Research on language processing has shown that the disruption of conceptual integration gives rise to specific patterns of event-related brain potentials —N400 and P600 effects. Here, we report similar ERP effects when adults performed cross-domain conceptual integration of analogous semantic and mathematical relations. In a problem-solving task, when participants generated labeled answers to semantically aligned and misaligned arithmetic problems, the second object label in misaligned problems yielded an N400 effect for addition problems. In a verification task, when participants judged arithmetically (...) correct but semantically misaligned problem sentences to be “unacceptable,” the second object label in misaligned sentences elicited a P600 effect. Thus, depending on task constraints, misaligned problems can show either of two ERP signatures of conceptual disruption. These results show that well-educated adults can integrate mathematical and semantic relations on the rapid timescale of within-domain ERP effects by a process akin to analogical mapping. (shrink)

As a theory of skill acquisition, the instance theory of automatization posits that, after a period of training, algorithm‐based performance is replaced by retrieval‐based performance. This theory has been tested using alphabet‐arithmetic verification tasks (e.g., is A + 4 = E?), in which the equations are necessarily solved by counting at the beginning of practice but can be solved by memory retrieval after practice. A way to infer individuals’ strategies in this task was supposedly provided by the opportunistic‐stopping phenomenon, according (...) to which, if individuals use counting, they can take the opportunity to stop counting when a false equation associated with a letter preceding the true answer has to be verified (e.g., A + 4 = D). In this case, such within‐count equations would be rejected faster than false equations associated with letters following the true answers (e.g., A + 4 = F, i.e., outside‐of‐count equations). Conversely, the absence of opportunistic stopping would be the sign of retrieval. However, through a training experiment involving 19 adults, we show that opportunistic stopping is not a phenomenon that can be observed in the context of an alphabet‐arithmetic verification task. Moreover, we provide an explanation of how and why it was wrongly inferred in the past. These results and conclusions have important implications for learning theories because they demonstrate that a shift from counting to retrieval over training cannot be deduced from verification time differences between outside and within‐count equations in an alphabet‐arithmetic task. (shrink)

I argue for the Wittgensteinian thesis that mathematical statements are expressions of norms, rather than descriptions of the world. An expression of a norm is a statement like a promise or a New Year's resolution, which says that someone is committed or entitled to a certain line of action. A expression of a norm is not a mere description of a regularity of human behavior, nor is it merely a descriptive statement which happens to entail a norms. The view can (...) be thought of as a sort of logicism for the logical expressivist---a person who believes that the purpose of logical language is to make explicit commitments and entitlements that are implicit in ordinary practice. The thesis that mathematical statements are expression of norms is a kind of logicism, not because it says that mathematics can be reduced to logic, but because it says that mathematical statements play the same role as logical statements. ;I contrast my position with two sets of views, an empiricist view, which says that mathematical knowledge is acquired and justified through experience, and a cluster of nativist and apriorist views, which say that mathematical knowledge is either hardwired into the human brain, or justified a priori, or both. To develop the empiricist view, I look at the work of Kitcher and Mill, arguing that although their ideas can withstand the criticisms brought against empiricism by Frege and others, they cannot reply to a version of the critique brought by Wittgenstein in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. To develop the nativist and apriorist views, I look at the work of contemporary developmental psychologists, like Gelman and Gallistel and Karen Wynn, as well as the work of philosophers who advocate the existence of a mathematical intuition, such as Kant, Husserl, and Parsons. After clarifying the definitions of "innate" and "a priori," I argue that the mechanisms proposed by the nativists cannot bring knowledge, and the existence of the mechanisms proposed by the apriorists is not supported by the arguments they give. (shrink)

‘Number sense’ is a short‐hand for our ability to quickly understand, approximate, and manipulate numerical quantities. My hypothesis is that number sense rests on cerebral circuits that have evolved specifically for the purpose of representing basic arithmetic knowledge. Four lines of evidence suggesting that number sense constitutes a domain‐specific, biologically‐determined ability are reviewed: the presence of evolutionary precursors of arithmetic in animals; the early emergence of arithmetic competence in infants independently of other abilities, including language; the existence of a homology (...) between the animal, infant, and human adult abilities for number processing; and the existence of a dedicated cerebral substrate. In adults of all cultures, lesions to the inferior parietal region can specifically impair number sense while leaving the knowledge of other cognitive domains intact. Furthermore, this region is demonstrably activated during number processing. I postulate that higher–level cultural devel‐opments in arithmetic emerge through the establishment of linkages between this core analogical representation and other verbal and visual representations of number notations. The neural and cognitive organization of those representations can explain why some mathematical concepts are intuitive, while others are so difficult to grasp. Thus, the ultimate foundations of mathematics rests on core representations that have been internalized in our brains through evolution. (shrink)

