Why consciousness cannot be explained scientifically (causally) and requires an approach that incudes agency.

Critically examines Nick Bostrom's "Are You Living in a Simulation?" and underlying concepts.

The Lorentz transformations can be interpreted either in ontological or epistemic terms. The invariance of c could have a different interpretation, as a side-effect of the exclusive role of light as signal between frames of reference. It would not necessarily pose an absolute cosmic speed limit. Time dilation would have a different explanation.

The mass-energy relationship does not derive logically from Special Relativity, since it is not a function of relative velocity. It might be a function of acceleration. ‘Mass’ is re-examined as a stand-alone concept.

The Value Alignment Problem (VAP) presupposes that artificial general intelligence (AGI) is desirable and perhaps inevitable. As usually conceived, it is one side of the more general issue of mutual control between agonistic agents. To be fully autonomous, an AI must be an autopoietic system (an agent), with its own purposiveness. In the case of such systems, Bostrom’s orthogonality thesis is untrue. The VAP reflects the more general problem of interfering in complex systems, entraining the possibility of unforeseen consequences. Instead (...) of consolidating skill in an agent that acts on its own behalf, it would be safer and as effective to create ad hoc task-oriented software tools. What motivates the quest to create a superintelligence with a will of its own? Is a general intelligence even possible that is not an agent? Such questions point to the need to clarify what general intelligence is, what constitutes an agent, whose values and intentionality are to be aligned, and how feasible “friendliness” is. (shrink)

For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...) this approach, a concept of agency is introduced along with a different understanding of intentionality. Following this approach reveals that the autopoietic cognitive system constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, which underlie perceptual completion effects and “filling in”—and, by implication, phenomenology in general. It creates phenomenality much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history that is the source of valuation upon which meaning depends. Phenomenality is a virtual representation to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self) tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub- agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from that of unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least psychologically bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter, and perhaps hope for a broader definition of science. (shrink)

Lack of coherence in concepts of intelligence has implications for artificial intelligence. ‘Intelligence’ is an abstraction grounded in human experience while supposedly freed from the embodiment that is the basis of that experience. In addition to physical instantiation, embodiment is a condition of dependency, of an autopoietic system upon an environment, which thus matters to the system itself. The autonomy and general capability sought in artificial general intelligence implies artificially re-creating the organism’s natural condition of embodiment. That may not be (...) feasible; and, if feasible, it may not be controllable or advantageous. (shrink)

The problem of cognitive domains is that one can conceive the territory only as it is portrayed in the map. It involves conflating the domain of representation with the domain of what it represents. This is a category mistake: there are essential qualitative and quantitative differences between map and territory. The output of cognitive processes, both perceptual and scientific, is recycled as the input.

Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to explore the nature and role of art as a human phenomenon from a broadly cognitive perspective. Like science and religion, art serves to mediate the unknown, at once to embrace and to defend against the fundamental mystery of existence. Thus, it may challenge the status quo while generally serving to maintain it. Art tracks the individuation of subjectivity, serving the pleasure principle, yet is appropriated by the collective’s commitment to the reality principle. (...) While science and religion close in on serious answers to fundamental questions, art opens up possibilities toward playfulness, uselessness, imagination, and arbitrary whim. Though art has no unifying definition, meaning, or intent through time and across cultures, it remains important to people, both to do and to enjoy. It serves to counterbalance the naive realism of science, the “rationality” of modern society, and the literalism of text-based religion. While its allegiance is divided, its most worthy intent is to aid us to confront and negotiate the great mystery revealed to us in consciousness. (shrink)

Much of the basic non-technical vocabulary of artificial intelligence is surprisingly ambiguous. Some key terms with unclear meanings include intelligence, embodiment, simulation, mind, consciousness, perception, value, goal, agent, knowledge, belief, optimality, friendliness, containment, machine and thinking. Much of this vocabulary is naively borrowed from the realm of conscious human experience to apply to a theoretical notion of “mind-in-general” based on computation. However, if there is indeed a threshold between mechanical tool and autonomous agent (and a tipping point for singularity), projecting (...) human conscious-level notions into the operations of computers creates confusion and makes it harder to identify the nature and location of that threshold. There is confusion, in particular, about how—and even whether—various capabilities deemed intelligent relate to human consciousness. This suggests that insufficient thought has been given to very fundamental concepts—a dangerous state of affairs, given the intrinsic power of the technology. It also suggests that research in the area of artificial general intelligence may unwittingly be (mis)guided by unconscious motivations and assumptions. While it might be inconsequential if philosophers get it wrong (or fail to agree on what is right), it could be devastating if AI developers, corporations, and governments follow suit. It therefore seems worthwhile to try to clarify some fundamental notions. (shrink)

Abstract: Given an embodied evolutionary context, the (conscious) organism creates phenomenality and establishes a first-person point of view with its own agency, through intentional relations made by its own acts of fiat, in the same way that human observers create meaning in language.

