Switch to: References

Citations of:

Color as a secondary quality

Mind 98 (January):81-103 (1989)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Time, tense and special relativity.Joshua M. Mozersky - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):221 – 236.
    In this essay I address the issue of whether Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity counts against a tensed or "A-series" understanding of time. Though this debate is an old one, it continues to be lively with many prominent authors recently arguing that a genuine A-series is compatible with a relativistic world view. My aim in what follows is to outline why Special Relativity is thought to count against a tensed understanding of time and then to address the philosophical attempts to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Truth vs. pretense in discourse about motion (or, why the sun really does rise).Brendan Jackson - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):298–317.
    These days it is widely agreed that there is no such thing as absolute motion and rest; the motion of an object can only be characterized with respect to some chosen frame of reference.1 This is a fact of which many of us are well-aware, and yet a cursory consideration of the ways we ascribe motion to objects gives the impression that it is a fact we persistently ignore. We insist to the police officer that we came to a full (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Revelation and the Nature of Colour.Keith Allen - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):153-176.
    According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • The indeterminacy of color vision.Richard Montgomery - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):167-203.
    A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A case of mind/brain identity: One small bridge for the explanatory gap.W. R. Webster - 2002 - Synthese 131 (2):275-287.
    Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Naïve realism and the problem of illusion.Søren Overgaard - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (3):174-191.
    As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F – appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way – i.e., without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character.Harold Langsam - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):375-389.
    I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it. I argue that reductionist versions of intentionalism are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience because they mischaracterize its nature; in particular, they fail to recognize the sensory nature of experience’s phenomenal character. I argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia.John O'dea - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):81-93.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness, such as those of Armstrong, Rosenthal and Lycan, typically distinguish sharply between consciousness and phenomenal character, or qualia. The higher-order states posited by these theories are intended only as explanations of consciousness, and not of qualia. In this paper I argue that the positing of higher-order perceptions may help to explain qualia. If we are realists about qualia, conceived as those intrinsic properties of our experience of which we are introspectibly aware, then higher-order perception might have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The individual variability problem.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
    Studies show that there are widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. These variations have serious ramifications in the debate about the nature and ontology of color. It is typical to think of the debate about color as a dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists hold that colors are perceiver-independent physical properties of objects while subjectivists hold that they are either projections onto external objects or dispositions objects have to look colored. I argue that individual color variations present (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.
    In this commentary I argue that Byrne & Hilbert commit a number of philosophical solecisms: They beg the question of “realism,” they take the phenomenon and the theoretical model to be the same thing, and they surreptitiously substitute data sets for the life-world.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Revelation and transparency in colour vision refuted: A case of mind/brain identity and another bridge over the explanatory gap.W. R. Webster - 2002 - Synthese 133 (3):419-39.
    Russell and others have argued that the real nature of colour is transparentto us in colour vision. It's nature is fully revealed to us and no further knowledgeis theoretically possible. This is the doctrine of revelation. Two-dimensionalFourier analyses of coloured checkerboards have shown that apparently simple,monadic, colours can be based on quite different physical mechanisms. Experimentswith the McCollough effect on different types of checkerboards have shown thatidentical colours can have energy at the quite different orientations of Fourierharmonic components but no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • What our colour experiences don't teach us: A reply to Boghossian and Velleman.Michael Watkins - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (4):783-786.
    RésuméPaul Boghossian et David Velleman ont soutenu que les théories physicalistes des couleurs — celles qui identifient les propriétés de couleur avec certaines propriétés physiques des objets ou de la lumière—ne peuvent accommoder l'intuition profonde selon laquelle nous ne pouvons pas être dans l'erreur au sujet des contenus représentationnels de nos expériences de couleur. Contre Boghossian et Velleman, je soutiens que cette intuition prétendue que les théories physicalistes ne réussisssent pas à accommoder, nest pas elle-même intuitivement plausible. En fait, c'est (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates.Richard M. Warren - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):51-51.
