Undeniably, the greatest way for a Moslem to be closer to Allah, is recitation of Holy-Quran approves with the method conveyed from Messenger of Allah Mohammed from the feature of speech points of letters and the intrinsic and fleeting characteristics of the letters, So, there is a persistent need to teach all Moslems the science of Tajweed Al-Quran. ITS (Intelligent Tutoring System) is computer software that supplies direct and tailored training or response to students without human teacher interfering. The main (...) target of ITS is smoothing the learning process using the wide-ranging facilities of computer. The proposed system will be implemented using the ITSB Authoring tool. In this thesis, the researcher presents an intelligent tutoring system for teaching Reciting Al-Quran "Tajweed" with Rewaya: Hafs from ‘Aasem by the way of Shatebiyyah. It was a novel idea that the researcher combined the science of Tajweed Al-Quran and the science of artificial intelligence in his thesis. The researcher arranged the material into chapters, lessons, examples then, added all these to the proposed system. He also added questions, right answers and the level of difficulty for each lesson. He prepared an exam for each chapter and a final exam to test the knowledge of the learner in the whole material. The system was evaluated by teachers and students in reciting science and the outcome of the assessment was encouraging and promising. (shrink)

Knowledge is correct and reliable when its foundation is correct, but humans never have the correct beliefs and methodology. Thus, knowledge is unreliable and the foundation of knowledge needs to be reconstructed. A pure rationalist only believes in logic. Thus, all matter and experience must be propositions derived from logic. The logically necessary consequence of this belief is truth; logically possible consequences are phenomena, and logically impossible consequence are fallacies and evils. This paper introduces belief and its logical consequences, such (...) as discovering first knowledge, both logically and illogically, establishing logical methodology, deducing truths purely through logic, and discovering unprovable truths by imitating the Universe. Logic and illogic are undeniable beliefs, and the reality of the Universe is the ultimate cause of everything. (shrink)

Caricature undeniably excels at mocking people and their foibles. But is this mode of depiction limited to human beings? Can animals, objects, or even abstract concepts be caricatured? The first goal of this paper is to trace the limits of the caricaturable and see how far they extend beyond the human figure. The second goal is to understand how the wondrous modification enacted by caricature works. To do so, I analyze the features that caricature selects, and argue that such features (...) have a relational nature—they are instantiated by the depicted subject but their sense hinges on implicit norms. I then outline the deep structure of reference exploited by caricature for depicting. Finally, I use this account to unravel the paradox of caricature: how can a picture both misrepresent its subject and prompt an accurate recognition? I defend the controversial claim that caricature per se does not amount to misrepresentation. (shrink)

We undeniably live in an information age—as, indeed, did those who lived before us. After all, as the cultural historian Robert Darnton pointed out: ‘every age was an age of information, each in its own way’ (Darnton 2000: 1). Darnton was referring to the news media, but his insight surely also applies to the sciences. The practices of acquiring, storing, labeling, organizing, retrieving, mobilizing, and integrating data about the natural world has always been an enabling aspect of scientific work. Natural (...) history and its descendant discipline of biological taxonomy are prime examples of sciences dedicated to creating and managing systems of ordering data. In some sense, the idea of biological taxonomy as an information science is commonplace. Perhaps it is because of its self-evidence that the information science perspective on taxonomy has not been a major theme in the history and philosophy of science. The botanist Vernon Heywood once pointed out that historians of biology, in their ‘preoccupation with the development of the sciences of botany and zoology… [have] diverted attention from the role of taxonomy as an information science’ (Heywood 1985: 11). More specifically, he argued that historians had failed to appreciate how principles and practices that can be traced to Linnaeus constituted ‘a change in the nature of taxonomy from a local or limited folk communication system and later a codified folk taxonomy to a formal system of information science [that] marked a watershed in the history of biology’ (ibid.). A similar observation could be made about twentieth-century philosophy of biology, which mostly skipped over practical and epistemic questions about information management in taxonomy. The taxonomic themes that featured in the emerging philosophy of biology literature in the second half of the twentieth century were predominantly metaphysical in orientation. This is illustrated by what has become known as the ‘essentialism story’: an account about the essentialist nature of pre- Darwinian taxonomy that used to be accepted by many historians and philosophers, and which stimulated efforts to document and interpret shifts in the metaphysical understanding of species and (natural) classification (Richards 2010; Winsor 2003; Wilkins 2009). Although contemporary debates in the philosophy of taxonomy have moved on, much discussion continues to focus on conceptual and metaphysical issues surrounding the nature of species and the principles of classification. Discussions centring on whether species are individuals, classes, or kinds have sprung up as predictably as perennials. Raucous debates have arisen even with the aim of accommodating the diversity of views: is monism, pluralism, or eliminativism about the species category the best position to take? In addition to these, our disciplines continue to interrogate what is the nature of these different approaches to classification: are they representational or inferential roles of different approaches to classification (evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics, phylogenetic systematics)? While there is still much to learn from these discussions—in which we both actively participate—our aim with this topical collection has been to seek different entrypoints and address underexposed themes in the history and philosophy of taxonomy. We believe that approaching taxonomy as an information science prompts new questions and can open up new philosophical vistas worth exploring. A twenty-first century information science turn in the history and philosophy of taxonomy is already underway. In scientific practice and in daily life it is hard to escape the imaginaries of Big Data and the constant threats of being ‘flooded with data’. In the life sciences, these developments are often associated with the socalled bioinformatics crisis that can hopefully be contained by a new, interdisciplinary breed of bioinformaticians. These new concepts, narratives, and developments surrounding the centrality of data and information systems in the biological and biomedical sciences have raised important philosophical questions about their challenges and implications. But historical perspectives are just as necessary to judge what makes our information age different from those that preceded us. Indeed, as the British zoologist Charles Godfray has often pointed out, the piles of data that are being generated in contemporary systematic biology have led to a second bioinformatics crisis, the first being the one that confronted Linnaeus in the mid-18th century (Godfray 2007). Although our aim is to clear a path for new discussions of taxonomy from an information science-informed point of view, we continue where others in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science have already trod. We believe that an appreciation of biological taxonomy as an information science raises many questions about the philosophical, theoretical, material, and practical aspects of the use and revision of biological nomenclatures in different local and global communities of scientists and citizen scientists. In particular, conceiving of taxonomy as an information science directs attention to the temporalities of managing an accumulating data about classified entities that are themselves subject to revision, to the means by which revision is accomplished, and to the semantic, material, and collaborative contexts that mediate the execution of revisions. (shrink)

Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.

