The work of this dissertation, in a broad sense, seeks to rescue what may be in the original project or nucleus of philosophy, from its Socratic arising: the idea of elucidative rationality. This rationality is aimed at expressing our practices in a way that can be confronted with objections and alternatives. The notion of expression is central to this rationality. This centrality is elucidated by the contemporary philosopher Brandom (1994, 2000, 2008a, 2013), from his view of the semantic inferentialism. With (...) this view, this dissertation, in a strict sense, investigates evidences that leads to the distinction of the inferentially expressivist tradition of syllogistic. In this semantic inferentialism, logic is the “organ of semantic self-consciousness”. In this sense, logic does not define the rational, in the most basic sense, but allows us to be aware, through inferential articulation, of the conceptual contents, which govern all our thoughts. Evidences presented in the work of this dissertation seek to show that the syllogism is marked by the logical-elucidative character of this semantic self-consciousness, because of its expressive role as inseparable from the notion of inference. In the first part of this dissertation, then, the tradition of syllogistics is examined, in which the expression is the main notion. This study is based on the tradition of syllogistics, composed of the Aristotelian school of Campinas, organized by Angioni (2014a), the logical economist Keynes (1906), and the “formalist” schools, represented mainly by the logician Łukasiewicz (1957, 1929/1963) and by Corcoran (1972, 1974, 2009, 2015). The main claims of the Campinas school are analyzed: the non-epistemological, but explanatory, exposition of (scientific) knowledge, in the syllogism, the secondary role of the notion of truth, the priority of the predicative structure, and the suggestion of approaching of the syllogistic to the relevant system of logic. In this analysis, we add the discussion about the reasoning of the epagogic type, important to the practical understanding of the “first principles”. The key points of Keynes are also discussed: the semantic priority of propositional judgment and the explanatory role of deductive inference. The second part of this dissertation discusses the relation between expression, inference and the expressive role of logic, based on the semantic inferentialism of Brandom. In order to discuss this relationship, propaedeutic questions are raised, related to the semantic role of sentences and subsentences (terms and predicates) in language, to different conceptions of logical validity, beyond the truth-functional aspect, to the logical demarcation of symbolic rules, to demarcation of logic, the idea of “formal logic”, and the removal of formal semantics from natural language concern. Next, the theoretical framework of Brandom's semantic inferentialism is presented. In this framework, the idea of philosophical semantics, pragmatisms of the semantic and conceptual type, expressivisms of the rationalist, logical and propositional conceptual type, and the semantically primitive notion of incompatibility come into play. Thus, to those who are interested in the correspondence between ancient logic and modern logic, the work of this dissertation offers a useful contribution, especially to projects of formalization of the syllogistics, which need not appeal against or in favor of a strictly formal approach to logic. (shrink)

I examine the difficulties involved in the Aristotelian proposal to identify the knowledge of “what it is” and “why it is”, in order to better understand the outlines that delimit it. I propose that the connections by which Aristotle links definition and explanation, and hence essence and cause, depend on the mutual convertibility between nominal expressions and predicative sentences.

O presente trabalho constitui-se de uma breve análise dos trechos que vão de 1005b 35 à 1006a 27 do capítulo quatro do livro Gama da Metafísica de Aristóteles e pretende fornecer uma leitura alternativa àquela feita pela tradição acerca da defesa do princípio de não-contradição elaborada nesse texto por Aristóteles. Com a ideia de um roteiro refutativo, pretendemos mostrar que argumentação em defesa do princípio encontra seu sucesso no seguimento desse roteiro provando, via demonstração elêntica, a validade e universalidade deste.

The Eleventh Aporia results from the breakup of the entire Greek philosophy previous to Aristotle in two manners of conceiving and proposing the first principles (archai), specially the One (to hen): (i) the manner by which Physiologoi conceived the One as a principle, namely, assuming an underlying nature, different from the One in itself, not adequately characterized by the simple fact of being one and which is denoted by the concept of One, and (ii) the manner inaugurated by the Pythagoreans (...) and later endorsed by Plato, marked by the abandonment of the appeal to an underlying nature and by conceiving the One in itself (auto to hen) as a principle, depriving it of any connection with some reality not strictly characterized by being one. Aristotle faces this aporia in Metaphysics Iota 2 and, according to the interpretation I propose: (a) refuses the Pythagorean-Platonic manner of conceiving and proposing principles, (b) endorses the course of action of the Physiologoi, and, in doing so, (c) steps back and retakes the “project” of the Physiologoi at the point where it was interrupted, namely, during the search for a principle of motion. From this scenario, I will try to show that the final outcome of the Eleventh Aporia can be the introduction of the Prime Mover as the properly Aristotelian (and cosmological) candidate to the title of One between the principles. (shrink)

In the following pages, the reader will find a detailed study of what Aristotle considered the most difficult aporia formulated in Metaphysics III (Beta), which is answered in chapter 2 of Book X (Iota): the Eleventh Aporia. In such aporia, Aristotle rivals: (i) the conception assumed by the ancient Physiologoi, which takes the One to be an underlying nature whose being is not exhausted by being One, and (ii) the Platonic-Pythagorean view, which prefers to conceive the One in itself, according (...) to its own determinations and apart from any connection with some reality outside it. (shrink)

Aristotle's theory of demonstration, developed in the Posterior Analytics, is not restricted to determining the formal requirements for formulating probative arguments that establish properly the results of scientific investigation. To the probative aspect of demonstration it shall be added its primarily explanatory character, orientated by theses of strong ontological and metaphysical content and involving notions like substance, essence and causation. We shall analyze the relation between those two ranges of Aristotle's philosophy of science and investigate how the formal features of (...) demonstration maintain an affinity with the metaphysical background to which scientific activity is conditioned. (shrink)

I claim that Aristotle does not make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In these chapters, Aristotle intends exactly the opposite, which is to refute the Socratic thesis that attributes to ignorance the cause of akrasia. I understand that Aristotle’s procedure has two parts whose boundaries are demarcated by the introduction of phusikōs argument. In the first part Aristotle shows some ways of having knowledge that do not produces action in order to contradict the Socratic thesis. In (...) the second part is shown how akratic failure takes place and how it is explained by Aristotelian conception of practical knowledge. Thus, by saying in the conclusion to this second part that Socrates somehow was right, Aristotle does not mean to make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism. Rather, he means that the sentence that conveys the Socratic position by itself could be interpreted as correct, but, despite this, it is an important piece of a complete incorrect theory. (shrink)

Meu objetivo nesse texto é oferecer uma interpretação do modo como a dialética aristotélica pode ser útil para a filosofia em geral, e o conhecimento dos princípios em particular, sem incorrer em problemas epistemológicos geralmente presentes ao se tentar explicar como, a partir de proposições das quais não temos comprovação do valor de verdade que possuem, as endoxa, se pode conhecer proposições primeiras e verdadeiras. Meu argumento central é que não é a dialética que, afinal, é útil para o conhecimento (...) filosófico, mas o próprio tratado, os Tópicos, na medida em que esse tratado oferece um conjunto amplo de ferramentas argumentativas que permitem ao seu estudante um domínio de técnicas lógico-linguísticas que podem ser aplicadas em qualquer âmbito discursivo, favorecendo o escrutínio mais profundo de proposições a serem examinadas. -/- English: My aim is to develop an interpretation about how Aristotelian dialectic can be useful to philosophy and, in more specific terms, to knowledge of the first principles, avoiding epistemological problems regarding the away one can explain the knowledge of propositions which are primaries and trues, by departing from proposition whose truth-evaluation is not assured, the endoxa. My main argument is that what is in fact useful to get to know the first principles is not dialectic itself, but the treatise at stake, the Topics. Accordingly, this treatise offers an wide set of logical and linguistic tools that can be applied to any discursive universe, favouring a deep scrutiny of proposition to be examined. (shrink)

This article is intended to examine specific passages from the section of Metaphysics IV 3-4 to be found between 1005a19-1006b34 in the light of the discussions made by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics. The aim is to understand better the argumentative strategies directed at proving the Principle of Non-Contradiction adopted in the above- mentioned section, based on the logic structured by Aristotle.

