Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science have asked, "what kind of thing is a scientific theory?" The logical positivists answered: a scientific theory is a mathematical theory, plus an empirical interpretation of that theory. Moreover, they assumed that a mathematical theory is specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. Later 20th century philosophers questioned this account, arguing instead that a scientific theory need not include a mathematical component; or that the mathematical component need (...) not be specified by a set of axioms in a formal language. We survey various accounts of scientific theories entertained in the 20th century -- removing some misconceptions, and clearing a path for future research. (shrink)

An introduction to the model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science is given and it is argued that this program is further enhanced by the introduction of partial structures. It is then shown that this leads to a natural and intuitive account of both "iconic" and mathematical models and of the role of the former in science itself.

In this work, the first of a series, we study the nature of informal inconsistency in physics, focusing mainly on the foundations of quantum theory, and appealing to the concept of quasi-truth. We defend a pluralistic view of the philosophy of science, grounded on the existence of inconsistencies and on quasi-truth. Here, we treat only the ‘classical aspects’ of the subject, leaving for a forthcoming paper the ‘non-classical’ part.

After proving, in a purely categorial way, that the inclusion functor |$\textrm {In}_{\textbf {Alg}(\varSigma )}$| from |$\textbf {Alg}(\varSigma )$|⁠, the category of many-sorted |$\varSigma $|-algebras, to |$\textbf {PAlg}(\varSigma )$|⁠, the category of many-sorted partial |$\varSigma $|-algebras, has a left adjoint |$\textbf {F}_{\varSigma }$|⁠, the (absolutely) free completion functor, we recall, in connection with the functor |$\textbf {F}_{\varSigma }$|⁠, the generalized recursion theorem of Schmidt, which we will also call the Schmidt construction. Next, we define a category |$\textbf {Cmpl}(\varSigma )$|⁠, of (...) |$\varSigma $|-completions, and prove that |$\textbf {F}_{\varSigma }$|⁠, labelled with its domain category and the unit of the adjunction of which it is a part, is a weakly initial object in it. Following this, we associate to an ordered pair |$(\boldsymbol {\alpha },f)$|⁠, where |$\boldsymbol {\alpha }=(K,\gamma,\alpha )$| is a morphism of |$\varSigma $|-completions from |${{\mathscr {F}}}=(\textbf {C},F,\eta )$| to |$\mathscr {G}= (\textbf {D},G,\rho )$| and |$f$| a homomorphism of |$\textbf {D}$| from the partial |$\varSigma $|-algebra |$\textbf {A}$| to the partial |$\varSigma $|-algebra |$\textbf {B}$|⁠, a homomorphism |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G},0}_{\boldsymbol {\alpha }}(f)\colon \textbf {Sch}_{\boldsymbol {\alpha }}(f)\longrightarrow \textbf {B}$|⁠. We then prove that there exists an endofunctor, |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G},0}_{\boldsymbol {\alpha }}$|⁠, of |$\textbf {Mor}_{\textrm {tw}}(\textbf {D})$|⁠, the twisted morphism category of |$\textbf {D}$|⁠, thus showing the naturalness of the previous construction. Afterwards, we prove that, for every |$\varSigma $|-completion |$\mathscr {G}=(\textbf {D},G,\rho )$|⁠, there exists a functor |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G}}$| from the comma category |$(\textbf {Cmpl}(\varSigma )\!\downarrow \!\mathscr {G})$| to |$\textbf {End}(\textbf {Mor}_{\textrm {tw}}(\textbf {D}))$|⁠, the category of endofunctors of |$\textbf {Mor}_{\textrm {tw}}(\textbf {D})$|⁠, such that |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G},0}$|⁠, the object mapping of |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G}}$|⁠, sends a morphism of |$\varSigma $|-completion of |$\textbf {Cmpl}(\varSigma )$| with codomain |$\mathscr {G}$|⁠, to the endofunctor |$\varUpsilon ^{\mathscr {G},0}_{\boldsymbol {\alpha }}$|⁠. (shrink)

The group of mathematicians known as Bourbaki persuasively proclaimed the isolation of its field of research – pure mathematics – from society and science. It may therefore seem paradoxical that links with larger French cultural movements, especially structuralism and potential literature, are easy to establish. Rather than arguing that the latter were a consequence of the former, which they were not, I show that all of these cultural movements, including the Bourbakist endeavor, emerged together, each strengthening the public appeal of (...) the others through constant, albeit often superficial, interaction. This codependency is partly responsible for their success and moreover accounts for their simultaneous fall from favor, which, however, can clearly be seen as also stemming from different internal problems. To understand this dynamics, I argue that Bourbaki’s role can best be captured by using the notion of cultural connector, which I introduce here. (shrink)