There is an undeniable tendency to dismiss women’s sexual assault allegations out of hand. However, this tendency is not monolithic—allegations that black men have raped white women are often met with deadly seriousness. I argue that contemporary rape culture is characterized by the interplay between rape myths that minimize rape, and myths that catastrophize rape. Together, these two sets of rape myths distort the epistemic resources that people use when assessing rape allegations. These distortions result in the unjust exoneration of (...) people we cannot conceive of as monstrous, while making it too easy to believe that some marginalized people could be rapists. I also argue that rape myths enable a novel kind of epistemic injustice. This injustice concerns how our assessments of trustworthiness and our assessments of plausibility interact. I argue that rape myths can result in runaway credibility deflations that can explain both why people fail to believe most women, and also why people may unjustly believe false allegations that white women have been raped by black men. (shrink)

It is undeniable that artificial intelligence technology helps humans in many fields but it is necessary to consider the risk of unprofessional use. Today, in the healthcare system, the use of artificial intelligence is widely diffused and in the future probably it will increase. Literature reports the accurancy of the various artificial intelligence tools like chatbots in some medical fields. This article aims to verify some relevant literature about this field and to test one famous provider of artificial intelligence Chatbots: (...) Based on the results of this test some crucial considerations are submitted to the researcher. A rigorous evaluation of the benefits and risks must be considered at this level of technology and today available. (shrink)

Two major clarifications have greatly abetted the understanding and fruitful expansion of the theory of natural selection in recent years: the acknowledgment that interactors, not replicators, constitute the causal unit of selection; and the recognition that interactors are Darwinian individuals, and that such individuals exist with potency at several levels of organization (genes, organisms, demes, and species in particular), thus engendering a rich hierarchical theory of selection in contrast with Darwin’s own emphasis on the organismic level. But a piece of (...) the argument has been missing, and individuals at levels distinct from organisms have been denied potency (although granted existence within the undeniable logic of the theory), because they do not achieve individuality with the same devices used by organisms and therefore seem weak by comparison. We show here that different features define Darwinian individuality across scales of size and time. In particular, species-individuals may develop few emergent features as direct adaptations. The interactor approach works with emergent fitnesses, not with emergent features; and species, as a consequence of their different mechanism for achieving individuality (reproductive exclusivity among subparts, that is, among organisms), express many effects from other levels. Organisms, by contrast, suppress upwardly cascading effects, because the organismic style of individuality (by functional integration of subparts) does not permit much competition or differential reproduction of parts from within. Species do not suppress the operation of lower levels; such effects therefore become available as exaptations conferring emergent fitness—a primary source of the different strength that species achieve as effective Darwinian individuals in evolution. (shrink)

A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous. These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some phenomenon is disunified and its accompanying term is ambiguous. The tests have been used to evaluate disunification proposals about causation, pain, and knowledge, among others. -/- These ambiguity tests, however, have come under fire. It has been alleged that the tests fail for polysemy, a common type of ambiguity, and one that (...) is at issue in philosophically interesting cases. Furthermore, the objection that the tests fail for polysemy is often taken to be an undeniable bit of linguistic data. -/- We argue that this is mistaken. The objection implicitly relies on controversial assumptions about how to account for copredicational sentences, in which a single argument is ascribed prima facie incompatible properties. Furthermore, on several viable theories of copredication, the objection fails. However, our discussion also reveals that even if ambiguity tests are preserved, they may be significantly harder to execute than previously thought. (shrink)

It is undeniable that human beings seek happiness and have difficulty finding it. This is not a new phenomenon: ever since ancient times man has wondered about what happiness is, where it lies and how to achieve it. For the Greeks, a people of deep pessimism, the search for happiness (eudaimonia) was a traditional theme of philosophy and it was precisely in Greece where Epicurus ́ (341-270 BC) doctrine of happiness emerged. A cursed and manipulated author (just like his admirer (...) Nietzsche), Epicurus has probably been the thinker who has most lucidly approached the question of eudaimonia. Its doctrine seeks and promises its followers happiness through pleasure (hedoné), self-sufficiency (autarky), friendship (philía) and mental calm (ataraxia), offering itself as medicine against the pain of flesh and the sufferings of the mind. But Epicurean hedonism, which harmonizes well with the ancient Apollonian maxim that wisdom consists of moderation and the knowledge of limits, is totally removed from both the tyranny of the happycracy and from the noxious culture of unrestrained and vacuous desire of contemporary postmodernity. This is precisely why Epicurus's timeless proposal for authentic happiness deserves to be known for everyone: for constituting an effective therapy against the ills that afflict the nihilistic human being of the neoliberal era. (shrink)

It seems undeniable that some cultures encourage individuals to act in ways that harm others, and/or to believe that there is nothing wrong when another acts in a way that harms them. And when this is the case it also seems undeniable that it would be better if the scope for such cultures to guide individuals' decision-making were minimized or even eliminated. From these observations a number of people have inferred that groups which exhibit bad cultures ought not to be (...) permitted to hold or exercise group rights. Susan Okin's liberal feminist critique of multiculturalism is one of the most interesting and persuasive examples of this type of argument. In this paper I take a closer look at Okin's critique and ask whether it actually does give one reason to be skeptical about group rights. I conclude that it does not. For although the worries which animate Okin's critique are good ones to have, it is a mistake to think that they are about group rights. Moreover, insofar as Okin's concerns are well motivated they are not actually worries about morally problematic cultures but rather worries about groups' internal political and social structures. These worries should not be equated. Ultimately (I argue) it is not only misleading but counterproductive to focus on the viciousness of a group's culture as a potential reason for disqualifying it from holding or exercising rights. (shrink)

It is undeniable Poincaré was a very famous and influential scientist. So, possibly because of it, it was relatively easy for him to participate in the heated discussions of the foundations of mathematics in the early 20th century. We can say it was “easy” because he didn't get involved in this subject by writing great treatises, or entire books about his own philosophy of mathematics (as other authors from the same period did). Poincaré contributed to the philosophy of mathematics by (...) writing short essays and letters. (shrink)

There are a bewildering variety of claims connecting Darwin to nineteenth-century philosophy of science—including to Herschel, Whewell, Lyell, German Romanticism, Comte, and others. I argue here that Herschel’s influence on Darwin is undeniable. The form of this influence, however, is often misunderstood. Darwin was not merely taking the concept of “analogy” from Herschel, nor was he combining such an analogy with a consilience as argued for by Whewell. On the contrary, Darwin’s Origin is written in precisely the manner that one (...) would expect were Darwin attempting to model his work on the precepts found in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on Natural Science. While Hodge has worked out a careful interpretation of both Darwin and Herschel, drawing similar conclusions, his interpretation misreads Herschel’s use of the vera causa principle and the verification of hypotheses. The new reading that I present here resolves this trouble, combining Hodge’s careful treatment of the structure of the Origin with a more cautious understanding of Herschel’s philosophy of science. This interpretation lets us understand why Darwin laid out the Origin in the way that he did and also why Herschel so strongly disagreed, including in Herschel’s heretofore unanalyzed marginalia in his copy of Darwin’s book. (shrink)

This chapter investigates how a reading of Wittgenstein along the lines laid out by Cora Diamond makes room for a novel approach to ethical truth. Following Diamond, I develop the connection between the kinds of elucidatory propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain the shape of our theoretical thinking, such as “‘someone’ is not the name of someone” and “five plus seven equals twelve,” and the kind of propositions by means of which we spell out and maintain (...) the shape of ethical thinking, such as “slavery is unjust.” As Diamond points out in connection with the last example, this is a proposition that we take to be an undeniable truth; for anyone who would attempt to negate it would become unintelligible to us. In this sense this ethical truth spells out the limits of ethical thinking. And yet what counts as coherent thought about such matters tends to shift over time. Indeed the great difficulty of overcoming ethical disagreements has to do with the fact that what is at stake in them is not just the content, but the form and limits of thought. Nonetheless, Diamond proposes that ethical propositions may count as genuine truths. For this to make sense, a middle path between realism and relativism must be found. In order to show how this is possible, and in order to defend Diamond’s view, I propose to approach ethical truth by means of a disjunctivist strategy. On this approach, while we, just as much as our interlocutor, may at times be misled in our ethical thinking, and while we may at times fail to shape our ethical thought in ways that prevent us from gaining clarity on ethical matters, this does not detract from the fact that we may at times be right, and that we may then genuinely possess ethical truth. (shrink)

Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...) to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture. Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. (Allen Wood, 1988). (shrink)

Selon l'interprétation traditionnelle de la révolution coperni­cienne, le géocentrisme est un anthropocentrisme et l'héliocen­trisme, un anthro­­popériphérisme. C'est cette double assimila­tion que cet article entend remettre en question. En effet, le géocentrisme peut être appréhendé comme un théocentrisme, un héliocentrisme, un diablo­centrisme et un anthropofinalisme, mais il n'en reste pas moins, indubitablement, un anthropopéri­phérisme. Le seul «anthropocentra­lisme» qui lui appartienne est un anthropoconceptualisme qui, hors de toute perspective valo­risante, n'est qu'une incapacité à se dé­centrer. Quant à l'hélio­centrisme proprement dit, s'il s'oppose (...) à l'anthropofinalisme des Anciens et à ce qu'il croit être leur anthropo­centralisme, il ne dégénère pas pour autant en un anthropo­péri­phérisme, car, d'une part, il est davantage préoccupé par la centration du So­leil que par la décentration de la Terre et, d'autre part, il par­vient même à s'accom­moder de perspectives franchement anthro­pocentriques. ––– According to the traditional interpretation of the Copernican revolution, the old geocentric system was anthropocentric and the new heliocentric system anthropoperipheric. The double assimilation is what this article wants to call into question. Although a geocentric system can be seen to be theocentric, a heliocentric system can be interpreted as being diabolocentric and anthropofinalist, but also undeniably anthropoperipheric. The only way a heliocentric system can be seen as anthropo­centric is as being anthropoconceptualist. Far from honouring man, this demonstrates an incapacity to see things from a point of view other than man's own. Although a heliocentric system is opposed to the ancient anthropofinality and what was seen as anthropocentrality, it is not necessarily anthropoperipheric. This is firstly because the new system was far more preoccupied with the new centrality of the sun than with the new position of the earth, and secondly because the new system managed to incorporate many aspects of anthropocentrality in her new vision. (shrink)

Fitness plays many roles throughout evolutionary theory, from a measure of populations in the wild to a central element in abstract theoretical presentations of natural selection. It has thus been the subject of an extensive philosophical literature, which has primarily centered on the way to understand the relationship between fitness values and reproductive outcomes. If fitness is a probabilistic or statistical quantity, how is it to be defined in general theoretical contexts? How can it be measured? Can a single conceptual (...) model for fitness be offered that applies in all biological cases, or must fitness measures be case-specific? Philosophers have explored these questions over the last several decades, largely in the context of an influential definition of fitness proposed in the late 1970s: the propensity interpretation. This interpretation as first described undeniably suffers from significant difficulties, and debate regarding the tenability of amendments and alternatives to it remains unsettled. (shrink)

The connection between science and mathematics is often considered necessary and insoluble. Therefore, a relationship between mathematics and humanities or arts is deemed exceptional or sometimes unnatural. Nevertheless, on the basis of historical, ontological and epistemological researches it can be noted that it’s impossible to warrant the immediate identification between mathematics and sciences on a deeper level than the practical one. Given the instrumentality and then the unnecessity of this connection, the relationship between mathematics and not-scientific disciplines is undeniable, even (...) if the mathematics in the explicit formalisms which we know doesn’t appear in them. It’s possible to demonstrate this relationship not only with philosophical argumentations, but also whit empirical verifications, e.g. in the music and in particular in the music of J. S. Bach. Such an epistemological thought finally leads to the question on the possibility of knowledge in the art in comparison to the epistemological characteristics of the Galilean and Post-Galilean science. (shrink)

Hydranencephaly is a developmental malady, where the cerebral hemispheres of the brain are reduced partly or entirely too membranous sacs filled with cerebrospinal fluid. Infants with this malady are presumed to have reduced life expectancy with a survival of weeks to few years and which solely depends on care and fostering of these individuals. During their life span these individuals demonstrate behaviours that are termed “vegetative” by neuroscientists but can be comparable to the state of being “aware” or “conscious”. Based (...) on the most simplified definition for consciousness i.e. “awareness” or “to be aware”, these individuals are undeniably aware of their existence and therefore should be termed “conscious”. The bigoted approach of neuroscience towards understanding consciousness is usually linked with the cortex of the brain and therefore a malady as hydranencephaly poses a great challenge to this field. This paper is a compilation of behaviours and aptitudes observed in several cases of hydranencephaly which suggests, that consciousness is not just a brain process, but is a highly quantum computed process that follows laws of quantum physics, giving rise to the subjective experience of consciousness in these individuals. (shrink)

Despite of the undeniable advantages and surprising applications of them in training and industry as well as cultures of different countries, there have been many ethical issues concerning intelligent and computer systems. Presenting a definition of artificial intelligence and intelligent systems, the research paper deals with the shared ethical issues of intelligent systems, computer systems as well as the global network; and then it concentrates on the most important ethical issues of two types of intelligent systems, i.e. data-analysis system and (...) expert system. (shrink)

This paper argues for a distinctive concept of "infopolitics" as a theoretical tool for understanding how new regimes of data are exerting increasing political control of our lives. It seems almost undeniable today that there is a politics at stake in such ubiquitous features of our society as social media interaction, electioneering (and election hacking) through those interactions, cell phone addiction, personal information monetization, the lack of security in personal data markets, and massively-scaled state surveillance. Yet, even if the fact (...) of the politics of these domains is now in view, what is insufficiently understood is how such a politics functions. What characterizes the politics of all of this data that is driving so much of our lives? To put the question in the terms afforded us by the political philosophy of Michel Foucault: what is the modality of power expressed in our contemporary politics of information? In response to these questions, this paper argues that the modality of "infopower" operates on us through the formats of data. (shrink)

The link between human nature and human flourishing is undeniable. "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). The ontology of the human person will, therefore, ground the nature of human flourishing and thereby sanctification. Spiritual formation is the area of Christian theology that studies sanctification, the Spirit-guided process whereby disciples of Jesus are formed into the image of Jesus (Rom. 8:28-29; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Peter 3:18). Until the nineteenth century, (...) there was an overwhelming consensus among Christian thinkers that some form of mind-body (or soul-body) dualism is true of human beings. Recently, that consensus has eroded, and with it the availability of a shared body of knowledge about spiritual formation. Some Christian physicalists argue that dualism is incompatible with central elements of spiritual formation. Neuroscientist Warren Brown and psychologist Brad Strawn offer the only substantive account of spiritual formation from the view of Christian physicalism and its accompanying objections to dualism. It is on their arguments that this chapter focuses. We argue that Brown and Strawn fail to support their incompatibility thesis. Additionally, we argue that Christian physicalism stands in tension with important philosophical and theological foundations of Christian spiritual formation. In doing so we offer a specific form of dualism, the bodily soul view, and explain how this view illuminates the importance of embodiment, our neurological and social development, and hence the important physical aspects of Christian spiritual formation. (shrink)

Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth-directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the rationality of beliefs. This approach has (...) undeniable attractions. But examining different versions of the approach uncovers problems. The problems help reveal why epistemic rationality is an indispensable part of understanding rationality—not only of beliefs, but of actions. We may or may not end up wanting to make a place, in our theories of epistemic rationality, for factors such as the practical or moral consequences of having beliefs. But a purely pragmatic notion of rationality—one that’s stripped of any component of distinctively epistemic evaluation—cannot do all the work that we need done. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the genealogy and transmission of moral duty in Western ethics. We begin with an uncontroversial account of the Stoic notion of the kathēkon, and then examine the pivotal moment of Cicero’s translation of it into Latin as ‘officium’. We take a deflationary view of the impact of Cicero’s translation and conclude that his translation does not mark a departure from the Stoic ideal. We find further confirmation of our deflationary position in the development of the (...) notion of ‘duty’ in Germany between the 16th and 18th centuries. We examine Pufendorf’s critique of ancient eudaimonism and his appropriation of officium, and claim that it foreshadows Kant’s rejection of Garve’s Ciceronian ethics. We demonstrate the undeniable parallels between Kant’s Groundwork and Garve’s influential translation of Cicero’s De Officiis, thereby indicating a novel way in which we should understand Cicero’s contribution to the development of modern moral philosophy. (shrink)

The importance of John Locke's discussion of persons is undeniable. Locke never explicitly tells us whether he thinks persons are substances or modes, however. We are thus left in the dark about a fundamental aspect of Locke's view. Many commentators have recently claimed that Lockean persons are modes. In this paper I swim against the current tide in the secondary literature and argue that Lockean persons are substances. Specifically I argue that what Locke says about substance, power, and agency commits (...) him to the claim that persons are substances. I consider the passages mode interpreters cite and show why these passages do not imply that Lockean persons are modes. I also respond to two objections anyone who thinks Lockean persons are substances must address. I show that a substance reading of Locke on persons can be sympathetic and viable. I contend that with a clearer understanding of the ontological status of Lockean persons we can gain a firmer grasp of what Locke's picture of persons looks like. Finally, once we are armed with a better understanding of Locke on substance, mode, and personhood, we can pave the way toward a more nuanced description of the early modern debate over personal identity. (shrink)

Hegel's lord-bondsman dialectic has been of especially great interest to progressive and radical Hegelians—broadly speaking, politically left-leaning interpreters of Hegel who object to certain social hierarchies and demand their abolition. They read Hegel as giving an account of how ‘lordship’ over others is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying social formation, even for its supposed beneficiaries. Marxists, feminists and post-colonial theorists have all found inspiration in Hegel's analysis of the lord and bondsman by applying it to concrete relations of oppression, such (...) as capitalism, patriarchy, or racism. In contrast, recent scholarship on Hegel's views on race and colonialism has cast doubt on whether his systematic political philosophy and philosophy of history can be of similar use to progressives. Hegel was undeniably a Eurocentric thinker, but philosophers like Robert Bernasconi and Alison Stone have convincingly shown that he was also a racist and a defender of colonialism. Crucially, however, few of the scholars who write on Hegel's pro-colonialism have analysed this feature of Hegel's thought in connection with the lord-bondsman dialectic. In this article, I argue for two connected theses. First, I argue that contrary to the hopes of some progressive defenders of Hegel, we cannot easily separate the lord-bondsman dialectic from Hegel's pro-colonialism. This is because Hegel himself appealed to the lord-bondsman dialectic to argue that colonial slavery educated its victims, and could therefore be temporarily justified. Second, I argue that this pro-colonial reading of the dialectic, though largely ignored by contemporary interpreters, was in fact recognized and embraced by a group of Hegelians in North America known as the St Louis Hegelians. They used the lord-bondsman dialectic as a basis for a qualified defence of pre-Civil War American slavery. (shrink)

Sport poses a number of important and no less significant questions, which, on the face of it, may not necessarily seem very important or significant to begin with – a peculiarity that we believe to be integral to sport itself. This article introduces, explores and outlines the psychoanalytic significance of this peculiarity. It explores how the emotions stirred by sport are intertwined with a realm of fiction and fantasy. Despite its lack of practical utility, sport carries an undeniable gravity, encapsulating (...) the aspirations of communities, nations and continents. As a result, psychoanalysis can be used to critically reflect on the purpose and meaning of sport: that is, why do we need sport, and why, for large sections of the world’s population, do we rely on it? Ultimately, while psychoanalysis maintains a unique relation to a variety of unexpected fields of study – including art, culture and neuroscience – we seek to add to this expanding list of inquiry by including sport in this critical domain. By utilising sport as a platform to elucidate psychoanalytic concepts, it is recognised that sport can also prompt questions for psychoanalysis. In so doing, theoretical discussions on the social, cultural and political dimensions of sport through psychoanalytic theory are introduced and applied. (shrink)

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was one of the main exponents of evolutionary thinking in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century. He gave that kind of thinking an unprecedented metaphysical turn. In consequence of his versatility he also encountered the notion of truth-making, which he connected with his ever-present concerns about time and duration. Eager to stress the dimension of radical change and of novelty in the nature of things, he rejected (in one form) what he called “the retrograde movement of (...) the true” while championing it – with undeniable delight in the air of paradox – in a derivative form. In the paper I explain what “the retrograde movement of the true” consists in – in its two forms. (shrink)

Does morality have a procedure? Unlike law, morality is arguably neither posited nor institutional. Thus, while morality undeniably prescribes various procedures, that morality itself has a procedure is less obvious. Indeed, the coexistence of procedural moral norms alongside substantive moral norms might seem paradoxical, given that they often yield contradictory prescriptions. After all, one may wonder, is morality not substantive all the way down? Nevertheless, the paper argues that morality has a “procedural branch” containing numerous norms that are themselves procedural. (...) These norms comprise what we hold are the three hallmarks of a procedural norm: second-orderness, providing reasons on how to engage with other norms, and outcome-neutrality. In this respect, morality is more like law than what one might have expected. (shrink)

Responding to the provocative phrase ‘The Age of Grammatology’, I propose to question the notion of ‘age’, and to interrogate the powers or forces, the dynameis or dynasties attached to the interpretative model of historical periodisation. How may we think the undeniable actuality of the event beyond the sempiternal history of ages, and beyond the traditional, onto-teleological chain of power, possibility, force or dynamis that undergirds such history?

