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  1. Responses to Ryan, Fosl and Gautier: SKEPSIS Book Symposium on 'Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy', by Paul Russell.Paul Russell - 2023 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 14 (26):121-139.
    In the replies to my critics that follow I offer a more detailed account of the specific papers that they discuss or examine. The papers that they are especially concerned with are: “The Material World and Natural Religion in Hume’s Treatise” (Ryan) [Essay 3], “Hume’s Skepticism and the Problem of Atheism” (Fosl) [Essay 12], and “Hume’s Philosophy of Irreligion and the Myth of British Empiricism (Gautier) [Essay 16].
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  2. Sobre la existencia de las percepciones en el pensamiento de Hume.Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero - 2018 - In Grobet Benítez & Luis Ramos-Alarcon (eds.), El concepto de substancia de Spinoza a Hegel. pp. 267-288.
    In this paper I try to understand David Hume’s theory of the ideas as an alternative ontology. I assume that David Hume seeks to establish a criterion of human knowledge and moral behavior by thinking the fundamental concepts from philosophical tradition, such as substance and personal identity or subjectivity, and turning between the denial and the affirmation of them. In this sense, the criticism of the metaphysical tradition, to which some interpreters reduce his theory, and the alternative ontology which we (...)
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  3. The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume's Skepticism.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2014 - In Patricia Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies. ATINER. pp. 5-15.
    Section III of part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise entitled “Of the ancient philosophy” has been virtually ignored by most Hume scholars. Although philosophers seem to concentrate on sections II and VI of part IV and pay little or no attention to section III, the latter section is paramount in showing how serious Hume's skepticism is, and how Hume's philosophy, contrary to his intention, is far removed from "the sentiments of the vulgar". In this paper I shall first (...)
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  4. Hume on Substance: A Critique of Locke.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2014 - In Paul Lodge & Tom Stoneham (eds.), Locke and Leibniz on Substance. New York: Routledge. pp. 45-62.
    The ancient theory of substance and accident is supposed to make sense of complex unities in a way that respects both their unity and their complexity. On Hume’s view such complex unities are only fictitiously unities. This result follows from his thoroughgoing critique of the theory of substance. I will characterize the theory Hume is critiquing as it is presented in Locke, presupposing what Bennett calls the “Leibnizian interpretation.” Locke uses the word ‘substance’ in two senses. Call substance in the (...)
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  5. Constancy and Coherence in 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise: The Root of “Indirect” Causation and Hume’s Position on Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - The European Legacy (4):444-456.
    This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect (...)
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  6. Imagined Causes: Hume’s Conception of Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2012 - Springer.
    This book provides the first comprehensive account of Hume’s conception of objects in Book I of the Treatise. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, I show that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. However, I argue that he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally imagine that objects are (...)
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  7. The Vulgar Conception of Objects in "Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses".Stefanie Rocknak - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):67-90.
    In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise ("Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses"), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume's position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first (...)
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  8. Identity, Continued Existence, and the External World.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2006 - In Saul Traiger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 114–132.
    To the question whether Hume believed in mind-independent physical objects (or as he would put it, bodies), the answer is Yes and No. It is Yes when Hume writes “We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but ’tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.” However the answer is No after inquiring into the causes of (...)
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