this paper, we deal with the issue of contradictory beliefs, particularly with regard to Philosophical Counseling: both voices from the philosophical tradition (with no claim of being exhaustive!) and concepts developed by philosophical practitioners will be considered, in order to make clear what a wide range of resources for dealing with contradictions is available to the philosopher who may wish to engage in Philosophical Counseling. Among the philosophical practitioners, we devote special consideration to Ben (...) Mijuskovic and Gerd Achenbach, and this for two main reasons: first, because the issue of contradiction plays a central role in their concept of Philosophical Counseling and, accordingly, it is given special consideration in their writings; second, because their approaches to Philosophical Counseling are so different that by looking at them one can get an impression of the variety of the positions one can adopt in Philosophical Counseling with respect to the issue of contradiction. (shrink)

Method in philosophical counselling is still a contentious topic. That is, there is no consensus on whether the philosophical counsellor should have a method in her practice to help the counsellee resolve philosophical problems. Some philosophical counsellors claim that there should not be any rigid adherence to method(s) as this will render philosophy too dogmatic. Philosophical counselling, in light of this view, promotes a kind of mutual philosophising sans definite goal with the counsellee. (...) What I call "dissentient philosophical counselling" takes this claim even further: the philosophical counsellor lives/practices her philosophical counselling, that is, she embodies and practices philosophy as a way of life. This view is posed as a response to contemporary conceptualisations of philosophical counselling where the philosophical counsellor might stand in a disembodied relationship with her method(s) and tries to have a conversation "from nowhere". Dissentient philosophical counselling, even though more focused on living philosophically , still suffers from certain shortcomings. In this paper, I firstly showcase how even the seemingly innocuous but important question "How might one live?" suffers from a lack of much needed nuance. And secondly, I introduce, via a fictional narrative, a provisional way of practicing this reworked dissentient philosophical counselling. I do this by, firstly, introducing African conversational philosophy, via its method of conversationalism, and secondly, I introduce a peculiar version of Pyrrhonian scepticism especially regarding the notion of bios adoxastōs (life without dogma). (shrink)