The encounter of the medieval Muslims with Greek philosophy undeniably shaped the course of their philosophical and theological thought. This encounter led to the complex and contentious issue of ‘philosophy versus theology’. Medieval Muslim thinkers needed to develop a response to the issue of philosophy versus theology. The present article will first highlight the response of the Islamic theologians to their encounter with Greek philosophy in the form of three major trends in medieval Islamic theology: (1) strong opposition to the (...) application of reason and rationalist approach to Islamic doctrines, and strict adherence to the actual text of the Qur’an and the Hadith, (2) the adoption of Greek philosophy, and the application of reason and rationalist approach to explain and defend Islamic religion and (3) acknowledging the significance of reason in exploring the matters related to the natural world but, at the same time, stressing the subordination of reason to revelation. This article will discuss Atharism, Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism as the representatives of the first, second and third trends, respectively. The response of the medieval Islamic theologians to the issue of philosophy versus theology serves as a context in which medieval Muslim philosophers carried out their philosophy–theology debate. The article will proceed to show that some medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Abu Bakr Al-Razi, subordinated religion or revelation to philosophy or reason. Other medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Al-Ghazali, subordinated philosophy to theology. The third group of medieval Islamic philosophers represented by Alfarabi argued for the reconciliation and harmonious co-existence of philosophy and religion. Contribution: This article highlights the response of medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers to the issue of philosophy versus theology that was caused by their encounter with Greek philosophy. (shrink)

Slavery in Ancient Greece, Absolutist Monarchy in pre-modern Europe, and the European conquest of the New World strike us, from our contemporary perspective, as injustices on a massive scale. But given the impact of these large-scale historical activities on the particular course taken by Western history, they almost undeniably played an important role in the evolution of modern liberalism. Bernard Williams suggests a startling claim—that liberal universalists cannot condemn past injustices, because those injustices were necessary conditions of the development of (...) the modern liberalism that they affirm. This paper examines this possible objection to liberal universalists who greatly value their liberal way of life, paying particular attention to the lamentable necessities thesis: the claim that modern liberalism would not have come into existence but for the occurrence of past injustices. It motivates the lamentable necessities thesis, and argues that those who accept it, and greatly value modern liberalism, are precluded from regretting all-things-considered certain past injustices. Finally, it makes the case that liberal universalists who greatly value modern liberalism may condemn past injustices necessary to its emergence, even if they are unable to regret them in the relevant sense. (shrink)

In the creation of maps, scientific knowledge related to mathematics and physics combines with knowledge specific to graphic or artistic disciplines. Since all maps are artifacts whose aesthetic qualities convey information that simultaneously engages the fields of ontology, epistemology, and politics, they are objects of undeniable interest for philosophical inquiry. This introduction to the 5th issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts reviews the latest literature and key topics surrounding the relationship between philosophy, cartography (...) and mapmaking. (shrink)

I. Introduction Siris, Berkeley's last major work, is undeniably a rather odd book. It could hardly be otherwise, given Berkeley's aims in writing it, which are three-fold: 'to communicate to the public the salutary virtues of tar-water,'1 to provide scientific background supporting the efficacy of tar-water as a medicine, and to lead the mind of the reader, via gradual steps, toward contemplation of God.2 The latter two aims shape Berkeley's extensive use of contemporary natural science in Siris. In particular, Berkeley's (...) focus on what he calls fire (or aether or light) as a quasiuniversal 'cause' of natural change3 serves these purposes, for the 'activity' of the aether, in his view, can both explain the miraculous virtues of a certain medicine, i.e. tar-water, and reveal God's action and his divine order.4 Berkeley's corpuscular speculations, including his use of fire-theory, are not especially idiosyncratic as natural philosophy. In his theorizing, as Jessop and other have noted, he is heavily indebted to the work of Hermann Boerhaave, the Dutch chemist, botanist, and physician whose teachings were highly influential in mid-eighteenth century Britain.5 Boerhaave, along with other Dutch natural philosophers cited by Berkeley, assigned a central role in accounting for physio-chemical activity to fire, a subtle, insensible particulate substance, sometimes identified with light. (shrink)

There is an undeniable link between overpopulation and climate change. Overpopulation is dangerous in its own right, and the facts about the current state of affairs are truly terrifying, yet heavily overlooked and underreported. Overpopulation has led to—and continues to accelerate—deforestation. The scale of deforestation is also overlooked and heavily underreported, as is the critical role of forests in ecosystems, including their influence on healthy rain patterns. Changes in rain patterns are among the most dangerous consequences of climate change, which (...) will lead to shortages of drinking water in the foreseeable future all over the world. This, too, will be caused by deforestation, as the facts confirm. This article will explain how deforestation has caused shifts in humidity, directly contributing to the severity and frequency of droughts and floods. Additionally, changes in relative humidity are responsible for higher temperatures and the shrinking of glaciers and polar ice caps. These water reservoirs are diminishing not only because they are melting but also because they are drying out—all as a consequence of altered humidity. This shift in humidity has led to a seemingly absurd paradox: on one hand, the air is becoming drier; on the other hand, the total amount of water in the atmosphere is increasing. Scientists have been ignoring the causes and consequences of this paradox for many years. All of this has been directly influenced by deforestation, which, in turn, has been driven by the growing number of humans on this planet. We have far exceeded sustainable population levels. Another problem that exacerbates all issues related to climate change is human intervention in the climate through various weather engineering methods, often referred to as geoengineering. These methods include cloud seeding, CO2 capture, and others. They all worsen the situation, and humans fail to realize this, largely because we have ignored the enormous role of humidity levels in our ecosystems—particularly their impact on rain patterns. All of this is a consequence of deforestation. The solutions to climate problems lie in afforestation and global depopulation. These measures are relatively easier and faster to implement. Unfortunately, for them to succeed, humankind must first acknowledge these issues as the real causes of climate change and act swiftly, especially since deforestation continues unabated. We are in danger of having wasted time meant to save our planet by barking up the wrong tree—CO2 emissions. We are losing essential time. We cannot afford to be a society that "doesn’t look up!" The facts in this article are undeniable. The problem is deforestation, which is caused by overpopulation. Let the facts speak! (shrink)

The goal of the article is to explore what is the most probable type of simulation in which humanity lives (if any) and how this affects simulation termination risks. We firstly explore the question of what kind of simulation in which humanity is most likely located based on pure theoretical reasoning. We suggest a new patch to the classical simulation argument, showing that we are likely simulated not by our own descendants, but by alien civilizations. Based on this, we provide (...) classification of different possible simulations and we find that simpler, less expensive and one-person-centered simulations, resurrectional simulations, or simulations of the first artificial general intelligence’s (AGI’s) origin (singularity simulations) should dominate. Also, simulations which simulate the 21st century and global catastrophic risks are probable. We then explore whether the simulation could collapse or be terminated. Most simulations must be terminated after they model the singularity or after they model a global catastrophe before the singularity. Undeniably observed glitches, but not philosophical speculations could result in simulation termination. The simulation could collapse if it is overwhelmed by glitches. The Doomsday Argument in simulations implies termination soon. We conclude that all types of the most probable simulations except resurrectional simulations are prone to termination risks in a relatively short time frame of hundreds of years or less from now. (shrink)

Modern life sciences research is increasingly relying on artificial intelligence (AI) approaches to model biological systems, primarily centered around the use of machine learning (ML) models. Although ML is undeniably useful for identifying patterns in large, complex data sets, its widespread application in biological sciences represents a significant deviation from traditional methods of scientific inquiry. As such, the interplay between these models and scientific understanding in biology is a topic with important implications for the future of scientific research, yet it (...) is a subject that has received little attention. Here, we draw from an epistemological toolkit to contextualize recent applications of ML in biological sciences under modern philosophical theories of understanding, identifying general principles that can guide the design and application of ML systems to model biological phenomena and advance scientific knowledge. We propose that conceptions of scientific understanding as information compression, qualitative intelligibility, and dependency relation modelling provide a useful framework for interpreting ML-mediated understanding of biological systems. Through a detailed analysis of two key application areas of ML in modern biological research – protein structure prediction and single cell RNA-sequencing – we explore how these features have thus far enabled ML systems to advance scientific understanding of their target phenomena, how they may guide the development of future ML models, and the key obstacles that remain in preventing ML from achieving its potential as a tool for biological discovery. Consideration of the epistemological features of ML applications in biology will improve the prospects of these methods to solve important problems and advance scientific understanding of living systems. (shrink)