Despite confident assertions by science and religion, no one can be absolutely certain what is going on in this drama we call existence. We are haunted by the realization that we are finite, vulnerable, mortal, and perhaps meaningless creatures. The ambiguity in all experience leaves us in a state of fundamental uncertainty, with a buried anxiety underlined by fear of mortality. However, the ability to consider consciousness as a personal creation enables us to appreciate experience for its own sake, despite (...) uncertainty and anxiety. It is the basis of art, and also of tolerance, epistemic responsibility, and the creative ability to think, perceive, and act outside the box. (shrink)

The Found and the Made: science, reason, and the reality of nature is a critical study of the role of abstraction and mathematical modeling in science, and how these affect the relationship of science and society to nature. This is a précis of the book, which questions the bias inherited from our religious and classical roots: that physical reality must be well defined, passive, and inert—a matter of divine or human specification. Determinism, time-reversibility, and isolated systems are persisting artifacts of (...) such a view, along with the notion that nature can be definitively grasped in a ‘theory of everything.’ However, if nature is autonomous in the way that organisms are (and mechanisms are not) it can be expected to self-organize in ways that elude mechanist treatment. Science could advance by taking a more self-reflective stance, acknowledging its role as a form of human cognition and examining the role of its practices and tacit assumptions in producing knowledge. Specifically, it could extend concepts of agency to non-living systems, in order to better explore self-organization in the cosmos at large. Such a shift in thinking might encourage society to extend to nature its natural legal rights. -/- . (shrink)

Recent years have seen growing public concern about the effects of persuasive digital technologies on public mental health and well-being. As the draws on our attention reach such staggering scales and as our ability to focus our attention on our own considered ends erodes ever further, the need to understand and articulate what is at stake has become pressing. In this ethical viewpoint, we explore the concept of attentional harms and emphasize their potential seriousness. We further argue that the acknowledgment (...) of these harms has relevance for evolving debates on digital inequalities. An underdiscussed aspect of web-based inequality concerns the persuasions, and even the manipulations, that help to generate sustained attentional loss. These inequalities are poised to grow, and as they do, so will concerns about justice with regard to the psychological and self-regulatory burdens of web-based participation for different internet users. In line with calls for multidimensional approaches to digital inequalities, it is important to recognize these potential harms as well as to empower internet users against them even while expanding high-quality access. (shrink)

The Mind-Body Problem is a by-product of subjective consciousness, i.e. of the self-reference of an awareness system. Given the possibility of a subjective frame placed around the contents of consciousness, and given also the reifying tendency of mind, the rift between subject and object is an inevitable artifact of human consciousness. The closest we can come to a solution is an understanding of the exact nature and situation of the embodied subject. Ontological solutions, such as materialism and idealism, are excluded (...) as part of the problem. Reification is examined as the fundamental movement of mind. Subjectified consciousness is a meta-system whose evolutionary role is to counterbalance the natural realism of mind. The Mind-Body Problem is the contradiction between these natural viewpoints. The intentionality of mind is likened to that of an "interpreted" formal system. The nature of experienced qualia is the same as that of the intentionally created meanings of words or mathematical symbols. The concept of a self who speaks this inner language is examined and rejected. There is a rapprochement between spiritual idealism and scientific materialism in regard to the nature, not only of the object, but also of the subject or self and its potential freedom. (shrink)

We routinely take diminished capacity as diminishing moral responsibility (as in the case of immaturity, senility, or particular mental impairments). The prospect of enhanced capacity therefore poses immediate questions with regard to moral responsibility. Of particular interest are those capacities that might allow us to better avoid serious harms or wrongdoing. We can consider questions of responsibility with regards to enhancement at various removes. In the first instance: where such (safe and effective) interventions exist, do we have an obligation to (...) undergo such enhancement? Secondly: once enhanced, would the ambit of our responsibility therefore increase? Some philosophers have argued that enhanced capacities potentially generate “hyperresponsibility.” Hyperresponsible people would be held to a different and higher moral standard than those of us with more ordinary human capacities, and are liable to be more blameworthy for wrongdoing than ordinary agents. This chapter discusses the implications of enhancement for three central views of responsibility, namely: capacity-based, control-based and revelation-based views. Debates around moral responsibility have primarily concerned diminished capacities; as such the prospect of enhancement introduces new terrain—and potentially new fault-lines and complexities—in which to interrogate our theoretical conceptions of the foundations (and limits) of moral responsibility. (shrink)