Starting from the four principles of Pólya's problem-solving method, by analogy, in this paper we propose a new method of philosophical counseling. Thus, the objectives of this study are as follows: the review of several methods of philosophical counseling; justifying the need for a new method, which we called the IPAA method; developing the four principles – the principle of identification (I), the principle of planification (P), the principle of application (A) and the principle of assumption (A). In (...) order to achieve these, we took into account the fact that the nature of the philosophical problems faced by the clients of the philosophical counselors, whether they are existential, moral or metaphysical, can be solved on their own. Therefore, we argued that if in the first instance, clients really need the input of the philosophical counselors, as long as the latter uses the IPAA method – a problem-solving method – they can offer clients the opportunity to self-counsel. The novelty of the IPAA method consists in the fact that it offers the client, assisted and guided at the beginning by the counselor, the possibility to carry out the act of counseling outside the office, being empowered to apply the four methodical principles mentioned above. The present study is relevant in that the new IPAA method, a method focused on solving everyday problems, is a useful method for both philosophical counselors, as its application in the office helps them to train the clients in researching, understanding and assuming their own lives, as well as for the clients, because if they are assisted in the first instance by the counselor's expertise, they can independently clarify and solve their daily difficulties. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, a contemporary movement in practical philosophy, continually expands its discourse by introducing novel philosophical ideas and different traditions. Nevertheless, a conspicuous silence persists regarding the introduction of African philosophies in its discourse. This issue becomes apparent when the question “How might one live?”—a fundamental question that the philosophical counsellor deals with—is adequately investigated. However, its current formulation suffers greatly from a much-needed nuance concerning temporal and contextual awareness. To address and transcend this shortcoming, I (...) turn to two distinct African philosophies, namely, the hermeneutic philosophy of Tsenay Serequeberhan and the conversational method of philosophising advocated by Jonathan O. Chimakonam. By incorporating these philosophies, my aim is twofold: first, to promote an interpretative actualisation situated within a conversational framework that might lead to the creation of new concepts and/or the disclosing of different ways of being/becoming, and second, to draw attention to an underlying assumption that might maintain the neglect of philosophical traditions beyond Western philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophical Counselling is a contemporary movement in practical philosophy. Philosophical counselling is an approach that aims to assist people to deal with life events in an effective manner. The approach utilizes both ancient and contemporary philosophical promises and theories. On the promise side, it offers the belief that philosophy can be concerned with providing answers to the question of how people ought to live a good or healthy life. On the theory side, it offers the (...) belief that philosophical inquiry and theory can help people towards such answers. In India also, several philosophy organization and educational institutes started their courses in philosophical counseling. In this paper, we will see the future perspectives of philosophical couselling in India and see how wide content these courses covers. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling is generally understood as the discussion or resolution of everyday problems with the help of philosophy. However, few agree on this definition. This leads to a crisis of definition for philosophical counselling which in turn causes practical problems regarding, inter alia, the teaching of future philosophical counsellors, the question of method, and the potential scope of philosophical counselling. I identify in this study a prevalent therapeutic thesis on the nature of (...) class='Hi'>philosophical counselling which ties together some of the more popular conceptions of philosophical counselling. This thesis predominates when philosophical counsellors focus on the counselling part and neglect the philosophical part of philosophical counselling. This stance keeps philosophical counselling firmly contained within a medico-therapeutic framework. In opposition to this predominant view, I propose a reconceptualisation of philosophical counselling which does not subscribe to the therapeutic thesis and by implication works outside of a medical framework. More specifically, in fleshing out my non-therapeutic understanding of philosophical counselling, I propose twelve context-dependent conditions of philosophical counselling by drawing on a Pyrrhonian disposition and also on examples of philosophical counsellors who begin to work outside of the medico-therapeutic framework. I argue that these conditions should be met for philosophical counselling to stay firmly within the realm of philosophy as an aim in itself, thereby remaining true to its origin and basic orientation, and drawing on its innate strengths. With this fundamental reconceptualisation and the accompanying twelve context-dependent conditions, I propose a novel account of philosophical counselling which (i) does not subscribe to the therapeutic thesis, (ii) gives a novel answer to the problem of educating future philosophical counsellors, and (iii) has a clear scope of potential counselees. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling is generally understood as a movement in practical philosophy that helps counselees, i.e. clients, resolve everyday problems with the help of philosophy. Moving outside of the scope of what philosophy can do, however, is a problem. More specifically, when the philosophical counsellor moves outside of the so-called realm of philosophy into the realm of psychotherapy, i.e. medical framework, problem resolution and ameliorative goals might be on the table. This plays into the hands of critics who (...) state that philosophical counselling is encroaching on the terrain of the mental health professions without, inter alia, the proper evidence of its treatment efficacy. This paper is an attempt to keep the philosophical counsellor in the realm of philosophy, and by doing this to keep them busy with philosophising as such, i.e. philosophising as an end in itself. In particular, the article focuses on a novel interpretation of how to approach the counselee’s problem so that the philosophical counsellor does not fall prey to problem resolving and ameliorative endeavours. To substantiate this novel reinterpretation to the counselee’s problem, I turn to the notions of the Pyrrhonian aporia and the Derridean perhaps, in conjunction with a crucial position exclusively available to the counselee in philosophical counselling. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling, a relatively new field in practical philosophy, offers to potentially edify the layperson’s everyday life with the help of philosophy. This lofty ideal is upheld by philosophical practitioners introducing various contemporary philosophies to its growing literature. However, many philosophical traditions beyond contemporary philosophy still somewhat suffer from an unwarranted neglect. Presently, African philosophy faces an almost complete absence in the philosophical counselling literature. It is thus a given that a prevalent lack of (...) inquiry exists regarding its use in philosophical counselling. Despite this silence, fertile grounds exist for innovative contributions to further advance the development of African philosophy in philosophical counselling. -/- In this talk, I will introduce a novel reading of African philosophy to the literature of philosophical counselling. This understanding of African philosophy is greatly inspired and influenced by the work of Tsenay Serequeberhan and Jonathan Chimakonam. More specifically, the notion of African philosophy gathered from these philosophers seek to advance the critical interpretation/hermeneutic actualised from a specific philosophical place or lifeworld through the method of conversationalism. Furthermore, the very rootedness of this notion of philosophy, stemming from a concrete lifeworld, actively problematises philosophies that reproduce a supposed and untenable value neutrality. -/- Developing this understanding of African philosophy in a philosophical counselling context, I offer an initial critique of uncritical applications of philosophies originating from distinct philosophical places under the guise of a value neutrality. In maintaining this unwarranted silence on different philosophical traditions, philosophical counsellors might promote the use of philosophies as if universally applicable. And secondly, I propose that following from this understanding of African philosophy, philosophical counselling as such can begin to foster an environment in which new concepts can be co-created. Consequently, and in conjunction with conversationalism, radically new ways of being/becoming can be explored which might hold greater contextual significance. (shrink)