As much as we may currently accept the Absolute as being Substance, to an equal degree we must now understand it as being Subject. Just as Spinoza shocked the age in which he taught that the Absolute was Substance, so too Hegel comes to shock our modern age with the Truth that Reality is Subject or Personality. "...alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondern eben so sehr als Subjekt aufzufassen und auszudrucken." "...everything turns on comprehending and expresssing the (...) Absolute Truth, not only as Substance but just as certainly as Subject." GWF Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit Personality is an undeniable element of Reality, as each of us affirms by our own existence. That personality should be the fundamental and irreducible nature of Reality as a whole as much as in part is rationally justifiable since the part may not have any greater quality than that of the whole to which it belongs. On the other hand, the concept that Reality is merely Substance is incomplete and therefore leaves us perplexed. (shrink)

This article derives from a project attempting to show that Western formal logic, from Aristotle onward, has both been partially constituted by, and partially constitutive of, what has become known as racism. In the present article, I will first discuss, in light of Frege’s honorary role as founder of the philosophy of mathematics, Reuben Hersh’s What is Mathematics, Really? Second, I will explore how the infamous section of Frege’s 1924 diary (specifically the entries from March 10 to April 9) supports (...) Hersh's claim regarding the link between political conservatism and the (historically and currently) dominant school of the philosophy of mathematics (to which Frege undeniably belongs). Third, I will examine Frege’s attempt at a more reader-friendly introduction to his philosophy of mathematics, The Foundations of Arithmetic. And finally, I will briefly analyze Frege’s Begriffsschrift to see how questions of race arise even at the heights of his logical abstraction. (shrink)

PREFACE WORD -/- Hilmi Ziya Ülken was born in Istanbul during the last period of the Ottoman Empire, was educated during this period and worked in many areas of the intellectual life of the newly established Republic. Although he was interested in many fields of social sciences, he gained fame in philosophy, sociology, history of thought and literature. Again, he undertook important tasks in revealing and introducing medieval Islamic thinkers and post-Tanzimat Turkish thought, and due to his deep knowledge of (...) Eastern and Western philosophies, he made comparative studies in these fields and tried to reveal the similarities and differences in both cultures. Many graduate studies, book chapters and articles have been written about such an important thinker whose works are also recognized abroad. Among the thinkers of the Republican Era, Ülken is one of the most studied names. In this study, Ülken's biography, his intellectual adventure, his understanding of philosophy and his ideas about the life of thought are discussed panoramically, and the bibliographic information obtained about his articles and other works that have not yet been fully revealed has been added to the study. Another important document added to this study is Ülken's biography written in his own handwriting. Our hope is that with the completion of the information missing in this study, a complete portrait of Ülken will be revealed. When Ülken's works are taken into consideration, it is understood that he wrote works in many fields of social sciences. The fact that he did not concentrate on a certain field but worked in many fields has been a frequently criticized aspect of him. In this sense, we think that the phrase "A Thinker of Mütebahhir", which we wrote as a subtitle to the title of our study, defines him very well. Many names have used the adjective mütebahhir, which means ocean and depth in Ottoman Turkish, about Ülken. While Necati Öner used it in a positive sense, names such as Cemil Meriç (1916-1987) and İsmail Tunalı (1923-2015) used it in a sense that includes negative connotations, such as saying words in every field, his knowledge is unlimited but formless and non-systematic, and Salâh Birsel (1919-1999) wrote on every subject. On the other hand, scholars such as Kurtuluş Kayalı and Ali Utku, who have recently conducted competent studies on Ülken, have emphasized that Ülken - contrary to popular belief - thought and worked within a system and was very sensitive about his system of thought. When Ülken's works are examined in general, it is seen that many of them were formed by turning lecture notes into books, and this situation caused many problems. This situation led to problems such as the disorganization of his works, the lack of a certain systematization, the lack of the necessary methodological sensitivity in footnotes and citations, and the use of some terms in their original language instead of their Turkish equivalents. When we look at the life stories of important thinkers in the history of thought, we observe that they were not only influenced by the social, political, economic, etc. conditions of the period in which they lived, but also that they influenced these conditions in the period in which they lived. The best example of this situation among the thinkers of the early years of the Republic is Ülken. When his works are examined in chronological order, it is noticeable that his ideas constantly changed, that he had to defend the ideas he criticized from time to time, and that he was in a constant search. He explained his works in many fields by saying that he wrote works that would be a source for his own works and that he served as a bridge to the past. The fact that he was a doyen in many fields of social sciences despite having a Mülkiye education can be explained by his self-education. Ülken, who set an example for academics and thinkers with his hard work, diligence, and lifestyle of constantly reading, researching and writing, carried out very important works in his 73 years of life. As Öner, a student of his who knew him closely, says: "In his daily life, Ülken was either reading, writing or philosophizing." Again, Tunalı says about his diligence that "when he was finishing a book, he would have written another book!" It can be said that one of Ülken's efforts was to establish a tradition of sociology and philosophy in Turkey by recognizing the disconnect in our world of thought. Ülken expressed this to his student Necati Öner by saying, "We are a quarter in philosophy, you will be half, and then we will be complete!" While the influence of philosophers and sociologists who came to our country with the educational reforms was quite limited, Ülken succeeded in establishing a tradition in Istanbul Sociology and Ankara Theology. For this reason, important sociologists and philosophers of our country, such as Baykan Sezer (1938-2002) and Kurtuluş Kayalı (born 1949), admitted that "we are students of the Ülken tradition" even though they were not his direct students. Ülken provided an important opening in the social sciences with his methodology that analyzed the problems he dealt with in depth, tried to deal with all aspects of the issues and made synthesis attempts between different ideas. In addition, with the newly established Republic, he made great efforts to collect and translate sources in many fields, especially philosophy, and to carry out activities on a philosophical basis. The fact that his works continued to attract attention in every period after him and were reprinted and read again and again reveals the centrality of his role in the intellectual life of the Republican period. In this study, in which the life, philosophy and thoughts of Hilmi Ziya Ülken, whose valuable contributions to Turkish-Islamic thought are undeniable, have been tried to be presented in general terms, the articles and book chapters I have written about Ülken in various journals and book chapters and whose titles I have given in the bibliography and bibliography section have also been utilized. I hope that this monographic study will make a small contribution to the studies on Ülken, who deserves to be remembered with mercy and gratitude. -/- . (shrink)