For diverse reasons, the problem of phenomenal consciousness is persistently challenging. Mental terms are characteristically ambiguous, researchers have philosophical biases, secondary qualities are excluded from objective description, and philosophers love to argue. Adhering to a regime of efficient causes and third-person descriptions, science as it has been defined has no place for subjectivity or teleology. A solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness will require a radical approach: to take the point of view of the cognitive system itself. To facilitate (...) this approach, a concept of agency is introduced along with a different understanding of intentionality. Following this approach reveals that the autopoietic cognitive system constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, which underlie perceptual completion effects and “filling in”—and, by implication, phenomenology in general. It creates phenomenality much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that it assigns meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history that is the source of valuation upon which meaning depends. Phenomenality is a virtual representation to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self) tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future action, and coordinating various sub- agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from that of unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least psychologically bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter, and perhaps hope for a broader definition of science. (shrink)

Despite growing understanding of the addictive qualities of the internet, and rising concerns about the effects of excessive internet use on personal wellbeing and mental health, the corresponding ethical debate is still in its infancy, and many of the relevant philosophical and conceptual frameworks are underdeveloped. Our goal in this chapter is to explore some of this evolving terrain. While there are unique ethical considerations that pertain to the formalisation of a disorder related to excessive internet use, our ethical concerns (...) (and indeed our mental health concerns) about whether certain technologies undermine wellbeing can and should be far broader than the debates about the appropriateness of particular diagnostic categories. In this chapter we introduce some of these wider debates with regards to persuasive digital technologies— particularly those which aim to maximise use, or even to encourage compulsive engagement—as well as the difficulty in articulating the harms involved in excessive internet use, especially where such use has not led to functional impairment. Following these conversations we briefly consider some more practical ethical implications, including regulation of certain design features, concerns about growing socioeconomic inequality in online services, and whether there should be a “right to disconnect.”. (shrink)

We can best understand the nature of consciousness through metaphor, by putting ourselves imaginatively in the place of the brain. Neural processes evoke sensation and meaning in the way that words evoke mental images. Conscious experience is (like) a virtual reality produced by the brain, guided by interaction with the external world. Explanation occurs in the field of view of the subject, so to speak. To explain the existence of that field inevitably involves circularity.

This paper proposes the feasibility of a second-order approach in cosmology. It is intended to encourage cosmologists to rethink standard ideas in their field, leading to a broader concept of self-organization and of science itself. It is argued, from a cognitive epistemology perspective, that a first-order approach is inadequate for cosmology; study of the universe as a whole must include study of the scientific observer and the process of theorizing. Otherwise, concepts of self-organization at the cosmological scale remain constrained by (...) unacknowledged assumptions and biases. Examples of limiting notions are discussed in the context of alternatives. To include the role of the theorist does not mean reducing science to subjective or sociological terms. On the contrary, second-order science would provide a more complete portrait of nature. The work of cosmologist Lee Smolin is discussed as a candidate example of second-order cosmology. (shrink)

Deductionism assimilates nature to conceptual artifacts (models, equations), and tacitly holds that real physical systems are such artifacts. Some physical concepts represent properties of deductive systems rather than of nature. Properties of mathematical or deductive systems can thereby sometimes falsely be ascribed to natural systems.

A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub- agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future (...) action, and coordinating various sub-agencies. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal and serves a function for higher organisms that is distinct from unconscious processing. While a strictly scientific solution to the hard problem is not possible for a science that excludes the subjectivity it seeks to explain, there is hope to at least informally bridge the explanatory gulf between mind and matter. (shrink)

Human culture seeks to transcend and replace the uncertainties of nature with a controllable human world. The quest for the Ideal has led to the creation of artificial environments, both material and intellectual—a second nature. New technologies express ancient dreams of immortality, freedom from embodiment and pain, and unlimited control of matter in man-made environments. But nature is not an artifact and may never be fully understood or controlled. While post-humanism may be delusional, its dreams could defeat the reasoned use (...) of technology to improve human life. Globalist economics is the latest expression of the mechanist metaphor. The basal gender imbalance of modern social values must be rectified to guide society sanely into the future. (shrink)

Supporters of neutrality as benign neglect argue that a neutral state should not grant any type of recognition to cultural or religious groups. Liberal multiculturalists argue instead that due to the non-neutral nature of public institutions, democratic states must adopt policies that recognize and accommodate the distinctive needs of ethnocultural groups. This article examines a different way of conceiving the principle of neutrality. In this conception, developed by Alan Patten in the framework of liberal multiculturalism, a state can only be (...) neutral when it extends equivalent levels of assistance/hindrance to rival conceptions of the good. Neutrality is thus reinterpreted to become a principle justifying the religious exemptions. The article highlights some aspects of this theory that should be reconsidered.// -/- Les défenseurs de la neutralité bienveillante soutiennent qu’un État neutre ne doit accorder aucun type de reconnaissance aux groupes culturels ou religieux. Les multiculturalistes libéraux avancent pour leur part que, en raison de la nature non neutre des institutions publiques, les États démocratiques doivent adopter des politiques vi-sant la reconnaissance et l’accommodement des besoins distinctifs des groupes ethnoculturels. Cet article examine une manière diffé-rente de concevoir le principe de neutralité. Dans cette conception, développée par Alan Patten dans le cadre du multiculturalisme libé-ral, un État ne peut être neutre que s’il assiste ou entrave de manière équivalente les différentes conceptions du bien. La neutralité est ainsi réinterprétée pour devenir un principe permettant de justifier les exemptions religieuses. L’article souligne certains aspects de cette théorie qui méritent d’être repensés. (shrink)

