The article focuses on the constitution of the concept of image in Bergson’s second important book, Matter and Memory. It intends to show how this concept is developing throughout the three types of perception that can be found in Bergson: the ordinary or utilitarian perception, pure perception and artistic perception . According to the modes of participation to these types of perception, the image can be regarded as representational image, movement-image and figuration-image . The article stresses the importance of artistic (...) vision, insufficiently treated by Bergson: it is regarded as a fundamental link between the two other types of perception and makes the appearance of material things possible for us, in our conscious perception. (shrink)

Bergson identifies multiple forms of memory throughout his work. In Matter and Memory, Bergson considers memory from the perspectives of both psychology and metaphysics, and he describes what we might refer to as contraction memory, perception memory, habit memory, recollection memory, and pure memory. Further, in subsequent works, Bergson discusses at least two additional forms of memory – namely, a memory of the present and a non-intellectual memory of the will. However, it is often not clear how these different forms (...) of memory relate to one another. With the aim of providing an overview of Bergson's philosophy of memory that can also serve as a point of entry to his philosophy as a whole, this article explores the different senses and forms of memory that Bergson describes, paying special attention to how they are distinct from one another and how they are unified. It is my intention to show that, although these various senses and forms of memory are different from one another , they are also continuous and unified insofar as they are equivalent to different tones of one's mental life and to different tensions of one duration. (shrink)

Interactive social cognition theory and approaches of developmental psychology widely agree that central aspects of emotional and social experience arise in the unfolding of processes of embodied social interaction. Bi-directional dynamical couplings of bodily displays such as facial expressions, gestures, and vocalizations have repeatedly been described in terms of coordination, synchrony, mimesis, or attunement. In this paper, I propose conceptualizing such dynamics rather as processes of affective resonance. Starting from the immediate phenomenal experience of being immersed in interaction, I develop (...) the philosophical notion of affective resonance to refer to a dynamic entanglement of moving and being-moved in relation. The concept of affective resonance makes visible that the interaction dynamic itself creates an affective experience rather than transmitting internal feeling states between pre-existent individuals. This leads to a philosophical framework in which relationality and ontogeny are primary over separate individuals, and in which the naturalistic distinction of a fundamental physical level versus an emerging level of social processes has to be given up. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to subject a basic figure of historical analysis - the juxtaposition of event and series - to the changing alphanumerical writing systems of Ancient Greece, the Early Modern Age, and the contemporary digitial environment. It shows how the basic mathematical analysis of periodicity and frequency in the realm of sound is, first, a by-product of innovations in war technology and, second, radically changed by different ways in which numerical systems process data. With regard to the (...) development of Kittler’s thought the article is a somewhat idiosyncratic but nonetheless highly revealing and representative example of his recent switch from media-technological to more alphanumerically oriented analyses and the accompanying focus on the importance of Ancient Greece for the evolution of science. (shrink)

This essay attempts to describe the neo-Lamarckian atmosphere that was dominant in French biology for more than a century. Firstly, we demonstrate that there were not one but at least two French neo-Lamarckian traditions. This implies, therefore, that it is possible to propose a clear definition of a (neo) Lamarckian conception, and by using it, to distinguish these two traditions. We will see that these two conceptions were not dominant at the same time. The first French neo-Lamarckism (1879-1931) was structured (...) by a very mechanic view of natural processes. The main representatives of this first period were scientists such as Alfred Giard (1846-1908), Gaston Bonnier (1853-1922) and Félix Le Dantec (1869-1917). The second Lamarckism - much more vitalist in its inspiration - started to develop under the supervision of people such as Albert Vandel (1894-1980) and Pierre-Paul Grassé (1895-1985). Secondly, this essay suggests that the philosophical inclinations of these neo-Lamarckisms reactivated a very ancient and strong dichotomy of French thought. One part of this dichotomy is a material, physicalist tradition, which started with René Descartes but developed extensively during the 18th and 19th centuries. The other is a spiritual and vitalist reaction to the first one, which also had a very long history, though it is most closely associated with the work of Henri Bergson. Through Claude Bernard, the first neo-Lamarckians tried to construct a mechanical and determinist form of evolutionary theory which was, in effect, a Cartesian theory. The second wave of neo-Lamarckians wanted to reconsider the autonomy and reactivity of life forms, in contrast to purely physical systems. (shrink)

RésuméJ'analyse la façon dont Bergson caractérise la logique tel un organe de simplification, de dissimulation, d'ordonnance, de limitation, de systématisation, comme habitude de pensée et comme ontologie foncière. Partout, la logique semble la prérogative de l'entendement et inapte à s'appliquer à la durée, voire à la réalité elle-même. Pour sortir d'un tel dualisme, je montre que Bergson conçoit une logique de l'absurde et de l'imagination, avec le rêve, la folie et le comique, laquelle transmute la logique dans le domaine du (...) pathologique et de l'art littéraire, et offre à l'image une seconde gloire.In this paper, I analyze the sense in which Henri Bergson characterizes logic, which he understands to be a means of simplification, dissimulation, ordering, limitation and systematizing, as well as a habit of thinking and something basically ontological. Overall, logic seems to be the privilege of the understanding; it is unfit to apply itself to duration, or to reality itself. To help us out of such dualism, I show that Bergson — considering dreams, madness, and comedy — conceives of a logic of the imagination and of the absurd that transplants logic into the field of the pathological and literary art, and that offers a second glory to images. (shrink)

This article reconstructs Henri Bergson’s argument at the beginning of the second chapter of his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience for his view that every idea of number involves sp...