From the school yard to the workplace, there’s no charge more damning than “you’re being unfair!” Born out of democracy and raised in open markets, fairness has become our de facto modern creed. The very symbol of American ethics—Lady Justice—wears a blindfold as she weighs the law on her impartial scale. In our zealous pursuit of fairness, we have banished our urges to like one person more than another, one thing over another, hiding them away as dirty secrets of our (...) humanity. In Against Fairness, polymath philosopher Stephen T. Asma drags them triumphantly back into the light. Through playful, witty, but always serious arguments and examples, he vindicates our unspoken and undeniable instinct to favor, making the case that we would all be better off if we showed our unfair tendencies a little more kindness—indeed, if we favored favoritism. Conscious of the egalitarian feathers his argument is sure to ruffle, Asma makes his point by synthesizing a startling array of scientific findings, historical philosophies, cultural practices, analytic arguments, and a variety of personal and literary narratives to give a remarkably nuanced and thorough understanding of how fairness and favoritism fit within our moral architecture. Examining everything from the survival-enhancing biochemistry that makes our mothers love us to the motivating properties of our “affective community,” he not only shows how we favor but the reasons we should. Drawing on thinkers from Confucius to Tocqueville to Nietzsche, he reveals how we have confused fairness with more noble traits, like compassion and open-mindedness. He dismantles a number of seemingly egalitarian pursuits, from classwide Valentine’s Day cards to civil rights, to reveal the envy that lies at their hearts, going on to prove that we can still be kind to strangers, have no prejudice, and fight for equal opportunity at the same time we reserve the best of what we can offer for those dearest to us. Fed up with the blue-ribbons-for-all absurdity of "fairness" today, and wary of the psychological paralysis it creates, Asma resets our moral compass with favoritism as its lodestar, providing a strikingly new and remarkably positive way to think through all our actions, big and small. (shrink)

Ignorance as the Root Cause of All Human and Societal Problems -/- Throughout history, humanity has struggled with a wide range of issues, from poverty and war to corruption and environmental destruction. While these problems may seem complex and varied, they all share a common root cause: ignorance. Ignorance, defined as a lack of knowledge, awareness, or understanding, is the fundamental source of poor decision-making, social injustice, and systemic failures. It is the invisible force that allows harmful ideologies to persist, (...) enables exploitation by those in power, and prevents societies from achieving sustainable progress. Unless ignorance is addressed through a holistic educational approach, humanity will continue to suffer from the same recurring problems. -/- The Consequences of Ignorance -/- 1. Poor Decision-Making and Its Societal Impact -/- Ignorance leads individuals and leaders to make uninformed or irrational decisions. When people lack knowledge about critical subjects—such as economics, science, health, or governance—they are more likely to make choices that harm themselves and others. For instance, ignoring the scientific evidence behind climate change has resulted in environmental destruction, worsening natural disasters, and resource scarcity. Similarly, uninformed political decisions can lead to economic crises, social unrest, and ineffective policies that fail to address the real needs of the people. -/- 2. Manipulation and Exploitation of the Masses -/- A population that is unaware of its rights and the mechanisms of power is easily manipulated by politicians, corporations, and religious institutions. Ignorance allows corruption to thrive, as people may be unaware of the deceitful tactics used by leaders who prioritize personal gain over public welfare. For example, authoritarian regimes often exploit the ignorance of their citizens by spreading propaganda, suppressing dissent, and maintaining a false sense of national progress. Without critical thinking skills, people fall victim to misinformation, fake news, and ideological manipulation. -/- 3. Religious and Ideological Conflicts -/- History is filled with wars and conflicts rooted in religious and ideological ignorance. When individuals blindly follow dogma without questioning its validity or understanding different perspectives, intolerance and discrimination arise. Religious extremism, racial discrimination, and cultural biases are often fueled by a lack of knowledge about diversity and human unity. Ignorance fosters division among people, making it difficult to achieve peace and cooperation in society. -/- 4. Resistance to Change and Innovation -/- Ignorance creates fear of the unknown, leading societies to resist progress. Scientific discoveries and technological advancements often face opposition because people do not understand them or perceive them as threats to tradition. For example, when the printing press was invented, religious authorities opposed it because it allowed the spread of knowledge that challenged established doctrines. Today, the same resistance can be seen in debates over artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and other innovations that could improve human life but are hindered by fear and misinformation. -/- 5. Social Injustice and Discrimination -/- Ignorance perpetuates social inequalities, as people fail to recognize systemic injustices and their own biases. Racism, sexism, and class discrimination are all products of misunderstanding and misinformation. When people are unaware of the historical and social structures that create inequality, they are less likely to support policies that promote fairness and human rights. Education plays a crucial role in breaking down prejudices and fostering a more just society. -/- 6. Economic Inequality and Poverty -/- Many people remain trapped in poverty due to a lack of financial education and economic literacy. Ignorance about personal finance, investment, and economic systems prevents individuals from making informed decisions that could improve their lives. On a larger scale, nations with poorly educated populations struggle to develop sustainable economies, as corruption, mismanagement, and short-term thinking hinder progress. When citizens understand economic principles, they can demand better governance and policies that promote prosperity for all. -/- 7. Health Crises and Misinformation -/- A lack of knowledge about health and medicine leads to preventable diseases and unnecessary deaths. The COVID-19 pandemic, for example, highlighted how misinformation about vaccines and treatments contributed to the spread of the virus. Ignorance about basic hygiene, nutrition, and medical science continues to be a major problem in many parts of the world. Proper education can empower individuals to take control of their health and make informed decisions that benefit society as a whole. -/- 8. Environmental Destruction -/- Ignorance about ecological balance and sustainability has led to reckless exploitation of natural resources, deforestation, pollution, and climate change. Many people do not understand the long-term consequences of their actions on the environment, resulting in irreversible damage to ecosystems. A well-informed society would prioritize sustainable living and conservation efforts to ensure the survival of future generations. -/- The Solution: A Holistic Educational System -/- To address ignorance at its root, a holistic educational system must be implemented. This system should emphasize: -/- ✅ Critical Thinking and Scientific Literacy – Teaching individuals to analyze information, recognize misinformation, and make rational decisions. ✅ The Universal Law of Balance in Nature – Educating people about how all systems must maintain equilibrium to function effectively, reducing ignorance-driven societal imbalances. ✅ Ethical Decision-Making and Governance – Training future leaders to prioritize balance and sustainability over greed and short-term gains. ✅ Artificial Intelligence and Technology Awareness – Preparing society for technological advancements to prevent exploitation and misuse. ✅ Cultural and Religious Compatibility – Ensuring that education respects religious beliefs while promoting rational and evidence-based thinking. -/- Conclusion -/- Ignorance is the invisible force that fuels human suffering, injustice, and societal collapse. Whether it manifests in poor decision-making, manipulation, resistance to progress, or environmental destruction, its consequences are undeniable. However, ignorance is not an unsolvable problem—it can be eradicated through proper education. A holistic educational system that integrates critical thinking, scientific literacy, and the universal law of balance in nature can empower individuals to make informed choices and build a more just, intelligent, and sustainable society. By addressing ignorance at its core, humanity can finally break free from the cycle of suffering and progress toward a future of true enlightenment and balance. -/- . (shrink)

Hasker’s “social” Trinity theory is subject to considerable philosophical problems. More importantly, the theory clashes with the clear New Testament teaching that the one God just is the Father alone. Further, in light of five undeniable facts about the New Testament texts, we can know that the authors of the New Testament thought that the only God was just the Father himself, not the Trinity. Hasker can neither deny these facts nor defeat the strong evidence they provide that in affirming (...) a triune God in the late 4th century, catholic tradition departed from apostolic teaching about the one God. (shrink)