In this article, I suggest that combining resources from philosophy and psychology can yield useful tools for philosophical counselling. More specifically, I argue for three theses: a) Iris Murdoch’s notion of just attention and Marshall Rosenberg’s method of non-violent communication are interestingly compatible; b) engaging in non-violent communication serves to support one’s endeavors to acquire the kind of clear vision Murdoch thinks doing well by others requires; and c) non-violent just communication would be beneficial to both counsellors and (...) counselees and thus a useful resource for philosophical counsellors. (shrink)

Contributions of Pierre Hadot pertaining to the notion of philosophy as a way of life have had a profound and enduring influence upon philosophical counselling theory and practice. Various philosophical counsellors, such as Robert Walsh and Arto Tukiainen, have embraced this imperative by living their philosophical counselling practice. Nonetheless, a prevailing trend among these practitioners lies in their exclusive reliance upon either the ancient Greek philosophical tradition as expounded by Hadot, or in their adaptation (...) of contemporary Western philosophies. Regrettably, a conspicuous omission prevails with respect to the incorporation of contemporary African philosophies, notably their philosophical praxes as a way of life/living, within the discourse of contemporary philosophical counselling. The integration of African philosophies into the discourse of philosophical counselling literature holds significant promise, particularly concerning the potential to impact ways of living within a Southern African context. Within the wider landscape of contemporary African philosophy, certain authors have already conceptualised ubuntu philosophy as a way of life/living. This talk, notwithstanding, undertakes to introduce two different African philosophies, namely, hermeneutic African philosophy and conversational philosophy. A novel interpretation of these philosophies will be advanced, positioning them as praxes for philosophical counselling. Emphasis is placed on an interpretative actualisation in response to lived experiences, contextualised within a conversational framework. The implications for philosophical counselling are threefold: firstly, the disclosing of alternative ways of life/living and being/becoming, along with the creation of new concepts; secondly, a profound accentuation of the relational dimension in philosophical counselling, underscored by the notion of collaborative philosophising that emerges from the dynamic interaction between the philosophical counsellor and the counselee; thirdly, a reworked understanding of philosophical counselling that moves beyond methodological constraints while embracing the transformative potential of reflective, creative, and critical conversations. (shrink)

I suggest that the current interest in philosophical counseling is comparable to the situation in the Sixties when many philosophy graduates entertained false hopes of nonacademic philosophical employment. I describe my own experience as a welfare worker, in the course of which my philosophical training proved useful in various ways; I maintain, though, that there was nothing especially philosophical in this. I then consider some ways in which philosophical counseling might be distinctively philosophical. I (...) conclude that philosophical training, as we know it, is in any case inadequate for philosophical counseling and would need to be supplemented by psychological and other training. (shrink)

The paper discusses the manner and extent to which Epicurean ethics can serve as a general philosophy of life, capable of supporting philosophical practice in the form of philosophical counseling. Unlike the modern age academic philosophy, the philosophical practice movement portrays the philosopher as a personal or corporate adviser, one who helps people make sense of their experiences and find optimum solutions within the context of their values and general preferences. Philosophical counseling may rest on almost (...) any school of philosophy, ranging — in the Western tradition from Platonism to the philosophy of language or logic. While any specialist school of philosophy may serve valuable purposes by elucidating specific aspects of one’s experiences and directing future action, the more ‘generalist’ the philosophy used as the basis for counseling is, the broader and more far-reaching its potential impact on the person undergoing counseling. Epicurean ethics is a prime example of a philosophy of life that is suitable for philosophical counseling today. Its closer examination reveals that, contrary to superficial opinion, it is not opposed to Stoicism and may in fact incorporate Stoicism and its antecedent virtues (including many Christian virtues) in a simple yet comprehensive practical system of directions for modern counseling. (shrink)