Le rapport issu de la commission Bouchard-Taylor qualifie la laïcité qui s’est implantée au Québec comme étant « plus libérale que républicaine », car elle permet à tous les citoyens « d’exprimer leurs convictions religieuses dans la mesure où cette expression n’entrave pas les droits et libertés d’autrui ». Les régimes républicains y sont présentés comme ceux qui refoulent les différences ethnoculturelles, « en les laissant en marge », tandis que le multiculturalisme accorderait une place prioritaire à la diversité. Dans (...) cet essai, je présente la relation entre le républicanisme et le multiculturalisme sous un éclairage différent. (shrink)

According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding of (...) the concept of a robust alternative. I will leave aside whether PAP also holds for praiseworthy actions -/- Según el Principio de Posibilidades Alternativas, un agente es moralmente responsable de una acción sólo si hubiera podido actuar de otro modo. La noción de alternativa robusta desempeña un papel prominente en ataques recientes al PPA basados en los llamados casos Frankfurt. En este artículo defiendo el PPA para la culpabilidad moral frente a casos Frankfurt propuestos recientemente por Derk Pereboom y David Widerker. Mi defensa descansa en algunos principios intuitivamente plausibles que dan lugar a una comprensión nueva del concepto de alternativa robusta. No trataré la cuestión de la verdad del PPA para acciones moralmente laudables. (shrink)

Le XI.ème Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M..) s’est déroulé à Porto (Portugal), du 26 au 30 août 2002, sous le thème général: Intellect et Imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale. A partir des héritages platonicien, aristotélicien, stoïcien, ou néo-platonicien (dans leurs variantes grecques, latines, arabes, juives), la conceptualisation et la problématisation de l’imagination et de l’intellect, ou même des facultés de l’âme en général, apparaissaient comme une ouverture possible pour aborder (...) les principaux points de la pensée médiévale. Les Actes du congrès montrent que « imagination » et « intellect » sont porteurs d’une richesse philosophique extraordinaire dans l’économie de la philosophie médiévale et de la constitution de ses spécificités historiques. Dans sa signification la plus large, la théorisation de ces deux facultés de l’âme permet de dédoubler le débat en au moins six grands domaines: — la relation avec le sensible, où la fantaisie/l’imagination joue le rôle de médiation dans la perception du monde et dans la constitution de la connaissance ; — la réflexion sur l’acte de connaître et la découverte de soi en tant que sujet de pensée ; — la position dans la nature, dans le cosmos, et dans le temps de celui qui pense et qui connaît par les sens externes, internes et par l’intellect ; — la recherche d’un fondement pour la connaissance et l’action, par la possibilité du dépassement de la distante proximité du transcendant, de l’absolu, de la vérité et du bien ; — la réalisation de la félicité en tant qu’objectif ultime, de même que la découverte d’une tendance au dépassement actif ou mystique de toutes les limites naturelles et des facultés de l’âme ; — la constitution de théories de l’image, sensible ou intellectuelle, et de ses fonctions. Les 3 volumes d’Actes incluent les 16 leçons plénières et 112 communications, ainsi que les index correspondants (manuscrits ; noms anciens et médiévaux ; noms modernes ; auteurs). Le volume IV des Actes, contenant 39 communications et des index, est publié par la revue " Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos ", du Gabinete de Filosofia Medieval de l’Universidade do Porto (volume 23, de 2004). Ouvrage publié avec l’appui de l’Universidade do Porto, de la Faculdade de Letras da U.P., du Departamento de Filosofia - F.L.U.P. et de la Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portugal). (shrink)

