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  1. added 2020-06-27
    In Favor of Mentalism in Economics: A Conversation with Christian List.Christian List & Catherine Herfeld - forthcoming - In Catherine Herfeld (ed.), Conversations on Rational Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This is an edited transcript of a conversation to be included in the collection "Conversations on Rational Choice". The conversation was conducted in Munich on 7 and 9 February 2016.
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  2. added 2016-12-12
    The Economic World View: Studies in the Ontology of Economics.Uskali Mäki (ed.) - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    The beliefs of economists are not solely determined by empirical evidence in direct relation to the theories and models they hold. Economists hold 'ontological presuppositions', fundamental ideas about the nature of being which direct their thinking about economic behaviour. In this volume, leading philosophers and economists examine these hidden presuppositions, searching for a 'world view' of economics. What properties are attributed to human individuals in economic theories, and which are excluded? Does economic man exist? Do markets have an essence? Do (...)
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  3. added 2015-09-10
    Realism, Commonsensibles, and Economics:The Case of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory.D. Wade Hands - 2012 - In Aki Lehtinen, Jaakko Kuorikoski & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Economics for Real: Uskali Mäki and the Place of Truth in Economics. Routledge. pp. 156-178.
    This paper challenges Mäki's argument about commonsensibles by offering a case study from contemporary microeconomics – contemporary revealed preference theory (hereafter CRPT) – where terms like "preference," "utility," and to some extent "choice," are radical departures from the common sense meanings of these terms. Although the argument challenges the claim that economics is inhabited solely by commonsensibles, it is not inconsistent with such folk notions being common in economic theory.
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  4. added 2015-09-10
    Thirteen Theses on Progress in Economic Methodology.D. Wade Hands - 1990 - Finnish Economic Papers 3:72-76.
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  5. added 2014-09-15
    The Construction of Social Reality: An Exchange.Barry Smith & John Searle - 2003 - American Journal of Economics and Sociology 62 (2):285-309.
    Part 1 of this exchange consists in a critique by Smith of Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality focusing on Searle’s use of the formula ‘X counts as Y in context C’. Smith argues that this formula works well for social objects such as dollar bills and presidents where the corresponding X terms (pieces of paper, human beings) are easy to identify. In cases such as debts and prices and money in a bank's computers, however, the formula fails, because these (...)
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  6. added 2014-03-10
    Revitalizing Causality: Realism About Causality in Philosophy and Social Science. [REVIEW]C. Tyler DesRoches - 2009 - Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (4):426-431.
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  7. added 2014-01-16
    Puzzled by Realism: A Response to Deichsel.Uskali Mäki - 2011 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 4 (1):42-52.
    No realist project in and about economics is close to completion. There are many open issues that remain to be addressed and resolved. Simon Deichsel (2011) has written a healthy challenge that should offer some useful inspiration to anyone interested in assessing and perhaps contributing to the realist projects. He argues against realism and in support of some sort of anti-realism. My response first deals with some conceptual issues regarding the very ideas of realism and anti-realism. I will then discuss (...)
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  8. added 2013-09-05
    Unrealistic Assumptions and Unnecessary Confusions : Rereading and Rewriting F53 as a Realist Statement.Uskali Mäki - 2009 - In The methodology of positive economics : Reflections on the Milton Friedman legacy. Cambridge University Press.
    It is argued that rather than a well defined F-Twist, Milton Friedman’s “Methodology of positive economics” offers an F-Mix: a pool of ambiguous and inconsistent ingredients that can be used for putting together a number of different methodological positions. This concerns issues such as the very concept of being unrealistic, the goal of predictive tests, the as-if formulation of theories, explanatory unification, social construction, and more. Both friends and foes of Friedman’s essay have ignored its open-ended unclarities. Their removal may (...)
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  9. added 2012-03-30
    Le réalisme des hypothèses et la Partial Interpretation View.Philippe Mongin - 1988 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (3):281-325.
    The article discusses Friedman's classic claim that economics can be based on irrealistic assumptions. It exploits Samuelson's distinction between two "F-twists" (that is, "it is an advantage for an economic theory to use irrealistic assumptions" vs "the more irrealistic the assumptions, the better the economic theory"), as well as Nagel's distinction between three philosophy-of-science construals of the basic claim. On examination, only one of Nagel's construals seems promising enough. It involves the neo-positivistic distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical ("observable") terms; so (...)
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  10. added 2012-03-30
    A la recherche du temps perdu : Réponse à M.M. Lafleur, Rosenberg et Salmon.Philippe Mongin - 1988 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (4):537-549.
    A rejoinder to commentators of the paper by P. Mongin, "Le réalisme des hypothèses et la "Partial Interpretation View"", Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 18, 1988, p. 281-325. (This paper is listed and made available by Philpapers.).
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