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  1. added 2018-06-28
    Ohne Telos und Substanz. Grenzen des naturwissenschaftlichen Kausalitätsverständnisses.Gregor Schiemann - 1998 - In Paideia. Philosophy of Science XX. World Congress for Philosophy 1998). pp. 1-8.
    Die Zeiten, in denen Kausalität das Charakteristikum von Wissenschaftlichkeit war, scheinen sich ihrem Ende zu nähern. Seit dem Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts ist eine seit langem schwelende Krise des herkömmlichen Kausalitätsverständnisses in den Naturwissenschaften unübersehbar zum Ausdruck gekommen. Dessen ungeachtet halten jedoch viele Wissenschaftstheoretiker an Kausalitätsvorstellungen als vermeintlich unverzichtbarem Analyseinstrument fest. In Kritik dieser Tendenz zur Verkennung eines grundlegenden Bedeutungsverlustes wird der historische Verdrängungsprozess von Kausalitätsvorstellungen unter den Stichworten der Entfinalisierung und Entsubstantialisierung nachgezeichnet. Aus der Perspektive geschichtlicher Rekonstruktion handelt es sich (...)
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  2. added 2017-10-05
    La conception déductive de l'explication scientifique et l'économie.Philippe Mongin - 2002 - Social Science Information 41 (2):139-165.
    This essay presents and discusses the currently most famous among the deductive conceptions of explanation, i.e., the deductive-nomological one, and proceeds to apply it to microeconomic theory. After restating the basic ideas, the essay investigates some of the important objections raised against it, with a view to decide whether or not they invalidate the proposed application to economics.
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  3. added 2017-06-19
    Thomas Reid on Causation and Scientific Explanation.Manuel Barrantes & Juan Manuel Durán - 2016 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (1):51-67.
    We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's and Benbaji's interpretations of Reid's (...)
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  4. added 2016-03-07
    Explaining Explanation.David-Hillel Ruben - 1990 - Routledge.
    This book introduces readers to the topic of explanation. The insights of Plato, Aristotle, J.S. Mill and Carl Hempel are examined, and are used to argue against the view that explanation is merely a problem for the philosophy of science. Having established its importance for understanding knowledge in general, the book concludes with a bold and original explanation of explanation.
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  5. added 2016-03-04
    Empiricism, Objectivity, and Explanation.Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Carl G. Anderson - 1993 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):121-131.
    We sley Salmon, in his influential and detailed book, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, argues that the pragmatic approach to scientific explanation, “construed as the claim that scientific explanation can be explicated entirely in pragmatic terms” (1989, 185) is inadequate. The specific inadequacy ascribed to a pragmatic account is that objective relevance relations cannot be incorporated into such an account. Salmon relies on the arguments given in Kitcher and Salmon (1987) to ground this objection. He also suggests that Peter Railton’s (...)
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  6. added 2013-05-10
    In Defense of a Causal Requirement on Explanation.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 470.
    Causalists about explanation claim that to explain an event is to provide information about the causal history of that event. Some causalists also endorse a proportionality claim, namely that one explanation is better than another insofar as it provides a greater amount of causal information. In this chapter I consider various challenges to these causalist claims. There is a common and influential formulation of the causalist requirement – the ‘Causal Process Requirement’ – that does appear vulnerable to these anti-causalist challenges, (...)
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  7. added 2012-08-11
    Explanations Are Like Salted Peanuts. Why You Can't Cut the Route Toward Further Reduction.Daniel Cohnitz - 2002 - In A. Beckermann & C. Nimtz (eds.), Argument und Analyse: Proceedings of GAP4. Mentis.
    Take a look at these four situations: Figure 1 All of these situations have certain features in common: in all of them an explanation is asked for, in all of them an explanation is given, and all these explanations are literally false (although in different ways).
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