Switch to: References

Citations of:

Color as a secondary quality

Mind 98 (January):81-103 (1989)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. (1 other version)Our Knowledge of Colour.Mohan Matthen - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (Supplement):215-246.
    Scientists are often bemused by the efforts of philosophers essaying a theory of colour: colour science sports a huge array of facts and theories, and it is unclear to its practitioners what philosophy can or is trying to contribute. Equally, philosophers tend to be puzzled about how they can fit colour science into their investigations without compromising their own disciplinary identity: philosophy is supposed to be an _a priori_ investigation; philosophers do not work in psychophysics labs – not in their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (2 other versions)How to Be Sure.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):38-69.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science.Mohan Matthen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):39-40.
    Byrne & Hilbert are right that it might be an objective fact that a particular tomato is unique red, but wrong that it cannot simultaneously be yellowish-red (not only objectively, but from somebody else's point of view). Sensory categorization varies among organisms, slightly among conspecifics, and sharply across taxa. There is no question of truth or falsity concerning choice of categories, only of utility and disutility. The appropriate framework for color categories is Nominalism and Pluralistic Realism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Temptation, Tradition, and Taboo: A Theory of Sacralization.Douglas A. Marshall - 2010 - Sociological Theory 28 (1):64-90.
    A theory of sacralization is offered in which the sacred emerges from the collision of temptation and tradition. It is proposed that when innate or acquired desires to behave in one way conflict with socially acquired and/or mediated drives to behave in another way, actors ascribe sacredness to the objects of their action as a means of reconciling the difference between their desired and actual behavior toward those objects. After establishing the sacred as a theoretical construct, the theory is sketched (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Colour inversion problems for representationalism.Fiona Macpherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Why I believe in an external world.Harold Langsam - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):652-672.
    I claim in this article that if my experience is such that it seems to me that there is an external object before me, then I have reason to believe that there is an external object before me. The sceptic argues that since my having the experience is compatible both with there being and with there not being an external object before me, I have no reason to believe that the former possibility obtains and not the latter. I respond that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • What is What it’s Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation.John Kulvicki - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):205-229.
    The central claim of this paper is that what it is like to see green or any other perceptible property is just the perceptual mode of presentation of that property. Perceptual modes of presentation are important because they help resolve a tension in current work on consciousness. Philosophers are pulled by three mutually inconsistent theses: representational externalism, representationalism, and phenomenal internalism. I throw my hat in with defenders of the first two: the externalist representationalists. We are faced with the problem (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.
    Revelation, the thesis that the full intrinsic nature of colors is revealed to us by color experiences, is false in Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) view, but in an interesting and nonobvious way. I show what would make Revelation true, given B&H's account of colors, and then show why that situation fails to obtain, and why that is interesting.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Composition as a secondary quality.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):359-383.
    Abstract: The 'special composition question' is this: given objects O1, . . . , On, under what conditions is there an object O, such that O1, . . . , On compose O? This paper explores a heterodox answer to this question, one that casts composition as a secondary quality. According to the approach I want to consider, there is an O that O1, . . . , On compose (roughly) just in case a normal intuiter would, under normal conditions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Josep Corbí, Morality, Self‐Knowledge and Human Suffering: An Essay on the Loss of Confidence in the World, London: Routledge, 2012, xvi + 254 pp. GBP 80.00 (Hardback), ISBN 9780415890694. [REVIEW]Manuel García-Carpintero - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):151-161.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color: A Functionalist Proposal.Cohen Jonathan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):1-42.
    In this paper I propose and defend an account of color that I call color functionalism. I argue that functionalism is a non-traditional species of primary quality theory, and that it accommodates our intuitions about color and the facts of color science better than more widely discussed alternatives.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • ‘Ordered and Placed in a Certain Form’: Kant on the Spatiality of Sensation.Tim Jankowiak - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3):418-446.
    Kant claims repeatedly that experience involves sensations being ‘ordered and placed’ in space. This paper considers what this surprising claim could possibly mean. After presenting the relevant textual evidence and rejecting two candidate interpretations of it, I defend a qualia or ‘mental paint’ interpretation, according to which experience involves a direct, conscious ‘acquaintance’ with sensations arrayed in a ‘phenomenal space.’ This interpretation allows us to take literally many of Kant's claims about sensation: that it is the matter of both intuition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Twofold Pictorial Experience.René Jagnow - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):853-874.
    Richard Wollheim famously argued that figurative pictures depict their scenes, in part, in virtue of their ability to elicit a unique type of visual experience in their viewers, which he called seeing-in. According to Wollheim, experiences of seeing-in are necessarily twofold, that is, they involve two aspects of visual awareness: when a viewer sees a scene in a picture, she is simultaneously aware of certain visible features of the picture surface, the picture’s design, and the scene depicted by the picture. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Shadow‐Experiences and the Phenomenal Structure of Colors.René Jagnow - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):187-212.
