- Good, Actually: Aristotelian Metaphysics and the ‘Guise of the Good’.Adam M. Willows - 2022 - Philosophy 97 (2):187-205.details
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Intention as Belief.John Schwenkler - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):318-334.details
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The unpleasantness of pain.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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Practical concepts and productive reasoning.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7659-7688.details
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Entitlement to Reasons for Action.Abraham Roth - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-92.details
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Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
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Presentation. Reason, reasoning and action: puzzling out the mark of Anscombe.Sofia Miguens & M. Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2020 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 64 (I):7-17.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action.Abraham Roth - 2020 - In A. Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Springer. pp. 169-180.details
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La explicación evolutiva: Los límites de las teorías del deseo cerca de lo desagradable.Abraham Sapién - 2018 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 23 (3).details
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Teleology and mentalizing in the explanation of action.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):2941-2957.details
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Reasons why in normative explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):607-623.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Mania, urgency, and the structure of agency.Elliot Porter - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
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Semantics for Non-Declaratives.Kirk Ludwig & Dan Boisvert - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.details
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Knowing How.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):285-307.details
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The Ethics of Expectations.Rima Basu - 2023 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol 13. Oxford University Press. pp. 149-169.details
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Stipulative Agency.Derek Lam - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 7-31.details
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What the tortoise should do: A knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation.Lisa Miracchi Titus & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Empathy as a means to understand people.Thomas Schramme - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-14.details
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The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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Bernard Williams on the guise of the good.Francesco Orsi - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):714-724.details
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Ethical Non-naturalism and the Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):581-590.details
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Hume and the Guise of the Bad.Francesco Orsi - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (1):39-56.details
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The modern guise of the good.Francesco Orsi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):1-4.details
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Editorial.[author unknown] - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (44):1-4.details
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A metaphysical account of agency for technology governance.Sadjad Soltanzadeh - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-12.details
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What is an omission?Randolph Clarke - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.details
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Intention: Hyperintensional Semantics and Decision Theory.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Expanding the Use of Continuous Sedation Until Death and Physician-Assisted Suicide.Samuel H. LiPuma & Joseph P. Demarco - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (3):313-323.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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Plan B.Sarah K. Paul - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):550-564.details
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Agentially controlled action: causal, not counterfactual.Malte Hendrickx - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):3121-3139.details
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No Being Sure of Myself.Derek Lam - manuscriptdetails
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Causation without the causal theory of action.Elena Popa - 2022 - Human Affairs 32 (4):389-393.details
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Cognitive dissonance and the logic of racism.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Fitting Inconsistency and Reasonable Irresolution.Simon D. Feldman & Allan Hazlett - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Anomalous monism: Oscillating between dogmas.M. De Pinedo - 2006 - Synthese 148 (1):79-97.details
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The rationality of conditional cooperation.Govert Den Hartogh - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (3):405-427.details
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Why people believe in indeterminist free will.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2033-2054.details
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On the Philosophical Significance of the Reform of the International System of Units (SI): A Double-Adjustment Account of Scientific Enquiry.Nadine de Courtenay - 2022 - Perspectives on Science 30 (4):549-620.details
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The two senses of desire.Wayne A. Davis - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.details
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Reasons and psychological causes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.details
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How to Respond to the Problem of Deviant Formal Causation.Stephen Davey - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):703-717.details
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Response to Schwenkler.Jonathan Dancy - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):195-200.details
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Der ‚intentionale Fehlschluß‘ — ein Dogma?Lutz Danneberg & Hans-Harald Müller - 1983 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 14 (2):376-411.details
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Der 'intentionale fehlschluß' — ein dogma?Lutz Danneberg & Hans-Harald Müller - 1983 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 14 (1):103-137.details
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An Extra-Mathematical Program Explanation of Color Experience.Nicholas Danne - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):153-173.details
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