This article explores the potential utility of the theory of Holism as developed by South African philosopher, British Commonwealth statesman and military leader, Jan Smuts, for philosophical counselling or practice. Central to the philosophical counseling process is philosophical counsellors or practitioners applying the work of philosophers to inspire, educate and guide their counselees in dealing with life problems. For example, Logic-Based Therapy, a method of philosophical counselling developed by Elliot Cohen, provides a rational framework (...) for confronting problems of living, where the counselor helps the counselee find an uplifting philosophy that promotes a guiding virtue that acts as an antidote to unrealistic and often self-defeating conclusions derived from irrational premises. We present the argument that Holism is one such uplifting philosophy which can be of utility to philosophical counselors or practitioners to help their counselees with confronting problems of living. Furthermore, we argue that Smuts’ articulation of freedom can act as a guiding virtue within this uplifting philosophy of Holism in accordance with the methodology of LBT. Smuts’ contribution to philosophy and psychology is arguably inadequately credited, and for this reason, and to the best of our knowledge, Smuts’ theory of Holism has yet to be discussed in the context of philosophical counseling or practice. Given these omissions, we begin this article with a discussion of his influence on 20th Century Anglo-American psychology. We then provide a brief historical context, and an introduction to the central argument of Smuts’ Holism, as well as a brief overview of the origins of Smut’s Holism and an introduction to his book Holism and Evolution. In the remainder of the article, we discuss several foundational concepts that underlie Smuts’ theory of Holism, as articulated and developed in his book Holism and Evolution, to substantiate our arguments. We conclude by highlighting the limitations of our article, limitations to Smuts’ model, and the challenges inherent in the use of a now largely antiquated theory, even by Smuts’ own admission nineteen years after its publication, for the purposes of contextualizing and substantiating the arguments and recommendations presented herein. (shrink)

This article explores the utility of Nietzsche’s ethical thought for philosophical counselling. Central to the philosophical counseling process is philosophical counsellors applying the work of philosophers to inspire, educate, and guide their counselees in dealing with life problems. For example, Logic-Based Therapy (LBT), a method of philosophical counselling developed by Elliot Cohen, provides a rational framework for confronting problems of living, where the counselor helps the counselee find an uplifting philosophy that promotes a guiding (...) virtue that acts as an antidote to unrealistic and often self-defeating conclusions derived from irrational premises. I present the argument that Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, and more specifically his analysis of suffering, is one such uplifting philosophy which can be of utility to philosophical counselors to help their counselees with confronting problems of living. According to Bernard Reginster, suffering forms the bedrock of Nietzsche's life-affirming concept of the will to power. Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power radically alters our conception and significance of suffering – and that the will to power is best understood as man’s desire for the activity of overcoming resistance. Nietzsche's analysis implies that the fundamental human impulse is not to avoid suffering, but instead to will nothing less than suffering itself. To find meaning in suffering is tantamount to affirming life itself. (shrink)

In my presentation I argue for the utility of a philosophical counseling method, called logic-based therapy (LBT), in the treatment of addicted populations. In the context of addiction treatment LBT could be also classified as a philosophical psychotherapy. Philosophical psychotherapy can be understood as an umbrella term for interventions designed to treat mental health disorders, with theoretical foundations that are philosophical. Philosophical psychotherapy would be distinct from philosophical counseling, as the latter does not directly (...) treat mental health disorders. I suggest that LBT has utility beyond philosophical counseling and is a viable intervention in the treatment of certain mental health disorders, like substance use disorders. I provide a brief overview of LBT and then discuss a LBT case study with a client suffering diagnosed with a substance use disorder. In the case study the client was advised to apply the moral philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche as an uplifting philosophical framework to counteract his unproductive worldview and fallacious thinking. Considering that there is an ostensibly low efficacy rate for the treatment of addiction, articulating the value of philosophical psychotherapies in the context of addiction treatment can assist in the development of novel philosophically-based addiction treatment and recovery-oriented programs––thus expanding the treatment and recovery options available for those seeking recovery from addiction. (shrink)

After coining the term “philopsychy” to describe a “soul-loving” approach to philosophical practice, especially when it welcomes a creative synthesis of philosophy and psychology, this article identifies a system of geometrical figures (or “maps”) that can be used to stimulate reflection on various types of perspectival differences. The maps are part of the author’s previously established mapping methodology, known as the Geometry of Logic. As an illustration of how philosophy can influence the development of psychology, Immanuel Kant’s table of (...) twelve categories and Carl Jung’s theory of psychological types are shown to share a common logical structure. Just as Kant proposes four basic categories, each expressed in terms of three subordinate categories, Jung proposes four basic personality functions, each having three possible manifestations. The concluding section presents four scenarios illustrating how such maps can be used in philosophical counseling sessions to stimulate philopsychic insight. (shrink)

Ancient philosophical schools developed and discussed perspectives and practices on the emotion of anger useful in contemporary philosophical practice with clients, groups, and organizations. This paper argues the case for incorporating these insights from four main philosophical schools (Platonist, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic) sets out eight practices drawn from these schools, and discusses how these insights can be used by philosophical practitioners with clients.

