Esta enciclopédia abrange, de uma forma introdutória mas desejavelmente rigorosa, uma diversidade de conceitos, temas, problemas, argumentos e teorias localizados numa área relativamente recente de estudos, os quais tem sido habitual qualificar como «estudos lógico-filosóficos». De uma forma apropriadamente genérica, e apesar de o território teórico abrangido ser extenso e de contornos por vezes difusos, podemos dizer que na área se investiga um conjunto de questões fundamentais acerca da natureza da linguagem, da mente, da cognição e do raciocínio humanos, bem (...) como questões acerca das conexões destes com a realidade não mental e extralinguística. A razão daquela qualificação é a seguinte: por um lado, a investigação em questão é qualificada como filosófica em virtude do elevado grau de generalidade e abstracção das questões examinadas (entre outras coisas); por outro, a investigação é qualificada como lógica em virtude de ser uma investigação logicamente disciplinada, no sentido de nela se fazer um uso intenso de conceitos, técnicas e métodos provenientes da disciplina de lógica. O agregado de tópicos que constitui a área de estudos lógico-filosóficos é já visível, pelo menos em parte, no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Ludwig Wittgenstein, uma obra publicada em 1921. E uma boa maneira de ter uma ideia sinóptica do território disciplinar abrangido por esta enciclopédia, ou pelo menos de uma porção substancial dele, é extrair do Tractatus uma lista dos tópicos mais salientes aí discutidos; a lista incluirá certamente tópicos do seguinte género, muitos dos quais se podem encontrar ao longo desta enciclopédia: factos e estados de coisas; objectos; representação; crenças e estados mentais; pensamentos; a proposição; nomes próprios; valores de verdade e bivalência; quantificação; funções de verdade; verdade lógica; identidade; tautologia; o raciocínio matemático; a natureza da inferência; o cepticismo e o solipsismo; a indução; as constantes lógicas; a negação; a forma lógica; as leis da ciência; o número. (shrink)

Classical propositional logic can be characterized, indirectly, by means of a complementary formal system whose theorems are exactly those formulas that are not classical tautologies, i.e., contradictions and truth-functional contingencies. Since a formula is contingent if and only if its negation is also contingent, the system in question is paraconsistent. Hence classical propositional logic itself admits of a paraconsistent characterization, albeit “in the negative”. More generally, any decidable logic with a syntactically incomplete proof theory allows for a paraconsistent characterization of (...) its set of theorems. This, we note, has important bearing on the very nature of paraconsistency as standardly characterized. (shrink)

I propose a comprehensive account of negation as a modal operator, vindicating a moderate logical pluralism. Negation is taken as a quantifier on worlds, restricted by an accessibility relation encoding the basic concept of compatibility. This latter captures the core meaning of the operator. While some candidate negations are then ruled out as violating plausible constraints on compatibility, different specifications of the notion of world support different logical conducts for negations. The approach unifies in a philosophically motivated picture the following (...) results: nothing can be called a negation properly if it does not satisfy Contraposition and Double Negation Introduction; the pair consisting of two split or Galois negations encodes a distinction without a difference; some paraconsistent negations also fail to count as real negations, but others may; intuitionistic negation qualifies as real negation, and classical Boolean negation does as well, to the extent that constructivist and paraconsistent doubts on it do not turn on the basic concept of compatibility but rather on the interpretation of worlds. (shrink)

In this paper, we present set theories based upon the paraconsistent logic Pac. We describe two different techniques to construct models of such set theories. The first of these is an adaptation of one used to construct classical models of positive comprehension. The properties of the models obtained in that way give rise to a natural paraconsistent set theory which is presented here. The status of the axiom of choice in that theory is also discussed. The second leads to show (...) that any classical universe of set theory (e.g. a model of ZF) can be extended to a paraconsistent one, via a term model construction using an adapted bisimulation technique. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of what logic is not. It argues against the wide spread assumptions that logic is: a model of reason; a model of correct reason; the laws of thought, or indeed is related to reason at all such that the essential nature of the two are crucially or essentially co-illustrative. I note that due to such assumptions, our current understanding of the nature of logic itself is thoroughly entangled with the nature of reason. I show that (...) most arguments for the presence of any sort of essential re- lationship between logic and reason face intractable problems and demands, and fall well short of addressing them. These arguments include those for the notion that logic is normative for reason (or that logic and correct reason are in some way the same thing), that logic is some sort of description of correct reason and that logic is an abstracted or idealised version of correct reason. A strong version of logical realism is put forward as an alternative view, and is briefly explored. (shrink)

