The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterexamples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent synonyms are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift” according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context. This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims (...) about synonymy and substitution while respecting the compositionality principle. Thus, Salmon (Philos Rev 115(4):415, 2006) and Glanzberg and King (Philosophers’ Imprint 20(2):1–29, 2020) offer occurrence-based accounts of variable binding, and Pagin and Westerståhl (Linguist Philos 33(5):381–415, 2010c) argue that an occurrence-based semantics delivers a compositional account of quotation. Our thesis is this: the occurrence-based strategies resolve the apparent failures of substitutivity in the same general way as the standard expression-based semantics do. So it is a myth that a Frege-inspired occurrence-based semantics affords a genuine alternative strategy. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science have asked, "what kind of thing is a scientific theory?" The logical positivists answered: a scientific theory is a mathematical theory, plus an empirical interpretation of that theory. Moreover, they assumed that a mathematical theory is specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. Later 20th century philosophers questioned this account, arguing instead that a scientific theory need not include a mathematical component; or that the mathematical component need (...) not be specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. We survey various accounts of scientific theories entertained in the 20th century -- removing some misconceptions, and clearing a path for future research. (shrink)

In this work, the first of a series, we study the nature of informal inconsistency in physics, focusing mainly on the foundations of quantum theory, and appealing to the concept of quasi-truth. We defend a pluralistic view of the philosophy of science, grounded on the existence of inconsistencies and on quasi-truth. Here, we treat only the ‘classical aspects’ of the subject, leaving for a forthcoming paper the ‘non-classical’ part.

After proving, in a purely categorial way, that the inclusion functor |$\textrm {In}_{\textbf {Alg}(\varSigma )}$| from |$\textbf {Alg}(\varSigma )$|⁠, the category of many-sorted |$\varSigma $|-algebras, to |$\textbf {PAlg}(\varSigma )$|⁠, the category of many-sorted partial |$\varSigma $|-algebras, has a left adjoint |$\textbf {F}_{\varSigma }$|⁠, the (absolutely) free completion functor, we recall, in connection with the functor |$\textbf {F}_{\varSigma }$|⁠, the generalized recursion theorem of Schmidt, which we will also call the Schmidt construction. Next, we define a category |$\textbf {Cmpl}(\varSigma )$|⁠, of (...) |$\varSigma $|-completions, and prove that |$\textbf {F}_{\varSigma }$|⁠, labelled with its domain category and the unit of the adjunction of which it is a part, is a weakly initial object in it. Following this, we associate to an ordered pair |$(\boldsymbol {\alpha },f)$|⁠, where |$\boldsymbol {\alpha }=(K,\gamma,\alpha )$| is a morphism of |$\varSigma $|-completions from |${{\mathscr {F}}}=(\textbf {C},F,\eta )$| to |$\mathscr {G}= (\textbf {D},G,\rho )$| and |$f$| a homomorphism of |$\textbf {D}$| from the partial |$\varSigma $|-algebra |$\textbf {A}$| to the partial |$\varSigma $|-algebra |$\textbf {B}$|⁠, a homomorphism |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G},0}_{\boldsymbol {\alpha }}(f)\colon \textbf {Sch}_{\boldsymbol {\alpha }}(f)\longrightarrow \textbf {B}$|⁠. We then prove that there exists an endofunctor, |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G},0}_{\boldsymbol {\alpha }}$|⁠, of |$\textbf {Mor}_{\textrm {tw}}(\textbf {D})$|⁠, the twisted morphism category of |$\textbf {D}$|⁠, thus showing the naturalness of the previous construction. Afterwards, we prove that, for every |$\varSigma $|-completion |$\mathscr {G}=(\textbf {D},G,\rho )$|⁠, there exists a functor |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G}}$| from the comma category |$(\textbf {Cmpl}(\varSigma )\!\downarrow \!\mathscr {G})$| to |$\textbf {End}(\textbf {Mor}_{\textrm {tw}}(\textbf {D}))$|⁠, the category of endofunctors of |$\textbf {Mor}_{\textrm {tw}}(\textbf {D})$|⁠, such that |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G},0}$|⁠, the object mapping of |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G}}$|⁠, sends a morphism of |$\varSigma $|-completion of |$\textbf {Cmpl}(\varSigma )$| with codomain |$\mathscr {G}$|⁠, to the endofunctor |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G},0}_{\boldsymbol {\alpha }}$|⁠. (shrink)