Moral distress is a well-documented phenomenon in the nursing profession, and increasingly thought to be implicated in a nation-wide nursing shortage in the US. First identified by the philosopher Andrew Jameton in 1984, moral distress has also proven resistant to various attempts to prevent its occurrence or at least mitigate its effects. While this would seem to be bad news for nurses and their patients, it is potentially good news for philosophical counselors, for whom there is both socially important (...) and philosophically interesting work to be done. In an effort to encourage such work, this paper explicates the philosophical (as opposed to more purely psychological or institutional) contours of the problem. A subsequent paper, titled 'A Philosophical Counseling Approach to Moral Distress,' will highlight ways in which such a response would differ from the strategies so far deployed within the nursing profession. (shrink)

Introduction to logic-based therapy. This Socratic dialogue illustrates the techniques used by Philosophical Counselors in helping their clients work through life problems. Philosophical Counseling is based on Stoic Philosophy and practitioners assist clients to identify faulty reasoning that leads to poor behavioral choices or unwanted emotions. Dialogues such as this can serve as teaching resources for students working towards certification in Practical Philosophy or Philosophical Counseling.

Logic-Based Therapy is a proposed modality of philosophical counseling developed by philosopher Elliot D. Cohen beginning in the mid-1980s. This Socratic dialogue illustrates the techniques used by Philosophical Counselors in helping their clients work through life problems. Philosophical Counseling is based on Stoic Philosophy and practitioners assist clients to identify faulty reasoning that leads to poor behavioral choices or unwanted emotions. Dialogues such as this can serve as teaching resources for students working towards certification in Practical Philosophy (...) or Philosophical Counseling. (shrink)

This translation of an English essay that was subsequently published in the Journal of Humanities Therapy 8.2 (December 2017), pp.75-111, was published in the proceedings of the 2017 Bk21+ International Conference on Philosophical Counseling and Therapy.

In the realm of Philosophical Practice, there remains a lack of clarity surrounding the essential characteristics that define a practice as “philosophical”. This paper aims to establish seven minimal criteria that must be met by a philosophical consultancy in order to be considered genuinely “philosophical”. Additionally, it explores the question of how one can assess the quality of such a philosophical consultancy. I provide a (non-exhaustive) answer from an Aristotelian point of view, according to which (...) goodness is a matter of balance. In the context of philosophical consultancy, the consultant should find this balance in two respects: first, between their concern for the topic and their concern for the individual seeking counsel, and, secondly, between a hermeneutical and a critical attitude in dialogue. Finally, I present a visual representation of my findings that can serve as a tool for evaluating whether a consultancy is philosophical and whether it is balanced. __ En el ámbito de la práctica filosófica, sigue habiendo una falta de claridad en torno a las características esenciales que definen una práctica como "filosófica". Este artículo pretende establecer siete criterios mínimos que debe cumplir una consultoría filosófica para ser considerada genuinamente "filosófica". Además, explora la cuestión de cómo se puede evaluar la calidad de dicha consultoría filosófica. Aporto una respuesta (no exhaustiva) desde un punto de vista aristotélico, según el cual la bondad es una cuestión de equilibrio. En el contexto de la consultoría filosófica, el consultor debe encontrar este equilibrio en dos aspectos: en primer lugar, entre su preocupación por el tema y su preocupación por el individuo que busca consejo, y, en segundo lugar, entre una actitud hermenéutica y una actitud crítica en el diálogo. Por último, presento una representación visual de mis conclusiones que puede servir de herramienta para evaluar si una consultoría es filosófica y si está equilibrada. (shrink)

In Japan, from the pre-war to the post-war period, unique indigenous philosophizing cultures have been nurtured outside academism. The contemporary new philosophical practices which have been recently imported from Europe and North America are welcomed and widespread in Japan because of this indigenous traditional cultural soil cultivated by those local forerunners in the past. In this paper, the 'Life Experience Writing Movement', which was popular from the late Taisho era until the early Showa era, as well as the Science (...) of Thought journal, which was founded by Shunsuke Tsurumi and the other six coteries in 1945 and continued to be published for fifty years until 1996, are discussed. (shrink)

