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  1. La objeción de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia.Alejandro Farieta - 2015 - Pensamiento y Cultura 18 (2):6-28.
    This paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism to the solution to Meno’s Paradox suggested by Plato. According to Aristotle, when Plato says that reminiscence (anámnēsis) is achieved, what is actually achieved is induction (epagōgê). Our interpretation is based on two aspects: (1) semantic criticism, since Plato’s use of the term anámnēsis is unusual; and (2) the theory is not able to give an adequate explanation of the effective discovery.
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  2. Louis Groarke, An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Creating Something From Nothing[REVIEW]John P. McCaskey - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (4).
    Groarke is surely right that Aristotle believed the cognitive hierarchy he described in Posterior Analytics B 19 is central to, and not antithetical to, validating the syllogism described in Prior Analytics B 23. But did Aristotle really believe induction ultimately relies on what Groarke calls “a stroke or leap of understanding,” “immediate illumination,” “moment of immediate cognition,” “a direct insight,” “moment of illumination,” and so on? . . . Overall, what Groarke says here is provocative and inviting, even if not (...)
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  3. Freeing Aristotelian Epagōgē From “Prior Analytics” II 23.John P. McCaskey - 2007 - Apeiron 40 (4):345-374.
    Since at least late antiquity, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics B 23 has been misread. Aristotle does not think that an induction is a syllogism made good by complete enumeration. The confusion can be eliminated by considering the nature of the surviving text and watching very closely Aristotle’s moving back and forth between “induction” and “syllogism from induction.” Though he does move freely between them, the two are not synonyms.
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  4. The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal.James Franklin - 2001 - Baltimore, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
    How were reliable predictions made before Pascal and Fermat's discovery of the mathematics of probability in 1654? What methods in law, science, commerce, philosophy, and logic helped us to get at the truth in cases where certainty was not attainable? The book examines how judges, witch inquisitors, and juries evaluated evidence; how scientists weighed reasons for and against scientific theories; and how merchants counted shipwrecks to determine insurance rates. Also included are the problem of induction before Hume, design arguments for (...)
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