A key idea in both Frege's development of arithmetic in theGrundlagen[7] and Zermelo's 1904 proof [10] of the well-ordering theorem is that of a “type reducing” correspondence between second-level and first-level entities. In Frege's construction, the correspondence obtains betweenconceptandnumber, in Zermelo's (through the axiom of choice), betweensetandmember. In this paper, a formulation is given and a detailed investigation undertaken of a system ℱ of many-sorted first-order logic (first outlined in the Appendix to [6]) in which this notion of type reducing (...) correspondence is accorded a central role and which enables Frege's and Zermelo's constructions to be presented in such a way as to reveal their essential similarity. By adapting Bourbaki's version of Zermelo's proof of the well-ordering theorem, we show that, within ℱ, any correspondencecbetween second-level entities (here calledconcepts) and first-level ones (here calledobjects) induces a well-ordering relationW(c) in a canonical manner. We shall see that, whencis the “Fregean” correspondence between concepts and cardinal numbers,W(c) is (the well-ordering of) the ordinalω+ 1, and whencis a “Zermelian” choice function on concepts,W(c) is a well-ordering of the universal concept embracing all objects.In ℱ an important role is played by the notion ofextensionof a concept. To each conceptXwe assume there is assigned an objecte(X) in such a way that, for any conceptsX, Ysatisfying a certain predicateE, we havee(X) =e(Y) iff the same objects fall underXandY. (shrink)

Of all the demands that mathematics imposes on its practitioners, one of the most fundamental is that proofs ought to be correct. It has been common since the turn of the twentieth century to take correctness to be underwritten by the existence of formal derivations in a suitable axiomatic foundation, but then it is hard to see how this normative standard can be met, given the differences between informal proofs and formal derivations, and given the inherent fragility and complexity of (...) the latter. This essay describes some of the ways that mathematical practice makes it possible to reliably and robustly meet the formal standard, preserving the standard normative account while doing justice to epistemically important features of informal mathematical justification. (shrink)

The group of mathematicians known as Bourbaki persuasively proclaimed the isolation of its field of research – pure mathematics – from society and science. It may therefore seem paradoxical that links with larger French cultural movements, especially structuralism and potential literature, are easy to establish. Rather than arguing that the latter were a consequence of the former, which they were not, I show that all of these cultural movements, including the Bourbakist endeavor, emerged together, each strengthening the public appeal of (...) the others through constant, albeit often superficial, interaction. This codependency is partly responsible for their success and moreover accounts for their simultaneous fall from favor, which, however, can clearly be seen as also stemming from different internal problems. To understand this dynamics, I argue that Bourbaki’s role can best be captured by using the notion of cultural connector, which I introduce here. (shrink)

In this paper we study the axiomatic system proposed by Bourbaki for the Theory of Sets in the Éléments de Mathématique. We begin by examining the role played by the sign \(\uptau \) in the framework of its formal logical theory and then we show that the system of axioms for set theory is equivalent to Zermelo–Fraenkel system with the axiom of choice but without the axiom of foundation. Moreover, we study Grothendieck’s proposal of adding to Bourbaki’s system the axiom (...) of universes for the purpose of considering the theory of categories. In this regard, we make some historical and epistemological remarks that could explain the conservative attitude of the Group. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn the minds of many, the Bourbakist trend in mathematics was characterized by pursuit of rigor to the detriment of concern for applications or didactic concessions to the nonmathematician, which would seem to render the concept of a Bourbakist incursion into a field of applied mathematices an oxymoron. We argue that such a conjuncture did in fact happen in postwar mathematical economics, and describe the career of Gérard Debreu to illustrate how it happened. Using the work of Leo Corry (...) on the fate of the Bourbakist program in mathematics, we demonstrate that many of the same problems of the search for a formalstructurewith which to ground mathematical practice also happened in the case of Debreu. We view this case study as an alternative exemplar to conventional discussions concerning the “unreasonable effectiveness” of mathematics in science. (shrink)

We present the theory, the experimental evidence and fundamental physical consequences concerning the existence of families of undistorted progressive waves (UPWs) of arbitrary speeds 0≤ϑ<∞, which are solutions of the homogeneuous wave equation, the Maxwell equations, and Dirac, Weyl, and Klein-Gordon equations.

In this paper we scrutinize the so called Principle of Local Lorentz Invariance (PLLI) that many authors claim to follow from the Equivalence Principle. Using rigourous mathematics, we introduce in the General Theory of Relativity two classes of reference frames (PIRFs and LLRFγs) which as natural generalizations of the concept of the inertial reference frames of the Special Relativity Theory. We show that it is the class of the LLRFγs that is associated with the PLLI. Next we give a definition (...) of physically equivalent reference frames. Then, we prove that there are models of General Relativity Theory (in particular on a Friedmann universe) where the PLLI is false. However our finding is not in contradiction with the many experimental claims vindicating the PLLI, because theses experiments do not have enough accuracy to detect the effect we found. We prove moreover that PIRFs are not physically equivalent. (shrink)

RésuméL'analyse non‐standard fournit une base solide à la théorie des infinitésimaux. L'approche axiomatique qu'en donne Nelson est basée sur un nouveau predicat qui est ajouté au langage de la théorie usuelle des ensembles. Nous interprétons ce prédicat et formulons les axio‐mes de Nelson ?on;une façon qui peut être comparee à la discussion de P. R. Halmos dans son livre Naïve Set Theory .SummaryNon‐standard analysis gives a proper foundation to the theory of infinitesimals. Nelson's axiomatic approach of it uses a new (...) predicate which is added to the classical language of set theory. We interpret this new predicate and formulate Nelson's axioms in a way that can be compared to P. R. Halmos' discussion of set axioms in his book Naïve Set Theory .ZusammenfassungDie nicht‐standard Analyse liefert eine solide Grundlage für die Theorie der infinitesimalen Grössen. Die von Nelson vorgeschlagene Axiomatisierung beruht auf einem neuen Prädikat, das den in der Sprache der Mengentheorie üblichen hinzugefügt wird. Wir interpretieren dieses Prädikat und formulieren Nelsons Axiome auf eine Art, die mit der Diskus‐sion von P.R. Halmos in Naïve Set Theory verglichen werden kann. (shrink)

Ackermann proved termination for a special order of reductions in Hilbert's epsilon substitution method for the first order arithmetic. We establish termination for arbitrary order of reductions.

We formulate epsilon substitution method for elementary analysisEA (second order arithmetic with comprehension for arithmetical formulas with predicate parameters). Two proofs of its termination are presented. One uses embedding into ramified system of level one and cutelimination for this system. The second proof uses non-effective continuity argument.

There is a well-known gap between metamathematical theorems and their philosophical interpretations. Take Tarski’s Theorem. According to its prevalent interpretation, the collection of all arithmetical truths is not arithmetically definable. However, the underlying metamathematical theorem merely establishes the arithmetical undefinability of a set of specific Gödel codes of certain artefactual entities, such as infix strings, which are true in the standard model. That is, as opposed to its philosophical reading, the metamathematical theorem is formulated (and proved) relative to a specific (...) choice of the Gödel numbering and the notation system. A similar observation applies to Gödel’s and Church’s theorems, which are commonly taken to impose severe limitations on what can be proved and computed using the resources of certain formalisms. The philosophical force of these limitative results heavily relies on the belief that these theorems do not depend on contingencies regarding the underlying formalisation choices. The main aim of this paper is to provide metamathematical facts which support this belief. While employing a fixed notation system, I showed in previous work (_Review of Symbolic Logic_, 2021, 14(1):51–84) how to abstract away from the choice of the Gödel numbering. In the present paper, I extend this work by establishing versions of Tarski’s, Gödel’s and Church’s theorems which are invariant regarding _both_ the notation system and the numbering. This paper thus provides a further step towards absolute versions of metamathematical results which do not rely on contingent formalisation choices. (shrink)

In this article, I wish to discuss in an informal way the motivations and the motifs of the constructivist approach to logic and mathematics and by a natural extension to the general field of science, particularly theoretical physics. Foundational questions in those domains are not ruled by philosophical principles, but a critical philosophy of foundations could be the leitmotiv to the extent that it can be used as a criterion to decide between the theoretical options of scientific practices that are (...) often oblivious to their own doctrinal presuppositions. My objective is to provide the justificatory reasons for a constructivist option or posture in the field of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

According to the semantic view, a theory is characterized by a class of models. In this paper, we examine critically some of the assumptions that underlie this approach. First, we recall that models are models of something. Thus we cannot leave completely aside the axiomatization of the theories under consideration, nor can we ignore the metamathematics used to elaborate these models, for changes in the metamathematics often impose restrictions on the resulting models. Second, based on a parallel between van Fraassen’s (...) modal interpretation of quantum mechanics and Skolem’s relativism regarding set-theoretic concepts, we introduce a distinction between relative and absolute concepts in the context of the models of a scientific theory. And we discuss the significance of that distinction. Finally, by focusing on contemporary particle physics, we raise the question: since there is no general accepted unification of the parts of the standard model (namely, QED and QCD), we have no theory, in the usual sense of the term. This poses a difficulty: if there is no theory, how can we speak of its models? What are the latter models of? We conclude by noting that it is unclear that the semantic view can be applied to contemporary physical theories. (shrink)