    It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Color and Armstrong's color realism under the microscope.Dale Jacquette - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):389-406.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color and content.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-34.
    Those who identify colours with physical properties need to say how the content of colour experiences relate to their favoured identifications. This is because it is not plausible to hold that colour experiences represent things as having the physical properties in question. I sketch how physical realists about colour might tackle this item of unfinished business.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Dualism and secondary quality eliminativism.Emmett L. Holman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The reality of qualia.Gary Hatfield - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):133--168.
    This paper argues for the reality of qualia as aspects of phenomenal experience. The argument focuses on color vision and develops a dispositionalist, subjectivist account of what it is for an object to be colored. I consider objections to dispositionalism on epistemological, metaphysical, and 'ordinary' grounds. I distinguish my representative realism from sense-data theories and from recent 'representational' or 'intentional' theories, and I argue that there is no good reason to adopt a physicalist stance that denies the reality of qualia (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Do metamers matter?Martin Hahn - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):30-31.
    Metamerism is a rather common feature of objects. The authors see it as problematic because they are concerned with a special case: metamerism in standard conditions. Such metamerism does not, however, pose a problem for color realists. There is an apparent problem in cases of metameric light sources, but to see such metamers as problematic is to fail to answer Berkeley's challenge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Objectivism about Color and Comparative Color Statements. Reply to Hansen.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):429-435.
    Nat Hansen builds a new argument for subjectivism about the semantics of color language, based on a potential kind of intersubjective disagreements about comparative color statements. In reply, I note that the disagreements of this kind are merely hypothetical, probably few if actual, and not evidently relevant as test cases for a semantic theory. Furthermore, even if they turned out to be actual and semantically relevant, they would be intuitively unusable by the subjectivist.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Ecological considerations support color physicalism.James J. Clark - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):24-25.
    We argue that any theory of color physicalism must include consideration of ecological interactions. Ecological and sensorimotor contingencies resulting from relative surface motion and observer motion give rise to measurable effects on the spectrum of light reflecting from surfaces. These contingencies define invariant manifolds in a sensory-spatial space, which is the physical underpinning of all subjective color experiences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location 1.Andy Egan - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.
    There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity.Don Dedrick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.
    The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies.Lieven Decock & Jaap van Brakel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):27-28.
    Reflectance physicalism only provides a partial picture of the ontology of color. Byrne & Hilbert’ account is unsatisfactory because the replacement of reflectance functions by productance functions is ad hoc, unclear, and only leads to new problems. Furthermore, the effects of color contrast and differences in illumination are not really taken seriously: Too many “real” colors are tacitly dismissed as illusory, and this for arbitrary reasons. We claim that there cannot be an all-embracing ontology for color.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Colour Vision and Seeing Colours.Will Davies - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw026.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Perceptual illusionism.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):396-417.
    Perceptual illusionism is the view that perceptual experience is, in general, radically illusory. That is, perceptual experience presents objects as having certain sensible properties and standing in certain sensible relations, but nothing in the subject’s environment has those properties or stands in those relations. This paper makes the case for perceptual illusionism by showing how a broad set of philosophical and scientific considerations converge to support illusionism about the full range of sensible properties and relations. After clarifying the illusionist thesis, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Paradise Regained: A Non-Reductive Realist Account of the Sensible Qualities.Brian Cutter - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):38-52.
    This paper defends a non-reductive realist view of the sensible qualities—roughly, the view that the sensible qualities are really instantiated by the external objects of perception, and not reducible to response-independent physical properties or response-dependent relational properties. I begin by clarifying and motivating the non-reductive realist view. I then consider some familiar difficulties for the view. Addressing these difficulties leads to the development and defence of a general theory, inspired by Russellian Monist theories of consciousness, of how the sensible qualities (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • True color only exists in the eye of the observer.Frans W. Cornelissen, Eli Brenner & Jeroen Smeets - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):26-27.
    The colors we perceive are the outcome of an attempt to meaningfully order the spectral information from the environment. These colors are not the result of a straightforward mapping of a physical property to a sensation, but arise from an interaction between our environment and our visual system. Thus, although one may infer from a surface’ reflectance characteristics that it will be perceived as “colored,” true colors only arise by virtue of the interaction of the reflected light with the eye (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Visual Experience: Cognitive Penetrability and Indeterminacy.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):119-130.
    This paper discusses a counterexample to the thesis that visual experience is cognitively impenetrable. My central claim is that sometimes visual experience is influenced by the perceiver’s beliefs, rendering her experience’s representational content indeterminate. After discussing other examples of cognitive penetrability, I focus on a certain kind of visual experience— that is, an experience that occurs under radically nonstandard conditions—and show that it may have indeterminate content, particularly with respect to low-level properties such as colors and shapes. I then explain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Pictorial experience: not so special after all.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):471-491.
