Results for 'W. V. Quine'

949 found
Order:
  1. W.V. Quine, Immanuel Kant Lectures, translated and introduced by H.G. Callaway.H. G. Callaway & W. V. Quine (eds.) - 2003 - Frommann-Holzboog.
    This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Soft Impeachment Disowned.W. V. Quine - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):450-451.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  3. Theories and things.W. V. Quine (ed.) - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Things and Their Place in Theories Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   309 citations  
  4. (2 other versions)Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Willard van Orman Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   519 citations  
  5. Review of W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning without Analyticity). [REVIEW]H. G. Callaway - 1991 - Dialectica, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1991, Pp. 317-22 45 (No. 4):317-322.
    Quine's aim in this slim book is to "update, sum up and clarify variously intersecting views on cognitive meaning, objective referencce, and the grounds of knowledge." Only nine pages had previously appeared as the book came to print. It is based largely on unpublished lectures and informal discussions of the past ten years back to the Immanuel Kant Lectures given at Stanford in 1980. It does not, then duplicate Leonelli's Italian translation of the Kant lectures, La Scienza E I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Vexed adults? Simone de Beauvoir’s “One is not born a woman” and W.V. Quine.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This is a one page handout outlining an interpretation of Simone de Beauvoir which draws heavily upon material from the analytic tradition of philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. A Critical Reflection on W.V.O. Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology.Abraham Tsehay Jemberie - 2019 - International Journal of Research and Analytical Review (IJRAR) 6 (2):39-43.
    W. V. O. Quine is the prominent advocate of naturalized epistemology, a collection of philosophical views that employ scientific methods, results, and practices to solve epistemological problems. In this paper, I explore whether Quine’s argument to replace epistemology by science is convincing. In naturalized epistemology, Quine totally rejects the normative aspect of epistemology; he focuses on the descriptive part of epistemology. Other thinkers such as Kim, Stroud, Almedir, Rorty argues that epistemology without norm is epistemology in name (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. W.V.O. Quine,“From Stimulus to Science”. [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 1996 - Metascience 5 (1):209-213.
    "From Stimulus to Science" crystallises one of America's most celebrated philosophers' thinking of a lifetime on naturalised epistemology. This slim volume grew out of Quine's Ferrarer Mora Lectures of 1990 at the Universitat de Girona in Catalonia. Its overarching theme can fairly be described as rational reconstruction of the passage to mature, predictive scientific theory from “...the mere impacts of rays and particles on our surfaces and a few odds and ends such as the strain of walking uphill” (p. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Logical Truth / Logička istina (Bosnian translation by Nijaz Ibrulj).Nijaz Ibrulj & Willard Van Orman Quine - 2018 - Sophos 1 (11):115-128.
    Translated from: W.V.O.Quine, W. H. O. (1986): Philosophy of Logic. Second Edition. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 47-61.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Notes on the Theory of Reference / Bilješke o teoriji referencije (Bosnian translation by Nijaz Ibrulj).Nijaz Ibrulj & Willard Van Orman Quine - 2019 - Sophos 1 (12):189-195.
    The text is translated from W.V.O.Quine: From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press. Second Edition, 1980. pp. 130-139.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Things and their Place in Theories / Stvari i njihovo mjesto u teorijama ( Bosnian translation by Nijaz Ibrulj).Nijaz Ibrulj & Willard Van Orman Quine - 2019 - Sophos 1 (12):197-216.
    The text is translated from the book W.V.O.Quine: Theories and Things. Second printing, 1982. pp. 1-24.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Distinguishing WV Quine and Donald Davidson.James Pearson - 2011 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (1):1-22.
    Given W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s extensive agreement about much of the philosophy of language and mind, and the obvious methodological parallels between Quine’s radical translation and Davidson’s radical interpretation, many—including Quine and Davidson—are puzzled by their occasional disagreements. I argue for the importance of attending to these disagreements, not just because doing so deepens our understanding of these influential thinkers, but because they are in fact the shadows thrown from two distinct conceptions of philosophical inquiry: (...)’s “naturalism” and what I call Davidson’s “humanism.” The clash between Quine and Davidson thus provides valuable insight into the history of analytic naturalism and its malcontents. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. The Cognitive Gap, Neural Darwinism & Linguistic Dualism —Russell, Husserl, Heidegger & Quine.Hermann G. W. Burchard - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):244-264.