Central to the philosophical practice is the application of philosophers' work by philosophical practitioners to inspire, educate, and guide their clients. For example, in Logic-Based Therapy (LBT), a philosophical practice methodology developed by Elliot Cohen, philosophical practitioners help their clients to find an uplifting philosophy that promotes a guiding virtue that acts as an antidote to unrealistic and often self-defeating conclusions derived from irrational premises. In this essay, I will explore the existential ethics of Simone de (...) Beauvoir, a French existentialist philosopher, and writer. I present the argument that Beauvoir’s existential ethics, more specifically her articulation of ambiguity, can act as an uplifting philosophy, as per LBT methodology, which could be of value to philosophical practitioners to inspire, educate and guide their counselees for confronting problems of living. I will present my discussion of Beauvoir’s existential ethics in the context of ideological obsession and ideology addiction, which is often supported by the reasoning that underlies the cardinal fallacy of existential perfectionism. I will argue that Beauvoir’s existential ethics could serve as a prophylactic for ideological obsession and ideology addiction. I will also suggest that LBT may be particularly suited when addressing the self-defeating, unrealistic conclusions derived from irrational premises in practical reasoning that may fuel ideological obsession because it could provide a methodology to address irrational beliefs in a way that could mitigate the fragmentation anxiety that may arise when relinquishing maladaptive self-object organizations. (shrink)

The paper presents a method for interpreting religious texts for use in psychotherapy. In particular, the paper takes the example of the pivotal character Arjuna in Bhagavad-Gita as having low frustration tolerance and uses the collective philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gita and Bhagavata-Purana through six steps of Logic-Based Therapy to overcome it. Although the paper uses Hindu religious texts, the treatment of these texts will speak to anyone interested in the possibility of integrating religious texts into psychotherapy.

In article I explore how Logic-based Therapy (LBT) can inform a philosophically oriented recovery pathway for individuals in addiction recovery. Considering that there is an ostensibly low efficacy rate for the treatment of addiction, there is significant value in highlighting the utility of LBT for the development of novel philosophically based addiction treatment and recovery-oriented programs, which would expand the treatment and recovery options. I propose that LBT may be a suitable intervention when challenging the unrealistic conclusions derived from illogical (...) premises in practical reasoning that contribute to addiction, because it can contest irrational beliefs in a way that could mitigate the fragmentation anxiety that often arises when individuals relinquish maladaptive self-object organizations. (shrink)

En el presente artículo pretendo mostrar a través de un análisis de mi propiotrabajo práctico, que aproximaciones en el trabajo de la consultoría filosófica tan distintas como las de Ran Lahav, Oscar Brenifier y Ora Gruengard no son en realidad tan incompatibles como ellos mismos consideran que son. Para ello comentaré extractos de una sesión de consultoría filosófica mía filmada hace un tiempo atrás, indicando las coincidencias con estos filósofos, que motivaron o inspiraron algunos de los pasos que llevé a (...) cabo en esta sesión. Asimismo trataré de absolver algunas de las posibles objeciones alas comparaciones propuestas. Mi propósito entonces es mostrar en base aun ejemplo práctico, cómo las reflexiones y discusiones sobre los diferentes aspectos de la consultoría filosófica de filósofos prácticos de diferentes aproximaciones, pueden servir para enriquecer la práctica filosófica y abrir nuevas perspectivas para su desarrollo, en vez de usarse para excluirse mutuamente. In this paper I mean to show, through an analysis of my own practical work that approaches of philosophical counseling as different as those of Ran Lahav, Oscar Brenifier and Ora Gruengard are not really that incompatible as they themselves consider them to be. To show this I am going to comment a videotaped session of philosophical counseling that I made to a counselee some time ago and I will show the coincidences with these philosophers, who motivated or inspired some of the steps I took. I also will try to respond to some of the possible objections to the comparisons that I am proposing. My purpose is to show through a practical example, how the reflections and discussions of different aspects of philosophical counseling of philosophical counselors with different approaches can help to enrich philosophical practice and open up new perspectives for its development, instead of excluding each other. (shrink)

This is a book review of: Thinking Through Dialogue: Essays on Philosophy in Practice, byTrevor Curnow, 2001, Surrey, UK: Practical Philosophy Press, 251 pages.