La question des rapports du spinozisme à l’axiologie a fait l’objet de nombreux débats. Certains commentateurs considèrent Spinoza comme étant profondément immoraliste, alors que pour d’autres, il maintient l'ensemble des valeurs humaines. Spinoza a cherché à dépasser l’utilitarisme propre au conatus de chacun, afin de fonder un altruisme rationnel. Il souligne que le bien auquel l’homme aspire lorsqu’il suit la vertu, il le désirera aussi pour tous les autres hommes. Cependant, les moyens mis en œuvre pour démontrer cette thèse semblent (...) problématiques. Cet article analyse la logique de la coopération interhumaine élaborée par Spinoza, ainsi que son idéal de l’homme libre, montrant, qu'en fait, il n'a pas réussi à surmonter la nature profondément égoïste du conatus. -/- The question of the relationship between Spinozism and axiology has been the subject of much debate. Some commentators consider Spinoza to be profoundly immoralist, while for others he upholds the set of human values. Spinoza sought to go beyond the utilitarianism proper to the conatus of each person, in order to establish a rational altruism. He emphasizes that the good to which man aspires when he follows virtue, he will also desire for all other men. However, the means used to demonstrate this thesis seem problematic. This article analyzes Spinoza's logic of interhuman cooperation, as well as his ideal of the free man, showing that, in fact, he failed to overcome the profoundly egoistic nature of conatus. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Ripstein and Dan-Cohen's critiques of the 'harm principle'. Ripstein and Dan-Cohen have asserted that the harm principle should be jettisoned, because it allegedly fails to provide a rationale for criminalising certain harmless wrongs that ought to be criminalised. They argue that Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative and his concept of 'external freedom' are better equipped for ensuring that criminalisation decisions meet the requirements of fairness. Per contra, I assert that Kant's deontological theory is (...) about identifying morally wrongful and rightful conduct: it does not tell the legislature which of those wrongs justify a criminal law response in accordance with the requirements of fairness and justice. Some wrongdoers deserve censure and the stigma that results from criminalisation, but others do not. Kant's deontological theory does not limit the scope of the criminal law merely to those wrongs that deserve a criminal law response. Fair and principled criminalisation requires more than mere wrongdoing. I assert that it is only fair to criminalise wrongs when further normative reasons can be invoked to justify the use of the criminal law as a means for deterring the unwanted conduct. While 'harm to others' is not the only normative reason that can be used to demonstrate that it is fair to criminalise a given act, it is the justification that has the greatest reach. It would not be fair to criminalise mere wrongdoing (that is, every violation of freedom: trespass to goods etc. or every violation of the categorical imperative: every false promise etc.). Nor is it possible to distinguish one violation of freedom from the next, as freedom is not measurable. Thus, murder and trespass to goods would be equally wrong and equally criminalisable in Kant's scheme. A further problem with Dan-Cohen's use of the second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative is that it aims to be an inclusive criterion for identifying conduct that is prima facie criminalisable, but this inclusive approach does not explain the wrongfulness (or in Dan-Cohen's use of the categorical imperative the criminalisableness) of harming animals. In this paper, I demonstrate that the harm principle is able to meet the challenges raised by Ripstein and Dan-Cohen. I also demonstrate that it offers superior criteria for ensuring that criminalisation decisions are fair, just and principled than is offered by Kant's deontological theory. (shrink)

Résumé Si l’absence de moralité des psychopathes a été largement étudiée, il existe peu de recherches sur leurs capacités esthétiques. Pourtant, beaucoup d’études cliniques de cas montrent qu’ils présentent un grave déficit dans ce domaine. Cet article se propose d’en chercher les causes. Il analyse les forces et les limites de l’hypothèse d’un manque d’empathie pour expliquer ces carences esthétiques, et montre pourquoi l’hypothèse d’un manque de distance psychique se révèle plus féconde. Celle-ci permet en outre de comprendre le lien (...) de l’esthétique et de l’éthique par leur filiation commune : elles ont pour socle commun la capacité à prendre de la distance par rapport à des intérêts étroitement égoïstes. (shrink)

Epitome L'Univers Les plus loin scintillements de l'Univers ne sont pas une lointaine bordure de finition. Mais des voyageurs concernés, émissaires de l’âge lumière. Ainsi, ici et dans le présent, dans un moment, au-delà dans l'obscurité, se dévoile l'assise du passé energetique, de l’âge noir de l'Univers. Martin J. B. Thibault Janvier 2021 .

Many differences exist between the logical relations “equality” and “equivalence”. In this monograph I point out differences that concern definition, linguistics, computational gates and tables, denotation, application, negation of terms, negation of the relation, relations to other relations, the laws of symmetry, transitivity and reflexivity, the laws of commutation and permutation, the law of tautology, the law of distribution, the law of association, propositional meaning, and “genesis”. I also point out a form of “symmetry breaking”: the negation of some equality (...) may yield some non-equality, while the negation of that non-equality might not yield the same equality. (For full access: use the website link of the title page. -- Copyright License: CC BY-NC-ND. -- DOI: 10.17026/dans-zh3-h2b2 --). (shrink)