    Guided by key insights of the four great philosophers mentioned in the title, here, in review of and expanding on our earlier work (Burchard, 2005, 2011), we present an exposition of the role played by language, & in the broader sense, λογοζ, the Logos, in how the CNS, the brain, is running the human being. Evolution by neural Darwinism has been forcing the linguistic nature of mind, enabling it to overcome & exploit the cognitive gap between an animal and its (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Comprometido, mas não casado, com solteiros: Explodindo o critério de compromisso ontológico de Quine.Deiver Melo - 2023 - In Vinícius Felipe Posselt, Taís Regina Chiodelli, Claiton Costa, Eduardo Alves, Kelvin Amorim de Melo, Leonardo Teixeira Pereira & Messias Miguel Uaissone (eds.), XXIII Semana Acadêmica PPG Filosofia PUCRS. Fundação Fênix. pp. 197-212.
    W. V. Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment is commonly presented as the slogan: “to be is to be the value of a variable”. More specifically, to be is to be in the domain of values of a bound variable attached to a existential quantifier in the body of a theory. If a sentence of our best available theory quantifies over bachelors, so we conclude that, according to it, there are bachelors. Simplicity and the use of logical apparatus for determining (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Willard Van Orman Quine's Philosophical Development in the 1930s and 1940s.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2018 - In Willard Van Orman Quine, Walter Carnielli, Frederique Janssen-Lauret & William Pickering (eds.), The Significance of the New Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    As analytic philosophy is becoming increasingly aware of and interested in its own history, the study of that field is broadening to include, not just its earliest beginnings, but also the mid-twentieth century. One of the towering figures of this epoch is W.V. Quine (1908-2000), champion of naturalism in philosophy of science, pioneer of mathematical logic, trying to unite an austerely physicalist theory of the world with the truths of mathematics, psychology, and linguistics. Quine's posthumous papers, notes, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. (1 other version)Fifty Years of Quine's "Two Dogmas".Hans-Johann Glock, Kathrin Glüer & Geert Keil (eds.) - 2003 - Rodopi.
    W. V. Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", first published in 1951, is one of the most influential articles in the history of analytic philosophy. It does not just question central semantic and epistemological views of logical positivism and early analytic philosophy, it also marks a momentous challenge to the ideas that conceptual analysis is a main task of philosophy and that philosophy is an a priori discipline which differs in principle from the empirical sciences. These ideas dominated early analytic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  75
    The Need for Merely Possible People.Johan Gustafsson - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 28 (2):230-241.
    W. V. Quine wished to restrict the interests that matter to those of actual people. Actual-Population Utilitarianism is a version of utilitarianism where, following Quine, only the interests of actual people matter. It is well known that ethical theories of this kind, which depend on what is actual, typically lead to normative variance. In this paper, I put forward a new objection to Actual-Population Utilitarianism. I present a case in which Actual-Population Utilitarianism prescribes choices that are worse for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Sign and Object : Quine’s forgotten book project.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5039-5060.
    W. V. Quine’s first philosophical monograph, Word and Object, is widely recognized as one of the most influential books of twentieth century philosophy. Notes, letters, and draft manuscripts at the Quine Archives, however, reveal that Quine was already working on a philosophical book in the early 1940s; a project entitled Sign and Object. In this paper, I examine these and other unpublished documents and show that Sign and Object sheds new light on the evolution of Quine’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  19. Quine’s conflicts with truth deflationism.Teemu Tauriainen - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (46):1-25.
    Compared to the extensive amount of literature on various themes of W.V.O. Quine’s philosophy, his immanent concept of truth remains a relatively unexplored topic. This relative lack of research contributes to a persistent confusion on the deflationary and inflationary details of Quine’s truth. According to a popular reading, Quine’s disquotational definition of the truth predicate exhausts the content of truth, thus amounting to a deflationary view. Others promote opposing interpretations. I argue that by relying on Tarski’s semantic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. Quine's Monism and Modal Eliminativism in the Realm of Supervenience.Atilla Akalın - 2019 - International Journal of Social Humanities Sciences Research (JSHRS) 6 (34):795-800.
    This study asserts that W.V.O. Quine’s eliminative philosophical gaze into mereological composition affects inevitably his interpretations of composition theories of ontology. To investigate Quine’s property monism from the account of modal eliminativism, I applied to his solution for the paradoxes of de re modalities’ . Because of its vital role to figure out how dispositions are encountered by Quine, it was significantly noted that the realm of de re modalities doesn’t include contingent and impossible inferences about things. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21. Quine's relativism.Lars Bergström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):286-298.