Nos Segundos Analíticos I. 14, 79a16-21 Aristóteles afirma que as demonstrações matemáticas são expressas em silogismos de primeira figura. Apresento uma leitura da teoria da demonstração científica exposta nos Segundos Analíticos I (com maior ênfase nos capítulo 2-6) que seja consistente com o texto aristotélico e explique exemplos de demonstrações geométricas presentes no Corpus. Em termos gerais, defendo que a demonstração aristotélica é um procedimento de análise que explica um dado explanandum por meio da conversão de uma proposição previamente estabelecida. (...) Em uma estrutura silogística, a proposição previamente estabelecida é a premissa maior e o termo mediador deve ser comensurado ao explanandum. O conjunto da premissa maior e da premissa menor (o explanans) é coextensivo ao explanandum, mas há uma assimetria intensional entre o explanans e o explanandum, de modo que apenas o primeiro explique o último. Por fim, defendo que o elemento identificado no termo mediador deve ser o mais apropriado para explicar precisamente o que certo explanandum é. (shrink)

Nos Segundos Analíticos II.8-10, Aristóteles apresenta um modelo investigativo de descoberta da essência pela causa a partir de uma estrutura triádica: a demonstração silogística. Esse modelo explanatório-causal é colocado em prática em casos de processos naturais (e.g. eclipse, trovão) e, apesar de mencionadas, as substâncias sensíveis (e.g. homem) não são concretamente analisadas – algo que só se consolida nos livros centrais da Metafísica (mais especificamente, em Z.17) a partir da análise hilemórfica. Além disso, em Segundos Analíticos II.9, Aristóteles apresenta uma (...) restrição quanto ao domínio de aplicação do modelo: apenas os itens que possuem “causa diferente” (ἕτερον αἴτιον) são passíveis de análise nesses termos. Se, por um lado, o capítulo parece ser uma restrição ao caso específico das substâncias, não são explicitados quais itens possuem e quais não possuem “causa diferente”. Desse modo, é suscitada a questão: teria Aristóteles previsto a aplicação do modelo explanatório-causal às substâncias hilemórficas quando da elaboração dos Segundos Analíticos, ou sua utilização na Metafísica representaria uma reformulação posterior? Neste cenário, temos pelo menos duas hipóteses interpretativas: (i) uma leitura restritiva (ou desenvolvimentista), em que as substâncias não teriam sido previstas; (ii) uma leitura não-restritiva, que se opõe à primeira ao defender que as substâncias já estariam previstas na elaboração dos Segundos Analíticos, e sua omissão se daria por economia argumentativa. O objetivo do presente trabalho é apresentar a hipótese não-restritiva como uma solução para o problema do ἕτερον αἴτιον, defendendo uma aproximação entre a Metafísica e os Segundos Analíticos. (shrink)

: In APo II 3-7 Aristotle discusses a series of difficulties concerning definition, deduction, and demonstration. In this paper I focus on two interrelated but distinct questions: firstly, what are exactly the difficulties emerging from or alluded to in the discussion in II 3-7; secondly, whether and in what sense the discussion in II 3-7 can be considered an aporetic discussion with a specific role to play in the development of the argument in APo II.