In this paper we extend the anodic systems introduced in Bueno-Soler (J Appl Non Class Logics 19(3):291–310, 2009) by adding certain paraconsistent axioms based on the so called logics of formal inconsistency , introduced in Carnielli et al. (Handbook of philosophical logic, Springer, Amsterdam, 2007), and define the classes of systems that we call cathodic . These classes consist of modal paraconsistent systems, an approach which permits us to treat with certain kinds of conflicting situations. Our interest in this paper (...) is to show that such systems can be semantically characterized in two different ways: by Kripke-style semantics and by modal possible-translations semantics . Such results are inspired in some universal constructions in logic, in the sense that cathodic systems can be seen as a kind of fusion (a particular case of fibring) between modal logics and non-modal logics, as discussed in Carnielli et al. (Analysis and synthesis of logics, Springer, Amsterdam, 2007). The outcome is inherently within the spirit of universal logic, as our systems semantically intermingles modal logics, paraconsistent logics and many-valued logics, defining new blends of logics whose relevance we intend to show. (shrink)

In his famous work on vagueness, Russell named “fallacy of verbalism” the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things. In this paper, I examine two (clusters of) mainstream paraconsistent logical theories – the non-adjunctive and relevant approaches –, and show that, if they are given a strongly paraconsistent or dialetheic reading, the charge of committing the Russellian Fallacy can be raised against them in a sophisticated way, by appealing to the intuitive reading of (...) their underlying semantics. The meaning of “intuitive reading” is clarified by exploiting a well-established distinction between pure and applied semantics. If the proposed arguments go through, the dialetheist or strong paraconsistentist faces the following Dilemma: either she must withdraw her claim to have exhibited true contradictions in a metaphysically robust sense – therefore, inconsistent objects and/or states of affairs that make those contradictions true; or she has to give up realism on truth, and embrace some form of anti-realistic (idealistic, or broadly constructivist) metaphysics. Sticking to the second horn of the Dilemma, though, appears to be promising: it could lead to a collapse of the very distinction, commonly held in the literature, between a weak and a strong form of paraconsistency – and this could be a welcome result for a dialetheist. (shrink)

There is a relatively recent trend in treating negation as a modal operator. One such reason is that doing so provides a uniform semantics for the negations of a wide variety of logics and arguably speaks to a longstanding challenge of Quine put to non-classical logics. One might be tempted to draw the conclusion that negation is a modal operator, a claim Francesco Berto, 761–793, 2015) defends at length in a recent paper. According to one such modal account, the negation (...) of a sentence is true at a world x just in case all the worlds at which the sentence is true are incompatible with x. Incompatibility is taken to be the key notion in the account, and what minimal properties a negation has comes down to which minimal conditions incompatibility satisfies. Our aims in this paper are twofold. First, we wish to point out problems for the modal account that make us question its tenability on a fundamental level. Second, in its place we propose an alternative, non-modal, account of negation as a contradictory-forming operator that we argue is superior to, and more natural than, the modal account. (shrink)

This paper introduces new logical systems which axiomatize a formal representation of inconsistency (here taken to be equivalent to contradictoriness) in classical logic. We start from an intuitive semantical account of inconsistent data, fixing some basic requirements, and provide two distinct sound and complete axiomatics for such semantics, LFI1 and LFI2, as well as their first-order extensions, LFI1* and LFI2*, depending on which additional requirements are considered. These formal systems are examples of what we dub Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFI) (...) and form part of a much larger family of similar logics. We also show that there are translations from classical and paraconsistent first-order logics into LFI1* and LFI2*, and back. Hence, despite their status as subsystems of classical logic, LFI1* and LFI2* can codify any classical or paraconsistent reasoning. (shrink)