In this paper we study the axiomatic system proposed by Bourbaki for the Theory of Sets in the Éléments de Mathématique. We begin by examining the role played by the sign \(\uptau \) in the framework of its formal logical theory and then we show that the system of axioms for set theory is equivalent to Zermelo–Fraenkel system with the axiom of choice but without the axiom of foundation. Moreover, we study Grothendieck’s proposal of adding to Bourbaki’s system the axiom (...) of universes for the purpose of considering the theory of categories. In this regard, we make some historical and epistemological remarks that could explain the conservative attitude of the Group. (shrink)

In §93 of The Principles of Mathematics, Bertrand Russell observes that “the variable is a very complicated logical entity, by no means easy to analyze correctly”. This assessment is borne out by the fact that even now we have no fully satisfactory understanding of the role of variables in a compositional semantics for first-order logic. In standard Tarskian semantics, variables are treated as meaning-bearing entities; moreover, they serve as the basic building blocks of all meanings, which are constructed out of (...) variable assignments. But this has disquieting consequences, including Fine’s antinomy of the variable and an undue dependence of meanings on language. Here I develop an alternative, Fregean version of predicate logic that uses the traditional quantifier–variable apparatus for the expression of generality, possesses a fully compositional, non-representational semantics, and is not subject to the antinomy of the variable. The advantages of Fregean over Tarskian predicate logic are due to the former’s treating variables not as meaningful lexical items, but as mere marks of punctuation, similar to parentheses. I submit that this is indeed how the variables of predicate logic should be construed. (shrink)

We present the theory, the experimental evidence and fundamental physical consequences concerning the existence of families of undistorted progressive waves (UPWs) of arbitrary speeds 0≤ϑ<∞, which are solutions of the homogeneuous wave equation, the Maxwell equations, and Dirac, Weyl, and Klein-Gordon equations.

While Saunders Mac Lane studied for his D.Phil in Göttingen, he heard David Hilbert's weekly lectures on philosophy, talked philosophy with Hermann Weyl, and studied it with Moritz Geiger. Their philosophies and Emmy Noether's algebra all influenced his conception of category theory, which has become the working structure theory of mathematics. His practice has constantly affirmed that a proper large-scale organization for mathematics is the most efficient path to valuable specific results—while he sees that the question of which results are (...) valuable has an ineliminable philosophic aspect. His philosophy relies on the ideas of truth and existence he studied in Göttingen. His career is a case study relating naturalism in philosophy of mathematics to philosophy as it naturally arises in mathematics. Introduction Structures and Morphisms Varieties of Structuralism Göttingen Logic: Mac Lane's Dissertation Emmy Noether Natural Transformations Grothendieck: Toposes and Universes Lawvere and Foundations Truth and Existence Naturalism Austere Forms of Beauty. (shrink)

The main tool of the arithmetization and logization of analysis in the history of nineteenth century mathematics was an informal logic of quantifiers in the guise of the “epsilon–delta” technique. Mathematicians slowly worked out the problems encountered in using it, but logicians from Frege on did not understand it let alone formalize it, and instead used an unnecessarily poor logic of quantifiers, viz. the traditional, first-order logic. This logic does not e.g. allow the definition and study of mathematicians’ uniformity concepts (...) important in analysis. Mathematicians’ stronger logic was rediscovered around 1990 as the form of independence-friendly logic which hence is not a new logic nor a further development of ordinary first-order logic but a richer version of it. (shrink)