Spinoza, le spinozisme et les fondements de la sécularisation est un ouvrage dédié à la mémoire d’Emmanuel Levinas, dont l’auteur a été l’élève durant plusieurs années. Il vise, à travers une analyse d’ordre philosophique, historique, épistémologique et théologique, à mettre au jour les conditions d’émergence interrelatées du spinozisme et de la sécularisation. Il présente une recherche interdisciplinaire devant permettre d’éclairer l’origine des difficultés théoriques que ce système philosophique présente. Ce volume est le premier d’une pentalogie consacrée à Spinoza et au (...) Spinozisme, dont les autres paraîtront dans la même collection. Spinoza, Spinozism and the Foundations of Secularization is a book dedicated to the memory of Emmanuel Levinas, whose author was a student for several years. It aims, through a philosophical, historical, epistemological and theological analysis, to bring to light the interrelated conditions of emergence of Spinozism and secularization. It presents interdisciplinary research to shed light on the origin of the theoretical difficulties that this philosophical system presents. This volume is the first of a pentalogy devoted to Spinoza and Spinozism, the others of which will appear in the same collection. (shrink)

Avant de commenter le livre, je vous propose des commentaires sur Wittgenstein et Searle et la structure logique de la rationalité. Les essais ici sont pour la plupart déjà publiés au cours de la dernière décennie (bien que certains ont été mis à jour), avec un élément non publié, et rien ici ne viendra comme une surprise pour ceux qui ont suivi son travail. Comme W, il est considéré comme le meilleur philosophe standup de son temps et son travail écrit (...) est solide comme un rocher et révolutionnaire tout au long. Cependant, son incapacité à prendre le W plus tard assez au sérieux conduit à quelques erreurs et confusions. Juste quelques exemples: sur p7, il note deux fois que notre certitude sur les faits de base est due à l’importance écrasante de la raison à l’appui de nos revendications, mais W a montré définitivement dans «Sur la certitude» qu’il n’y a aucune possibilité de douter de la véritable seule structure axiomatique de notre système 1 perceptions, souvenirs et pensées, car il est lui-même la base du jugement et ne peut pas lui-même être jugé. Dans la première phrase sur p8, il nous dit que la certitude est révisable, mais ce genre de «certitude», que nous pourrions appeler Certainty2, est le résultat de l’extension de notre certitude axiomatique et non révisible (Certitude1) par l’expérience et est tout à fait différent car il est proposé (vrai ou faux). C’est bien sûr un exemple classique de la « bataille contre l’envoûtement de notre intelligence par la langue » dont W a démontré maintes et maintes fois. Un mot- deux (ou plusieurs) utilisations distinctes. Son dernier chapitre "L’unité de la proposition" (précédemment inédit) bénéficierait également grandement de la lecture de W "On Certainty" ou les deux livres de DMS sur OC (voir mes commentaires) car ils font clairement la différence entre les phrases vraies seulement décrivant S1 et les propositions vraies ou fausses décrivant S2. Cela me semble comme une approche bien supérieure à S de prendre S1 perceptions comme propositionnelle car ils ne deviennent T ou F après que l’on commence à penser à eux dans S2. Cependant, son point que les propositions permettent des déclarations de vérité réelle ou potentielle et de fausseté, du passé et du futur et de la fantaisie, et donc fournir une énorme avancée sur la société pré ou protolinguistique, est convaincante. Comme il l’affirme : « Une proposition est tout ce qui peut déterminer une condition de satisfaction... et une condition de satisfaction... est que tel ou tel est le cas. Ou, il faut ajouter, qui pourrait être ou aurait pu être ou pourrait être imaginé pour être le cas. Dans l’ensemble, PNC est un bon résumé des nombreuses avancées substantielles sur Wittgenstein résultant du demi-siècle de travail de S, mais à mon avis, W est toujours inégalé une fois que vous saisissez ce qu’il dit. Idéalement, ils devraient être lus ensemble: Searle pour la prose et les généralisations clairement cohérentes, illustrés par les exemples perspicaces de W et les aphorismes brillants. Si j’étais beaucoup plus jeune, j’écrirais un livre faisant exactement cela. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

À propos de la possibilité de voyager dans le temps sur la base de plusieurs ouvrages spécialisés, notamment ceux de Nicholas J. J. Smith (« Time Travel »), William Grey (« Troubles with Time Travel »), Ulrich Meyer (« Explaining causal loops »), Simon Keller and Michael Nelson (« Presentists should believe in time-travel »), Frank Arntzenius and Tim Maudlin (« Time Travel and Modern Physics »), et David Lewis (« The Paradoxes of Time Travel »). L'article commence par une (...) Introduction dans laquelle je fais une brève présentation du voyage dans le temps et poursuit par une Histoire du concept de voyage dans le temps, les principaux aspects physiques du voyage dans le temps, y compris les voyages dans le temps dans le passé dans la relativité générale et la physique quantique , et les voyages dans le temps dans le futur, puis une présentation du Paradoxe du grand-père abordé dans presque toutes les œuvres spécialisées, suivie d’une section consacrée à la Philosophie du voyage dans le temps et d’une section dans laquelle j’analyse les Boucles causales pour le voyage dans le temps. Je termine mon travail avec Conclusions, dans laquelle je maintiens mes opinions personnelles sur le voyage dans le temps et la Bibliographie sur laquelle repose le travail. -/- TABLE: -/- Abstract Introducere Istoria conceptului de călătorie în timp Paradoxul bunicului Filosofía călătoriei în timp Buclele cauzale Concluzii Note Bibliografie -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27116.51841. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020), philosophe américaine parmi les figures les plus marquantes dans l’étude de la normativité et de l’éthique, s’est éteinte ce 20 novembre à l’âge de 91 ans. Professeure émérite au MIT, sa carrière s’est étendue sur cinq décennies consacrées à la recherche, à l’enseignement et à la publication de plusieurs articles et ouvrages sur la nature des valeurs, des normes et des droits. Parmi ses ouvrages les plus importants, nous rappelons The Realm of Rights (1990), Goodness and (...) Advice (2001) et Normativity (2008). (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’étudie la représentation faite par la médecine hippocratique des principaux organes du corps et du système vasculaire en souhaitant montrer que l’anatomie hippocratique n’est ni le produit de l’observation rigoureuse, ni celui de la pure fantaisie, mais qu’elle a toujours pour fonction de soutenir une théorie physiologique ou une pratique thérapeutique. Je mets d’abord en évidence la correspondance étroite entre certaines descriptions anatomiques parmi les plus détaillées du Corpus hippocratique et la physiologie humorale défendue par plusieurs auteurs. (...) J’analyse ensuite quelques schémas du système vasculaire dans le but d’exposer leur dépendance à l’égard de l’étiologie et de la thérapie. (shrink)

J’ai lu de nombreuses discussions récentes sur les limites du calcul et de l’univers en tant qu’ordinateur, dans l’espoir de trouver quelques commentaires sur le travail étonnant du physicien polymathe et théoricien de la décision David Wolpert, mais n’ont pas trouvé une seule citation et je présente donc ce résumé très bref. Wolpert s’est avéré quelques théoricaux d’impossibilité ou d’incomplétude renversants (1992 à 2008-voir arxiv dot org) sur les limites de l’inférence (computation) qui sont si généraux qu’ils sont indépendants de (...) l’appareil faisant le calcul, et même indépendamment des lois de la physique, ainsi ils s’appliquent à travers les ordinateurs, la physique, et le comportement humain. Ils utilisent la diagonalisation de Cantor, le paradoxe menteur et les worldlines (lignes du monde) pour fournir ce qui peut être le théorème ultime dans Turing Machine Theory, et apparemment fournir des aperçus de l’impossibilité, l’incomplétude, les limites du calcul, et l’univers comme ordinateur, dans tous les univers possibles et tous les êtres ou mécanismes possibles, générant, entre autres, un principe d’incertitude mécanique non quantique et une preuve de monothéisme. Il existe des connexions évidentes à l’œuvre classique de Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov et Wittgenstein et à l’idée qu’aucun programme (et donc aucun dispositif) ne peut générer une séquence (ou un dispositif) avec une plus grande complexité qu’il ne possède. On pourrait dire que cet ensemble de travaux implique l’athéisme puisqu’il ne peut y avoir d’entité plus complexe que l’univers physique et du point de vue wittgensteinien, « plus complexe » n’a aucun sens (n’a pas de conditions de satisfaction, c’est-à-dire véridique ou test). Même un « Dieu » (c’est-à-dire un « dispositif » avec un temps/ espace et une énergie illimité) ne peut pas déterminer si un « nombre » donné est « aléatoire», ni trouver un certain moyen de montrer qu’une « formule » donnée, un « théorème » ou une « phrase » ou un « dispositif » (tous ces jeux de langage complexes) fait partie d’un « système » particulier. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux systemes peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir 'Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 2ème ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Je soutiens que la prise en compte de Lotze dans la genèse de la phénoménologie du jeune Husserl fournit de nouveaux éléments qui supportent la lecture frégéenne de la phénoménologie. Pour ce faire, je vais d’abord retracer l’origine lozéenne des questions épistémologiques issues du développement de la nouvelle psychologie et de la logique au milieu du XIXe siècle en Allemagne et j’insisterai sur l’apport de trois de ses étudiants prestigieux; je montrerai ensuite que Husserl a acquis sa connaissance de cette (...) problématique via sa fréquentation de Brentano et de Stumpf; je me pencherai ensuite sur la tournant antipsychologiste de Husserl au milieu des années 1890 et examinerai brièvement un manuscrit de Husserl intitulé « Microcosmos » qui date de cette même période et qui montre clairement l’apport de la logique de Lotze dans ce tournant antipsychologiste; j’examinerai enfin brièvement l’apport de Lotze dans la critique que Husserl adresse au psychologisme logique dans ses Prolégomènes. Je conclurai avec quelques remarques sur l’importance de Lotze dans la phénoménologie de Husserl après la publication des Recherches logiques. (shrink)