Maximality is a desirable property of paraconsistent logics, motivated by the aspiration to tolerate inconsistencies, but at the same time retain from classical logic as much as possible. In this paper we introduce the strongest possible notion of maximal paraconsistency, and investigate it in the context of logics that are based on deterministic or non-deterministic three-valued matrices. We show that all reasonable paraconsistent logics based on three-valued deterministic matrices are maximal in our strong sense. This applies to practically all three-valued (...) paraconsistent logics that have been considered in the literature, including a large family of logics which were developed by da Costa's school. Then we show that in contrast, paraconsistent logics based on three-valued properly nondeterministic matrices are not maximal, except for a few special cases (which are fully characterized). However, these non-deterministic matrices are useful for representing in a clear and concise way the vast variety of the (deterministic) three-valued maximally paraconsistent matrices. The corresponding weaker notion of maximality, called premaximal paraconsistency, captures the "core" of maximal paraconsistency of all possible paraconsistent determinizations of a non-deterministic matrix, thus representing what is really essential for their maximal paraconsistency. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce non-normal modal extensions of the sub-classical logics CLoN, CluN and CLaN, in the same way that S0.5 0 extends classical logic. The first modal system is both paraconsistent and paracomplete, while the second one is paraconsistent and the third is paracomplete. Despite being non-normal, these systems are sound and complete for a suitable Kripke semantics. We also show that these systems are appropriate for interpreting □ as “is provable in classical logic”. This allows us to (...) recover the theorems of propositional classical logic within three sub-classical modal systems. (shrink)

We define in precise terms the basic properties that an ‘ideal propositional paraconsistent logic’ is expected to have, and investigate the relations between them. This leads to a precise characterization of ideal propositional paraconsistent logics. We show that every three-valued paraconsistent logic which is contained in classical logic, and has a proper implication connective, is ideal. Then we show that for every n > 2 there exists an extensive family of ideal n -valued logics, each one of which is not (...) equivalent to any k -valued logic with k < n. (shrink)

One of our purposes here is to expose something of the elementary logical structure of abductive reasoning, and to do so in a way that helps orient theorists to the various tasks that a logic of abduction should concern itself with. We are mindful of criticisms that have been levelled against the very idea of a logic of abduction; so we think it prudent to proceed with a certain diffidence. That our own account of abduction is itself abductive is methodological (...) expression of this diffidence. A second objective is to test our conception of abduction's logical structure against some of the more promising going accounts of abductive reasoning. We offer our various suggestions in a benignly advisory way. The primary targets of our advice is ourselves, meant as guides to work we have yet to complete or, in some instances, start. It is possible that our colleagues in the abduction research communities will find our counsel to be of some interest. But we repeat that our first concern is to try to get ourselves straight about what a logic of abduction should encompass. (shrink)

The term "non-monotonic logic" covers a family of formal frameworks devised to capture and represent defeasible inference , i.e., that kind of inference of everyday life in which reasoners draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Such inferences are called "non-monotonic" because the set of conclusions warranted on the basis of a given knowledge base does not increase (in fact, it can shrink) with the size of the knowledge base itself. This is (...) in contrast to classical (first-order) logic, whose inferences, being deductively valid, can never be "undone" by new information. (shrink)

In the present paper, various features of the class of propositional literal paralogics are considered. Literal paralogics are logics in which the paraproperties such as paraconsistence, paracompleteness and paranormality, occur only at the level of literals; that is, formulas that are propositional letters or their iterated negations. We begin by analyzing Bochvar’s three-valued nonsense logic B3, which includes two isomorphs of the propositional classical logic CPC. The combination of these two ‘strong’ isomorphs leads to the construction of two famous paralogics (...) P1 and I1, which are functionally equivalent. Moreover, each of these logics is functionally equivalent to the fragment of logic B3 consisting of external formulas only. In conclusion, we structure a four-element lattice of three-valued paralogics with respect to the possession of paraproperties. (shrink)