The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of (...) human non-rational desires. (shrink)

Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, allegedly denying motion, have been conceived to reinforce the Parmenidean vision of an immutable world. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that these famous logical paradoxes should be seen instead as paradoxes of immobility. From this new point of view, motion is therefore no longer logically problematic, while immobility is. This is convenient since it is easy to conceive that immobility can actually conceal motion, and thus the proposition “immobility is mere illusion of the (...) senses” is much more credible than the reverse thesis supported by Parmenides. Moreover, this proposition is also supported by modern depiction of material bodies: the existence of a ceaseless random motion of atoms—the ‘thermal agitation’—in the scope of contemporary atomic theory, can offer a rational explanation of this ‘illusion of immobility’. Our new approach to Zeno’s paradoxes therefore leads to presenting the novel concept of ‘impermobility’, which we think is a more adequate description of physical reality. (shrink)

The received view of Bergson's philosophy of life is that it advances some form of vitalism under the heading of an “élan vital.” This paper argues against the vitalistic interpretation of Bergson's élan vital as it appears in Creative Evolution in favor of an interpretation based on his overlooked reflections on entropy and energetics. Within the interpretation developed here, the élan vital is characterized not as a spiritualistic “vital force” but as a tendency of organization opposed to the tendency of (...) entropic degradation. It is then shown how Bergson's view of evolution and living organization resonates with more contemporary scientific approaches belonging to a “thermodynamic paradigm” in theoretical biology in different respects, including the critique of neo-Darwinism and the positing of a driving force behind evolution. Finally, the special interest that Bergson's philosophical biology bears today is considered in terms of the connection between the concepts of élan vital and duration. (shrink)

The article focuses on the history of the conflict between analytic and continental tradition, which dominated the philosophy of the 20th century. Although both traditions originated from the same intellectual environment and were heavily influenced by Neo-Kantianism, their mutual lack of understanding progressed over time and, on several occasions, the situation grew into open hostility. The article describes the ten most serious conflicts: Russell vs. Bergson, Schlick vs. Husserl, Carnap vs. Heidegger, Ryle vs. Heidegger, Popper's critique of pseudoscience, conference in (...) Royaumont, Searle vs. Derrida, the revelation of Heidegger's Nazi past, Derrida's Honorary Doctorate from Cambridge, and Sokal's scam. At the beginning of the 21st century it turns out that the conflict between analytic and continental philosophy has been exhausted. What is more substantial is the dispute over the philosophical methodology, which is reflected in the division into naturalistic and anti-naturalistic thinkers. (shrink)

This article analyzes the role, decisive but all-too unknown, played by the American paleontologist and embryologist Edward Drinker Cope in the argumentation, both biological and metaphysical, of Bergson in his Evolution créatrice. As in the cases of Weismann and, negatively, of Haeckel, this role is all the more important that it is less visible in the explicit references. It concerns three questions: that of aging, which is, for Bergson, the mark of the duration on the organism; that of photosynthesis, which (...) is the chemical phenomenon to which all life is suspended; and, above all, that of the difference between life and matter. This difference is seen by Bergson from the standpoint of a science to which Cope gives great importance too, namely the thermodynamics. (shrink)

Creare est unire? An outline of Teilhard de Chardin's metaphysics of union As underlying leitmotiv throughout all his work, Teilhard de Chardin develops the relationship between spirit and matter. Matter and spirit are related as follows: centricity depends on the complexity. Nothing in the universe exists but spirit in different states or degrees of organization or plurality for Teilhard. If it is defined as a thing without a trace of consciousness, matter does not exist. The Spirit comes innovatively by successive (...) synthesis, by what he calls law of central-complexity. From the central-complexity, we present here how Teilhard identifies three areas in the universe: the pre-living, the living and thinking ; and yet, we expose how he bases its philosophy of creation in a non-materialistic monism and a kind of panpsychism, to avoid a radical dualism between spirit and matter, which enables him to explain in what sense the spirit emerges from the union of matter. Hence based on its spirituality, Teilhard wants to integrate Science and Faith for a Christian worldview. (shrink)

« Esprit de corps » is a now globally uttered phrase, which designates the strong inner cohesion of — and attachment to — a human organized group. Since the Encyclopaedists up until Bourdieu, the term is usually critical and pejorative in French thought, used to fustigate the groupthink of privileged social casts. But in their famous chapter on war machines, Deleuze and Guattari proposed a much less well-known yet promising U-turn in the way esprit de corps was theorized. Far from (...) the now common paranoid idea of discipline, often defended by Foucauldian exegetes, this overseen aspect of nomadology, inspired by Bergson’s ideas on esprit de corps, but also by medieval guilds and oriental martial art communities, reopens the path to what could be called a politics of hieropoiesis, a communal and secular production of the sacred. (shrink)