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  1. Is the Mind Conscious, Functional, or Both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
    What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to (...)
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  • Philosophy and Cognitive Sciences: Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg Am Wechsel, Austria 1993).Roberto Casati & Barry Smith (eds.) - 1994 - Vienna: Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
    Online collection of papers by Devitt, Dretske, Guarino, Hochberg, Jackson, Petitot, Searle, Tye, Varzi and other leading thinkers on philosophy and the foundations of cognitive Science. Topics dealt with include: Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science, Content and Object, Logic and Foundations, Language and Linguistics, and Ontology and Mereology.
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  • Fine-Grained Type-Free Intensionality.George Bealer - 1989 - In Gennero Chierchia, Barbara H. Partee & Raymond Turner (eds.), Properties, Types, and Meaning, Volume 1. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 177-230.
    Commonplace syntactic constructions in natural language seem to generate ontological commitments to a dazzling array of metaphysical categories - aggregations, sets, ordered n-tuples, possible worlds, intensional entities, ideal objects, species, intensive and extensive quantities, stuffs, situations, states, courses of events, nonexistent objects, intentional and discourse objects, general objects, plural objects, variable objects, arbitrary objects, vague kinds and concepts, fuzzy sets, and so forth. But just because a syntactic construction in some natural language appears to invoke a new category of entity, (...)
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  • An Empirical Case Against Materialism.Andrew Clifton - manuscript
    Empirical arguments for materialism are highly circumstantial—based, as they are, upon inductions from our knowledge of the physical and upon the fact that mental phenomena have physical correlates, causes and effects. However, the qualitative characteristics of first-person conscious experience are empirically distinct from uncontroversially physical phenomena in being—at least on our present knowledge—thoroughly resistant to the kind of abstract, formal description to which the latter are always, to some degree, readily amenable. The prima facie inference that phenomenal qualities are, most (...)
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  • The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
    It is often said, metaphorically, that belief "aims" at the truth. This paper proposes a normative interpretation of this metaphor. First, the notion of "epistemic norms" is clarified, and reasons are given for the view that epistemic norms articulate essential features of the beliefs that are subject to them. Then it is argued that all epistemic norms--including those that specify when beliefs count as rational, and when they count as knowledge--are explained by a fundamental norm of correct belief, which requires (...)
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  • In Pursuit of the Functional Definition of a Mind: The Inevitability of the Language Ontology.Vitalii Shymko - 2018 - Psycholinguistics 23 (1):327-346.
    In this article, the results of conceptualization of the definition of mind as an object of interdisciplinary applied research are described. The purpose of the theoretical analysis is to generate a methodological discourse suitable for a functional understanding of the mind in the context of the problem of natural language processing as one of the components of developments in the field of artificial intelligence. The conceptual discourse was realized with the help of the author's method of structural-ontological analysis, and developed (...)
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  • Property Theories.George Bealer & Uwe Mönnich - 1989 - In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume IV. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 133-251.
    Revised and reprinted in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, volume 10, Dov Gabbay and Frans Guenthner (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, (2003). -- Two sorts of property theory are distinguished, those dealing with intensional contexts property abstracts (infinitive and gerundive phrases) and proposition abstracts (‘that’-clauses) and those dealing with predication (or instantiation) relations. The first is deemed to be epistemologically more primary, for “the argument from intensional logic” is perhaps the best argument for the existence of properties. This argument is presented in the (...)
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  • Who is Computing with the Brain?John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):632-642.
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  • Consciousness, Historical Inversion, and Cognitive Science.Andrew W. Young - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):630-631.
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  • Ontogeny and Intentionality.Philip David Zelazo & J. Steven Reznick - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):631-632.
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  • Conscious and Unconscious Representation of Aspectual Shape in Cognitive Science.Geoffrey Underwood - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):628-629.
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  • The Causal Capacities of Linguistic Rules.Alice ter Meulen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):626-627.
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  • Unintended Thought and Nonconscious Inferences Exist.James S. Uleman & Jennifer K. Uleman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):627-628.
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  • The Neurophysiology of Consicousness and the Unconscious.Christine A. Skarda - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):625-626.
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  • The Possibility of Irreducible Intentionality.Charles Taylor - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):626-626.
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  • Unconscious Mental States Do Have an Aspectual Shape.Howard Shevrin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):624-625.
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  • On Being Accessible to Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):621-621.
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  • When Functions Are Causes.Jonathan Schull - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):622-624.
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  • Somebody Flew Over Searle's Ontological Prison.Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):618-619.
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  • Constituent Causation and the Reality of Mind.Georges Rey - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):620-621.
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  • Does Cognitive Science Need “Real” Intentionality?Robert J. Matthews - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):616-617.
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  • Zombies Are People, Too.Drew McDermott - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):617-618.
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  • What's It Like to Be a Gutbrain?John Limber - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-615.
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  • Loose Connections: Four Problems in Searie's Argument for the “Connection Principle”.Dan Lloyd - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):615-616.
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  • On Doing Research on Consciousness Without Being Aware of It.Daniel Holender - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):612-614.
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  • Is Searle Conscious?John C. Kulli - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):614-614.
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  • Matter, Levels, and Consciousness.Jerry R. Hobbs - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):610-611.
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  • “Consciousness” is the Name of a Nonentity.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):611-612.
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  • Intentionality: Some Distinctions.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):607-608.
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  • Searle's Vision of Psychology.James Higginbotham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):608-610.
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  • Grammar and Consciousness.Robert Freidin - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):605-606.
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  • Unconscious Mental Processes.Clark Glymour - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):606-607.
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  • Consciousness as Physiological Self-Organizing Process.Walter J. Freeman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):604-605.
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  • Language and the Deep Unconscious Mind: Aspectualities of the Theory of Syntax.B. Elan Dresher & Norbert Hornstein - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-603.
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  • Searle's Freudian Slip.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):603-604.
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  • Aspects and Algorithms.Andy Clark - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):601-602.
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  • The Ability Versus Intentionality Aspects of Unconscious Mental Processes.Maria Czyzewska, Thomas Hill & Pawel Lewicki - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):602-602.
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  • Conscious Mental Episodes and Skill Acquisition.Richard A. Carlson - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):599-599.
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  • Accessibility “in Principle”.Noam Chomsky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):600-601.
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  • Intention Itself Will Disappear When its Mechanisms Are Known.Bruce Bridgeman - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):598-599.
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  • Consciousness and Accessibility.Ned Block - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):596-598.
    This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to what he calls (...)
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  • Eliminacija Eliminativizama.Davor Pećnjak - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):19-33.
    In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something. Consciousness, for example, is a factual phenomenon that should be explained and cannot be eliminated, by eliminative materialism or by functional eliminativism, as an explanandum and as a fact.
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  • Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
    Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that (...)
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  • What's Really Going on in Searle's 'Chinese Room'.Georges Rey - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (September):169-85.
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