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  1. Aristotle on “dunatos” as a label for imperfect syllogisms.Lucas Angioni - forthcoming - In Graziana Ciola & Milo Crimi (eds.), Validity Throughout History. Munich, Germany:
    This paper discusses the following question: why was the term “dunatos” (“possible”) employed by Aristotle as an alternative label for imperfect syllogisms in his discussion of assertoric syllogistic? My answer ascribes to Aristotle a bottom up perspective, in which he stresses what is necessary in the premise-pairs to attain target conclusions of a given form within a given figure. I argue that “dunatos” is employed by Aristotle to stress that an imperfect syllogism is always one of the possible options to (...)
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  2. Aristotle on the Individuation of Syllogisms.Phil Corkum - forthcoming - Ancient Philosophy.
    Discussion of the Aristotelian syllogistic over the last sixty years has arguably centered on the question whether syllogisms are inferences or implications. But the significance of this debate at times has been taken to concern whether the syllogistic is a logic or a theory, and how it ought to be represented by modern systems. Largely missing from this discussion has been a study of the few passages in the Prior Analytics where Aristotle provides explicit guidance on how to individuate syllogisms. (...)
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  3. A Mereological Reading of the Dictum de Omni et Nullo.Phil Corkum - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    When Aristotle introduces the perfect moods, he refers back to the dictum de omni et nullo, a semantic condition for universal affirmations and negations. There recently has been renewed interest in the question whether the dictum validates the assertoric syllogistic. I rehearse evidence that Aristotle provides a mereological semantics for universal affirmations and negations, and note that this semantics entails a nonstandard reading of the dictum, under which the dictum, in the presence of a minimal logical apparatus, indeed validates the (...)
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  4. Aristóteles. Primeiros Analíticos 1.1-7. Apresentação, tradução e notas.Wellington D. Almeida & Mateus R. F. Ferreira - 2023 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 33:1-42.
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  5. Os métodos de prova nos Primeiros Analíticos de Aristóteles e sua natureza normativa.Ralph Leal Heck - 2020 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 65 (3):1-13.
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  6. Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic. [REVIEW]Lucas Angioni - 2018 - Ancient Philosophy 38 (1):211-216.
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  7. Empty Negations and Existential Import in Aristotle.Phil Corkum - 2018 - Apeiron 51 (2):201-219.
    Aristotle draws what are, by our lights, two unusual relationships between predication and existence. First, true universal affirmations carry existential import. If ‘All humans are mortal’ is true, for example, then at least one human exists. And secondly, although affirmations with empty terms in subject position are all false, empty negations are all true: if ‘Socrates’ lacks a referent, then both ‘Socrates is well’ and ‘Socrates is ill’ are false but both ‘Socrates is not well’ and ‘Socrates is not ill’ (...)
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  8. Why Are There No Conditionals in Aristotle’s Logic?David Ebrey - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (2):185-205.
    Aristotle presents a formal logic in the Prior Analytics in which the premises and conclusions are never conditionals. In this paper I argue that he did not simply overlook conditionals, nor does their absence reflect a metaphysical prejudice on his part. Instead, he thinks that arguments with conditionals cannot be syllogisms because of the way he understands the explanatory requirement in the definition of a syllogism: the requirement that the conclusion follow because of the premises. The key passage is Prior (...)
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  9. Demonstração, silogismo e causalidade.Lucas Angioni - 2014 - In Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles. Phi. pp. 61-120.
    This chapter argues in favour of three interrelated points. First, I argue that demonstration (as expression of scientific knowledge) is fundamentally defined as knowledge of the appropriate cause for a given explanandum: to have scientific knowledge of the explanandum is to explain it through its fully appropriate cause. Secondly, I stress that Aristotle’s notion of cause has a “triadic” structure, which fundamentally depends on the predicative formulation (or “regimentation”) of the explanandum. Thirdly, I argue that what has motivated Aristotle to (...)
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  10. Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles.Lucas Angioni - 2014 - Phi.
    Collective volume with papers by alumni and students from the Campinas Aristotle Group.
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  11. O escopo do 'toi tauta einai' na silogística aristotélica.Felipe Weinmann - 2014 - Intuitio 7 (1):43-66.
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  12. A Cláusula Final da Definição Geral do Silogismo e suas funções na silogística e nos Primeiros Analíticos I de Aristóteles.Felipe Weinmann - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Aristotle's General Definition of the Syllogism may be taken as consisting of two parts: the Inferential Conditions and the Final Clause. Although this distinction is well known, traditional interpretations neglect the Final Clause and its influence on syllogistic. Instead, the aforementioned tradition focuses on the Inferential Conditions only. We intend to show that this neglect has severe consequences not just on syllogistic but on the whole exegesis of Aristotle's Prior Analytics I. Due to these consequences, our objective is to analyse (...)
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  13. Necessidade, mediação e o papel do 'toi tauta einai' nos Primeiros Analíticos I.4 e I.7 de Aristóteles.Felipe Weinmann - 2013 - Revista Do Seminário Dos Alunos Do PPGLM/UFRJ 4 (1):70-87.
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  14. A LÓGICA DE ARISTÓTELES: PROBLEMAS INTERPRETATIVOS E ABORDAGENS CONTEMPORÂNEAS DOS PRIMEIROS ANALÍTICOS.Mateus Ricardo Fernandes Ferreira - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
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  15. Aristotle's logic at the university of buffalo's department of philosophy.John Corcoran - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (140):99-117.
    We begin with an introductory overview of contributions made by more than twenty scholars associated with the Philosophy Department at the University of Buffalo during the last half-century to our understanding and evaluation of Aristotle's logic. More well-known developments are merely mentioned in..
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  16. Warum fehlt bei Aristoteles die 4. Figur?Theodor Ebert - 1980 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 62 (1):13-31.
    The reason for Aristotle’s treatment of (traditional) fourth figure syllogisms as first figure syllogisms with inverted terms in the conclusion is the following: To disprove the conclusiveness of a premiss pair Aristotle formulates two triplets of true propositions such that two of them correspond to the premiss pair in question and that the third proposition corresponding to a conclusion is an a-proposition in the first case, an e-proposition in the other. Since the truth of an a-proposition grants the falsity of (...)
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  17. Aristotle's definition of syllogism in Prior Analytics 24b18-20.Lucas Angioni - manuscript
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