The Heisenberg-Gabor uncertainty principle defines the limits of information resolution in both time and frequency domains. The limit of resolution discloses unique properties of a time series by frequency decomposition. However, classical methods such as Fourier analysis are limited by spectral leakage, particularly in longitudinal data with shifting periodicity or unequal intervals. Wavelet transformation provides a workable compromise by decomposing the signal in both time and frequency through translation and scaling of a basis function followed by correlation or convolution with (...) the original signal. This study aimed to compare the accuracy of predictive models in mental arithmetic in time and frequency domains. Analysis of the author's response time at mental arithmetic using a soroban was modeled for two periods, an initial period, and a return period both separated by an interval of 370 days. The median response times in seconds was longer for all tasks during the TI compared to the TR period, for addition [CTAdd 62 vs 50 s] and summation [CTSum 68 vs 57 s]. Response times were longer for errors regardless of the study period or task. There was an increasing phase difference for the addition and summation tasks during the TI period toward the end of the series 49.65o compared to the TR period where the phase difference between the two tasks was only 2.05o, indicating that both tasks are likely demonstrating similar learning rates during the latter study period. A comparison between time and time/frequency domain forecasts for an additional 100 tasks demonstrated higher accuracy of the maximum overlap discrete wavelet transform model, where the mean absolute percentage error ranged between 5.48 and 8.19% and that for the time domain models [autoregressive integrated moving average, generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity ] was 6.16–10.80%. (shrink)

Here we present a systematic plan to the experimental study of test–retest reliability in the multitasking domain, adopting the multitrait-multimethod approach to evaluate the psychometric properties of performance in Düker-type speeded multiple-act mental arithmetic. These form of tasks capacitate the experimental analysis of integrated multi-step processing by combining multiple mental operations in flexible ways in the service of the overarching goal of completing the task. A particular focus was on scoring methodology, particularly measures of response speed variability. To this end, (...) we present data of two experiments with regard to test–retest reliability, between-measures correlational structure, and stability. Finally, we compared participants with high versus low performance variability to assess ability-related differences in measurement precision, which is especially relevant in the applied fields of clinical neuropsychology. The participants performed two classic integrated multi-act arithmetic tasks, combining addition and verification and addition and comparison. The results revealed excellent test–retest reliability for the standard and the variability measures. The analysis of between-measures correlational structure revealed the typical pattern of convergent and discriminant relationships, and also, that absolute response speed variability was highly correlated with average speed, indicating that these measures mainly deliver redundant information. In contrast, speed-adjusted variability revealed discriminant validity being correlated to a much lesser degree with average speed, indicating that this measure delivers additional information not already provided by the speed measure. Furthermore, speed-adjusted variability was virtually unaffected by test–retest practice, which makes this measure interesting in situations with repeated testing. (shrink)

In this paper, representational structures of arithmetical thinking, encoded in human minds, are described. On the basis of empirical research, it is possible to distinguish four types of mental number lines: the shortest mental number line, summation mental number lines, point-place mental number lines and mental lines of exact numbers. These structures may be treated as generative mechanisms of forming arithmetical representations underlying our numerical acts of reference towards cardinalities, ordinals and magnitudes. In the paper, the theoretical framework for a (...) formal model of mental arithmetical representations is constructed. Many competitive conceptions of the mental system responsible for our arithmetical thinking may be unified within the presented framework. The paradigm underlying our research may be interpreted philosophically as a neo-Kantian approach to modeling the mind’s representational structures. (shrink)

The paper undertakes three interdisciplinary tasks. The first one consists in constructing a formal model of the basic arithmetic competence, that is, the competence sufficient for solving simple arithmetic story-tasks which do not require any mathematical mastery knowledge about laws, definitions and theorems. The second task is to present a generalized arithmetic theory, called the arithmetic of indexed numbers (INA). All models of the development of counting abilities presuppose the common assumption that our simple, folk arithmetic encoded linguistically in the (...) mind is based on the linear number representation. This classical conception is rejected and a competitive hypothesis is formulated according to which the basic mature representational system of cognitive arithmetic is a structure composed of many numerical axes which possess a common constituent, namely, the numeral zero. Arithmetic of indexed numbers is just a formal tool for modelling the basic mature arithmetic competence. The third task is to develop a standpoint called temporal pluralism, which is motivated by neo-Kantian philosophy of arithmetic. (shrink)