O presente texto tem por simples objectivo o comentário sistemático ao capítulo 2 do Livro V da Metafísica de Aristóteles, onde o autor apresenta uma sistematização sobre o chamado modelo das quatro causas. Teremos também no horizonte de análise o famoso capítulo 3 do Livro I do mesmo tratado, onde Aristóteles inicia a crítica à tradição precedente justamente à luz deste modelo de causalidade. O objectivo é apenas comentar e esclarecer o texto original, cujas hesitantes formulações podem levantar alguns obstáculos (...) de interpretação. (shrink)

I present Aristotle’s theory of causation in a way that privileges a comparison with contemporary discussion on causation. I do so by selecting in Aristotle’s theory points that are interesting to contemporary discussion and by translating Aristotle in the contemporary philosophical terminology. I compare Aristotle’s views with Mackie’s (1993/1965) and Sosa’s (1993/1980). Mackie is a humean regularist regarding the metaphysics of causal necessity, but his theory postulates some formal aspects of the causal relation which are similar to the Aristotelian theory. (...) By introducing the notion of causal field as a third causal relatum – a sample in which the cause must be picked out as a explanation coextensive to the effect –, Mackie holds a point very similar to Aristotle, inasmuch as both defend that the causal relation is triadic and both have the extensional desideratum. Sosa (1993/1980) defends that every cause necessitates its effect, arguing against classical Humeanism, and he also proposes a causal pluralism. Both these theses are clearly Aristotelian. Aristotle comprehends that the causal relation has three relata: a subjacent C, a property of that subjacent A and a cause B that explains why such property is attributed to that subjacent. The subjacent is similar to Mackie’s notion of causal field, for in regard to it the cause must be coextensive to the property. But Aristotle also says that for each explanandum (property attributed to a subjacent of which one aims to investigate a cause) there is only one cause, which necessitates it. Sosa and Aristotle are similar because both develop a causal pluralism from a theory of causes as having intrinsic necessitation. For Aristotle, causes/explanations [aitiai] are central for attaining scientific knowledge, and its triadic structure determines the syllogistic structure of scientific demonstrations. Aristotle’s theory of causation also involves comprehending the actualisation of capacities (dispositional properties of objects) affirming that the causal relation is resultant from intrinsic properties of the objects, and the cause B is the essence of the explanandum. (shrink)

Our aim is to argue for a deflationary interpretation of Aristotelian dialectic in the Topics, showing that dialectic is, for Aristotle, a specific sort of regulated debate, in contrast to a widely spread kind of interpretation which conceives dialectic as a method of philosophical investigation. Our claim is that an analysis carefully conducted of certain key texts does provide us with sufficient evidences for defending that the Topics is a handbook which codifies an existent art. This codification has a descriptive (...) character and reveals the rules of the debate, what is the specific kind of argument used in it, how premises are obtained and the predicative relation of the propositions used by the debaters. The mastery of the techniques required by the debate is not grounded in any sort of particular knowledge, rather in linguistic competence. It is by doing a technical usage of this competence that the Topics can be useful for philosophy. (shrink)

Nossa meta é caracterizar alguns aspectos da metodologia científica utilizada por Aristóteles em algumas passagens dos dois primeiros livros do Sobre o Céu e averiguar quais são os principais recursos a que Aristóteles recorre para descobrir os princípios de sua astronomia e para coletar os dados iniciais astronômicos relevantes. Procuraremos mostrar que, para Aristóteles, embora escassos e imprecisos, os dados observacionais ainda têm preferência em relação aos endoxa astronômicos, o que não impede, porém, o emprego de alguns testes dialéticos para (...) o estabelecimento do conhecimento preliminar relevante para a astronomia. (shrink)

opinião é uma noção há muito negligenciada em Aristóteles. Seja nos estudos de sua filosofia teórica, ou nos estudos de sua filosofia prática. Sabendo disso, este trabalho a toma como fim condutor para um tratamento do conhecimento prático em Aristóteles, pois a partir da opinião e de sua relação com o saber prático é possível uma singularização da razão prática em Aristóteles em contraposição à razão teórica, e, com mais razão, a especificação do saber prático enquanto um saber imerso na (...) contingência. (shrink)