In the Prolegomena to De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Hugo Grotius expounds his theory of natural law by way of reply to a skeptical challenge from the Greek Academic Carneades. Though this dialectical context is undeniably important for understanding Grotian natural law, commentators disagree about the substance of Carneades’s challenge. This paper aims to give a definitive reading of Carneades’s skeptical argument, and, by reconstructing Grotius’s reply, to settle some longstanding debates about Grotius’s conception of natural law. I argue that (...) Grotius held a Stoic view of natural law, endorsing both the doctrine of eudaimonism and the claim that moral obligations are natural, not grounded in divine command. Consequently, Grotius’s view of natural law has more continuity with pre-modern, indeed ancient, morality than is usually supposed. However, I argue that we can still understand Grotius as a founder of modern moral philosophy. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of the evident scientific method of Galen, which establishes the necessity of correct diagnosis of diseases, determination of true symptoms and causes of diseases, which results in the choice of the exact method of treatment. The article focuses on how Galen seeks to achieve reliable knowledge based on an undeniable logical necessity. Logical reliability is contrasted with “dialectical”, that is, probabilistic judgments, often leading to the opposite of what was originally asserted in them. (...) Probabilistic judgments were characteristic of the Stoic philosophical school, with which Galen hotly argues, asserting his understanding of truth. Truth, in his opinion, is achieved through facts based on true premises. The criterion of truth for Galen is the study of the device of a living organism, and the logical conclusions depend on the accuracy of knowledge of human anatomy. Thus, the nature of the proof judgments of Galen depends on their practical content and not on the formal and logical structure offered by the Stoics when studying the functions of the human body, which ultimately leads to incorrect methods of treatment. (shrink)

This research was carried out in order to verify by simulation Mendel’s laws and seek for the clarification, from the author’s point of view, the Mendel-Fisher controversy. It was demonstrated from: the experimental procedure and the first two steps of the Hardy-Weinberg law, that the null hypothesis in such experiments is absolutely and undeniably true. Consequently, repeating hybridizing experiments as those showed by Mendel, it makes sense to expect a highly coincidence between the observed and the expected cell frequencies. By (...) simulation, 30 random samples were generated with size equal to the number of observations reported by Mendel for his single trait trial, in this case, seed shape; assuming complete dominance, with genes A and a; likewise, it was simulated the results for the experiment with two traits, segregating in separate chromosomes, in this case seed shape, as before, and albumen color, with genes B and b, both loci with complete dominance. In the case of a single trait, the data only showed evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis (Ho ) in 1/30 samples, with (P<0.05). In the case of the 30 samples of the two traits experiment, (Ho ) was rejected only on 3/30 times, when it was set a = 0.05. In both simulations there was a high correspondence between the observed and expected cell frequencies, which is simply due to the fact that (Ho ) is true, and under these conditions, that is what would to expect. It was concluded, that Mendel had no reason to manipulate his data in order to make them to coincide with his beliefs. Therefore, in experiment with a single trait, and in experiments with two traits assuming complete dominance, segregation ratios are 3:1; and 9:3:3:1, respectively. Consequently, Mendel’s laws, under the conditions as were described are absolutely valid and universal. (shrink)

Owing to the nearly tangible result in the quest toward inclusive development in Africa, there has been the clamour that perhaps the Social Sciences, charged with the responsibility of providing solace for the menace are no longer adequate. This is the axiomatic basis upon which this essay builds its argument as it aims to blaze a trail that is usually taken for granted in the discourse on development – pedagogy. Hence, via the methods of comparison and analysis, this essay discloses (...) the nexus between John Dewey’s reconstructionism and Julius Nyerere’s educational model of self-reliance as a basis to structure development from the arena of education. For Dewey, through education, society can develop and reform its purposes and can move in different directions. For Nyerere, education for self-reliance has to foster communal goals of living together and working together for the common good. Both Dewey and Nyerere stated that education should make the individual realize that he is a member of the society and learn to participate in social learning. A critical examination of the ideas of these minds reveals that in the face of the discrepancies or differences motivations between their educational philosophies, the aggregate factor is suggestive of a worthy platform upon which a self-reliant education that will usher in the era of social development may be erected. This study admits the undeniable Western presence and the indigenous approach which makes it to initiate a blend of them. The parenthood can serve as a platform that will nurture minds that will consequently inform national development, also ideology plays a very crucial role. The present educational system of contemporary Africa has waned consequent to the circumvention of proper assessment of knowledge. The educational framework is therefore the onus and recommendation of this intellectual inquiry. (shrink)

Filipino's love for the elderly is undeniable. However, despite the respect they have for the elderly, an increasing amount of elderly abandonment is rising in the Philippines. The drastic increase in statistics of abandonment will still grow over the years because aging is inevitable. The primary goal of this study is to dig deeper into the experiences, challenges, and coping mechanisms of abandoned senior citizens inside of a home for the aged to spread awareness about this certain topic. By the (...) use of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, the study come up with the following findings: (1) The abandoned senior citizens chose to be inside the facility because they don't want to be a burden in their original homes. (2) Faith and religious works affect their psychological well-being. (3) Physical appearance does not affect their self-esteem. (4) Social support boosts their psychological well-being as well. (5) One of the biggest reasons why abandoned senior citizens left their homes is being neglected to cause them to leave and stay in home for the aged (6) Lastly, people inside the facilities accepted the fact that death is drawing closer to them but they don't want to die yet. (shrink)

We offer a sceptical examination of a thesis recently advanced in a monograph published by Princeton University Press, entitled Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia. In this dense and probing work, Christopher I. Beckwith, a professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, argues that Pyrrho of Elis adopted a form of early Buddhism during his years in Bactria and Gandhāra, and that early Pyrrhonism must be understood as a sect of early Buddhism. In making (...) his case Beckwith claims that virtually all scholars of Greek, Indian, and Chinese philosophy have been operating under flawed assumptions and with flawed methodologies, and so have failed to notice obvious and undeniable correspondences between the philosophical views of the Buddha and of Pyrrho. In this study we take Beckwith’s proposal and challenge seriously, and we examine his textual basis and techniques of translation, his methods of examining passages, his construal of problems and his reconstruction of arguments. We find that his presuppositions are contentious and doubtful, his own methods are extremely flawed, and that he draws unreasonable conclusions. Although the result of our study is almost entirely negative, we think it illustrates some important general points about the methodology of comparative philosophy. (shrink)

According to certain theories, acquiring knowledge of God does not necessarily depend on philosophical evidence, and a believer is not obligated to rely on philosophical arguments from natural theology to justify their religious convictions. However, it is undeniable that philosophical arguments supporting the existence of God and theodicies possess significant epistemic value. This raises the question: what is the epistemic significance of the intellectual products derived from natural theology if they are not essential for attaining knowledge of God? Drawing upon (...) of distinction between knowledge and understanding as separate epistemic goods, I argue that it is reasonable to assert that arguments for theism and theodicies contribute to religious understanding rather than directly providing knowledge of God. Finally, I enumerate several theoretical advantages that this proposal would offer to the field of religious epistemology. (shrink)