In this paper I reassess Floridi's solution to the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox (the information-yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions), and that unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false) there is no reason to presuppose that there is no such thing (...) like contradictory information. (shrink)

The traditional connection between logic and reasoning has been under pressure ever since Gilbert Harman attacked the received view that logic yields norms for what we should believe. In this article I first place Harman's challenge in the broader context of the dialectic between logical revisionists like Bob Meyer and sceptics about the role of logic in reasoning like Harman. I then develop a formal model based on contemporary epistemic and doxastic logic in which the relation between logic and norms (...) for belief can be captured. (shrink)

The Logics of Deontic (In)Consistency (LDI's) can be considered as the deontic counterpart of the paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal (In)Consistency. This paper introduces and studies new LDI's and other paraconsistent deontic logics with different properties: systems tolerant to contradictory obligations; systems in which contradictory obligations trivialize; and a bimodal paraconsistent deontic logic combining the features of previous systems. These logics are used to analyze the well-known Chisholm's paradox, taking profit of the fact that, besides contradictory obligations do (...) not trivialize in LDI's, several logical dependencies of classical logic are blocked in the context of LDI's, allowing to dissolve the paradox. (shrink)

A logic is said to be paraconsistent if it does not allow everything to follow from contradictory premises. There are several approaches to paraconsistency. This paper is concerned with several philosophical positions on paraconsistency. In particular, it concerns three ‘schools’ of paraconsistency: Australian, Belgian and Brazilian. The Belgian and Brazilian schools have raised some objections to the dialetheism of the Australian school. I argue that the Australian school of paraconsistency need not be closed down on the basis of the Belgian (...) and Brazilian schools’ objections. In the appendix of the paper, I also argue that the Brazilian school’s view of logic is not coherent. (shrink)

We introduce a family of matrices that define logics in which paraconsistency and/or paracompleteness occurs only at the level of literals, that is, formulas that are propositional letters or their iterated negations. We give a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic defined by the class of all these matrices, we give conditions for the maximality of these logics and we study in detail several relevant examples.

The aim in this paper is to define an Abductive Question-Answer System for the minimal logic of formal inconsistency \. As a proof-theoretical basis we employ the Socratic proofs method. The system produces abductive hypotheses; these are answers to abductive questions concerning derivability of formulas from sets of formulas. We integrated the generation of and the evaluation of hypotheses via constraints of consistency and significance being imposed on the system rules.

This paper presents Rasiowa–Sikorski deduction systems for logics \, \, \ and \. For each of the logics two systems are developed: an R–S system that can be supplemented with admissible cut rule, and a \-version of R–S system in which the non-admissible rule of cut is the only branching rule. The systems are presented in a Smullyan-like uniform notation, extended and adjusted to the aims of this paper. Completeness is proved by the use of abstract refutability properties which are (...) dual to consistency properties used by Fitting. Also the notion of admissibility of a rule in an R–S-system is analysed. (shrink)

We investigate two large families of logics, differing from each other by the treatment of negation. The logics in one of them are obtained from the positive fragment of classical logic (with or without a propositional constant ff for “the false”) by adding various standard Gentzen-type rules for negation. The logics in the other family are similarly obtained from LJ+, the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic (again, with or without ff). For all the systems, we provide simple semantics which is (...) based on non-deterministic four-valued or three-valued structures, and prove soundness and completeness for all of them. We show that the role of each rule is to reduce the degree of non-determinism in the corresponding systems. We also show that all the systems considered are decidable, and our semantics can be used for the corresponding decision procedures. Most of the extensions of LJ+ (with or without ff) are shown to be conservative over the underlying logic, and it is determined which of them are not. (shrink)

In an adaptive logic APL, based on a (monotonic) non-standardlogic PL the consequences of can be defined in terms ofa selection of the PL-models of . An important property ofthe adaptive logics ACLuN1, ACLuN2, ACLuNs1, andACLuNs2 logics is proved: whenever a model is not selected, this isjustified in terms of a selected model (Strong Reassurance). Theproperty fails for Priest's LP m because its way of measuring thedegree of abnormality of a model is incoherent – correcting thisdelivers the property.

