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  1. added 2018-11-12
    Urteilstheorien Und Sachverhalte.Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith - 2001 - In Satz Und Sachverhalt. Academia Verlag. pp. 9-72.
    The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...)
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  2. added 2018-11-12
    Satz Und Sachverhalt.Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith - 2001 - Academia Verlag.
    The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...)
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  3. added 2016-04-12
    Brentano on Truth.Johannes Brandl - forthcoming - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
    How to understand Brentano’s account of truth is a question of some controversy. A number of different views have been put forward as positions that Brentano held at some stage in his career. The received view has it that the early Brentano subscribed to a form of correspondence theory which he later rejected in favor of a definition of truth in terms of correct judging, where the correctness of a judgment is defined in terms of the notion of self-evidence (see (...)
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  4. added 2016-04-05
    Marty and Brentano.Laurent Cesalli & Kevin Mulligan - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
    The Swiss philosopher Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847 - Prague, 1914) belongs, with Carl Stumpf, to the first circle of Brentano’s pupils. Within Brentano’s school (and, to some extent, in the secondary literature), Marty has often been considered (in particular by Meinong) a kind of would-be epigone of his master (Fisette & Fréchette 2007: 61-2). There is no doubt that Brentano’s doctrine often provides Marty with his philosophical starting points. But Marty often arrives at original conclusions which are diametrically opposed to (...)
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  5. added 2016-03-29
    Brentano on Judgment.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 103-109.
    ‘Judgment’ is Brentano’s terms for any mental state liable to be true or false. This includes not only the products of conceptual thought, such as belief, but also perceptual experiences, such as seeing that the window was left open. ‘Every perception counts as a judgment,’ writes Brentano (1874: II, 50/1973a: 209). Accordingly, his theory of judgment is not exactly a theory of the same phenomenon we call today ‘judgment,’ but of a larger class of phenomena one (perhaps the main) species (...)
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  6. added 2014-10-04
    How to Speak of Existence.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In S. Lapointe (ed.), Themes from Ontology, Mind, and Logic: Essays in Honor of Peter Simons. Brill. pp. 81-106.
    To a first approximation, ontology is concerned with what exists, metaontology with what it means to say that something exists. So understood, metaontology has been dominated by three views: (i) existence as a substantive first-order property that some things have and some do not, (ii) existence as a formal first-order property that everything has, and (iii) existence as a second-order property of existents’ distinctive properties. Each of these faces well-documented difficulties. In this chapter, I want to expound a fourth theoretical (...)
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  7. added 2014-02-21
    Belief-That and Belief-In: Which Reductive Analysis?Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Let propositionalism be the thesis that all mental attitudes are propositional. Anti-propositionalists typically point at apparently non-propositional attitudes, such as fearing a dog and loving a spouse, and play defense against attempts at propositional analysis of such attitudes. Here I explore the anti-propositionalist’s prospects for going on the offensive, trying to show that some apparently propositional attitudes, notably belief and judgment, can be given non-propositional analysis. Although the notion that belief is a non-propositional attitude may seem ludicrous at first, it (...)
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  8. added 2014-01-15
    Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 97-102.
    In Chapter 3 of Book I of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano articulates what he takes to be the four most basic and central tasks of psychology. One of them is to discover the ‘fundamental classification’ of mental phenomena. Brentano attends to this task in Chapters 5-9 of Book II of the Psychology, reprinted (with appendices) in 1911 as a standalone book (Brentano 1911a). The classification is further developed in an essay entitled “A Survey of So-Called Sensory and Noetic (...)
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  9. added 2013-12-17
    Der Subjektivismus bei Franz Brentano in den Grenzen von Psychologie und Logik.Wolfgang Cernoch - 1998 - In Michael Benedikt, Endre Kiss & Reinhold Knoll (eds.), Verdrängter Humanismus — Verzögerte Aufklärung. Bd. 4, Anspruch und Echo: Sezession und Aufbrüche in den Kronländern zum Fin-de-Siécle. Philosophie in Österreich (1880-1920). Edituria Triade.
    Diese Arbeit zeichnet die Schwierigkeit nach, die Franz Brentano zwischen der Begruendung der Sittlichkeit aus moralischem Gefuehl und der Begruendung aus Vernunftgruenden zeitlebens gehabt hat: Die Eroerterung eines Gefuehls verwandelt dieses unweigerlich in ein Konzept der Kommunikation, das nicht nur rationaler, vielmehr noch oeffentlicher Diskussion zugaenglich wird. Beschraenkt man aber die Quelle des moralischen Gefuehls UND den Verstand auf ein individuelles Subjekt, geraet man mit der Untersuchung der Evidenz der sittlichen Erkenntnis in die naemlichen Aporien wie Franz Brentano.
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  10. added 2013-12-07
    Brentano's Philosophical Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 21-32.
    Franz Brentano was not a systematic writer, but he was very much a systematic thinker. Through his manuscripts, lecture notes, letters, dictations, and occasional published writings, one can discern a systematic, unified approach to the true, the good, and the beautiful. My goal here is to articulate explicitly this approach, and the philosophical program it reflects. The exercise requires going over big stretches of terrain with some efficiency; I will go just as deep into Brentano’s approaches to the true, the (...)
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  11. added 2013-07-06
    Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth.Artur Rojszczak & Barry Smith - 2003 - In Jaako Hintikka (ed.), Philosophy and Logic: In Search of the Polish Tradition. Boston: Kluwer. pp. 229-268.
    The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the century, (...)
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  12. added 2013-03-22
    Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski's Semantic Theory.Jan Woleński - 1989 - Topoi 8 (2):105-110.
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