The deviation of mathematical proof—proof in mathematical practice—from the ideal of formal proof—proof in formal logic—has led many philosophers of mathematics to reconsider the commonly accepted view according to which the notion of formal proof provides an accurate descriptive account of mathematical proof. This, in turn, has motivated a search for alternative accounts of mathematical proof purporting to be more faithful to the reality of mathematical practice. Yet, in order to develop and evaluate such alternative accounts, it appears as a (...) necessary prerequisite to first possess a clear picture of what the deviation of mathematical proof from formal proof consists in. The present work aims to contribute building such a picture by investigating the relation between the elementary steps of deduction constituting the two types of proofs—mathematical inference and logical inference. Many claims have been made in the literature regarding the relation between mathematical inference and logical inference, most of them stating that the former is lacking properties that are constitutive of the latter. Such differentiating claims are, however, usually put forward without a clear conception of the properties occurring in them, and are generally considered to be immediately justified by our direct acquaintance, or phenomenological experience, with the two types of inferences. The present study purports to advance our understanding of the relation between mathematical inference and logical inference by developing a detailed philosophical analysis of the differentiating claims, that is, an analysis of the meaning of the differentiating claims—through the properties that occur in them—as well as the reasons that support them. To this end, we provide at the outset a representative list of the different properties of logical inference that have occurred in the differentiating claims, and we notice that they all boil down to the three properties of formality, generality, and mechanicality. For each one of these properties, our analysis proceeds in two steps: we first provide precise conceptual characterizations of the different ways logical inference has been said to be formal, general, and mechanical, in the philosophical and logical literature on formal proof; we then examine why mathematical inference does not appear to be formal, general, and mechanical, for the different variations of these notions identified. Our study results in a precise conceptual apparatus for expressing and discussing the properties differentiating mathematical inference from logical inference, and provides a first inventory of the various reasons supporting the observations of those differences. The differentiating claims constitute thus a set of data that any philosophical account of mathematical inference and proof purporting to be more faithful to mathematical practice ought to be able to accommodate and explain. (shrink)

We are used to the idea that computers operate on numbers, yet another kind of data is equally important: the syntax of formal languages, with variables, binding, and alpha-equivalence. The original application of nominal techniques, and the one with greatest prominence in this paper, is to reasoning on formal syntax with variables and binding. Variables can be modelled in many ways: for instance as numbers (since we usually take countably many of them); as links (since they may `point' to a (...) binding site in the term, where they are bound); or as functions (since they often, though not always, represent `an unknown'). None of these models is perfect. In every case for the models above, problems arise when trying to use them as a basis for a fully formal mechanical treatment of formal language. The problems are practical—but their underlying cause may be mathematical. The issue is not whether formal syntax exists, since clearly it does, so much as what kind of mathematical structure it is. To illustrate this point by a parody, logical derivations can be modelled using a Gödel encoding (i.e., injected into the natural numbers). It would be false to conclude from this that proof-theory is a branch of number theory and can be understood in terms of, say, Peano's axioms. Similarly, as it turns out, it is false to conclude from the fact that variables can be encoded e.g., as numbers, that the theory of syntax-with-binding can be understood in terms of the theory of syntax-without-binding, plus the theory of numbers (or, taking this to a logical extreme, purely in terms of the theory of numbers). It cannot; something else is going on. What that something else is, has not yet been fully understood. In nominal techniques, variables are an instance of names, and names are data. We model names using urelemente with properties that, pleasingly enough, turn out to have been investigated by Fraenkel and Mostowski in the first half of the 20th century for a completely different purpose than modelling formal language. What makes this model really interesting is that it gives names distinctive properties which can be related to useful logic and programming principles for formal syntax. Since the initial publications, advances in the mathematics and presentation have been introduced piecemeal in the literature. This paper provides in a single accessible document an updated development of the foundations of nominal techniques. This gives the reader easy access to updated results and new proofs which they would otherwise have to search across two or more papers to find, and full proofs that in other publications may have been elided. We also include some new material not appearing elsewhere. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the difference between (...) proliferations of logic systems, the questions of relativity and universality of logic and the position and interaction of logic with regards to other sciences such as physics, biology, mathematics and computer science. (shrink)

According to the semantic view, a theory is characterized by a class of models. In this paper, we examine critically some of the assumptions that underlie this approach. First, we recall that models are models of something. Thus we cannot leave completely aside the axiomatization of the theories under consideration, nor can we ignore the metamathematics used to elaborate these models, for changes in the metamathematics often impose restrictions on the resulting models. Second, based on a parallel between van Fraassen’s (...) modal interpretation of quantum mechanics and Skolem’s relativism regarding set-theoretic concepts, we introduce a distinction between relative and absolute concepts in the context of the models of a scientific theory. And we discuss the significance of that distinction. Finally, by focusing on contemporary particle physics, we raise the question: since there is no general accepted unification of the parts of the standard model (namely, QED and QCD), we have no theory, in the usual sense of the term. This poses a difficulty: if there is no theory, how can we speak of its models? What are the latter models of? We conclude by noting that it is unclear that the semantic view can be applied to contemporary physical theories. (shrink)