This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens' weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Schütte's maximally paraconsistent logic Φv. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.

In many real-life applications of logic it is useful to interpret a particular sentence as true together with its negation. If we are talking about classical logic, this situation would force all other sentences to be equally interpreted as true. Paraconsistent logics are exactly those logics that escape this explosive effect of the presence of inconsistencies and allow for sensible reasoning still to take effect. To provide reasonably intuitive semantics for paraconsistent logics has traditionally proven to be a challenge. Possible-translations (...) semantics can meet that challenge by allowing for each interpretation to be composed of multiple scenarios. Using that idea, a logic with a complex semantic behavior can be understood as an appropriate combination of ingredient logics with simpler semantic behaviors into which the original logic is given a collection of translations preserving its soundness. Completeness is then achieved through the judicious choice of the admissible translating mappings. The present note provides interpretation by way of possible-translations semantics for a group of fundamental paraconsistent logics extending the positive fragment of classical propositional logic. The logics PI, Cmin, mbC, bC, mCi and Ci, among others, are all initially presented through their non-truth-functional bivaluation semantics and sequent versions and then split by way of possible-translations semantics based on 3-valued ingredients. (shrink)

It is shown that the consequence relations defined from theRescher-Manor Mechanism are all inconsistency-adaptive logics combined with a specific interpretation schema for the premises. Each of the adaptive logics isobtained by applying a suitable adaptive strategy to the paraconsistent logicCLuN.This result provides all those consequence relations with a proof theory and with a static semantics.

In this paper, we present a calculus of paraconsistent logic. We propose an axiomatisation and a semantics for the calculus, and prove several important meta-theorems. The calculus, denoted as CB1, is an extension of systems PI, C min and B1, and a proper subsystem of Sette’s calculus P1. We also investigate the generalization of CB1 to the hierarchy of related calculi.

Modal logics have in the past been used as a unifying framework for the minimality semantics used in defeasible inference, conditional logic, and belief revision. The main aim of the present paper is to add adaptive logics, a general framework for a wide range of defeasible reasoning forms developed by Diderik Batens and his co-workers, to the growing list of formalisms that can be studied with the tools and methods of contemporary modal logic. By characterising the class of abnormality models, (...) this aim is achieved at the level of the model-theory. By proposing formulae that express the consequence relation of adaptive logic in the object-language, the same aim is also partially achieved at the syntactical level. (shrink)

Paraconsistent logics are logics that, in contrast to classical and intuitionistic logic, do not trivialize inconsistent theories. In this paper we take a paraconsistent view on two famous modal logics: B and S5. We use for this a well-known general method for turning modal logics to paraconsistent logics by defining a new negation as $\neg \varphi =_{Def} \sim \Box \varphi$. We show that while that makes both B and S5 members of the well-studied family of paraconsistent C-systems, they differ from (...) most other C-systems in having the important replacement property. We further show that B is a very robust C-system in the sense that almost any axiom which has been considered in the context of C-systems is either already a theorem of B or its addition to B leads to a logic that is no longer paraconsistent. There is exactly one notable exception, and the result of adding this exception to B leads to the other logic studied here, S5. (shrink)

It is part of the current wisdom that the Liar and similar semantic paradoxes can be taken care of by the use of certain non-classical multivalued logics. In this paper I want to suggest that bivalent logic can do just as well. This is accomplished by using a non-deterministic matrix to define the negation connective. I show that the systems obtained in this way support a transparent truth predicate. The paper also contains some remarks on the conceptual interest of such (...) systems. (shrink)