Botticelli and Tizian depict the Annunciation in two very different ways. Botticelli portrays a kneeling angel in an act of guiding from below, while Tizian represents an angel imposing himself from above with an authoritarian forefinger. Botticelli's painting suggests an intention of orientation that is not authoritarian yet able to bring about a transformation (Umbildung). It also suggests that an individual's transformation cannot be achieved in a closed solipsistic dimension, but requires a disclosure from otherness. My theory is that at (...) the origin of ethics there is a non-authoritarian way of orientation that comes from otherness and arises from the emotional sphere thanks to a "care of desire". The expression cura sui has often been interpreted as a care confined to a private and solipsistic dimension with the aim of strengthening the self-referential subject. By "care of desire" I mean a care not turned upon itself but made possible by a disclosure coming from otherness and addressed to the transformation of the individual and of society. In the human existence, emotions reveal an extraordinary plasticity. They are not already regulated by instinct but develop and get to maturity even many years after biological birth. Moreover, this maturation process does not follow a universal process identical for everyone, being different for every individual. In fact it finds its realization in the unique order of feelings (ordo amoris) that characterizes every individual. Emotions guide actions and the way we interact with the others and with the world. In the human existence they become plastic and don't have only a homeostatic function of self-regulation. They give flexibility to our way of perceiving, of existing and of taking our position in the world. The care of desire is dedicated to the plasticity of emotions and makes ethics, i.e. a person's formation process (Bildung) and flourishing, possible. It also allows the transition from the “environmental closedness” (Umweltgeschlossenheit) to the world-openness (Weltoffenheit). To sum up, the care of desire implies the transition from a solipsistic self-care to a “care for world-openness”. From this point of view, emotion is no more the secondary result of a cognitive process, but at the origin of every formative, perceptive and cognitive process: In the beginning was the emotion. Yet in this process of creative transformation not every emotion has the same significance: at the core of emotions’ plasticity there are love and wonder (thaumàzein), whose peculiar feature is “lack of envy” (aphthonoi). (shrink)

The phenomenon of self-love elicits conflicting reactions. Some believe it is the key to happiness, while others are skeptical. This essay defines self-love as wholehearted concern for one's well-being, argues that it does not imply selfishness, arrogance, or vanity, discusses reasons to value self-love, and describes ways Logic-Based Therapy can be used to help people love themselves.

When political philosopher Hannah Arendt introduced the concept of ‘banality of evil’ she did so in reference to the actions of Germans who appropriated the doctrines of National Socialism “thoughtlessly” and without obvious intentions to do evil. But, Arendt’s description of this phenomenon entails that such banality can be found even in a democracy such as the USA. The relation of law and morality must therefore be unambiguous to defend the rule of law against the rule of men. However, a (...) legal philosophy other than positivism is essential to safeguard the Republic against the overreach of executive power. And, where the psychopathology of Donald Trump is at the core of America’s electoral discontent in 2020, as mental health professionals have argued, there is all the more reason to take Arendt’s counsel especially seriously today. It is in this context that it is argued here that the American public must beware Trump’s inducement of America’s banality of evil. (shrink)

Our culture praises—indeed revels in—the beauty of the human form. And yet, in the midst of this exuberant celebration of corporeal beauty, not even the most unreflective can be unaware of the problems that have been laid at its feet. The philosopher Kathleen Higgins notes a “pervasive impression that is widespread in our culture: that beauty, or some near kin of it, is unsavory, a temptation that might get the soul off-track” (2000, 89). In response to this suspicion, some have (...) argued that beauty is in desperate need of reform or redefinition in our time. In this essay, I attempt to analyze and evaluate this counsel. How should these claims be understood? Would we be wise to follow them? (shrink)

The Welfare-Funded Sex Doula Programme is a proposed sexual needs service that advances the sexual citizenship of disabled people by providing specially trained ‘sex doulas’ to meet the various, often complex, sexual needs of disabled people. Conceived as providing disabled individuals with practical sexual support services, the role of the sex doula includes advocacy, counselling, therapy, and practical relief from sexual tension. The programme constitutes a robust, comprehensive, and theoretically cohesive welfare service that seeks to provision access to sexual (...) citizenship for disabled people. -/- Grounded in Aristotelian concepts of flourishing, the programme identifies sexual citizenship as a fundamental basic need and seeks to ensure that disabled people have the opportunity to achieve the same level of sexuality as able-bodied people. Work advancing the programme includes both philosophical and theoretical arguments showing how the programme is justified under several moral frameworks, and claims made therein have resulted in velitation in the literature regarding the potential of such a programme to violate individuals’ negative rights. (shrink)

Many of the moral and political disputes that loom large today involve claims (1) in the register of respect and offense that are (2) linked to membership in a subordinated social group and (3) occasioned by symbolic or expressive items or acts. This essay seeks to clarify the nature, stakes, and characteristic challenges of these recurring, but often disorienting, conflicts. Drawing on a body of philosophical work elaborating the moral function of etiquette, I first argue that the claims at (...) issue implicate a communicative apparatus of the same basic kind—a system that I term the “etiquette of equality.” That regime, I suggest, can serve a kindred function of facilitating the expression of morally appropriate attitudes. I also argue, however, that the etiquette of equality exhibits three problematic features that counsel ambivalence about its mounting significance: (1) the costly overdetermination of relevant signals; (2) a recursive tendency toward inflation in respect’s demands; and (3) a related set of incentives for testing, and then affirming, a group’s status through the assertion and symbolic remediation of dignitary harm. The upshot is a better understanding of the trade-offs and predicaments we face in a vital area of public life. (shrink)

The point of psychotherapy has occasionally been associated with talk of ‘life’s meaning’. However, the literature on meaning in life written by contemporary philosophers has yet to be systematically applied to literature on the point of psychotherapy. My broad aim in this chapter is to indicate some plausible ways to merge these two tracks of material that have run in parallel up to now. More specifically, my hunch is that the connection between meaning as philosophers understand it and therapy as (...) psychotherapists ought to practice it is much closer than is suggested by the field of existential psychotherapy, which expressly addresses the topic of life’s meaning and appeals to ideas from classic philosophers such Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and the like. I instead proffer the claim that psychodynamic and humanistic therapy, clinical psychology, and counselling psychology as such, not a particular branch of them, are best understood as enterprises in search of meaning in life, in the way many present-day philosophers understand this phrase. In this chapter, I spell out what I mean by this bold hypothesis and provide some good reason to take it seriously. (shrink)

More than a century before Anscombe counseled us to jettison concepts such as that of the moral ought, or moral law, Schopenhauer mounted a vigorous attack on such prescriptive moral concepts, particularly as found in Kant. In this chapter I consider the four objections that constitute this attack. According to the first, Kant begs the question by merely assuming that ethics has a prescriptive or legislative-imperative form, when a purely descriptive-explanatory conception such as Schopenhauer’s also presents itself as a possibility. (...) According to the second, Kant’s purportedly philosophical ethics is in fact a theological ethics in disguise, because the moral ought and its prescriptive cousins presuppose a divine lawgiver. According to the third, Kant’s conceptions of the moral law as a law of freedom, and of moral imperatives as categorical or unconditioned, involve him in contradictions. Finally, Schopenhauer objects that there can be no such thing as a moral ought because a binding ought or law must be understood to operate through appeals to self-interest, which stands in opposition to morality. I contend that these last three objections are sound and that the fourth in particular succeeds in confuting the prescriptivist conception of morality. (shrink)

This text highlights not only how highly Charles S. Peirce esteems philosophical study, but also the close connection between philosophy and science, something he always emphasized. For Peirce, as for medieval scholars, philosophy —even metaphysics— should be pursued with a scientific attitude. I believe following his counsel here is essential to thinking about how philosophy should be taught today. -/- My exposition is divided into four sections: 1) A brief presentation of Peirce, focusing on his work as a professional (...) scientist and a scientific philosopher; 2) Peirce considered as an educational philosopher; 3) Some practical suggestions I have drawn from Peirce's ideas and from my experience teaching philosophy today; and finally, 4) A brief conclusion. (shrink)

The present book, “Essays on Positive Philosophy” is an anthology of revised papers presented in several places. I am thankful to the organizers of the seminars who gave me an opportunity to share my ideas on their platform. The first paper “Philosophy and Values in Public Affairs: An Appraisal” presented in National Seminar on Philosophy in Practice: Making Sense of Human Existence organized by Society for Philosophical Praxis Counselling and Spiritual Healing held on 23rd Feb, 2014 at Department (...) of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. This paper discusses the nature of philosophy and different values and their use in public affairs. Second paper “Higher Education and Research in India: An Overview” presented in 28th National Conference of Council for Teacher Education on the theme “Emerging Perspectives in Indian Teacher Education: Search for Identity and Building Humane Society” held on November 1-2, 2014 organized by CTE (HSC) at Kurukshetra which discuss status of higher education and research. The last paper, “The Role of Religious and Spiritual Values in Shaping Humanity (A Study of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Religious Philosophy) in 3rd International Dharma-Dhamma Conference on Harmony of Religions: Welfare of Humankind, held on 24-26 October, 2015 at Indore (MP). This paper is related to the religious philosophy of Dr. B.R.Ambedkar. Since philosophy, education and religion are highly inter-related subjects, you can find my views about them in my these papers. Hope this short volume will help us to understand some basics of these subjects. (shrink)