    Keywords: W.V.Quine claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):317-342.
    W. V. Quine is arguably the intellectual father of contemporary naturalism, the idea that there is no distinctively philosophical perspective on reality. Yet, even though Quine has always been a science-minded philosopher, he did not adopt a fully naturalistic perspective until the early 1950s. In this paper, I reconstruct the genesis of Quine’s ideas on the relation between science and philosophy. Scrutinizing his unpublished papers and notebooks, I examine Quine’s development in the first decades of his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  23. (1 other version)Quine, Ontology, and Physicalism.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2019 - In Robert Sinclair (ed.), Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 181-204.
    Quine's views on ontology and naturalism are well-known but rarely considered in tandem. According to my interpretation the connection between them is vital. I read Quine as a global epistemic structuralist. Quine thought we only ever know objects qua solutions to puzzles about significant intersections in observations. Objects are always accessed descriptively, via their roles in our best theory. Quine's Kant lectures contain an early version of epistemic structuralism with uncharacteristic remarks about the mental. Here (...) embraces mitigated anomalous monism, allowing introspection and the availability in principle of full physical descriptions of the perceptual states which get science off the ground. Later versions abandon these ideas. My epistemic-structural interpretation explains why. I argue first-personal introspective access to mental states is incompatible with global epistemic structuralism. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Understanding Quine in Terms of the Aufbau: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology.Stefanie Rocknak - 2010 - In Marcin Młlkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
    I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Carnap on Analyticity and Existence: A Clarification, Defense, and Development of Quine’s Reading of Carnap’s Views on Ontology.Gary Ebbs - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):1-31.
    Does Carnap’s treatment of philosophical questions about existence, such as “Are there numbers?” and “Are there physical objects?”, depend on his analytic–synthetic distinction? If so, in what way? I answer these questions by clarifying, defending, and developing the reading of Carnap’s paper “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” that W. V. Quine proposes, with little justification or explanation, in his paper “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology”. The primary methodological value of studying Quine’s reading of “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” is that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Quine's Physicalism.H. G. Callaway & Paul Gochet - 2007 - In H. G. Callaway & Paul Gochet (eds.), Filosofia, Scienza e Bioetica nel dibattito contemperano, Studi internazionali in onore di Evandro Agazzi, pp. 1105-1115.
    In this paper we briefly examine and evaluate Quine’s physicalism. On the supposition, in accordance with Quine’s views, that there can be no change of any sort without a physical change, we argue that this point leaves plenty of room to understand and accept a limited autonomy of the special sciences and of other domains of disciplinary and common-sense inquiry and discourse. The argument depends on distinguishing specific, detailed programs of reduction from the general Quinean strategy of reduction (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Duhem–Quine virtue epistemology.Abrol Fairweather - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):673-692.
    The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  28. Quine, Putnam, and the ‘Quine–Putnam’ Indispensability Argument.David Liggins - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
    Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine's argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  29. In Defense of Wishful Thinking: James, Quine, Emotions, and the Web of Belief.Alexander Klein - 2017 - In Sarin Marchetti & Maria Baghramian (eds.), Pragmatism and the European Traditions: Encounters with Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology Before the Great Divide. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 228-250.
    What is W. V. O. Quine’s relationship to classical pragmatism? Although he resists the comparison to William James in particular, commentators have seen an affinity between his “web of belief” model of theory confirmation and James’s claim that our beliefs form a “stock” that faces new experience as a corporate body. I argue that the similarity is only superficial. James thinks our web of beliefs should be responsive not just to perceptual but also to emotional experiences in some cases; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Quine’s Meaning Nihilism: Revisiting Naturalism and Confirmation Method.Sanjit Chakraborty (ed.) - 2017
    The paper concentrates on an appreciation of W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and ‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indeterminacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. The Behaviorisms of Skinner and Quine: Genesis, Development, and Mutual Influence.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (4):707-730.
    in april 1933, two bright young Ph.D.s were elected to the Harvard Society of Fellows: the psychologist B. F. Skinner and the philosopher/logician W. V. Quine. Both men would become among the most influential scholars of their time; Skinner leads the "Top 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century," whereas philosophers have selected Quine as the most important Anglophone philosopher after the Second World War.1 At the height of their fame, Skinner and Quine became "Edgar Pierce (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  32. (1 other version)The Esoteric Quine?H. G. Callaway - 2003 - In H. G. Callaway & W. V. Quine (eds.), W.V. Quine, Immanuel Kant Lectures, translated and introduced by H.G. Callaway. Frommann-Holzboog.