By using the notions of exact truth and exact falsity, one can give 16 distinct definitions of classical consequence. This paper studies the class of relations that results from these definitions in settings that are paracomplete, paraconsistent or both and that are governed by the Strong Kleene schema. Besides familiar logics such as Strong Kleene logic, the Logic of Paradox and First Degree Entailment, the resulting class of all Strong Kleene generalizations of classical logic also contains a host of unfamiliar (...) logics. We first study the members of our class semantically, after which we present a uniform sequent calculus that is sound and complete with respect to all of them. Two further sequent calculi and \ calculus) will be considered, which serve the same purpose and which are obtained by applying general methods to construct sequent calculi for many-valued logics. Rules and proofs in the SK calculus are much simpler and shorter than those of the \ and the \ calculus, which is one of the reasons to prefer the SK calculus over the latter two. Besides favourably comparing the SK calculus to both the \ and the \ calculus, we also hint at its philosophical significance. (shrink)

In this paper a first order theory for the logics defined through literal paraconsistent-paracomplete matrices is developed. These logics are intended to model situations in which the ground level information may be contradictory or incomplete, but it is treated within a classical framework. This means that literal formulas, i.e. atomic formulas and their iterated negations, may behave poorly specially regarding their negations, but more complex formulas, i.e. formulas that include a binary connective are well behaved. This situation may and does (...) appear for instance in data bases. (shrink)

A survey is given of three-valued paraconsistent propositionallogics connected with Jaśkowski’s criterion for constructing paraconsistentlogics. Several problems are raised and four new matrix three-valued paraconsistent logics are suggested.

This paper shows that some classes of multimodal paraconsistent logics endowed with weak forms of negation are incompletable with respect to Kripke semantics. The reach of such incompleteness is discussed, and we argue that this shortcoming, more than just a logical predicament, may be relevant for attempts to characterize quantum logics and to handle quantum information and quantum computation.

In this paper, we study logical systems which represent entailment relations of two kinds. We extend the approach of finding ‘exactly true’ and ‘non-falsity’ versions of four-valued logics that emerged in series of recent works [Pietz & Rivieccio (2013). Nothing but the truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42(1), 125–135; Shramko (2019). Dual-Belnap logic and anything but falsehood. Journal of Logics and their Applications, 6, 413–433; Shramko et al. (2017). First-degree entailment and its relatives. Studia Logica, 105(6), 1291–1317] to the case (...) of infectious logics, namely to the case of Deutsch's logic Sfde introduced in Deutsch [Relevant analytic entailment. The Relevance Logic Newsletter, 2(1), 26–44; The completeness of S. Studia Logica, 38(2), 137–147]. The particular systems obtained in this way are Setl and Snfl. We present them in the form of sequent calculi and prove corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. We illuminate the connection between Setl, Snfl and two well-known systems, strong Kleene three-valued logic K3 and Priest's Logic of Paradox LP. This connection allows us to investigate the characterisation of the entailment relations associated with Setl and Snfl as well as to introduce the notion of ‘infectious analogue’ of a certain logic. We also study implicative extensions of Setl and Snfl and prove soundness and completeness theorems for them as well. (shrink)

This paper studies the question: How should one handle inconsistencies that derive from the inadequacy of the criteria by which one approaches the world. I compare several approaches. The adaptive logics defined from CLuN appear to be superior to the others in this respect. They isolate inconsistencies rather than spreading them, and at the same time allow for genuine deductive steps from inconsistent and mutually inconsistent premises. Yet, the systems based on CLuN seem to introduce an asymmetry betweennegated and non-negated (...) formulas, and this seems hard to justify. To clarify and understand the source of the asymmetry, the epistemological presuppositions of CLuN, viz. inadequate criteria, are investigated. This leads to a new type of paraconsistent logic that involves gluts with respect to all logical symbols. The larger part of the paper is devoted to this logic, to the adaptive logics defined from it, and to the properties of these systems. While the resulting logics are sensible and display interesting features, the search for variants of the justification leads to an unexpected justification for CLuN. (shrink)