    The central thesis (CT) that this paper upholds is that a picture depicts an object by generating in those who view the picture a visual experience of that object. I begin by presenting a brief sketch of intentionalism, the theory of perception in terms of which I propose to account for pictorial experience. I then discuss Richard Wollheim’s twofoldness thesis and explain why it should be rejected. Next, I show that the socalled unique phenomenology of pictorial experience is simply an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • (1 other version)Color primitivism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2007 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73 - 105.
    The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind-body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Indirect perceptual realism and multiple reference.Derek Brown - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (3):323-334.
    Indirect realists maintain that our perceptions of the external world are mediated by our 'perceptions' of subjective intermediaries such as sensations. Multiple reference occurs when a word or an instance of it has more than one reference. I argue that, because indirect realists hold that speakers typically and unknowingly directly perceive something subjective and indirectly perceive something objective, the phenomenon of multiple reference is an important resource for their view. In particular, a challenge that A. D. Smith has recently put (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives.Derek Henry Brown - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):377-394.
    I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • La théorie représentationnelle de la conscience phénoménale et le problème des apparences visuelles.Paul Bernier - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (1):1-23.
    According to a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness (RTPC), the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is completely exhausted by its representational content. Some considerations suggested by Christopher Peacocke raise an important problem for the RTPC. In his recent bookConsciousness, where he defends a version of the RTPC, Christopher Hill argues that to solve Peacocke’s problem, visualqualiamust be identified with “visual appearances” understood as relational properties of external objects. I raise two problems for Hill’s solution and I suggest an alternative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Primitivism and the Analogy between Colors and Values.Hagit Benbaji - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):621-639.
    The analogy between colors and values is strongly interlinked with the idea that these properties are by nature dispositions or response-dependent properties. Indeed, that colors are essentially visible, and values are inherently motivational, cries out for a dispositional or a response-dependent account. Recently, Primitivism has challenged the viability of the dispositional account of colors, taking the apple, for instance, to be “gloriously, perfectly, and primitively red.” Unsurprisingly, the attack on the dispositional account of colors has found a moral analogue in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)On the Asymmetry between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth.Hagit Benbaji - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):137-150.
    A crucial disanalogy between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth undermines qualia‐internalism. A recent transplant to Inverted Earth has been equipped with color‐inverting contact lenses, so that she is unable to see the colors of objects whereas a recent transplant to Twin Earth can see twater. It is implausible to think that time alone could rectify this perceptual shortcoming – that the passage of time could alter the contents of her visual perceptions or the meaning of her color terms. Thus, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perceptual variation and access to colors.Edward Wilson Averill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-22.
    To identify the set of reflectances that constitute redness, the authors must first determine which surfaces are red. They do this by relying on widespread agreement among us. However, arguments based on the possible ways in which humans would perceive colors show that mere widespread agreement among us is not a satisfactory way to determine which surfaces are red.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Observational concepts and experience.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    The thesis is intended to contribute to the growing understanding of the indispensable role played by phenomenal consciousness in human cognition, and specifically in making our concepts of the external world available. The focus falls on so called observational concepts, a type of rudimentary, perceptually-based objective concepts in our repertoire — picking out manifest properties such as colors and shapes. A theory of such concepts gets provided, and, consequently, the exact role that perceptual consciousness plays in making concepts of this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The transparencies and the opacities of experience. Intentionalism, phenomenal character, and moods.Davide Bordini - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Milan
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Pitch.Casey O'Callaghan - manuscript
    Some sounds have pitch, some do not. A tuba’s notes are lower pitched than a flute’s, but the fuzz from an untuned radio has no discernible pitch. Pitch is an attribute in virtue of which sounds that possess it can be ordered from “low” to “high”. Given how audition works, physics has taught us that frequency determines what pitch a sound auditorily appears to have.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Color representations as hash values.Justin C. Fisher - 2005
    The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: When we have mental states that represent certain things as being colored, what properties are our mental states representing these things as having?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Color.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - In Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.
    The nature of the colors—what they are like, whether they are instantiated by objects or are projected by our minds, whether their nature is revealed to us in color perception, and whether there could be alien colors (e.g. reddish-green)—has been one of the central topics in philosophy for centuries. This entry focuses on the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of the colors.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • A physicalist relationist theory of color.Eliezer Mintz - unknown
    The nature of color is an open philosophical and scientific question. In this work I develop a physicalist relationist theory of color. So far, attempts to identify color as a physical property of objects have not been convincing because no physical property used by scientists seems to be well correlated with color sensations. I define a new physical property which I call transformance and show that transformance is 100% correlated with color sensations. Intuitively, transformance is a very general abstract physical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark