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Who, Me?

Philosophical Review 89 (3):427 - 466 (1980)

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  1. The no-self alternative.Thomas Metzinger - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This article explores the ‘no-self alternative’ in the debate on the metaphysical and phenomenological concept of the self. It suggests that the no-self alternative may not be an alternative at all and it could simply be the default assumption for all rational approaches to self-consciousness and subjectivity. It outlines several different anti-realist arguments about the self and explains why the idea that there are no selves is counter-intuitive. It shows why the intuitions of phenomenology are traceable to the contingent fact (...)
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  • (1 other version)Logical foundations for belief representation.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.
    This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems for natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because--unlike pure indicators--they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning of the (...)
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  • Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence.Joel Pust - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):295-315.
    One can have no prior credence whatsoever (not even zero) in a temporally indexical claim. This fact saves the principle of conditionalization from potential counterexample and undermines the Elga and Arntzenius/Dorr arguments for the thirder position and Lewis' argument for the halfer position on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, thereby supporting the double-halfer position. -/- .
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  • Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 9.Emar Maier, Corien Bary & Janneke Huitink (eds.) - 2005 - Nijmegen Centre for Semantics.
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  • The being that knew too much.Patrick Grim - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):141-154.
    John Abbruzzese has recently attempted a defense of omniscience against a series of my attacks. This affords me a welcome occasion to clarify some of the arguments, to pursue some neglected subtleties, and to re-think some important complications. In the end, however, I must insist that at least three of four crucial arguments really do show an omniscient being to be impossible. Abbruzzese sometimes misunderstands the forms of the argument themselves, and quite generally misunderstands their force.
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  • Lost innocence.Scott Soames - 1985 - Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):59--71.
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  • The semantics of belief ascriptions.Michael McKinsey - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):519-557.
    nated discussion of the semantics of such verbs. I will call this view.
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  • De Se Attitudes and Action.Dilip Ninan - 2021 - In Heimir Geirsson & Stephen Biggs (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge.
    This essay offers a proposal for how to understand the idea that there is a special connection between de se attitudes and the explanation of action.
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  • Problems for Omniscience.Patrick Grim - 2013 - In J. P. Moreland, K. A. Sweis & Ch V. Meister (eds.), Debating Christian Theism. Oxford Univ. Press. pp. 169-180.
    A survey of logical problems for the concept of omniscience.
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  • De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):50-76.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  • What is Special about De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2021 - In Heimir Geirsson & Stephen Biggs (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge. pp. 464-481.
    De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.
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  • Ricoeur’s Transcendental Concern: A Hermeneutics of Discourse.William D. Melaney - 1971 - In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana. Dordrecht,: Springer. pp. 495-513.
    This paper argues that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy attempts to reopen the question of human transcendence in contemporary terms. While his conception of language as self-transcending is deeply Husserlian, Ricoeur also responds to the analytical challenge when he deploys a basic distinction in Fregean logic in order to clarify Heidegger’s phenomenology of world. Ricoeur’s commitment to a transcendental view is evident in his conception of narrative, which enables him to emphasize the role of the performative in literary reading. The meaning (...)
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  • The Myth of the De Se.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-283.
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  • What's the meaning of "this"?: a puzzle about demonstrative belief.David F. Austin - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    In recent literature in the philosophy of mind and language, one finds a variety of examples that raise serious problems for the traditional analysis of belief as a two-term relation between a believer and a proposition. My main purpose in this essay is to provide a critical test case for any theory of the propositional attitudes, and to demonstrate that this case really does present an unsolved puzzle. Chapter I defines the traditional, propositional analysis of belief, and then introduces a (...)
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  • Referential/attributive: A contextualist proposal.Francois Recanati - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (3):217 - 249.
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  • Science and the phenomenal.Jenann Ismael - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):351-69.
    The Hard Problem of the mind is addressed and it is argued that physical-phenomenal property identities have the same status as the identification of an ostended bit of physical space and the coordinates assigned the spot on a map of the terrain. It is argued, that is to say, that such identities are, or follow from, stipulations which interpret the map.
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  • Temporal Counteridentity and Imagining De Nunc.Hazel Pearson - 2024 - Topoi 43 (4):1117-1135.
    In temporal counteridenticals like ‘Ian is imagining that it is 2030 and Sally is rich’, the subject locates themself at a time other than (what they believe to be) the current time. In such reports, tense in the embedded clause can denote the time that the attitude holder imagines herself to be located at, or the time that she believes herself to be located at. I show that these two interpretations are subject to systematic constraints. The observed pattern is parallel (...)
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  • Conscious Perception in Favour of Essential Indexicality.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2022 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35 (2):13-30.
    It has been widely acknowledged that indexical thought poses a problem for traditional theories of mental content. However, recent work in philosophy has defied this received view and challenged its defenders not to rely on intuitions but rather to clearly articulate what the problem is supposed to be. For example, in “The Inessential Indexical”, Cappelen and Dever claim that there are no philosophically interesting or important roles played by essential indexical representations. This paper assesses the role of essential indexicality in (...)
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  • Attitudes and action: against de se exceptionalism.Lixiao Lin - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    De se exceptionalism is the view that de se attitudes pose a distinctive problem for traditional theories of propositional attitudes. A recent argument for de se exceptionalism attempts to prove that the distinctive problem of de se attitudes has something to do with the role of de se attitudes in explaining actions. The argument is based on a case where two subjects seem to believe and desire all the same propositions but perform different actions. This is the most promising argument (...)
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  • The philosophical significance of the De Se.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):253-276.
    Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ – first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se – call for special treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very influential; one might take them as establishing a new ‘effect’ – new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is (...)
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  • Indexical belief.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):129-151.
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  • The haecceity theory and perspectival limitation.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3):295-305.
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  • Representing de re beliefs.Thomas J. McKay - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (6):711 - 739.
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  • Semantics, psychological attitudes, and conceptual roles.James E. Tomberlin - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (March):205-226.
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  • Recent Work on God and Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):91 - 109.
    This is a survey of recent work on God and human freedom. A version of the "basic" argument for the incompatibility of God's omniscience and human freedom is presented. Various possible responses are developed and discussed.
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  • The Vietnamese mode of self‐reference: A model for Buddhist Egology.Steven W. Laycock - 1994 - Asian Philosophy 4 (1):53 – 69.
    Abstract Buddhist egology concurs with the Husserlian claim that the enipirical ego is ?constituted?. The Buddhist ?deconstruction? of the ego will not, however, pace Husserl, permit the pronoun ?I? to refer to a purported extra?linguistic entity. The insights here distilled from the unique mode of self?reference functional within the Vietnamese language secure for us an unmistakable confirmation of the Buddhist thesis and have profound consequences for the philosophical problems surrounding the existence and nature of the self and the existence of (...)
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  • Re-acquaintance with qualia.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):353 – 378.
    Frank Jackson argued, in an astronomically frequently cited paper on 'Epiphenomenal qualia '[Jackson 1982 that materialism must be mistaken. His argument is called the knowledge argument. Over the years since he published that paper, he gradually came to the conviction that the conclusion of the knowledge argument must be mistaken. Yet he long remained totally unconvinced by any of the very numerous published attempts to explain where his knowledge argument had gone astray. Eventually, Jackson did publish a diagnosis of the (...)
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  • The new b-theory's tu quoque argument.William Lane Craig - 1996 - Synthese 107 (2):249 - 269.
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  • Demystifying the myth. Perry: Revisiting the essential indexical.Ponte María de - 2022 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35 (2):107-127.
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  • Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Thoughts and their ascription.Michael Devitt - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
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  • De re and de se in quantified belief reports.Emar Maier - 2005 - In Sylvia Blaho, Luis Vicente & Erik Schoorlemmer (eds.), Proceedings of Console Xiii. pp. 211-29.
    Percus & Sauerland (2003) use quantified belief reports of the form 'Only Peter thinks he's...' to argue for dedicated de se LFs. The argument is targeted against any reductionist account that sees de se as merely a particular subtype of de re, viz. a de re belief about oneself from a first person perspective, requiring nothing but an account of de re attitudes. My acquaintance resolution framework is an attempt at just such a reduction and in this paper I extend (...)
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  • Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good.Stephen Darwall - 2000 - Utilitas 12 (3):291.
    Sidgwick maintains, plausibly, that the concept of a person's good is a normative one and takes for granted that it is normative for the agent's own choice and action. I argue that the normativity of a person's good must be understood in relation to concern for someone for that person's own sake. A person's good, I suggest, is what one should want for that person in so far as one cares about him, or what one should want for him for (...)
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  • Identity, intensionality, and intentionality.James E. Tomberlin - 1984 - Synthese 61 (1):111 - 131.
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  • ”Knowing What It’s Like’ and the Essential Indexical.Carolyn McMullen - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (September):211-33.
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  • Beliefs and believing.Igal Kvart - 1986 - Theoria 52 (3):129-45.
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