    This is the Introduction to my translation of Quine's Kant Lectures. Part of my interpretation is that an "esoteric doctrine" in involved in Quine's distinctive semantic claims: his skepticism of the credulity of non-expert evaluation of discourse and theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Lewis and Quine in context.Sander Verhaegh - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-8.
    Robert Sinclair’s *Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction* persuasively argues that Quine’s epistemology was deeply influenced by C. I. Lewis’s pragmatism. Sinclair’s account raises the question why Quine himself frequently downplayed Lewis’s influence. Looking back, Quine has always said that Rudolf Carnap was his “greatest teacher” and that his 1933 meeting with the German philosopher was his “first experience of sustained intellectual engagement with anyone of an older generation” (1970, 41; 1985, 97-8, my emphasis). (...)’s autobiographies contain only a handful of biographical references to Lewis and he regularly soft-pedaled the latter’s influence in private correspondence. In this note, I discuss some archival evidence that helps us better understand Quine’s reluctance to acknowledge Lewis’s influence. I contextualize the relation between Lewis and Quine and argue that the latter viewed his teacher as a retrograde force in modern epistemology, impeding the more rigorous approach that Carnap had been developing in Europe. Next, I briefly discuss Lewis’s contribution to the development of scientific philosophy in the United States and argue that Quine underestimated his teacher’s role in this process. In doing so, I hope to show that Quine’s zealous commitment to Carnap’s approach negatively affected his assessment of Lewis’s influence, thereby supplementing Sinclair’s praiseworthy reconstruction with an explanation of why Quine himself underestimated Lewis’s role. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. Evolution of Quine’s Thinking on the Thesis of Underdetermination and Scott Soames’s Accusation of Paradoxicality.M. Ashraf Adeel - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):56-69.
    Scott Soames argues that interpreted in the light of Quine's holistic verificationism, Quine's thesis of underdetermination leads to a contradiction. It is contended here that if we pay proper attention to the evolution of Quine's thinking on the subject, particularly his criterion of theory individuation, Quine's thesis of underdetermination escapes Soames' charge of paradoxicality.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Writing Conversationalists into History.James Pearson - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (6).
    Burton Dreben taught a generation of scholars the value of closely attending to the recent philosophical past. But the few papers he authored do little to capture his philosophical voice. In this article, I turn instead to an unpublished transcript of Dreben in conversation with his contemporaries. In addition to yielding insights into a transitional period in W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s thought, I argue that this document showcases Dreben in his element, revealing the way that he shaped the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Quine on the Nature of Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):96-115.
    Quine's metaphilosophical naturalism is often dismissed as overly “scientistic.” Many contemporary naturalists reject Quine's idea that epistemology should become a “chapter of psychology” and urge for a more “liberal,” “pluralistic,” and/or “open-minded” naturalism instead. Still, whenever Quine explicitly reflects on the nature of his naturalism, he always insists that his position is modest and that he does not “think of philosophy as part of natural science”. Analyzing this tension, Susan Haack has argued that Quine's naturalism contains (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Quine’s Meaning Nihilism: Revisiting Naturalism and Confirmation Method,’.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2017 - Philosophical Readings (3):222-229.
    The paper concentrates on an appreciation of W.V. Quine’s thought on meaning and how it escalates beyond the meaning holism and confirmation holism, thereby paving the way for a ‘meaning nihilism’ and ‘confirmation rejectionism’. My effort would be to see that how could the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts him to the indeterminacy thesis of meaning. There is an interesting shift from epistemology to language as Quine considers that a person who is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Problems start with the preface! Are fair equality of opportunity and Quine consistent?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    The preface to A Theory of Justice includes the interesting suggestion that John Rawls’s system is consistent with W.V. Quine’s system. I raise a problem for achieving fair equality of opportunity granting Quine’s system: that one does not have to respond to apparent evidence that two candidates are equally suitable for a job in the desired way. There does not appear to be a logical inconsistency between the systems at this point, but in practice regular positive discrimination schemes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms.Tony Cheng - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):548-567.