Dans 'Godel’s Way', trois éminents scientifiques discutent de questions telles que l’indécidabilité, l’incomplétude, le hasard, la calculabilité et la paraconsistence. J’aborde ces questions du point de vue de Wittgensteinian selon lesquelles il y a deux questions fondamentales qui ont des solutions complètement différentes. Il y a les questions scientifiques ou empiriques, qui sont des faits sur le monde qui doivent être étudiés de manière observationnelle et philosophique quant à la façon dont le langage peut être utilisé intelligiblement (qui incluent certaines (...) questions en mathématiques et en logique), qui doivent être décidés en regardant un comment nous utilisons réellement des mots dans des contextes particuliers. Lorsque nous obtenons clair sur le jeu de langue que nous jouons, ces sujets sont considérés comme des questions scientifiques et mathématiques ordinaires comme les autres. Les idées de Wittgenstein ont rarement été égalées et jamais dépassées et sont aussi pertinentes aujourd’hui qu’elles l’étaient il y a 80 ans lorsqu’il a dicté les Livres Bleus et Brown. Malgré ses défauts, vraiment une série de notes plutôt qu’un livre fini, c’est une source unique du travail de ces trois savants célèbres qui travaillent aux confins de la physique, des mathématiques et de la philosophie depuis plus d’un demi-siècle. Da Costa et Doria sont cités par Wolpert (voir ci-dessous ou mes articles sur Wolpert et mon examen de Yanofsky 'The Outer Limits of Reason') depuis qu’ils ont écrit sur le calcul universel, et parmi ses nombreuses réalisations, Da Costa est un pionnier dans la paraconsistence. -/- Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux système peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 » 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Hilde Lindemann argues that personhood is the shared practice of recognizing and responding to one another. She calls this practice holding. Holding, however, can fail. Holding failure, by stereotyping for example, can inhibit others’ epistemic confidence and ability to recall true beliefs as well as create an environment of racism or sexism. How might we avoid holding failure? Holding failure, I argue, has many epistemic dimensions, so I argue that moral encroachment has the theoretical tools available to avoid holding failures. (...) The goal of this paper, therefore, is to articulate and understand the epistemology of holding in an attempt to remedy holding failure. I show that the virtue of wokeness emerges from an epistemic environment tainted with moral encroachment. I argue that as long as an individual is woke, she will have a tendency to avoid holding failures. Wokeness and moral encroachment, consequently, are fundamental to the epistemology of holding and consistent proper holding. (shrink)

[Updated 2/23/21: complete chapter scan] In this chapter I sketch a rightist approach to monumentary policy in a diverse polity beleaguered by old ethnic grievances. I begin by noting the importance of tribalism, memorialization, and social trust. I then suggest a policy which 1) gradually narrows the gap between peoples in the heritage landscape, 2) conserves all but the most offensive of the least beloved racist monuments, 3) avoids recrimination (i.e., “keeps it positive”) and eschews ideological commentary in new monuments (...) or revisions to old ones, 4) as much as politically feasible, recognizes only the offense of willing tribemates, and 5) responds to aesthetic and other “irrational” offenses more than to “objective” historical or philosophical critiques. (shrink)

In this chapter we focus on the debate over publicly-maintained racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the US (chiefly regarding the over 700 monuments devoted to the Confederacy), but to some degree also in Britain and Commonwealth countries, especially South Africa (chiefly regarding monuments devoted to figures and events associated with colonialism and apartheid). After pointing to some representative examples of racist monuments, we discuss ways a monument can be thought racist, and neutrally categorize removalist (...) and preservationist arguments heard in the monument debate. We suggest that both extremist and moderate removalist goals are likely to be self-defeating, and that when concerns of civic sustainability are put on moral par with those of fairness and justice, something like a Mandela-era preservationist policy is best: one which removes the most offensive of the minor racist monuments, but which focuses on closing the monumentary gap between peoples and reframing existing racist monuments. (shrink)

Much of the climate ethics discussion centers on considerations of compensatory justice and historical accountability. However, little attention is given to supporting and defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle as a guide for policymaking. This principle states that those who have benefitted from an instance of harm have an obligation to compensate those who have been harmed. Thus, this principle implies that those benefitted by industrialization and carbon emission owe compensation to those who have been harmed by climate change. Beneficiary Pays (...) is commonly juxtaposed with Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle in the relevant literature. Beneficiary Pays withstands objections that raise suspicion for the latter two. (shrink)

Discussions of “privilege” have become increasingly common, but it’s often unclear what exactly people mean by “privilege.” Even well-known writings about privilege rarely take the time to define the word and explain what it means. The confusion this creates is one reason why debates about privilege are often contentious and unproductive. This essay aims to demystify privilege, presupposing no prior knowledge of philosophy. With a clear definition, it is easier to discuss some of the main debates about privilege: Is there (...) such a thing as “white privilege”? What about “male privilege”? And what’s the point of talking about privilege, anyway? (shrink)