- Why you'll never know whether Roger Penrose is a computer.Clark Glymour & Kevin Kelly - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):666-667.details
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Computation and consciousness.Drew McDermott - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):676-678.details
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Penrose's grand unified mystery.David Waltz & James Pustejovsky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):688-690.details
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Minds beyond brains and algorithms.Jan M. Zytkow - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):691-692.details
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Fast-Collapsing Theories.Samuel A. Alexander - 2013 - Studia Logica (1):1-21.details
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A Machine That Knows Its Own Code.Samuel A. Alexander - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (3):567-576.details
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Philosophy of mathematics.Leon Horsten - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Logic and limits of knowledge and truth.Patrick Grim - 1988 - Noûs 22 (3):341-367.details
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Precis of the emperor's new mind.Roger Penrose - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):643-705.details
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Risky business.Alan Hájek - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):189-205.details
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On the Anti-Mechanist Arguments Based on Gödel’s Theorem.Stanisław Krajewski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):9-56.details
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Self-referential theories.Samuel A. Alexander - 2020 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 85 (4):1687-1716.details
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Ideen zu einer Kritik ‚algorithmischer‘ Rationalität.Dieter Mersch - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (5):851-873.details
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A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy.Jared Warren & Daniel Waxman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):477-495.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Computing the thinkable.David J. Chalmers - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):658-659.details
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Is mathematical insight algorithmic?Martin Davis - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):659-660.details
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Don't ask Plato about the emperor's mind.Alan Gamham - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):664-665.details
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Strong AI and the problem of “second-order” algorithms.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):663-664.details
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Selecting for the con in consciousness.Deborah Hodgkin & Alasdair I. Houston - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):668-669.details
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Quantum AI.Rudi Lutz - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):672-673.details
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And then a miracle happens….Keith E. Stanovich - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):684-685.details
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Incompleteness, mechanism, and optimism.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):273-302.details
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The nonalgorithmic mind.Roger Penrose - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):692-705.details
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Between Turing and quantum mechanics there is body to be found.Francisco J. Varela - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):687-688.details
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Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind.Jon Cogburn & Jason Megil - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.details
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Two Unpublished Contributions by Alfred Tarski.Francisco Rodriguez-Consuegra - 2007 - History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (3):257-264.details
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Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument.Stewart Shapiro - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):19-42.details
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Why Godel's theorem cannot refute computationalism: A reply to Penrose.Geoffrey LaForte, Patrick J. Hayes & Kenneth M. Ford - 1998 - Artificial Intelligence 104 (1-2):265-286.details
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Gödel’s Disjunctive Argument†.Wesley Wrigley - 2022 - Philosophia Mathematica 30 (3):306-342.details
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Contradiction as a Positive Property of the Mind: 90 Years of Gödel’s Argument.Dmitriy V. Vinnik - 2022 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 64 (7):26-45.details
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A philosophical view on singularity and strong AI.Christian Hugo Hoffmann - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-18.details
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Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem and the Anti-Mechanist Argument: Revisited.Yong Cheng - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):159-182.details
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On the necessary philosophical premises of the Goedelian arguments.Fano Vincenzo & Graziani Pierluigi - unknowndetails
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The powers of machines and minds.Chris Mortensen - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):678-679.details
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The pretender's new clothes.Tim Smithers - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):683-684.details
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Computability, consciousness, and algorithms.Robert Wilensky - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):690-691.details
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Minds vs Machines.Karim Gherab - 2022 - Human Review. International Humanities Review / Revista Internacional de Humanidades 11 (2):185-195.details
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Artificial Intelligence Is Stupid and Causal Reasoning Will Not Fix It.J. Mark Bishop - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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The Anti-Mechanist Argument Based on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Indescribability of the Concept of Natural Number and Deviant Encodings.Paula Quinon - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):243-266.details
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A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.details
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Algorithms and physical laws.Franklin Boyle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):656-657.details
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Perceptive questions about computation and cognition.Jon Doyle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):661-661.details
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On Some Properties of Humanly Known and Humanly Knowable Mathematics.Jason L. Megill, Tim Melvin & Alex Beal - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (1):81-88.details
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Representing the knowledge of turing machines.Hyun Song Shin & Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):125-146.details
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Godel on the mathematician's mind and Turing Machine.Inês Hipólito - 2014 - E-Logos 21 (1):1-11.details
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Seeing truth or just seeming true?Adina Roskies - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):682-683.details
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On “seeing” the truth of the Gödel sentence.George Boolos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):655-656.details
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Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?Johannes Stern - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):81-90.details
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Consistency, mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind.Qiuen Yu - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):145-79.details
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