    The authors favor a “color realism” theory that considers colors to be physical properties residing in objects that reflect, emit, or transmit light. It is opposed to the theory that colors are sensations or visual experiences. This commentary suggests that both theories are correct, and that context usually indicates which of these dual aspects is being considered.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (2 other versions)Persons and bodies: A constitution view.Peter Van Inwagen - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):138-141.
    Philosophers of mind have not in general been very attentive to metaphysics. This book is a salutary exception to this general observation. A philosopher of mind—at least the body of her very influential work would be classified by most philosophers as belonging to the philosophy of mind—attempts to ground a theory of the relation between human persons and their bodies in an extended essay on the metaphysics of the natural world. Baker is a materialist : in her book, you and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Calibrating Introspection.Maja Spener - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):300-321.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • (1 other version)A theory of sentience.Susanna Siegel - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):135-138.
    Three central theses of A Theory of Sentience are these.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Content, Character and Color.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-278.
    The words “content” and “character” in my title refer to the representational content and phenomenal character of color experiences. So my topic concerns the nature of our experience of color. But I will, of course, be talking about colors as well as color experience. Let me set the stage by mentioning some things, some more controversial than others, that I will be taking for granted. I assume, to begin with, that objects in the world have colors, and have them independently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • XV-The Limits of Normative Detachment.Nishi Shah - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):347-371.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia.Işık Sarıhan - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):5-32.
    Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context.Michael E. Rudd - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-47.
    In visual science, color is usually regarded as a subjective phenomenon. The relationship between the specific color experiences that are evoked by a visual scene and the physical properties of the surfaces viewed in that scene are complex and highly dependent on spatial context. There is no simple correspondence between experienced color and a stable class of physical reflectances.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color as a factor analytic approximation to nature.Adam Reeves - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-46.
    Color vision provides accurate measures of the phase and intensity of daylight, and also a means of discriminating between objects. Neither property implies that objects are colored.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mathematical expressibility, perceptual relativity, and secondary qualities.Derk Pereboom - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (1):63-88.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Philosophical Standpoint of a Recent Mathematical Color Perception Model.Filippo Pelucchi, Michel Berthier & Edoardo Provenzi - forthcoming - Foundations of Science:1-14.
    The problem of explaining color perception has fascinated painters, philosophers and scientists throughout the history. In many cases, the ideas and discoveries about color perception in one of these categories influenced the others, thus resulting in one of the most remarkable cross-fertilization of human thought. At the end of the nineteenth century, two models stood out as the most convincing ones: Young-Helmholtz’s trichromacy on one side, and Hering’s opponency on the other side. The former was mainly supported by painters and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What does the 'Transparency of Experience' Show about the Relationship between the Phenomenality and the Intentionality of Experience?Yasushi Ogusa - 2011 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (1):17-33.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Our Knowledge of Colour.Mohan Matthen - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (Supplement):215-246.
    Scientists are often bemused by the efforts of philosophers essaying a theory of colour: colour science sports a huge array of facts and theories, and it is unclear to its practitioners what philosophy can or is trying to contribute. Equally, philosophers tend to be puzzled about how they can fit colour science into their investigations without compromising their own disciplinary identity: philosophy is supposed to be an _a priori_ investigation; philosophers do not work in psychophysics labs – not in their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (2 other versions)How to Be Sure.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):38-69.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Temptation, Tradition, and Taboo: A Theory of Sacralization.Douglas A. Marshall - 2010 - Sociological Theory 28 (1):64-90.
    A theory of sacralization is offered in which the sacred emerges from the collision of temptation and tradition. It is proposed that when innate or acquired desires to behave in one way conflict with socially acquired and/or mediated drives to behave in another way, actors ascribe sacredness to the objects of their action as a means of reconciling the difference between their desired and actual behavior toward those objects. After establishing the sacred as a theoretical construct, the theory is sketched (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Colour inversion problems for representationalism.Fiona Macpherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Why I believe in an external world.Harold Langsam - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):652-672.