    This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. (1 other version)The Cambridge Companion to Quine (Review). [REVIEW]Andrew Lugg - 2004 - Philosophy in Review 24 (5):325-328.
    Review of Roger Gibson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Quine.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Setting Sail: The Development and Reception of Quine’s Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18:1-24.
    Contemporary analytic philosophy is dominated by metaphilosophical naturalism, the view that philosophy ought to be continuous with science. This naturalistic turn is for a significant part due to the work of W. V. Quine. Yet, the development and the reception of Quine’s naturalism have never been systematically studied. In this paper, I examine Quine’s evolving naturalism as well as the reception of his views. Scrutinizing a large set of unpublished notes, correspondence, drafts, papers, and lectures as well (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. Pure Logic and Higher-order Metaphysics.Christopher Menzel - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    W. V. Quine famously defended two theses that have fallen rather dramatically out of fashion. The first is that intensions are “creatures of darkness” that ultimately have no place in respectable philosophical circles, owing primarily to their lack of rigorous identity conditions. However, although he was thoroughly familiar with Carnap’s foundational studies in what would become known as possible world semantics, it likely wouldn’t yet have been apparent to Quine that he was fighting a losing battle against intensions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Russell as a Precursor of Quine.Andrew Lugg - 2005 - The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly 128 (November):9-22.
    On Russell's and Quine's "naturalism".
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Questions of Ontology.Kathrin Koslicki - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    Following W.V. Quine’s lead, many metaphysicians consider ontology to be concerned primarily with existential questions of the form, “What is there?”. Moreover, if the position advanced by Rudolf Carnap, in his seminal essay, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology ”, is correct, then many of these existential ontological questions ought to be classified as either trivially answerable or as “pseudo-questions”. One may justifiably wonder, however, whether the Quinean and Carnapian perspective on ontology really does justice to many of the most central (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  45. Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action.Sean Crawford - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1):103-121.
    In Making it Explicit Robert Brandom claims that perspectivally hybrid de re attitude ascriptions explain what an agent actually did, from the point of view of the ascriber, whether or not that was what the agent intended to do. There is a well-known problem, however, first brought to attention by Quine, but curiously ignored by Brandom, that threatens to undermine the role of de re ascriptions in the explanation of action, a problem that stems directly from the fact that, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Quine and First-Person Authority.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):141-161.
    Blackburn and Searle have argued that Quine‘s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation results in a denial of the sort of first-person authority that we commonly concede we have over our mental and semantical content. For, the indeterminacy thesis implies that there is no determinate meaning to know at all. And, according to Quine, the indeterminacy holds at home too. For Blackburn, Quine must constrain the domain of indeterminacy to the case of translation only. Searle believes that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. (1 other version)Realism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism: A Closer Look at the Views of Quine and Devitt.Gregg Caruso - 2007 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):64-83.
    Michael Devitt’s views on realism and naturalism have a lot in common with those of W.V. Quine. Both appear to be realists; both accept naturalized epistemology and abandon the old goal of first philosophy; both view philosophy as continuous with the empirical procedures of science and hence view metaphysics as similarly empirical; and both seem to view realism as following from naturalism. Although Quine and Devitt share quite a bit ideologically, I think there is a deeper, more fundamental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (1):161-183.
    Davidson has famously argued that conceptual relativism, which, for him, is based on the content-scheme dualism, or the “third dogma” of empiricism, is either unintelligible or philosophically uninteresting and has accused Quine of holding onto such a dogma. For Davidson, there can be found no intelligible ground for the claim that there may exist untranslatable languages: all languages, if they are languages, are in principle inter-translatable and uttered sentences, if identifiable as utterances, are interpretable. Davidson has also endorsed the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine’s Naturalism. [REVIEW]Ali Hossein Khani - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):210-212.
    Working from Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism. By Verhaegh Sander.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Philosophical Naturalism and Empirical Approaches to Philosophy.Jonathan Y. Tsou - forthcoming - In Marcus Rossberg (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    This chapter examines the influence of the empirical sciences (e.g., physics, biology, psychology) in contemporary analytic philosophy, with focus on philosophical theories that are guided by findings from the empirical sciences. Scientific approaches to philosophy follow a tradition of philosophical naturalism associated with Quine, which strives to ally philosophical methods and theories more closely with the empirical sciences and away from a priori theorizing and conceptual analysis.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 949