    I claim in this article that if my experience is such that it seems to me that there is an external object before me, then I have reason to believe that there is an external object before me. The sceptic argues that since my having the experience is compatible both with there being and with there not being an external object before me, I have no reason to believe that the former possibility obtains and not the latter. I respond that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.
    Revelation, the thesis that the full intrinsic nature of colors is revealed to us by color experiences, is false in Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) view, but in an interesting and nonobvious way. I show what would make Revelation true, given B&H's account of colors, and then show why that situation fails to obtain, and why that is interesting.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Composition as a secondary quality.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):359-383.
    Abstract: The 'special composition question' is this: given objects O1, . . . , On, under what conditions is there an object O, such that O1, . . . , On compose O? This paper explores a heterodox answer to this question, one that casts composition as a secondary quality. According to the approach I want to consider, there is an O that O1, . . . , On compose (roughly) just in case a normal intuiter would, under normal conditions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Josep Corbí, Morality, Self‐Knowledge and Human Suffering: An Essay on the Loss of Confidence in the World, London: Routledge, 2012, xvi + 254 pp. GBP 80.00 (Hardback), ISBN 9780415890694. [REVIEW]Manuel García-Carpintero - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):151-161.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color: A Functionalist Proposal.Cohen Jonathan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):1-42.
    In this paper I propose and defend an account of color that I call color functionalism. I argue that functionalism is a non-traditional species of primary quality theory, and that it accommodates our intuitions about color and the facts of color science better than more widely discussed alternatives.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Color and Armstrong's color realism under the microscope.Dale Jacquette - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):389-406.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color and content.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-34.
    Those who identify colours with physical properties need to say how the content of colour experiences relate to their favoured identifications. This is because it is not plausible to hold that colour experiences represent things as having the physical properties in question. I sketch how physical realists about colour might tackle this item of unfinished business.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Do metamers matter?Martin Hahn - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):30-31.
    Metamerism is a rather common feature of objects. The authors see it as problematic because they are concerned with a special case: metamerism in standard conditions. Such metamerism does not, however, pose a problem for color realists. There is an apparent problem in cases of metameric light sources, but to see such metamers as problematic is to fail to answer Berkeley's challenge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Ecological considerations support color physicalism.James J. Clark - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):24-25.
    We argue that any theory of color physicalism must include consideration of ecological interactions. Ecological and sensorimotor contingencies resulting from relative surface motion and observer motion give rise to measurable effects on the spectrum of light reflecting from surfaces. These contingencies define invariant manifolds in a sensory-spatial space, which is the physical underpinning of all subjective color experiences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location 1.Andy Egan - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.
    There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Colour Vision and Seeing Colours.Will Davies - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw026.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Color primitivism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2007 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73 - 105.
    The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind-body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives.Derek Henry Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):377-394.
    I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • (1 other version)On the Asymmetry between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth.Hagit Benbaji - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):137-150.
    A crucial disanalogy between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth undermines qualia‐internalism. A recent transplant to Inverted Earth has been equipped with color‐inverting contact lenses, so that she is unable to see the colors of objects whereas a recent transplant to Twin Earth can see twater. It is implausible to think that time alone could rectify this perceptual shortcoming – that the passage of time could alter the contents of her visual perceptions or the meaning of her color terms. Thus, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color representations as hash values.Justin C. Fisher - 2005
    The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: When we have mental states that represent certain things as being colored, what properties are our mental states representing these things as having?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A physicalist relationist theory of color.Eliezer Mintz - unknown
    The nature of color is an open philosophical and scientific question. In this work I develop a physicalist relationist theory of color. So far, attempts to identify color as a physical property of objects have not been convincing because no physical property used by scientists seems to be well correlated with color sensations. I define a new physical property which I call transformance and show that transformance is 100% correlated with color sensations. Intuitively, transformance is a very general abstract physical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark